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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In 1972, with the publication of Violence and the Sacred, René Girard makes the 
stunning assertion that violence is the foundation of culture.  Humanity’s innate 
urges for competition and rivalry entrap us in cycles of violence, which left alone 
would find no resolution.  Girard calls the cause of this rivalry “mimetic desire”, 
and the only way out of this deeply embedded vengeance is to create a 
scapegoat to take the blame, reconciling the conflicting parties.  Girard asserts 
that the biblical texts uniquely reveal the mechanisms of mimetic rivalry and 
scapegoating, and even demystify sacrificial rituals as nothing more than 
sacrilized “good” violence to keep a fragile peace.  This revelation, according to 
Girard, can finally allow us to remove violence from the sacred. 
 Much scholarship has been devoted to Girard’s theory, in particular how it 
offers a viable alternative to the still-dominant sacrificial theology of the cross.  
But there is little scholarship on the connection between Girard and Judaism; and 
Girard’s own work leaves us with a picture of Judaism that is at best incomplete, 
and at worst unable to find an answer to disturbing violence permeating the 
scriptures.  This dissertation brings the Hebrew Bible into dialogue with Girard’s 
ideas in a systematic fashion to assert, contra Girard, that the Jewish revelation 
is a full, effective and even practical expression of his theory.  After an overview 
of Girard’s work in the first chapter, the dissertation examines three Jewish 
“vaccines” to the mimetic disease as follows:  the Birkhat ha-Banim (“The 
Blessing of the Children”); the reading of the Book of Esther on Purim; and the 
reading of Jonah on Yom Kippur.    
 The conclusion to the dissertation asserts, drawing on these three 
demonstrations, the following points:  1) Rene Girard gives an important and 
clarifying lens to aid us in finding a new way to talk about, understand, and unify 
Jewish scripture and ritual; 2) a Jewish perspective can help flesh out what a 
different “revelation” of Girard’s mimetic desire looks like—even providing 
prescriptions to curtail this desire; and 3) positive mimesis is possible, and there 
are Hebrew examples of it free of originary violence.  The final chapter addresses 
certain challenges in reconciling Girard with Judaism, moving toward a sincere 
Jewish Girardianism that will harmonize with the central views of the tradition. 	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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On June 20th, 2013, I attended a conference called “Sacred Texts, Human 
Contexts”—an interfaith conference devoted to research and reflection upon how 
sacred texts both unite and divide humanity.  At the conference, Rachel Mikva, 
former Rabbi and Professor of Jewish Studies at Chicago Theological Seminary, 
commented on one principle of interfaith studies that she finds of crucial 
importance.  This principle was the need for each religion involved in dialogue to 
not only bring their standard texts into the conversation, but also those that they 
found troublesome—the texts, let’s say, that have been the thorns of one’s 
tradition—the ones the people, and even history has found impossible to fully 
affirm.  The importance of exposing one’s textual vulnerability in dialogue makes 
an enormous difference in human relations in general; it displays our willingness 
to step out of our comfort zone.  Bringing our troublesome texts into dialogue 
may expose our tradition, and even us, to criticism.  Sharing from these places of 
vulnerability, and across faith lines, though, typically has an opposite effect.  It 
allows all of us together to acknowledge the lingering questions about the 
universe and ourselves that evade our wisdom.  The multiple voices of faith, 
together, searching out these troublesome texts from varied points of view, bring 
a spectrum of light into our understanding.  In our shared and vulnerable space, 
we sit in our full humanity, and even possibly channel divinity. 
Mikva continued that in the many decades of dialogue with Christians in 
the classroom, she has asked of her students which text(s) they would bring to 
the table, and she reported that they always cite an Old Testament text.  With a 
smile and a laugh, she admits that she finds it an annoyance that her own sacred 
texts are always the ones singled out.  So she requests that her students find a 
text from within their own Testament, while fully accepting of the fact that many 
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texts are indeed called forth as difficult from the Hebrew Bible, and eager herself 
to bring the most difficult from her own lot. 
In reflecting on Mikva’s words near the completion of this dissertation, I 
must admit that there are few texts that are not troublesome in my own Hebrew 
Bible.  Whether we speak of the blame cast in the Garden of Eden, the murder of 
Abel, the Binding of Isaac, the woes of Job, the Purim massacre, the casting out 
of Hagar and Ishmael, the resistance of Jonah, or the expulsion of Vashti, our 
texts depict a violence that perhaps humans might prefer not to confront.  But is 
this violence something we can call “sacred”?  Is it from God?  Is it of God?  In at 
least some cases we find the text criticizes the violence it presents, but this is not 
always so.  What are we to make of this?  Is violence a part of this world we are 
meant to accept?  Is violence connected to the divine?  These are certainly some 
of the questions that prompted the writing of this dissertation. 
Several different approaches to addressing the conspicuous violence in 
the biblical texts have surfaced, especially since the 1980’s.  Phyllis Trible’s 
famous Texts of Terror is a feminist classic1—her book specifically dealing with 
“sacred” violence against women in the Hebrew Scriptures.  She focuses on four 
texts that raise, in her own words, a “theological challenge” to the faith of Israel in 
their inhumane and at times deeply violent treatment of women from within a 
patriarchal structure.  Her chapter on Hagar, for example, depicts Hagar as a 
foreshadowing of Israel “through contrast.”  Trible explains that Hagar represents 
all that Israel may be terrified of: 
 
She experiences exodus without liberation, revelation without 
salvation, wilderness without covenant, wanderings without land, 
promise without fulfillment, and unmerited exile without 
return…This Egyptian slave woman is afflicted for the 
transgressions of Israel.2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Phyllis Trible, Texts of Terror:  Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives (MN:  
Fortress Press, 1984). 
2 Ibid., 28.   
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And yet despite her circumstances, Hagar is “a pivotal figure in biblical theology” 
for her receiving an annunciation and divine promise.  Trible deals effectively with 
the darkness of human actions and choices, and the human need to integrate the 
“others” in our midst.  Trible’s main contribution is in her ability to let the text be 
as it is without squeezing it into a context that might provide a less disturbing 
conclusion.  Hagar is “the surrogate mother, the resident alien without legal 
recourse, the other woman, the runaway youth…the homeless woman…”3   
Trible speaks loudly to remind us not to forget our victims.  Hagar, in short, 
is right in our midst, before our eyes.  Perhaps we are Hagar.  She may well 
represent not just the greatest fear of Israel as Trible declares—of being without 
God’s protection and covenant—but the greatest fear of woman—single 
womanhood, a mother unable to quench her child’s thirst, left alone to watch her 
beloved son die.  Trible seeks to bring comfort in the midst of these very 
uncomfortable stories by squaring them with the sadness that does often 
permeate the human experience.  Trible does not offer the even more 
uncomfortable idea, however, that perhaps we are also Sarah.  Perhaps we are 
the one who commits the violence. 
Reuven Firestone is another active voice in the movement to understand 
violence in the Abrahamic traditions, offering an informed historical and political 
perspective of the violence found in the Hebrew Bible, a good compliment to 
Trible’s rhetorical critical analysis.  Firestone responds to the violent texts in the 
Tanakh by locating biblical Judaism, including its violent and vengeful texts, 
inside of a historical time period in which Jews held some political power.  
Firestone postulates that it is within this context that the Jews used violence to 
ensure the status quo and their position of power.  In his article entitled “Judaism 
on Violence and Reconciliation:  An Examination of Key Sources,”4 Firestone 
contrasts the biblical era in which Jews could be victors (and often were), with 
the Rabbinic period following the destruction of the Second Temple—an era 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. 
4 Reuven Firestone, "Judaism on Violence and Reconciliation: An Examination of Key 
Sources," in Beyond Violence: Religious Sources of Social Transformation in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, ed. James Heft (NY:  Fordham University Press, 2004), 74–87. 
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when Jews (and also Christians) were under the impenetrable domination of the 
Holy Roman Empire, and were, in contrast to certain earlier periods, powerless.  
God tends to be interpreted in the Talmudic literature, Firestone says, as more 
quietist.  In the Jews’ subordinate political existence, to survive in fact required 
not fighting.   
 Firestone admits, in light of his analysis, that perhaps religion is relative.  
But he does not consider this possibility a threat.  Instead, he uses it to ask the 
question of both Jew and non-Jew alike:  can one sustain a commitment to non-
violence even when in a position of power?  He states: 
 
The greatest struggle for the Jews today is reflected in the moral 
challenge set before us all, Jew and non-Jew alike, in the twenty-
first century.  It is easy to cry out for peace and justice when 
excluded from authority.  The real challenge is this:  when we are in 
a position of power, can we carry out the vision of peace?5 
 
 
Firestone’s analysis points to an important pattern in the history of God, 
demonstrating a correlation between political and sacred power.  It also airs the 
possibility that the sacred is determined, at least in part, by human needs, in 
particular human needs for safety and security.  Firestone’s analysis does not, 
however, take into account the idea that perhaps Jewish victories re-founded the 
sacred presence and power in the death of the victims.  Firestone’s analysis 
opens wide the need to think more carefully about the connection of the sacred 
to violence.  
Firestone’s analysis also misses one further point-- namely, that the 
quietist sacred during times of Jewish vulnerability may have been nothing more 
than a redirecting of the violence.  During periods of political weakness, for 
example, violence was projected not upon God but upon the dominating powers.  
Rivalries from the Tanakh were made archetypal:  Esau became the progenitor 
of evil; Esau was Edom, and later Rome and Christianity.  God may have been 
quietist, but the political and ideological battlefield was not.  Violence was still out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid, 83. 
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there.  And somehow the sacred was caught up in its midst, denigrating “Esau.”  
Firestone’s moral challenge will have no bearing if one cannot understand and 
take responsibility for the violence that lurks deep within humanity, and how 
humanity connects the sacred to it.  To respond to the moral challenge Firestone 
puts before us first requires insight into the mentality and the mechanism that 
propagates violence and victims in the first place. 
 René Girard is one writer who is not afraid to assert humanity’s deep 
entrenchment in violence.  Girard may be said to organize the thought of 
scholars such as Trible, Firestone and others, inside of a structure that gets to 
the heart of how victimage operates and why it is so pervasive in sacred 
scriptures.  In Girard’s 1972 work Violence and the Sacred, he made the 
stunning assertion that violence is, in fact, the foundation of culture.  
Groundbreaking in the creativity and sheer breadth of his endeavor, Girard points 
to examples from myth and religion from across the world to confidently state that 
human societies are built upon an original act of murder.  The effectiveness of 
these original murders in founding civilization, and later in reconciling 
communities in conflict, was so pronounced, he says, that these original murders 
became reified and reproduced in religious ritual.  Religious ritual is therefore 
“good” violence, serving ultimately to channel humanity’s aggression in a 
controlled fashion.  Humans erroneously believe the peace and deliverance felt 
from these controlled acts of violence is from, and even commanded by, the 
sacred. 
Girard does not just provide an aetiology of religious ritual, though.  He 
goes further to explain the innate operations within human nature that give rise to 
this need for violence.  Girard calls the cause of violence “mimetic desire,” which 
is simplistically (for now, as I will go into detail in chapter one) a type of imitative 
competition with others fueled ultimately by a more or less existential feeling of 
emptiness.  Humans compete for being, run by imitative desire, which inevitably 
leads to rivalry and violence.  The core problem of humanity, for Girard, is our 
entrapment in the vicious cycle of desire, rivalry, and reconciling sacrifice (i.e. 
finding a scapegoat upon which to place blame); and the temporary respite we 
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receive we think is “divine.”  We are so enculturated in this schema, it is nearly 
impossible to think outside of it.  Girard advocates that the biblical texts, 
however, uniquely reveal the mechanism of mimetic rivalry and the scapegoat in 
which we are stuck.  It is through the biblical narratives that our entrenchment in 
violence is finally disclosed. 
This penetrating theory of Girard’s is difficult to ignore.  Though Girard, 
unlike Trible, is quite direct in his disinterest in the plights of the disenfranchised 
(and he has been duly criticized for his lack of concern for these issues), he 
takes our “modern” concern with the voice of the victim (as Trible’s work does 
exemplify) and raises the conversation to a structural and aetiological level.  
Unconcerned with the particular diversity aspects that may define the victims of 
the biblical texts, Girard’s premise is that the texts are by nature revelations of 
humanity’s habitual participation in sacrifice and victimage.  Trible’s critique of 
patriarchy fits neatly into the Girardian mold as just one example of a violent 
system that creates victims. 
Firestone’s moral challenge is met and amplified in a study of Girard as 
well, which presents the world with the idea that we are all caught up in creating 
victims and oppressors regardless of political status.  This inclination to blame 
and scapegoat is more pervasive than one can imagine.  Victims and 
persecutors alike participate in a “sacrificial mentality” barely conscious of what 
one is doing.  On occasion it may be recognized (as we will see in the following 
analysis of Esther and Jonah); but our entrapment in a larger culture that 
operates according to violence resists a peaceful solution.  Victimage may not in 
fact be a question of choice.  Even with the revelation of the biblical scriptures at 
our fingertips, Girard predicts that our likely future is a full-scale apocalyptic 
battle.  And yet, there is a glimmer of hope in Girard’s thought that the biblical 
revelation can help humanity to create a new culture based on a positive non-
violent mimesis. 
The main enterprise of this dissertation, therefore, is to provide a Girardian 
analysis of three Hebrew texts and their corresponding rituals, to put forth Jewish 
“vaccines” for the problem of mimetic violence.  Given that the Bible will always 
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contain “texts of terror”, how can one possibly understand these texts anew and 
even, perhaps, utilize them for greater awareness through the distinctive tools 
Girard provides?  My initial research of course focused on whether the Hebrew 
revelation as a whole could be correlated with Girard’s theory, and to what 
extent.  The more research I did, the more profitable I found the Tanakh to be for 
promulgating them.  The Girardian study of Jewish practice in ritual form proved 
just as fruitful.  The following questions thus guided me further: How precisely do 
the Tanakh and its midrashim reveal and address Girard’s mechanism?  And 
what kinds of ritual prescriptions are there in Jewish ritual life to transform 
mimetic rivalry before it becomes violent?  In demonstrating the usefulness of 
Girard for the interpretation of Judaism, I then asked:  What are the stumbling 
blocks for bringing Girard into dialogue with Judaism?  And does the Hebrew 
revelation have anything to add to Girard’s theory in return? 
A few words about my choice of the term “vaccine” may be needed here, 
too, to describe how I understand the Hebrew texts and rituals to operate within 
the Girardian and Judaic schema.  The use of the word vaccine to describe how 
Jewish rituals operate first came up in a discussion with a friend and colleague 
named Yehezkel Landau at Hartford Seminary back in about the year 2005.  It 
seems no coincidence that a theologian Landau and I both reference in our 
scholarly pursuits, Walter Wink, also uses this term in his book The Powers That 
Be.  Wink, in fact, uses this term with specific reference to Rene Girard: 
 
According to the French philosopher, Rene Girard, Jesus’ death 
revealed the sacrificial system as a form of organized violence in 
the service of social tranquility.  The sacrificial system is like a 
vaccination, in which a smaller amount of violence is perpetrated 
against a single victim in order to prevent a greater amount of evil 
from engulfing society. (italics mine)6 
 
 
The way that Wink uses the term vaccination reflects the term’s meaning in its 
sense as a controlled dosage of an antigen to ward off the more devastating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Walter Wink, The Powers That Be (New York:  Doubleday, 1998), 83. 
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effects of a full-blown disease (i.e., the purported “all-against-all.”)  Wink, 
however, envisages the community doling out the antigen onto a single victim 
instead of each member of the community receiving the booster shot.  Given this, 
Wink seems to use the term vaccine in the sense of a catharsis, which has short 
term, but no long-term transformational effect on the community in the grip of the 
disease.  And this is how Girard himself imagines the term vaccination initially in 
his short discussion in Violence and the Sacred.  Girard asserts that the terms 
catharsis (a kind of purgation or expulsion) and a related term pharmakon 
(Greek, meaning both ‘remedy’ and ‘poison’), denote the “metaphorical 
displacement of sacrifice.”7  In Violence and the Sacred, Girard states that the 
modern concept of vaccination is simply yet another type of sacrificial 
substitution:  “The beneficent process,” says Girard, “is still conceived in terms of 
an invasion repulsed, a harmful intruder chased from the premises.”8  Catharsis, 
vaccination, and pharmakon are all in essence purifications or expulsions in 
which “the crisis is provoked by a supplementary dosage of the affliction resulting 
in the pathogenic agents along with itself.”9  In other words, they are all mimetic 
process that use violence to eradicate violence. 
 While Girard’s theory explains religious ritual in terms of this same 
process of controlled violence, Girard also views the biblical scriptures as 
revelations of this violence that have had a lasting effect on human 
consciousness; that is, the revelation has brought with it an understanding of 
systemic victimage.  As Rene Girard explains in his succinct “Account of Mimetic 
Theory”: 
 
Christianity, as atheistic anthropology correctly points out, is exactly 
the same schema, with one fundamental difference, systematically 
ignored by modern anthropology, the attribution of guilt is reversed 
and the scapegoat victim is explicitly vindicated. This is why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, MD:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1972), 290. 
8 Ibid., 289. 
9 Ibid., 288. 
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Christianity, far from being just one more religion, reveals the lie of 
all religions (including itself when misunderstood).10  
 
My choice of the word vaccine follows this trajectory.  My use of the term vaccine 
moves away from the notion of repetitious cathartic expulsion (i.e., of the 
pharmakon) that, in keeping with our medical terminology, does nothing to 
engage the root cause of the disease, but merely treats the recurring, superficial 
symptoms.  Contrarily, the biblical “vaccines,” in revealing the root of the disease, 
are meant to help humans, who are naturally mimetic and susceptible to rivalry 
and violence, to develop lasting immunity.11  The way that vaccines work, in fact, 
is: 
 
by stimulating the immune system, the natural disease-fighting 
system of the body.  The healthy immune system is able to 
recognize invading bacteria and viruses and produce substances 
(antibodies) to destroy or disable them.12 
 
According to this statement, vaccines generate a biological memory of disease, 
which importantly then protects the system against future exposure.  It is true that 
some vaccines need to be repeated through one’s lifetime; likewise, the Jewish 
vaccinations discussed herein will need to be repeated until the biological and 
spiritual memory has been sufficiently cultivated, and immunity achieved.  In this 
way, vaccines are no longer just sacrificial substitutions, but are anti-sacrificial in 
that they actively repel against sacrifice (the disease) and move the organism into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Rene Girard, “Account of Mimetic Theory,” (March 2009), accessed January 16, 2014, 
http://www.imitatio.org/uploads/tx_rtgfiles/Account_of_Mimetic_Theory.pdf. 
11 Humans are susceptible to rivalry and violence due their very nature as mimetic 
individuals and, in Jewish terms, due to their yetzer ha-ra or evil inclination as we will discuss in 
chapter two. 
12 “Definition of Vaccination,” accessed January 16, 2014, www.medterms.com.  
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a different, inclusive consciousness.  The only expulsion that the vaccines herein 
intend is the expulsion of sacrifice itself. 
In a few particular instances, I will also refer to what I call “peace” 
vaccines.  Unlike the traditional vaccine that at least contains a trace of the 
poison, peace vaccines are a kind of proactive medicine—the generation of 
health—which is a necessary complement to the protection against disease.  We 
might call these peace vaccines “preventative medicine,” as they utilize the 
energies of a healthy system without the need for poison; they do not inject with 
a dose of sacrifice, but rather with peace.  They might also be considered 
“antidotes,” which are tonics used to “neutralize or counteract the effects of a 
poison.”13  The basic trajectory is that peace vaccines will operate as mimetically 
as their counterpart, creating a biological and spiritual “contagion” in the system, 
eventually enculturating humans through memory into peaceful relations.  These 
peace vaccines must also be repeated as needed (or as divinely commanded), 
until enculturation is complete.  We will find examples of peace vaccines (or 
“positive mimesis”) through the dissertation, specifically in the Blessing of the 
Children (Heb., Birkhat ha-Banim) and the Ninevites of Jonah.  While it is 
possible to argue (as I will demonstrate following) that these two vaccines also 
contain traces of the disease, they are at the same time foundations of a new 
order.14 
In addition to thinking through the various ways in which the term vaccine 
could elucidate how Girard and observant Jews could conceive of at least certain 
scriptures, there was the additional task of choosing the texts for the exercise, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Antidote,” accessed January 16, 2004, www.thefreedictionary.com/antidote.  The 
Torah is also, for the observant Jew, referred to as the “antidote,” that is, the healing agent that 
has been received from the divine for the purpose of drawing humanity into a new, non-sacrificial, 
design.  For the Jew, the whole of the Torah is the antidote to the violence and evil of current 
existence.  Within the Torah, though, are all the individual vaccines, which are of various sorts, to 
help humans repair themselves along the journey.  In this author’s view, the vaccines are all 
necessary until the system is ready to receive the antidote wholesale. 
14 It is important, too, that the creation of biological/religious memory is not just an 
individual process, but one enacted inside of a religious community to develop a collective 
immunity and character.  The community as a whole needs to receive the shots if the disease is 
truly to be controlled, even eradicated, and if a new mode of peace and health is to take root. 
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and what criteria should determine my choice.  My decision in this regard was to 
choose texts that are central to the practice of Judaism – texts that are utilized in 
full in the synagogue; texts that are commanded reading; and texts that are tied 
to a specific ritual or set of rituals in Jewish observance.  The goal was to bring 
Girard in conversation with mainstream Jewish practice, and the texts and rituals 
chosen are, as such, time-tested symbols of Jewish observance across 
denominations.  The texts I chose specifically, based on these criteria, were the 
Birkhat ha-Banim in Genesis 48, the blueprint for a weekly Sabbath ritual; the 
Book of Esther and the annual festival of Purim; and the Book of Jonah and the 
Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur.15  One chapter is devoted to each text and ritual 
pair and, as mentioned above, they each constitute a different type of vaccine.  
While some inoculate us by exposure to violence, others inject us with peace.  In 
either case, one receives a powerful and protective memory to ward off disease 
and generate life.  It is in light of our “peace” vaccines that I take up a focused 
discussion in chapter five on positive mimesis to see if the Hebrew rituals 
examined enable a stride forward. 
 I admit the inherent challenge in choosing any text and ritual in the 
context of a Girardian study.  Girard’s claim that religious rituals are violent 
means (in actuality or in symbol) to control more serious violence puts the validity 
of any ritual on trial.  I agree with Girard that, in many cases, rituals have been 
developed out of sacrificial hermeneutics (Purim plays are a primary example).  
In bringing the originating texts together with their rituals, however, it seemed 
possible to distinguish between the ritual practices that got reverted into the 
sacrificial, from the rituals that prove to be the antidotes.16   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In interpreting these texts and ritual practices throughout the dissertation, I refer often 
to the “rabbinic tradition,” which generally denotes early rabbinic commentary that is recorded in 
the Babylonian Talmud (Bavli), the Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi), and the early midrashim, 
unless otherwise noted. 
16 Using Girardian analysis upon three different Hebrew texts and corresponding Jewish 
rituals, one comes to realize that the sacrificial mechanism is not just an aggressive inclination in 
ourselves, but the very structure of our thought.  One of the highlights of this study has been the 
unraveling of how the selected biblical texts themselves regress into sacrificial thinking while at 
the same time revealing it.  The sailors of Jonah, and Jonah himself, are figures I will use to 
illustrate this phenomenon.  The rabbinic commentators and even modern scholars fall equally 
into a sacrificial hermeneutic, often obscuring the very principle the texts themselves are trying to 
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The dissertation also addresses a fundamental gap in scholarship 
connecting Girard’s ideas with Judaism.  I express my deep indebtedness to 
Sandor Goodhart, who represents the primary exception to this statement.  
Goodhart has written numerous articles and treatises connecting Girard to 
Emanuel Levinas, as well as Girard-inspired exegeses on the several biblical 
passages and practices.17  Aside from a handful of papers otherwise (which I will 
address as pertinent), Goodhart stands alone.18   
In contrast, much scholarship has been devoted to Girard’s theories of 
mimetic desire and scapegoating in Christianity.  Christian scholars and 
laypersons alike have been enthusiastic in presenting Girard’s theology of the 
cross as an attractive non-violent alternative to the theology of sacrificial 
atonement.  The paucity of Jewish scholarship on Girard in light of the flowering 
of Girard in Christianity is notable.  This is at least in part, if not entirely in my 
estimation, due to Girard’s own articulated position regarding the Hebrew 
Scriptures.  For Girard, the revelation of the Tanakh is at best incomplete, and at 
worst unable to answer to the blatant and disturbing violence permeating the 
scriptures and our world.  For Girard, while the Hebrew texts do present an 
enormous leap forward in the consciousness of humankind, (i.e., they are written 
from the perspective of the victim), they present a sacred that is still ambivalent 
when it comes to violence.  For Girard, the Hebrew revelation is simply unclear 
and unsatisfying.  The following chapters are also, therefore, an effort to address 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disclose.  In doing this, the religion that has been passed down through the generations is still just 
a mask for violence.  Scholarship on Girard has covered how this phenomenon has played out in 
the history of Christianity, and I am deeply indebted to Anthony Bartlett, Charles Bellinger, and 
Peter Stork in particular for their contributions in this area.  Throughout my analysis herein, I offer 
a parallel in the tradition of Judaism. 
17 Goodhart sources will be cited as used. 
18 Also notable is Raymond Schwager’s very comprehensive analysis of the Old 
Testament in Girardian terms.  He ultimately asserts, however, that the narratives are 
contradictory and inconclusive.  He suggests that they would be reconciled only if brought under 
the hermeneutic of Isaiah’s Suffering Servant, which he regretfully declares as a passage glossed 
over and forgotten by the Jews.  Schwager makes a good observation in noting the consistent 
trend of reinterpretation within the Hebrew Bible itself.  Unsatisfied with the contradictions, 
however, Schwager, like Girard and others, advocate for the New Testament as a reinterpretation 
that reconciles the discrepancies found in the Old.  See Raymund Shwager, Must There Be 
Scapegoats?  Violence and Redemption in the Bible, trans. Maria L. Assad (NY:  The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 2000). 	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Girard’s criticism.  The following chapters systematically present various case 
studies side-by-side to test and elaborate on a kind of “Girardian Judaism.” 
In terms of methodology, I have simply used Girard’s ideas of mimetic 
desire and scapegoating as a lens through which to exegete the Hebrew texts 
chosen and their corresponding rituals.  This method of course assumes the 
basic soundness of Girard’s theories, and this author admits to this assumption in 
the conception of this work, and throughout its main expository chapters.  The 
last two chapters of the dissertation do, however, raise some essential questions 
about Girard’s theory, and whether it holds water in light of the analysis 
presented.  I offer by the end that perhaps our Girardian lens, after all, prevents 
us from noticing the models already at our disposal in creating an alternative 
future of “positive mimesis.”  I offer that perhaps Girard’s theory falls too often 
into the mimetic crisis of which it speaks, requiring a scapegoat for resolution; 
and Girard often makes it sound as if his scapegoat is human nature itself.  But 
to be fair, Girard does indicate that transformation is possible, just not likely.  My 
own analysis, at least I hope, provides a less dramatic approach and solution 
concerned more with our day-to-day struggle about how to relate to others; how 
to manage practically when there is a crisis; how to be whole and complete; and 
how to know that we, and all the children of the world, are blessed.  Girard’s 
insistence that we are in a time of spiritual crisis only further enflames humanity 
into crisis-mode.  I assert, in fact, that humanity has always been in a spiritual 
crisis.  But if we relax, slow down, and take the time to observe our habitual ways 
and indeed hear what our scriptures are really demanding, we may find our crisis 
has naturally dissipated. 	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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Girard’s Mimetic Theory and Scapegoating Mechanism 
 
I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only 
temporary; the evil it does is permanent. 
       --Mahatma Gandhi 
 
 
René Girard was inducted into the Académie Française in November of 2005 
and as such took his place among the other immortels.  This honor, most would 
agree, is well deserved.  It comes after a long academic career most recently as 
the Andrew B. Hammond Professor of French Language, Literature and 
Civilization at Stanford University, and a long list of publications that present, 
explain, and expound upon the theories of mimetic desire and the scapegoat 
mechanism—the two theories that have made Girard a virtually household name 
in the field of social theory and Christian theology.  Beginning with Girard’s 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel (1961, 1965)19 to his most recent Battling to the 
End (2007, 2010), his writing demonstrates a refinement and expansion of his 
theories over time.  Girard’s personal development mirrors his scholarly 
revelations as well, and one experiences Girard’s transforming from an atheist 
into a man of faith through his writing. Girard is what I would call an embodied 
scholar-- he was (and is) not only intellectually engaged in his research, but 
willing to let his texts read him in return, transforming him in the process. 
 A very brief overview of Girard’s body of work begins with Deceit, Desire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 All dates will be given as 1) the original publication in French, and 2) the date of the 
English translation. 
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and the Novel, which is the first work to present his theory of “mediation” (which 
becomes “mimetic desire” in subsequent works), exploring its operations in the 
context of literary criticism.  Violence and the Sacred (1972, 1977) came eleven 
years later, and proved to be a full throttle introduction of mimesis, bringing the 
theory into the arenas of anthropology and religion, and introducing the details of 
what he calls “the victimage mechanism.”  Subsequent works remain focused on 
refinements and elaborations of these two primary ideas:  To Double Business 
Bound (1978) is a collection of essays on literature, mimesis and anthropology; 
The Scapegoat (1982, 1986) presents the victimage mechanism through the 
structure of the “persecution narrative,” and is used to exegete various texts of 
myth and biblical narrative; and Job:  The Victim of His People (1985, 1987) is an 
interpretation of Job as a ‘failed’ scapegoat.  Following Job, Girard puts out a 
type of summation of his work in Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the 
World (1978, 1987).  Things Hidden is a masterful work in interview form, which 
presents Girard’s theories comprehensively and systematically.  Girard then puts 
out four more books that present a widening of application:  A Theater of Envy 
(1991) focuses on Shakespeare; I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (1999, 2001) 
propels Girard’s theories into the realm of biblical theology; Evolution and 
Conversion (2004) presents an interview format that “takes stock” and in some 
cases emends Girard’s lifetime of work; and finally Battling to the End – Girard’s 
“finishing” of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’ treatise On War -- discusses 
the trajectory of the world toward apocalypse. 
 In this chapter, I present a detailed exposition of the two books by Girard 
that serve the subject matter of this dissertation most intimately.  These books 
are Violence and the Sacred (V&S from this point forward), and I See Satan Fall 
Like Lightning (I See Satan from this point forward).  I focus on V&S for it’s in 
depth exposition of mimetic desire and the scapegoat mechanism; and I See 
Satan for the application of these theories in the arena of biblical theology.  After 
presenting this overview of Girard’s foundational theories and theological 
application, I will bring forth some areas that have yet to be fully explored within 
the primary and secondary literature, setting the stage for the chapters that 
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follow. 
 
 
Violence and the Sacred 
 
The Primitive Mindset 
 
In beginning his exposition of his theory of religion in V&S, Girard recognizes the 
need to alter how people think about religion.  In particular, Girard calls for a 
rethinking of sacrificial ritual.  For Girard, there have been numerous theories on 
the origin of sacrifice to date.  Girard discusses, for example, some of the 
theories put forth by W. Robertson Smith, James Frazer, Emile Durkheim, 
Theodor Gaster, and Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, whose theories fall into 
some general categories.  Smith and Frazer were some of the earliest theorists 
on ritual:  Smith emphasized the function of ritual to cement community ties and 
identity, (Durkheim following suit with his own functionalist explanation of ritual as 
a vehicle for solidarity and “effervescence”); and Frazer elaborated that 
underneath these rituals were patterns of dying and rising gods—beings that 
served cultural expression and community prosperity and well-being (Gaster 
elaborating on Frazer asserting that sacrifices follow the patterns of nature).  
Hubert and Mauss were critical of Durkheim, but seemed to adapt something of 
his notion of the totem in their proposal that ritual attributes a divine nature to 
social and collective forces. Despite the tenacity of these theories, Girard 
maintains that they have provided only unsatisfying, disparate and inconclusive 
results; none of them have persuaded scholars (or at least Girard) of their 
overarching truth.  Girard believes these theories are further inadequate in their 
inability to provide a universal paradigm that can be applied to rituals across 
geographical space and time.  Most important, perhaps, is that these theories fail 
to provide an aetiology for sacrifice.  How did sacrifice—i.e. legitimated acts of 
violence—come to be a human practice? 
	   20	  
Because of the historical gap between today and the time when sacrifice 
might first have been performed, plus the barrier of culture and modernity that 
stands between understandings, perhaps a subtle resignation about ever finding 
the truth had set in.  But not for Girard.  Girard points to this sense of resignation, 
but refuses to give in to it.  Instead, Girard takes on thinking about the subject 
matter in a different way so that sacrifice might finally be demystified.  Girard 
begins the demystification process by trying, with the reader, to enter into the 
“primitive” mindset, insofar as this is possible.  Girard acknowledges that his 
reconstruction is unable to be proven through direct evidence, but he is confident 
enough that the scenario he presents is a way-- the way perhaps-- to finally 
come to terms with how ancients understood sacrificial ritual, and for what 
purpose it was performed. 
Girard opens with the idea that, for those in primitive cultures, the threat of 
violent vengeance was overwhelming and acute; that is, when an act of violence 
occurred, the typical response would be retributive violence, which would 
continue in a vicious cycle until there was the imminent sense that the entire 
community could thus be destroyed.  The primitive mind was so threatened by 
communal violence, and the inability to control violent contagion, that 
preventative measures needed to be put into place lest their communities fall 
prey to complete dissolution.  According to Girard, sacrifice was, and still is in 
fact, one preventative measure to disrupt the cycle of vengeance.  Through the 
sacrifice of a carefully chosen victim (the details of which will be addressed later), 
conflicting parties within the community could join forces in the placing of blame, 
and gain a kind of catharsis through a ritual sacrifice.  Instead of ongoing 
vengeance, the sacrificial victim would be the bearer of all blame, as well as, 
ironically, the person responsible for restoring the peace.  The community, 
through this kind of mechanism, could return to normal.  Girard thus defines 
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sacrifice in an oddly simple way as:  “an instrument of prevention in the struggle 
against violence.”20 
Girard offers a more elaborate definition of ritual sacrifice a bit later in his 
work, which seems pertinent here:   
 
The function of ritual is to ‘purify’ violence; that is, to ‘trick’ violence 
into spending itself on victims whose death will provoke no 
reprisals…The secret of the dual nature of violence still eludes 
men.  Beneficial violence must be carefully distinguished from 
harmful violence, and the former continually promoted at the 
expense of the latter.  Ritual is nothing more than the regular 
exercise of ‘good’ violence.21 
 
“Good violence” would seem to be an oxymoron, but Girard is clearly setting up a 
framework to help us imagine that “good” violence is the only recourse possible if 
human communities and cultures are to survive.  (He points to cultures, in fact, 
that have mysteriously disappeared to explain their tragic end.)  “Good” violence 
is simply the sacrifice of one for the many – the one that has the misfortune of 
becoming the sacrifice Girard call at times the “scapegoat”, and at times the 
“surrogate victim” or “sacrificial victim.”  Good violence is the type of violence that 
restores the peace for a minimal cost, that is, one life.  The alternative is “bad” 
violence, which is vengeful violence, the type of violence that can yield only more 
violence.  Bad violence costs many lives and contains no hope for restoration or 
reconciliation.  The primitive mind, for Girard, had an acute experience of bad 
violence, which would make the sacrifice of only one life for peace seem, 
perhaps not so surprisingly, “good” in the end – even salvific.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (John Hopkins University 
Press, 1972, 1977), 17.   
21 Ibid., 36-7. 
22 Girard does not discuss modern examples in which vengeful violence is at play in this 
work, but does begin to bring his theories into contemporary scenarios of conflict in Battling to the 
End. 
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We may relate to Girard’s theory in the modern day as we must still deal 
with the consequences of violence.  In V&S, Girard begins a conversation that he 
takes up in more detail in his later work Things Hidden Since the Foundation of 
the World 23 about the gradual evolution of the sacrificial system into the modern 
day judicial system – a system he calls “the crowning institution to stave off 
communal retributive disintegration.”   There is a distinct difference between the 
primitive and modern systems, though.  In contrast to our modern judicial system, 
which punishes the guilty (or at least this is what we hope), the logic of the 
primitive culture was to effect punishment on an innocent party in place of the 
guilty one.  This, for Girard, is absolutely crucial for understanding the origin of 
sacrifice.  By punishing an innocent victim, the cycle of vengeance is broken 
because one has averted a directly retributive type of punishment.  It is this logic 
that is, further, at the root of the sacrifice of innocent victims.  Again, Girard 
impresses the reader with the need to understand the primitive mind to get to the 
basis of the sacrificial ritual – the need to understand the “primitive” fear of 
escalating revenge and unleashed violence, which religious rituals are 
specifically designed to meet.  Within the context of a tribal type of culture, it 
certainly seems logical to take one innocent life to stave off the dissolution of an 
entire population; whereas today, fitting our modern social arrangement, our 
system at least purports to be based on punishing the guilty as there is no longer 
fear of reprisal.  Girard thus sets the stage for presenting the finer details of his 
theory of sacrifice by first having closed this gap in understanding. 
 
What is Religion? 
 
Girard’s theory of sacrifice as the killing of one to save many on its own could 
aspire to moral legitimacy only perhaps in Machiavellian terms.  Even if a culture 
is “saved” through the death of one individual, it is still quite impossible to justify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephan Bann 
and Michael Metteer (California: Stanford University Press, 1978, 1987). 
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murder.   Sacrifice, however, is a practice that occurs within the context of 
religion.  Girard, therefore, grapples with religion and how religion serves the 
sociological function of sacrificial murder that he has put forth.   
Girard states:  “Religion, in its broadest sense, then, must be another term 
for that obscurity that surrounds man’s efforts to defend himself by curative or 
preventative means against his own violence.”24  Girard elaborates further by 
saying that religion is imbued with a “transcendental effectiveness of a violence 
that is holy, legal, and legitimate successfully opposed to a violence that is 
unjust, illegal and illegitimate.”25  Religion, as a result, has a very important role 
to play in terms of:  1) keeping an obscuring mythology around humanity’s 
tendency toward violent self-destruction; and 2) legitimizing otherwise illegitimate 
acts, e.g. acts of murder such as sacrifice.  We will discuss the first point at 
greater length later, but for now the second point, I believe, is helpful.26  Based 
on careful readings of ethnographical reports as well as thinkers such as Freud 
and Levi-Strauss, Girard holds forth that religion serves at once to both proscribe 
and endorse certain practices, all the time under the auspices of a sacred 
command.  Religion, for example, generates taboos on practices that threaten 
the stability of society (like incest, murder); but, interestingly, religion may also 
make these practices legitimate within the bounds of religious rites (as in 
sacrificial killing).  Perhaps, at least in part, due to the influence of Mary Douglas’ 
Purity and Danger (1966), this is an irony that Girard finds within religious 
systems across time and cultures. 
Girard explores the tendency of religion to incorporate and legitimate what 
Douglas has called “dirt” through the parallel of the modern judicial system.  The 
modern judicial system operates according to an objective type of transcendent 
authority that instills a control in the social fabric; one living in a modern society 
feels compelled to follow the laws of this transcendent system almost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Girard, V&S, 23. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For a discussion of the first point, please see section below entitled “The Hidden-ness 
of the Mechanism.” 
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automatically as the result of living in the culture.  It is part of how humans have 
learned to live together, and part of how cultures are transmitted.  The modern 
judicial system, therefore, can be said to function as a social control.  
Punishment, even death, is also part of this judicial system, though.  The judicial 
system was set up and retains the right to put a human being to death within the 
realm of the law in spite of the fact that the law itself prohibits murder.  The 
modern judicial system, like religion, could therefore be said to incorporate the 
“dirt”—to act as a transcendent authority, able to legitimate an otherwise 
proscribed act.  Likewise for those in primitive societies, except in primitive 
societies, it was the notion of the divine or the sacred that functioned as the 
transcendent authority.   
It is within the context of understanding religion as legitimating sacrificial 
murder that one finds the basis of Girard’s breakthrough idea:  that violence is at 
the heart of religion and the sacred.  Religion and its rituals, for Girard, were a 
function of controlling a violent threat to society—it functioned to keep society 
under control, safe, and intact; and the divine lent a transcendent authority to the 
violence within the ritual system needed to appease the need for vengeance and 
create reconciliation.  Religion, cast in this light, is sacred violence meant to 
sustain cultures and keep humans from destroying themselves. 
It is beyond a doubt that Girard presents us with a rather bleak picture of 
both humanity and religion.  Religion seems reduced to a sociological function 
(and Girard is heavily indebted to Durkheim for this), and humans are a mystery 
to themselves.  Even beyond this, Girard paints a picture of the world with no 
alternative to violence; “Only violence can put an end to violence, and that is why 
violence is self-propagating.”27  Without the underpinning idea that one needs 
violence to control violence, there would be in effect no need for sacrifice or a 
sacrificial victim to assuage the need for vengeance.  Without this idea, neither 
would Girard’s theory hold water.  One might criticize Girard for being nihilistic 
given his idea that the best (at least most) humans seem able to produce is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Girard, V&S, 26. 
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“good” violence.  Girard states that some rare human beings (i.e. “geniuses” and 
“saints”)28 prove that an alternative may be possible; but he does not believe 
humanity can effectively embrace its own darkness without an accompanying 
socio-cultural upheaval (i.e., apocalypse).  This upheaval, paradoxically, will 
finally lead to the ultimate renunciation of violence and a new order.  The 
“romantic lie” that has sacralized violence has been exposed, and can no longer 
hide retaliatory or substitutive sacrifice. 
It is tempting to ask whether a period of apocalyptic chaos is the only way.  
Figures such as Jesus and Gandhi, and their forms of resistance, certainly come 
to mind (two of Girard’s “geniuses and saints”, to be sure).  And yet even they 
were swallowed up in the structure of violence, surrounded in violence generated 
by others.  We are jumping ahead for a moment here, but it is important to 
underscore the absolute necessity of violence to religion within the Girardian 
system, and the near impossibility of an alternative.  Like Girard’s theology of the 
cross, non-violent figures serve a very specific purpose; they are mirrors of their 
attackers, revealing the horror of humanity’s own violence to themselves – or at 
least this is the ultimate purpose.  As Per Bjornar Grande states about the 
Hebrew prophets:  “The prophet’s message, condemning violence against 
victims, leads to violence against those who reveal the violence. The prophet 
who brings the victimage mechanism to light, also tends to become the victim of 
the people.”29  This is how the Tanakh demythologizes the pagan sacred, and 
these prophetic figures are meant to reveal to their attackers the mechanism of 
violence and humanity’s innate violent nature, hopefully causing the brutality at 
least temporarily to cease.  Non-violence serves as a mirror to make our violence 
more apparent.   
Girard is very clear about the unavoidability of violence in his system; he 
believes there is no way we can sustain ourselves in society as we know it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Rene Girard, Battling to the End:  Conversations with Benoit Chantre, trans. Mary 
Baker (Michigan:  State University Press, 2010), 133.	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without the use of “good” violence, which is endorsed in different contexts by 
either religion or the judicial system.  But slowly, Girard believes, we will become 
more aware of the violence that is at the heart of our system (for even good 
violence is violence) and, once this happens, the system as we know it will 
inevitably move toward cultural breakdown, and either disintegration or 
apocalypse.  And this seems, for Girard, to be taking place now. 
 
The Surrogate Victim Mechanism 
 
Having illustrated to this point how violence is at the heart of religion, it is now 
necessary to move into the details of Girard’s theory.  It is one thing to say that 
religious sacrifice is the substitution of one innocent victim for the sake of 
communal reconciliation lent legitimacy by divine authority; but it is quite another 
to find practical evidence to substantiate this claim.  Through his work, Girard 
teases out different aspects of his theory of sacrifice to paint as comprehensive a 
picture as possible of how such a practice might have evolved. 
Girard is direct in admitting that there is no evidence to “prove” the truth of 
his theory on the origin of sacrifice.  Rather, one must search for what might have 
been the origin through the workings of the imagination.  Girard voices the 
essential question to get our imaginations moving in this direction:  what must 
have happened initially to cause humans to kill their fellow beings?  Girard 
adamantly asserts that there must have been a very serious situation to have 
given rise to this ritual; human or even animal sacrifice, for Girard, is not 
something humans would do without cause, even if the cause lies hidden to the 
human mind.  He thus lays out a scenario for how he believes sacrifice 
originated, and this is through what he calls “the surrogate victim mechanism.”  
Girard recounts how this mechanism came into being, and why the surrogate 
victim mechanism must be at the heart of sacrificial ritual, in V&S. 
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 Girard discusses various aspects of the surrogate victim mechanism 
throughout V&S, but I think he provides the clearest means for understanding it 
in his analysis of the play The Bacchae by Euripides,30 which he uses to draw out 
the detailed victimage process.  Through this play, Girard is able to discuss 
aspects of his theory such as mimetic desire, the sacrificial crisis and violent 
unanimity, all through the festival of Dionysus, which is the subject of Euripides’ 
tragic drama.  The festival is an important type of religious event for Girardian 
theory in general, in fact, as it demonstrates how the overall elimination of 
differences occurs, thereby leading up to the sacrificial crisis.  The sacrificial 
crisis, in turn, sets the stage for the sacrificial act, which is the pinnacle event and 
the event that restores differentiation and peace.  Now I will go over each step of 
the mechanism following how Girard presents it through The Bacchae. 
 Girard first and importantly defines the ritual bacchanal that takes place in 
the The Bacchae as a “festival.”  This is an important type of definition as a 
“festival” is conceived of as an event that has its purpose in the elimination of 
distinctions, which is one of the first steps in setting the stage for the sacrificial 
crisis.  Girard describes festivals in general as events in which the social order is 
turned inside out—social roles are reversed deliberately and, in some cases, this 
kind of disruption of order may be accompanied by violence.   
 Girard believes Euripides provides us with an excellent example of the 
festival in The Bacchae, though as we will see a bit later, it is nothing that can be 
labeled a “typical” festival.  The Bacchae presents us with a festival that begins 
harmoniously enough – it is described by Girard as “idyllic” at first – in which role 
reversals and non-differentiation are kept orderly and to a minimum.  Soon, 
however, Girard reports the festival becomes “a bloodthirsty nightmare” in which 
Dionysus rapidly eliminates differences including distinctions between the sexes, 
between man and beast, and between mortals and god.31  Girard describes how 
all men become god-men, mimetic twins, in a Dionysiac frenzy:  “God-inspired 	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madness has made each celebrant another Dionysus.”32  In this collapse of 
differentiation, (brought on by the god), all mortals become mimetic rivals vying 
for divinity, though in the end they find out divinity cannot be gained as a “prize” – 
and they realize, with difficulty, that there was no real contest to begin with.  Only 
Dionysus is reaffirmed as the divinity—and as the divinity, he only is both the 
cause of the disintegration and ensuing chaos, and also the one who stands 
alone and victorious over the ruins. 
 Essential to understanding the “mimetic snowballing” that occurs in the 
Dionysiac festival just described, is exactly what Girard means by mimetic desire.  
In V&S, Girard introduces the notion of desire, specifically mimetic desire, as the 
root of doubling, non-differentiation, and any resulting violence.  This notion of 
mimetic desire is foundational for his subsequent work and his overall theory of 
the origins of religion.  Before introducing the principle of mimesis per se, though, 
Girard sets out to first address how we think (as he often does.)  Here he 
attempts to alter how we think about desire.  He asserts, for example, that most 
people tend to view desire as non-violent; but he quickly offers that this is a mere 
hope that humans buy into.  We are, one might say, attached to or fond of our 
desires – desire is pervasive through life, so it is uncomfortable to think of desire 
as being a cause of violence.  Girard is not afraid to consider the negative effects 
of desire, though.  He puts forth that desire is fundamentally violent, even the 
cause of reciprocal violence, which culminates in what he calls the “surrogate 
victim mechanism” and the various forms of religious rites we will be discussing 
below.  Mimetic desire is, in effect, the root of violence creating the need for 
religion. 
 Girard goes into a detailed analysis of how he understands the operation 
of mimesis toward the end of V&S.  He states that in the varieties of desire there 
are three variables:  the subject, the rival, and the object.   When looking from the 
outside, it appears in a situation of mimetic rivalry that both the subject and the 
rival are competing for an object.  It is important to note, however, that mimetic 	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rivalry does not occur because of the convergence of two desires on a single 
object; the subject, instead, desires the object because the rival desires it.33  
Desiring the object, the rival alerts the subject to the object’s desirability.  In this 
way, the rival serves as the model for the subject. 
 This idea of mimetic rivalry in Girard’s view, however, is not merely a 
competition or a superficial attempt at imitation.  For Girard, this phenomenon is 
at its core a striving or a desire for being.  The rival perceives he lacks a way of 
being that the other possesses, thus he looks to the other person to see what he 
should desire in order to acquire that being.  Objects are merely the substitute for 
the being that is really desired.  Mimetic desire is, therefore, a deep and mostly 
unconscious yearning to “be” the other, though on the outside it seems like the 
imitation is related to something tangible.  Mimetic desire, because it is 
unconscious and misunderstood by those engaged in it, almost inevitably leads 
to rivalry and violence.  The closer the “subject” gets to the “model,” the more 
intense the rivalry becomes. 
Novelists alone have adequately explored the mechanism of mimetic 
desire for Girard, and Girard looks in particular to the genre of tragedy in which 
he sees its workings unfold most clearly.  He returns therefore, to The Bacchae 
to show how mimetic desire begins, intensifies over time, causes a state of non-
differentiation and “monstrous doubles,” eventually giving way to the sacrificial 
crisis.  Let’s explore the festival scene again with this idea of mimesis in mind.  
The process of mimetic rivalry – in the play and otherwise-- begins with 
oscillation:  in tragedy everything alternates – one character gets angry then 
abates, then another gets angry and abates, then another, etc.; “through the 
course of tragedy, each subject gives a blow, each with intention to stop violence 
– none managing to lay final claim to the object of desire.”34  Girard explains how 
The Bacchae illustrates the ongoing dynamic of mimetic desire:  first there are 
the individuals oscillating over the object of desire (i.e. they each want to take on 	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being the god); then the differences that separate the antagonists shift faster and 
faster as the crisis grows in intensity until everything becomes blurred (i.e. 
everyone is a man-God; everyone becomes Dionysus)– the entire everyday 
world becomes “caught up in the whirl-producing hallucinatory state that is not a 
synthesis of elements, but a formless and grotesque mixture of things that are 
normally separate.”35  For Girard, this state is a monstrosity, an extraordinary 
strangeness of the world, in which categories are no longer clear and differences 
between the rivals, though not eliminated, are muddied and confused.  The rivals 
become as doubles of each other; inside the chaos of non-differentiation, the 
rivals become as monsters that symbolically (and literally) defy an ordered 
reality.  The festival scene becomes a melting pot – all markings of individual and 
social identity have been lost. 
Girard calls a “sacrificial crisis” the time when a community reaches this 
type of critical and threatening level of undifferentiation, requiring an intervention 
to control disastrous violent outbreak.  Girard uses a few different terms when 
describing the sacrificial crisis.  He speaks of undifferentiation, for example, in 
terms of “mimetic rivalry,” and the escalation of the rivalry to the point of “mimetic 
twins” and “mimetic snowballing” (I See Satan)36; that is, when those in 
competition engage in such rivalry as to become mirrors of each other (more 
obsessed with each other, eventually losing sight of the desired object 
completely.)  He also speaks, as mentioned above, of mimetic twins as 
“monsters” or “monstrous doubles” to elucidate the sense of the boundary-less 
conjunction of opposites that each figure involved in the sacrificial crisis 
represents; that is, the monsters or mimetic twins (they may be metaphorical 
twins or literal twins) symbolize in themselves and in their own rivalry the chaos 
of an undifferentiated social order.   
According to Girard, “order, peace and fecundity depend on cultural 
distinctions” and the loss of these distinctions gives birth to rivalries and sets 	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family and same-social group members in violent conflict.  This undifferentiation 
is linked at times to ritual impurity, and at times to a privileged status in primitive 
cultures, e.g. twins who were either privileged or killed.  According to Girard’s 
hypothesis, ritual and myth are expressions of the sacrificial crisis created not 
only to disguise it, but also to reenact it and ritually re-purify those involved in it. 
In addition to The Bacchae, Girard uses the story of Oedipus to lay out the 
mechanism that both reveals and conceals the forces at play in his theory of the 
sacrificial crisis and the surrogate victim mechanism.  In the case of Oedipus, the 
subject is patricide and incest—two crimes that symbolically represent the 
dissolution of the social order and the breakdown of the family unit.  Should such 
acts run rampant in a society, the society would inevitably crumble.  The threat 
that this kind of chaos brings to the primitive mind, for Girard, has been explained 
above.  What Girard adds through his treatment of Oedipus, however, is a further 
explanation of the process of undifferentiation.  For example, social or familial 
order is one way to maintain a sense of differentiation in a culture.  Without the 
obligatory prohibitions between family members, this sense of order and 
differentiation between individuals becomes threatened.  Oedipus marrying his 
mother blurs the identity of himself with that of his father, and there can be no 
family unit existing in this way.  This type of breakdown of the family unit, for 
Girard, is the beginning of social and cultural dissolution. 
Girard speaks of Oedipus or other tragic “criminals/heroes” in one sense 
as not necessarily responsible themselves for the breakdown of the social order, 
though they are blamed for it; they are more generally symbolic of the innate 
potentiality for breakdown in any system.  Girard also calls on the figure of 
Andromache who, like Oedipus, acts outside of the bounds of social civility, 
representing an incitement to social chaos.  The criminal/hero brings fear into the 
heart and mind because they manifest in themselves the dissolution of order; 
they thus become the bearer of the guilt—the surrogate victim—who has brought 
all the ills upon the society in which they are located.  While they are certainly 
symbolic and representative, really their responsibility is also very literal for the 
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community in which they are victimized.  The victim is the repository of guilt that, 
once expelled, likewise is responsible for the restoration of communal harmony.    
Girard goes further to explain the mechanism at play in creating the 
criminal/hero as the scapegoat.  Where one may begin a play, a tragedy, or 
myth, with several “heroes”, each of whom may in the end be declared guilty 
simply by process of agreement, over due time unanimity is established and one 
sole individual becomes responsible for both the calamitous destruction, and the 
restoration of peace.  This is the process toward “violent unanimity.”  According 
to Girard, there becomes an elevated level of hostility and clash between 
members of the community, which creates a kind of mob frenzy leading to the 
blaming of a victim.  In the context of the frenzy,  
 
The slightest hint, the most groundless accusation, can circulate 
with vertiginous speed and is transformed into irrefutable proof.  
The corporate sense of conviction snowballs, each member taking 
confidence from his neighbor by a rapid process of mimesis.37 
 
In other words, within this irrational realm the pointing to a scapegoat to take the 
blame for the disorder is an idea that takes on lightening speed and conviction, 
and it is an accusation that fails to be checked by any external authority. 
 
Where only shortly before a thousand individual conflicts had raged 
unchecked between a thousand enemy brothers, there now 
reappears a true community, united in its hatred for one alone of its 
number….all the differing antagonisms, now converge on an 
isolated and unique figure, the surrogate victim.38 
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 Those caught up in this type of mob frenzy, this type of liminal space or 
space of undifferentiation as presented in both Oedipus and The Bacchae, 
occupy the space between unity and difference which makes the community ripe 
for the sacrificial substitution.  Girard adds that this liminality is the atmosphere of 
terror and hallucination that accompanies the primordial religious experience.  In 
the hysteria of this atmosphere, the monstrous double becomes pervasive and 
takes on a quality of evil.  People become violent in this context and focused on 
eradicating the outwardly projected evil.  To this point, it seems Oedipus and The 
Bacchae are in agreement in terms of how they illustrate mimetic desire and the 
process of undifferentiation.   
 There is an essential difference between Oedipus and The Bacchae, 
though.  In Oedipus, the surrogate victim mechanism is already at work and 
importantly protects the society in which Oedipus lives from complete descent 
into chaos.   The Bacchae presents us with a different scenario.  In The Bacchae, 
extreme violence now taking place, Girard describes what happens in the play as 
the utter disintegration of social institutions and the collapse of the cultural order.  
“In the play, everything eventually goes up in flames, but the god emerges 
unscathed from the ruins.”39  Though every mortal in the play assumes divinity for 
themselves in vain grasping their own being, the object of their desire is utterly 
out of reach and they fall into monstrosity, the order around them disintegrating 
into chaos and collapse.  The god they were yearning to be, Dionysus, is all that 
remains, above the chaos and unattained by mortals. 
 The Bacchae, for Girard, is not a typical festival.  A “typical” festival would 
culminate in a sacrificial rite, which would reestablish order and deflate any 
ensuing violence—the festival would be a controlled form of chaos for the 
purpose of reestablishing the status quo in a relative time of peace (something 
like what happens in Oedipus, with Oedipus being the scapegoat and society 
returning to normal, though within the context of a sacred rite.)  The Bacchae, 
however, is a festival gone wrong.  And not only this:  Girard believes Euripides 	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is describing not just any festival, but the original bacchanal – that is, the 
sacrificial crisis itself—the originating event upon which subsequent festivals are 
based.40  The intensity of this festival, the completeness of the process of non-
differentiation, and the following annihilation of the cultural order that must 
necessarily follow, is the originating event for Girard that was indeed cataclysmic.  
It was an event that instilled tremendous fear; it was the annihilation of everything 
known and the collapse into chaos.  For Girard, it seems logical that humans will 
want to avoid this type of disintegration into nothing from happening again at all 
costs.  This type of event is the driver, the motivation, for Girard; this is the type 
of event that would compel humans to sacrifice if sacrifice would mean the 
avoidance of such a cataclysm and the restoration of order and peace. 
 For Girard, Euripides allows us a fleeting glimpse of the hypothetical 
originary event, and connects it to the sacrificial rite, intimating that there is a real 
relationship—a connection between an actual event and its subsequent imitation 
in ritual.41  For Girard, the type of festival depicted in The Bacchae is, once again, 
a type of originating event, a cataclysmic event, which is the ground and impetus 
for the development of the surrogate victim mechanism—a mechanism that 
creates violent unanimity and a sacrificial victim in order to control absolute 
disintegration into chaos and ensure the restoration of order and the continuation 
of society and culture.  Euripides’ festival gone wrong enables us to imagine 
exactly the type of event that had the gravity to impel humans to commit murder 
for the sake of restoration.  One life, Girard suggests, the life of the surrogate 
victim, for the sake of the many, so that we can avert the trappings and the truth 
of tragedy.   
 Importantly to Girard’s theory as well is his demonstration that festivals, in 
general, are manifested in primitive societies around the world.  These festivals, 
and even what Girard calls “anti-festivals,” are controlled experiments at non-
differentiation which culminate in the reestablishment of order.  While there are 	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differences in detail across the various festivals that are practiced, Girard is 
single-minded in maintaining that the structure he presents is foundational, and 
that Euripides has enabled us to visualize how such a structure began and took 
shape.  Euripides, more than any other writer, helps us to imagine how an 
originating event might have been the impulse requiring the creation of the 
surrogate victim mechanism. 
Girard’s thinking on the origins of sacrifice goes against the grain of some 
more or less “standard” theories of religious ritual as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, and Girard takes care to address these theories in his work.  It is at this 
point in V&S that he argues against the Cambridge Ritualists (Frazer et. al.) who 
assert that the cycles of nature are the fundamental pattern that gave rise to 
human thought and actions revolving around death and rebirth, specifically 
religious rites.  This type of thinking, which declares religious rites and festivals 
as having their basis in nature, has been very persuasive as a theory about the 
origin of ritual.  Girard, however, wants us to consider the origin of ritual from an 
obverse perspective.  Contra the Cambridge school (also referred to as the Myth 
and Ritual school), Girard asserts the death and rebirth of nature could not 
possibly have been the impetus for such a drastic action as murder.  And Girard 
certainly gets us with this point—we are dealing in ritual sacrifice with the death 
of a human being (or an animal at the very least); we are not simply observing 
and commemorating the death of leaves falling from the trees.  Girard believes 
there must have been something other than the changes and repetition in nature 
that compelled the birth of religious ritual. 
According to Girard, the surrogate victim mechanism also occurs in a 
pattern of death and rebirth.  The surrogate victim mechanism succeeds in 
bringing a crisis to an end, symbolic of a death; but it is also, importantly, the 
origin of a sacrificial system, symbolic of a birth.  That is, the mechanism ends 
the destructive cycle of violence and marks the beginning of a new constructive 
cycle (the new cycle being that of the sacrificial rite, protecting the community 
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and allowing culture and order to flourish).42  For Girard, it must first have been 
the surrogate victim mechanism with its corresponding social pattern of death 
giving way to rebirth, and second the projection of this pattern onto nature.  
Girard avers that “Sacrifice deals with humankind, and it is in human terms that 
we must attempt to comprehend it.”43  The surrogate victim, then, is a social 
mechanism that in effect provided the window to seeing a similar pattern in 
nature, not the other way around.  Girard sees nature as conforming to human’s 
pattern and not vice versa.  The surrogate victim mechanism and the sacrificial 
crisis fulfill all conditions required of a satisfactory hypothesis, and it is a type of 
sociological mechanism, the response of humans to each other within community 
as opposed to a response based on anything external, such as nature:  “I 
contend that the objective of ritual is the proper reenactment of the surrogate 
victim mechanism; its function is to perpetuate or renew the effects of this 
mechanism; that is, to keep violence outside the community.”44 
 
The Identity of the Surrogate Victim 
 
Girard presents a tempting theory to consider.  His idea of the surrogate victim 
mechanism, to this point, however, still begs questions about the identity of the 
victim.  If the victim must, as said in the beginning of this chapter, be an innocent 
victim, and not the guilty party, how does one choose them?  Girard admits the 
impossibility of providing a hard and fast formula for how the victim is chosen, but 
he does discuss in quite a bit of detail how he understands the process to occur 
from ethnographic reports. 
Girard declares that sacrifice actually requires not just the choosing of one 
victim, but a double substitution.  First, there is the substitution of one member of 
the community for all of them brought about through the operation of the 	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surrogate victim.  This first step happens at the height of mimetic rivalry and out 
of the mentality of mob frenzy discussed above.  The victim blamed here brings 
the contentious factions together in violent unanimity, and constitutes the “all 
against one” dynamic integral to Girard’s theory.  Second, a “ritual” substitution is 
superimposed on the first; that is, there is the substitution of a victim belonging to 
a sacrificial category who takes the place of the original victim.  This second step 
is crucial for, while the surrogate victim comes from inside the community, the 
ritual victim comes from outside it.  In this way, the ritual victim is a neutral party 
against whom the community could unite, but without fear of reprisal.   
 In chapter ten of V&S Girard expounds further on the concept of double 
substitution, and he does so within a discussion about the externality of the 
sacred.  Girard has just finished explaining the necessary separation between 
the community and the sacred (and also violence), which ensures the safety of 
the community.  The sacred is a strong and violent force that has given birth to 
the community, but is kept at bay for the sheer force of the deity is too strong for 
the community to survive in its presence.  The deity will periodically enter into the 
community in an onslaught of sacred violence, and the community then 
appeases the deity through sacrificial rite.  In discussing the identity of the victim, 
Girard points out that it is essential that the ritual victim come from outside the 
community because the victim must be identified with the sacred.  If the sacred is 
located outside the community, the victim, representing the sacred, must also be 
from without.  Members of the community, on the other hand, are by nature 
separated from the sacred and cannot be effective sacrifices. 
 The ritual victim, however, cannot be totally separate; rather, they must be 
made to be as a “monstrous double.”  The victim must symbolize and partake of 
all possible differences within the community, particularly the difference of within 
and without.  The victim, as monstrous double, passes freely from interior to 
exterior, and in this way might be called a liminal figure, symbolic of the 
monstrosity of the original event, the dissolution of differences, including the 
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ambiguous line between the community and the sacred.  The victim is both a link 
and a barrier between the community and sacred, and differences in general.45   
 Once the ritual victim has been obtained, Girard describes how the 
community strives to make them conform to the original victim for maximum 
cathartic potential; they strive to recreate the original victim.  This intervention is 
called the “sacrificial preparation,” the goal of which is to make the victim wholly 
“sacrifice-able.”  The preparation employs two approaches:  1) it seeks to make a 
victim too close to the community more foreign, e.g. the sacred king (who is 
required to commit incest to cut him off from the community and transform him 
into a sacred monster); or 2) it seeks to reintegrate one too foreign, (e.g. the 
Dinka cattle sacrifice, which seeks to humanize the cattle as sacrificial 
preparation.)46  Girard substantiates the act of sacrificial preparation through 
varied examples from across the globe and across time, impressively illustrating 
the boundary-crossing and anomalous identity that is integral to the sacrificial 
victim and the community they restore. 
 
The Hidden-ness of the Mechanism 
 
Girard ruminates on how he sees society as strangely protected by a kind of 
religious misapprehension.  Humanity, for Girard is strangely naïve and 
misguided, buying into mythologies which purport to promote peace, love and 
hope, but which really are founded in a violent act that paradoxically keeps us 
entrenched in violence while protecting us from its ability to extinguish us.  
Religious institutions and beliefs are purveyors and keepers of this mechanism; 
and we are awkwardly both misguided by our religion while protected by it.  The 
rite of sacrifice and the institution of religion are so persuasive, too, because of 
the concrete results they produce.  The rite does indeed promote unanimity and 
quell violence.  It also prevents an outbreak of bloodshed within the community.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., 271. 
46 Ibid., 272. 
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It is precisely that the rite is effective that the truth remains hidden and unknown, 
and the truth is kept hidden by dint of projecting it onto inscrutable god. 
Still, though, one must wonder, given the pervasiveness Girard claims for 
the surrogate victim mechanism, why humans have simply not noticed it.  Girard 
explores the notion that this mechanism has been hidden from view, perhaps, on 
purpose:    
 
Men cannot confront the naked truth about their violence without 
the risk of abandoning themselves to it entirely…It is possible that 
the survival of all human societies of the past was dependent on 
this fundamental lack of understanding.47   
 
The natural question to ask, then, is why can’t man successfully confront his own 
violence?  Would this not be a step toward ceasing the vicious cycle instead of 
exacerbating it?    
I think this question is worth teasing out.  To do so, let’s take the 
Holocaust as an example, and of how humans have tended to think and speak of 
this event in general.  The tendency when discussing this historical atrocity and 
descent into mass chaos, as I have experienced it, is to squarely place the blame 
on Hitler, as if he were the only one responsible.  When one thinks of the 
Holocaust generally, one does, I believe, think of Hitler as the instigator and 
perpetrator of the evil (perhaps much like how we think of Oedipus [and his 
community thought of him], but on a grander, world-affecting scale.)  The 
Holocaust, however, was the result of an entire cultural order and not one man; it 
could not, in fact, have been carried out by one man alone.  Rather, it took the 
participation of not just one, but in fact several cultures to escalate the violence to 
such horrific lengths.  But are we ready to face this fact?  This would involve a 
very difficult and soul-searching look at how a culture, and with other cultures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid., 82. 
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standing by, could have bred this kind of evil.  Perhaps the biggest block to 
confronting this is in fact because this kind of genocide still occurs in the world, 
and many cultures, most cultures, let it happen.   
To Girard’s point, we may not yet, as a species, be ready and willing to 
face our own violent participation.  To do so, as Girard does point out, would lead 
to further breakdown of cultural orders around the world.  This breakdown would 
cause further violence, as there would be no “good” violence to control it.  The 
world does still seem to be operating out of a surrogate victim mechanism, and 
from within the confines of a sacrificial mentality; blame is still accorded to 
individuals who must fall for the sake of others’ righteousness and restoration, 
one, and sometimes many, at a time.  Humanity might not like to be responsible 
for their participation in sacrificial culture, but the use of the sacrificial technique 
on both small and large scales cannot be denied. 
 
The Unity of All Rites 
 
Toward the end of V&S, the reader begins to understand that Girard is selling his 
theory of the surrogate victim as foundational for human nature across the board, 
as well as the operations of the world.  In chapter eleven, Girard focuses 
specifically on proving the common foundation of religious rites as he asserts that 
all rites are based on the surrogate victim mechanism.  He uses varied rites to 
make his case, demonstrating the idea that an outward diversity is not 
necessarily indicative of difference in ground.  He turns to ritual forms including 
cannibalism, rites of passage, and rites of kingship to illustrate the varying ways 
the surrogate victim mechanism can form the basis of religious practices.  
 In his discussion of cannibalism, Girard invites the reader to look at the 
ethnographic reports from the Tupinamba Indians of North West Brazil.  The 
Tupinamba’s primary form of cannibalism was a ritual form reserved for enemies 
brought alive to their village – enemies who were sometimes kept alive for years 
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before being devoured.  During the period in which they were kept alive, the 
enemy/victim was given the task of acting out social roles, until they became “a 
complete human being,” meaning one who has a place and function within 
society.  As a foreigner acting as part of the community, though, the 
enemy/victim exemplified the contradictions society creates – he is at once an 
enemy yet living within the confines of the tribe; he is at once outside the social 
order and part of it; he is to be killed, but is kept alive.  The enemy/victim in this 
way represents the kinds of contradictions that threaten the stability and order of 
society, essentially living in an impossible situation that can only end in death.48 
The surrogate victim is ritually created in order to reflect and absorb the 
community’s inner tensions as well as any accumulated hatred or bitterness, 
which can all be externalized and digested (literally) in the act of the cannibalistic 
rite. 
 Girard provides a second example of how the rite of cannibalism operates 
according to the surrogate victim mechanism with an illustration from with 
Tsimshian tribe.  The members of this tribe are reported to have an agreement 
amongst each other never to agree; thus they live in a permanent state of war 
maintained for the purpose of providing victims for ritual cannibalism.49  The 
victim, in this context, is always reconciling the permanently warring tribes, 
promulgating the need for continuous rites.  It is in this deliberately contrived 
state of warfare that the rites provide stability and the means to maintain the 
status quo.  The surrogate victim mechanism is the antidote to the constant 
threat of chaos. 
 Girard then turns to rites of passage to demonstrate how this type of rite is 
also founded upon in the surrogate victim mechanism.  Here, Girard uses Arnold 
van Gennep’s work Rites of Passage as his main source.50  Based on van 
Gennep’s work, Girard cites two distinct stages in a primitive’s change of status:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid., 275. 
49 Ibid., 278. 
50 Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1960). 
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first, they experience a loss of previous status; and second, they acquire a new 
one.51  For Girard, when the initiate loses their initial status, loss of difference is 
called to mind, putting us on familiar terrain in terms of Girard’s greater theory 
and the stage upon which violence and in turn the sacrificial crisis enter.  During 
the rite of passage, the initiate exists in a state of liminality; they symbolize 
literally in themselves, and their in-between identity, the loss of distinctions that 
can plunge a community into chaos and a subsequent sacrificial crisis.  Girard 
believes the mere presence of initiates is a threat to society for they confront the 
community with the possibility of violence and contagion.52  Girard asserts that 
primitive societies created procedures to direct the dangerous flow of energy 
generated by these events into channels prepared by the cultural order, thereby 
able to integrate the initiate back into a structured identity and more generally 
sustain, through the rite of passage, reentry into the social structure and the 
status quo.  There may or may not be a literal sacrifice offered at a rite of 
passage, but the point here is that the principles and stages of the surrogate 
victim mechanism are represented in this rite.  “Wherever there is potential for 
dangerous change, the remedy lies in ritual, and inevitably in the reproduction of 
the original solution, a rebirth of differences.”53 
 Girard, in light of the rites he discusses, all of which I will not go into here, 
asserts that there is a unity among rituals that parallels the operation and 
principle underneath the surrogate victim mechanism.   
 
There is a unity that underlies not only all mythologies and rituals 
but the whole of human culture, and this unity of unities depends on 
a single mechanism, continually functioning because perpetually 
misunderstood – the mechanism that assures the community’s 
spontaneous and unanimous outburst of opposition to the surrogate 
victim.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid., 281. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 284. 
54 Ibid., 299. 
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In both the rite of cannibalism and the rite of passage, the surrogate victim is 
intentionally created as a “monster” that embodies opposing identities and exists 
in an anomalous state in the cracks of social structure.  Both the cannibal 
sacrifice and the initiate of the rite of passage symbolize the loss of difference 
that sustains order in society and as such threaten society with impending chaos 
and violence by their very existence.  Integration back into order, and the re-
establishment of difference through either killing the “monster” or reintegration 
into a new and structure-bound identity is what is necessary to avoid violent 
escalation. The pattern that was apparent in the surrogate victim mechanism (i.e. 
loss of differentiation, escalation of chaos and imminence of violent contagion, 
monstrous doubling, reconciliation through surrogate victim) is thus apparent in 
these other rites, enabling Girard to assert the fundamental unity of all rites in this 
pattern.   
 Further, Girard maintains there is no real difference between rites of 
passage and rites to maintain the status quo.  He observes of course that some 
change is inevitable (people grow up, marry, fall sick, etc.), but primitive societies 
created procedures to direct the dangerous flow of energy generated by these 
events into channels prepared by the cultural order.  For Girard, wherever there 
is potential for dangerous change, the remedy lies in ritual, and inevitably in 
reproduction of the original solution, the rebirth of differences, which alleviates 
and keeps at bay the sacrificial crisis.55  All rites, therefore, are just forms of 
sacrificial rites, and attempts to maintain the status quo.  These rites play an 
integral part in the sustaining of institutional and cultural forms, and thus religious 
rites have a distinctly sociological function.  They also function to protect the 
human community, though as aforementioned, there is a price and an 
attachment to violence that must be paid for this kind of protection.  The price we 
are paying is what Girard believes we are perhaps only gradually now waking up 
to. 	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Final Commentary on Violence and the Sacred 
 
In his conclusion, René Girard demonstrates his approach to the origin of religion 
and culture quite clearly in his assertion that there is, indeed, and for him without 
a trace of doubt, one structure that can explain the aetiology of religious rites and 
rituals, regardless of their diversity and seeming incompatibility on the exterior.  
Girard denies the validity of previously expounded theories on the origin of 
religious rituals; he denies their origin in nature and in Freudian psychology.  He 
continues that religion is not patterned upon observation of the world; nor is it a 
function of our psychic lack of fulfillment in relational issues with our parents.  
Rather, religion is grounded in an event, an original sacrificial event, which 
prevented the imminent and overwhelmingly threatening dissolution of a 
community.  The saving act of violence, like the initial violent onslaught that 
created the chaos, became externalized as a manifestation of the “sacred.”  
Religion, for Girard, is thus grounded in the human being, in human nature, in 
how humans interact with one another; religion is grounded in how we protect 
ourselves from extinction and ensure our survival.  Religion is not based on 
nature; it is based on human nature.  Religion is, indeed, a human, even 
evolutionary, phenomenon.  
 Integral to Girard’s theory of course is that the human phenomenon, the 
originating event of which we are speaking, is an act of violence.  The originating 
event is a murder.  Thus, religion is founded not only in human nature for Girard, 
but in the aspect of our nature that resorts to violence to handle perceived threats 
or chaos, and restore peace.  Whereas the originating event took place in a 
situation of extreme perceived threat and chaos, however (as in The Bacchae), 
contrived religious rites are performed in the context of relative peace.  Many 
imitative rites purposefully incite forms of chaos, such as reversing gender roles 
or power structures, to set the stage for the sacrificial crisis, culminating in a 
sacrificial ritual that returns the community to its sense of order, differentiated 
identities and structures, and the ultimate affirmation of the status quo.  Religion, 
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in addition to being a mechanism ensuring our survival, is also a mechanism 
affirming social and cultural order and control. 
 The only thing preventing us today from accepting or even seeing the 
“truth” of Girard’s theory, according to Girard, is our suspicion, which he implies 
comes from our having been influenced too heavily by deconstructionism’s 
allergic reaction to any form of absolutism.  But for Girard, this suspicion 
manages only to leave us in a place where we have no consensus on religion or 
ritual; we have only varied and dissonant analyses which ultimately serve only to 
hide the foundational structure he has identified.  We are thus forced to choose.  
On one hand, we may buy into deconstructionist plurality which, in the end, 
provides us with a plethora of possibilities to ponder regarding the origin of 
religion and ritual; and yet at the same time, it gives us no sense of continuity—
no sense of a thread that may indeed tie all religions and all religious rites 
together in a frame that might make the mystery of religion more intelligible to us.  
On the other hand, we may choose Girard’s structuralism, which provides one 
absolute and unyielding “truth” – a dangerous proposition to buy into because 
there is no room for alternatives, but exceedingly attractive in its certainty, 
especially if we concede that Girard might be right. 
 Having said all this, Girard covers his bases by admitting that the 
generative violence, and the originating event, can never be witnessed, directly 
observed, or proven.  Calling up theories such as evolution and Freudian 
psychology, Girard offers the idea that perhaps not being able to “prove” a theory 
is not essential (as neither of the other theories that have radically altered 
humans perspective on the world can in fact be proven either.)  But Girard 
displays his academic arrogance in declaring his theory superior than other 
ground-breaking theories—superior even to evolution because the surrogate 
victim mechanism offers an explanation of the role religion played in primitive 
societies, which evolution did not; and better than Freudian theory because 
Freud’s theory was inconsistent and failed to accomplish a perspective on the 
unity of all religious rites.  Girard is immovable in his declaration that he has 
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uncovered the structural foundation of religion.  The entirety of his first exposition 
of this theory in V&S is a work designed to give the reader insight into the details 
of his theory through countless examples from primitive religion as well as certain 
modern expressions, which despite the diversity of manifestations, convincingly 
do point to a consistent underlying structure. 
 
I See Satan Fall Like Lightning 
 
In I See Satan56, Girard applies his theory of mimetic desire and the violence 
embedded in ritual to the realm of biblical interpretation, hence this book’s clear 
import for the current undertaking.  Girard moves through selected biblical 
texts—from both the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament—to illustrate 
how the biblical scriptures were the first scriptures self-conscious of their own 
violence – that is, they were the first to reveal mimesis and the single victim 
mechanism Girard delineated in V&S.  For Girard, the biblical scriptures 
importantly present scenarios of violence (as do the pagan myths), but where 
they differ is that the biblical scriptures present these scenarios from the 
perspective of the victim.  In doing so, they overturn the “pagan sacred,” which is 
a violent sacred that persecutes guilty victims, with a god that is victimized, 
innocent, and free of violence.  Girard’s analysis is undeniably at the meeting 
point of sociology and anthropology, but offers distinct and decisive theological 
implications as well.  I will go through the main ideas of I See Satan below in an 
attempt to illustrate how Girard’s ideas from V&S are applied to the biblical 
scriptures, and become essential for the task of biblical studies and theology.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (New York: 
Orbis Books, 1999, 2001). 
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Mimetic Rivalry Recognized in The Ten Commandments 
 
I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (hereafter I See Satan) opens with a discussion of 
the Ten Commandments to demonstrate that the bedrock of biblical religion is 
grounded in the understanding of mimesis and mimetic rivalry.  Girard looks 
specifically at commandments five through ten, all of which express prohibitions 
around different kinds of violence (i.e. stealing, adultery, murder, bearing false 
witness, coveting your neighbor’s wife).  Girard presents a unique interpretation 
of the commandments in that he sees commandments five through nine as 
ultimately explained by the tenth commandment.  The tenth commandment, 
(coveting one’s neighbor’s wife etc.), different from the rest, specifically prohibits 
desire itself.  For Girard, the connection seems clear:  desire is the root of 
violence, and thus commandment five through nine are really just working up to 
the ultimate commandment, which is the ground of them all, in the prohibition of 
desire itself.  The principle source of violence between human beings in Girard’s 
thought is mimetic rivalry which causes conflicts so intense that rivals will 
denigrate each other, steal from one another, sleep with the other’s spouse, or 
commit murder (i.e. four of the ten commandments).57 
 For Girard, the tenth commandment “signals a revolution” that comes to 
fruition in the New Testament, and it is right in the opening chapter of his book 
that Girard demonstrates something of a development in his thought since V&S 
with regard to mimesis.  In Girard’s understanding, the prohibitions as expressed 
in the ten commandments are necessary—they arose out of the human being’s 
inclinations toward mimetic rivalry, and there needed to be stops put into society 
for harmonious communal living.  This notion is in tune with what Girard has 
previously articulated in V&S, which is that mimetic rivalry needs to be curtailed 
(through prohibitions, rituals, etc.).  One primary criticism of Girard’s work on 
mimesis, however, is that while we are provided with many examples of rivalry to 
teach us how not to behave, we have no non-violent example to follow.  As 	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Girard himself points out in Freudian fashion, the prohibitions that keep us in 
check also tempt us to transgress.  How can one escape the vicious cycle of 
mimetic rivalry?  
In response, (perhaps to the criticisms he has received), Girard embarks – 
if ever so briefly-- on a discussion of what Rebecca Adams has called “positive” 
or “creative” mimesis and Vern Redekop has called a “mimetic of blessing.”  The 
truest example of positive mimesis for Girard is to be found in Jesus.  For Girard, 
Jesus does not abolish the law—he does not rid of the prohibitions—but he fulfills 
the law in the sense that he provides a model for desiring nothing but God.  “The 
basis of imitating Jesus is to imitate his desire, which is to resemble God the 
Father as much as possible.”58  Jesus, in other words, desires God, imitates God, 
and assumes the being of God.  He models the perfect image of the divine and 
he invites us to do the same.  In then imitating Jesus’ desire, we in turn desire 
only God, aligning our being, via mimesis, with the divine.  The incarnation of the 
divine in Jesus is an integral theological point for this aspect of Girard’s “antidote” 
to violent mimesis; imitating Jesus is the imitation of God himself while at the 
same time the incarnation provides a human model with whom one can enter into 
a mimetic relationship. Girard asserts that there is nothing egotistical, greedy or 
arrogant about this – we are not to become Jesus, we are to imitate his desire.  
The best way of preventing violence, thus, is not in forbidding objects or desire 
(like the commandments do), but in offering to people the model that will protect 
them from mimetic rivalries of violence, and providing an alternative way of 
being.59 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ibid., 13. 
59 This notion of positive mimesis and what it entails will be discussed in much greater 
detail in chapter five.  It is also useful to state here that mimetic desire is not always bad in itself 
even if it is responsible for violent acts that distress us when it is uncontrolled or misguided (15).  
As Girard points out, if there were no mimesis, our being and actions would be reduced to instinct 
like the animals.  Without mimesis, there would be neither freedom nor humanity. 
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Scandals and the Single Victim Mechanism in the Gospels 
 
Girard’s intimation that positive mimesis is possible (given, of course, that 
mimesis is integral to being human) is uplifting; nonetheless, the focus of I See 
Satan is not how to embrace and manifest this new model.  In this work, Girard 
remains focused on how mimetic rivalry is illustrated in the narratives of the Bible 
and what this means theologically.  In this vein, Girard calls up several examples 
from the Gospels to make his point.  I will give one example here to illustrate a 
scandal.  
“Scandals” are mini-rivalries that circulate and converge to create a 
mimetic crisis.  In I See Satan, Girard explains that scandal is from the noun 
scandalon and verb scandalizein (Gr., from verb “to limp,” meaning to continually 
collides with his or her shadow).  Scandal is “not one of those ordinary obstacles 
that we avoid easily after we run into it the first time, but a paradoxical obstacle 
that is almost impossible to avoid:  the more this obstacle, or scandal, repels us, 
the more it attracts us.”60  Scandal is sometimes translated as ‘stumbling block,’ 
and scandals are impossible to avoid because of the sheer number of humans 
there are, and the multitude and pressure of scandals circulating all around us.61  
For Girard, scandals begin as seemingly clear-cut rivalries with distinct 
boundaries and clear antagonists.  Scandals, however, often begin to overlap, 
antagonists may become involved in more than one scandal, and smaller 
scandals tend to become absorbed into larger scandals until one, main, 
polarizing scandal remains.  It is when the scandals converge in this way that 
one has a mimetic crisis, eventually causing the whole community to mobilize 
against one single individual.62  Girard states: “scandals all swarm around the 
single victim like worker bees around the queen held together by intensified 
contagion.”63  And the more unbearable personal scandals become, the more 
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61 Ibid., 18. 
62 Ibid., 23. 
63 Ibid., 24. 
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they are wont to be extinguished in one huge scandal – the war of “all against 
all,” which would annihilate the community if it were not transformed into an all 
against one. 
 Girard shows how, in the gospels, Jesus warns his disciples that they will 
participate in the mimetic contagion of the scandal—and on the side of the 
persecutors no less.64  The sudden rejection of Jesus in the gospels stems from 
mimetic contagion, and scandals play a role in the convergence toward Jesus as 
the single victim.  A primary example of this phenomenon is in Matthew 26.73-75 
when Peter imitates hostility when plunged into a hostile crowd, and then denies 
Jesus.65  Though his love for Jesus is sincere and profound, “The Gospels show 
him to be the puppet of his own mimetic desire, incapable of resisting pressures 
that work upon him from moment to moment.”66  Girard asserts that looking for 
the cause of Peter’s denial through a lens of psychology or temperament misses 
the point and minimizes its significance for Christianity.67  Even worse, Girard 
points out that blaming Peter’s character for his response implies that when we 
read this passage, we believe we would have acted differently in his situation.  It 
is akin to how children resist imitating their parents, and then grow up to be just 
like them (hence the old adage “what you resist, persists.”)  For Girard,   
 
This false difference is already the mimetic illusion of modern 
individualism, which represents the greatest resistance to the 
mimetic truth that is reenacted again and again in human relations.  
The paradox is that the resistance itself brings about the 
reenactment.68  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid., 23-4. 
65 All translations of the biblical text are from the New Revised Standardized Version 
unless otherwise noted. 
66 Ibid., 19. 
67 Ibid., 20. 
68 Ibid. 
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In seeing Peter’s fault as something we have already corrected, we fail to see our 
involvement in the mimetic scandals that exist all around us. 
With his theory of mimetic rivalry, Girard refutes the given Christian 
theology of ransom à la Anselm et al that has been a mainstay of Christian 
doctrine for centuries in favor of a mimetic anthropology.  For Girard, God is not 
instigating the death of Jesus or requiring the death of Jesus in any way in these 
narratives.  There is nothing in the gospels, he states, to even suggest that God 
causes the mob to unite against Jesus; violent contagion is enough.69  The 
victim, Girard says, is chosen spontaneously by the contagion itself.  The 
crucifixion, in this light, may be explained as an anthropological event.  The 
reason why it has never been interpreted this way, though, for Girard, is because 
other factors entered into the narratives of Jesus, which affected how we 
understood and interpreted the revelation inherent in them; the narratives include 
information that prevent us from seeing how Jesus was in fact chosen by chance 
as the result of the mob mentality characteristic of the single victim mechanism.70 
The kind of mob mentality that ultimately closes in on a single victim as in 
the gospels is illustrated well through the literature Girard introduces in V&S 
(such as The Bacchae described above).  It is also illustrated very succinctly and 
clearly in Girard’s exposition of the myth of Apollonius in I See Satan.  This myth, 
written by Philostratus, (a pagan of the second century CE), tells of a man named 
Apollonius who “heals” a plague that was wiping out the city of Ephesus.71  The 
myth includes Apollonius coaxing the townspeople to stone a beggar on the 
street, saying the beggar is the demon responsible for the plague.  The 
townspeople are hesitant to follow Apollonius’ command, but Apollonius 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid., 21. 
70 Ibid., 25.  As an example, Girard cites anti-Semitic interpretations of the crucifixion, 
which use ethnic or religious identity as a reason for persecuting Jesus.  He asserts that these 
kinds of interpretations cast shadows over the underlying reason of the crucifixion, which is really 
mimetic contagion and scapegoating. 
71 According to Girard, a “plague” was not always physical but included a social 
dimension.  Wherever “real” epidemics occurred, they affected social relations.  Wherever social 
relations were disrupted, epidemics could occur.  Thus “plague” could denote a social problem, a 
physical epidemic, or both. 
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convinces them to stone him.  While stoning him, the beggar’s personality 
becomes aggressive, “proving” that he was indeed a demon.  The stoning 
passes as miraculous as it puts an end to the “plague” of Ephesus.  Girard states 
that Ephesus was suffering from social internal tensions as at least one aspect of 
its “plague,” which Apollonius knew could be eradicated with the sacrifice of a 
scapegoat.  Uniting the city against a victim was enough to ease tension and 
restore harmony. 
This myth, however, describes the deliberate manipulation of the masses 
to create a scapegoat.  As such, the myth comes across as strangely self-
conscious, blatantly portraying the inner workings of mimetic contagion, mob 
frenzy, and the single victim mechanism.72  But the myth of Apollonius does not 
go all the way; it does not fully reveal the single victim mechanism.  Girard 
explains that in a complete myth, the one sacrificed tends to become a god after 
the ”miracle” their death produces.  Philostratus’ story is a “pale form of myth” in 
that the stoning does not, in the end, produce a god.  “If the collective violence 
were more powerful, the beggar would be divinized.”  Philostratus, Girard claims, 
has only written “half a myth”; the second transformation is completely absent (cf. 
Oedipus for contrast).  
The gospels, on the other hand, present the full arc of the single victim 
mechanism, which moves from scandal to scapegoat to divinization of the victim.  
And Girard avers that this full spectrum gives myth a certain power, associating 
the victim with the sacred, which can be drawn upon infinite times in rituals for 
restoration.  The myth of Apollonius cannot provide this.  The myth of Apollonius, 
however, if viewed together with the gospels, reveals even more clearly human 
being’s vulnerability to manipulation, violence, mob mentality, and scapegoating, 
which is precisely, for Girard, what led to Jesus’ death.  For Girard, it is the 
reading of myth and gospels together that allow this mechanism to be fully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This myth, written in the century after Jesus, may perhaps even be seen as something 
of an ironic commentary on the passion narratives.  Girard does not discuss, nor do I think he has 
looked into, whether this myth was in reality a deliberate comment or criticism upon Christian 
theology, but it seems a likely possibility. 
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exposed.  One needs the gospels in order to see through the mythology; 
mythology alone would only perpetuate the mechanism and keep it hidden.   
Aside from Jesus becoming deified and the beggar in the above myth’s 
failure to represent the full spectrum of the mechanism, there are other important 
differences.   First, Girard notes that there is no prior demonization behind the 
divinity of Christ.73  Christians don’t ascribe any guilt to Jesus.  Thus, Jesus’ 
divinity cannot rest on the same process as mythic deification.  Second, the 
gospels present an essential ingredient that makes them unique among ‘mythic’ 
narratives:  they contain a small group of dissidents that separates from the 
collective violence of the crowd and destroys its unanimity.74  This dissident 
minority has no equivalent in the pagan myths, leading Girard to assert that the 
structure of the Christian revelation is unique.  “The Gospels embody the 
discernment of a small minority that dares to oppose the monstrous mimetic 
contagion of a Dionysian lynching.”75  This rupture of unanimity is also what 
separates the gospels from the Hebrew Scriptures for Girard, bolstering the idea 
that the gospels go even further than the Hebrew narratives in debunking mythic 
deception.  The rupture is part of the revelation as it provides a contrast to the 
unconscious behavior of the crowds, which is summarized in gospel sayings 
such as “Forgive them for they know not what they do.”  Peter, also, refers to the 
ignorance of the persecutors in Acts 3.17.  The mimetic process and the single 
victim mechanism count on this type of unconsciousness in which the 
persecutors think they are doing good, working for justice and saving their 
community.  This is precisely how myth dupes us.  The gospels, however, 
disclose what is at the heart of our violence and give us what we need to reject 
the mythologies that have kept us ignorant.  Girard calls “prophetic” any text that 
denounces persecutory illusions; thus, the Psalms, Job, many parts of Genesis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Girard, I See Satan, 123. 
74 Girard describes how the mimetic contagion affects all but a few of the women, 
showing the power of the contagion even among Jesus’ disciples who had received warnings of 
its operations. 
75 Girard, I See Satan, 178. 
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and of course the Gospels, are placed in this category as well as literature that 
may exist without religious intent (Shakespeare, Dostoyevsky et al.). 
 
The Hebrew Scriptures – The Victim’s Perspective 
 
In between the ancient myths and the gospels is the Hebrew Bible.  Girard uses 
several examples in order to show how the Hebrew Scriptures open up a new 
kind of perspective that moves away from blood sacrifice to the humanization of 
the victim and bloodless reconciliation. 
The story of Joseph is one of the primary examples Girard draws on.  
Girard uses the biblical story of Joseph as a contrast to ancient myths to show 
that they are in basic opposition over whether collective violence is justifiable.  
The Bible, he asserts, clearly says no; whereas ancient myths say it can be 
legitimate.  Bringing us back to Oedipus as an example of ancient myth, we have 
seen that, in Oedipus, Oedipus is found guilty, made a victim, and justifiably 
expulsed.  This, for Girard, conveys the basic action and perspective of ancient 
myth, which is that the victim is always wrong and the persecutors are always 
right.  The myth of Apollonius above also shows how Philostratus takes 
advantage of this kind of mentality.  This stands in direct opposition to the Bible 
in which Joseph, for example, is always portrayed as “right” during the instances 
of his persecution; Joseph is the victim of his brothers’ persecution not because 
Joseph was guilty, but because of his brothers’ jealousy.  The essential 
observation Girard is making declares that, structurally, the ancient and biblical 
myths look quite similar, but have radically different viewpoints:  “The structural 
similarity is the basis of a radical difference from the standpoint of the narrative’s 
identification with the victim.”76  The basic and essential difference between the 
Bible and myth is in the biblical assertion of the victim as innocent and the myth’s 
assertion of the victim as guilty. 	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Girard also draws on the Book of Job to make this point.  Calling the book 
“an immense psalm,”77 Girard discusses the book in terms of its anthropological 
dynamics, pointing out how Job’s ‘friends’ and community only serve to 
persecute (mythically, for Girard) Job who is the helpless and vulnerable victim.  
There is unanimity in viewing Job as one who must have sinned, as guilty and 
deserving of his punishment, thereby justifying God’s violence and persecution of 
him as well.  Girard asserts, however, that Job ‘takes hold’ of the mimetic 
contagion and defeats it.  Job shows and is convinced that his God is not a God 
of persecution, but a God of victims.  “I know that my Defender lives,” asserts Job 
and, of course, God affirms in the end that Job is right.  The victim in this text is 
the one in the right; the victims are innocent and the executioners are guilty, says 
Girard.  The executioners, too, are the ones who have projected vengeance and 
violence onto God; but “they have not spoken right of God.”  Girard 
acknowledges, though, that this is “de-stabilizing” knowledge—the Book of Job, 
as well as the rest of the Hebrew Scriptures, call into question the right of those 
who persecute and oppress, declaring justice for the innocent victims, and taking 
a firm stand on the error of persecuting human action.  For Girard, the Hebrew 
Scriptures revolutionized a perspective on conflict:  “The reversal of the relation 
of innocence and guilt between victims and executioners is the keystone of 
biblical interpretation.”78 
For Girard, the genius of the Hebrew text is also the renunciation of 
idolatry.  Job, like Joseph, is idolized in his status within the family and the 
community—Job, in particular, is even considered “perfect” (Heb., tamim).  
Through his suffering, though, Job is humanized, and through God’s theophany, 
made well aware of his place in the grand scheme of things.  Joseph, likewise, 
endures harsh suffering and is subsequently redeemed.  The victims are made 
right in the end, but are affirmed in humanity through suffering in the process.  
The Hebrew Bible in this way “rejects the gods created by sacralized violence” 
and may even be considered “a criticism of the mechanism producing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid., 117. 
78 Ibid., 118. 
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gods.”79  In the Bible there is a divine reality that no longer belongs to the sphere 
of the collective idols of violence.  The God, Yahweh, does not depend at all on 
what happens with humankind.  This is the God that reproaches humans for their 
violence and sides with the victim.  In the Hebrew Bible, God is not created from 
violence; God is UN-created, independent of human action.  The divine is clearly 
separated from any result of collective violence. 
Girard points again to the story of Joseph to illustrate the biblical text’s 
demonstration of bloodless reconciliation in place of blood sacrifice.  “The final 
triumph of Joseph is, not an insignificant “happy ending”, but a means of making 
explicit the problem of violent expulsions.”80  In the Joseph story, pardon replaces 
obligatory vengeance—and only this is capable of stopping the vicious cycle of 
reprisals.  For Girard, 
 
The essential truth of the Joseph story lies, not in its possible 
correspondence to facts outside the text, but in its critique of mythic 
expulsions…It’s the difference between a world where arbitrary 
violence triumphs without being recognized and a world where this 
same violence is identified, denounced, and finally forgiven.81 
 
Girard notes that in the Bible, humans are just as violent as they ever 
were, and the single victim mechanism is still in place, but the Bible interprets 
actions uniquely.  Girard strongly criticizes those who read the psalms, for 
example, without seeing the real physical violence of the persecutors who are 
about to “lynch” their victim (i.e. the psalmist.)  Those who only criticize the texts 
for being violent are ignorant of what constitutes human violence:  “They have 
suppressed, hidden, or eliminated the ‘referent’, which is to say what the psalms 
are really about.”82  Thus, for Girard, the Hebrew Bible is the first place to honor 
the victim’s perspective, taking the unique view that the victim is not guilty just 	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80 Ibid., 111. 
81 Ibid., 113-14. 
82 Ibid., 115. 
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because they are being persecuted.  The Hebrew Bible, for Girard, may not 
divinize the victim as in the gospels, but it does humanize the victim by taking 
their perspective.  The Hebrew Bible also succeeds in the cessation of the 
idolatrous creation of gods out of violence, and of beginning the process of 
removing violence from the sacred.  
 
Satan 
 
Girard’s most startling assertion in I See Satan, however, is that human beings 
are actually carrying out Satan’s work, but of course we have no idea we are 
doing such.  Satan, for Girard, is as he is labeled in the New Testament, namely 
“the prince of this world”; he is the power that currently rules over human beings.  
He wreaks havoc with human beings, too, using the world as his playground, and 
we have been blind to how he manages to do this.  To explain how this is so, 
Girard begins with the gospel phrase “Satan expels Satan” – a strangely 
nonsensical phrase on the surface, but which takes on an undeniable logic and 
compelling possibility when exegeted in Girardian terms.   
In order to understand this phrase, it is necessary to first look deeply into 
the character of Satan.  According to Girard, Satan, in general, is understood to 
be a paradox; he is the principle of order and he is the principle of disorder.  The 
Satan that gets expelled is the one of disorder; Girard describes Satan as a 
cause of chaos – he is the violent contagion that creates mimetic rivalry, sets off 
the single mechanism, and importantly persuades the entire community that the 
guilt of the victim chosen is real.  This destructive and chaotic aspect is Satan’s 
favorite manifestation.  This is the Satan of disorder, and this is the Satan that 
gets expelled. 
Then there is an aspect to Satan that is the aspect of order.  It is the Satan 
of order who does the expelling!  According to Girard, as a principle of order, 
Satan wants to dispel the chaos he has created with mimetic contagion and 
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restore the peace (even if it is a temporary and unstable peace).  Why?  Because 
if reconciliation is not established, the chaos created by mimetic frenzy would 
ultimately destroy his earthly playground.  Satan thus has something at stake in 
the matter. “It is the same Satan who creates the furnace that sets off single 
victim mechanism.  Satan makes a way of expelling himself out of the highest 
heat in order to prevent the destruction of his kingdom.”83  Importantly, though, 
this satanic restoration is done through hearts and hands that succumb to 
violence.  “When the trouble caused by Satan is too great, he provides his own 
antidote.”84  And this antidote is the murder of the scapegoat.  Satan can always 
put enough order into the world to prevent the total destruction of what he 
possesses without depriving himself for too long of his favorite pastime, which is 
to sow disorder, violence, and misfortune.”85 
As Satan is both order and disorder, the instigator of mimetic rivalry and 
contagion and the one who sets off the single victim mechanism that temporarily 
restores the peace, Girard is saying that human beings are stuck in a satanic 
cycle quite literally.  Anthropologically, the mechanisms out of which we operate 
are satanic mechanisms that have been programmed into us since the beginning 
of culture.  Satan indeed may be seen, through this hypothesis, as expelling 
himself; “Satan casts out Satan.”  It is Satan on both sides of the equation – he is 
in the order that he causes to inevitably destabilize, which he then rectifies with 
the murder of a scapegoat.  The single victim mechanism is a satanic 
mechanism, and scarily the mechanism underneath culture and religion.   
According to Girard, our current way of handling human society on earth is 
through this devilish and violent process, a process that we are only beginning to 
see through thanks to the Jewish and Christian revelations.  For Girard, the Bible 
is explicit in the choice that exists between Satan and God, death and life.  In 
particular, Girard finds that John’s gospel lays out the consequences of choosing 
Satan and mimetic desire the most clearly, i.e. satanic murder.   The gospel of 	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John even scandalizes those who do not detect this choice – if we do not see the 
choice between the devil and God, we have already chosen the devil.  Girard’s 
exegesis of John’s gospel includes the important insight that even those Jesus 
speaks to do not get the choice before them, and they fail to understand how 
mimetic desire works (e.g. as in the example of Peter again, above).  Girard 
wants to steer us away from the anti-Semitic interpretation of John’s gospel to a 
broader interpretation using mimetic desire and not religious categories as the 
interpretive scheme. 
Theologically, there are two primary points to tease out.  First, there is the 
question of how Satan is related to God.  Girard notes how Satan “imitates” God, 
but in a distorted fashion.  Satan is the “ape of God” as Girard describes him—a 
parasite on creation as Satan cannot create by his own means.86  Both God and 
Satan contain the opposites of chaos and order within them, but where God is 
infinite being, Satan has no being at all; Satan’s transcendence is false, without 
reality in a religious sense, though his works are felt and formidable on the 
worldly plane. Girard’s Satan is almost Dantean – while travelling with the pilgrim 
through the Inferno, one revels at the expanse of hell and the power that Satan 
seems to have; Satan controls and punishes all of these fallen souls.  But when 
one finally meets Satan, he is just the husk of a being – a grotesque parody of 
the tri-une God living at the bottom of the pit of hell.  Satan, in reality, is a pitiful 
nothing.  Likewise, Satan, for Girard, is mimetic contagion personified and non-
existent as an individual entity; his seeming power is an illusion that will collapse 
once exposed.87  And for Girard, the Jewish and Christian scriptures are the 
means for this exposure and the ultimate defeat of Satan.   The death and 
resurrection of Jesus is meant, therefore, even in Girardian terms, as the end of 
the reign of Satan and the end to his government of the world according to the 
single victim mechanism.88 
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87 Ibid., 42. 
88 Before the biblical literature, myths presented and enacted this kind of mimetic 
violence, and always took the side of the perpetrator, as the victim was the pharmakon with no 
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The second theological point is that, through Satan, Girard asserts that the 
Gospels criticize the gods of pagan religions that have been given a false 
transcendence.  For Girard, the pagan “gods” are credited reconciling powers 
through sacrifice, and in so doing a violent sacred becomes worshipped, in fact 
masking humankind’s own violence; our violence is displaced onto a false 
sacred.  The idea of mimetic contagion, however, allows the New Testament to 
provide a space for the existence of evil without making a god out of it.  This is an 
important aspect of Girardian thought to emphasize given certain criticisms 
accusing him of a Gnostic theology, criticisms which do not hold water in this 
light.89  Satan becomes, at least in John’s gospel (in the Synoptics the term 
scandal is used), the impersonal principle of mimetic contagion, but is no more 
(at least according to Girard) than a personification.  There is no absolute evil in 
existence apart from the force of mimetic contagion and the single victim 
mechanism. In my view, this understanding of Satan can be drawn out of the 
Hebrew Scriptures as well, particularly poignant in Job in which the Satan of the 
folktale envelope may be construed as a personification of the mimetic contagion 
that spreads through the poetic dialogues.   
Despite Satan’s false transcendence, the effect he has on the world is 
nonetheless real; Satan has effective power.  Girard elaborates on the idea of 
false transcendence in chapter eight of I See Satan, where he speaks of the 
“powers” and “principalities” that are “offspring” of Satan.  My understanding of 
what Girard means by powers and principalities is precisely mimetic desire and 
the single victim mechanism, which he describes as “rooted in transcendence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
voice, but then divinized.  The mythic illusion is that these scripts get reenacted in everyday life—
the victims have no voice, and scapegoats are “outs” for the restoration of communal harmony.  
The human race on the whole used to take part in the single victim mechanism unconsciously.  
“Standing before the myths, we remain the dupes of transformations that are no longer capable of 
fooling us” (I See Satan, 73).  Now, we see through the lies of the persecutors and understand 
the victims must be understood as real and innocent.  We no longer give in to the single victim 
mechanism that would produce false gods.  We don’t want to make ourselves accomplices to the 
witch-hunt.  The process still operates in the world in a weakened form—a form therefore 
incapable of producing true myths.  According to Girard, the Bible was the first literature that gave 
the victim a voice and took the side of the victim. 
89 See Richard A. Cohen, “Is René Girard’s Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the 
World a Gnostic Theology?” (2008), Academia.edu, accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://www.academia.edu.  
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that is unreal yet effective.”90  “Sacrificial rituals do not seek to become one with 
false transcendence; they do not aspire to mystical union with Satan.  To the 
contrary, they try to keep this formidable figure at a distance and hold him at bay 
outside the community.”91  The problem though, as said above, is that they do 
this by the power of Satan without realizing it.  The more they try to keep him at 
bay, the more they invoke his force in mimetic contagion and the single victim 
mechanism, using Satan to expel Satan.  Girard insists, though, that one should 
not condemn the powers blindly:   
 
In a world that is alien to the kingdom of God, they are 
indispensible to the maintenance of order…St. Paul says the 
powers exist because they have a role to play as authorized by 
God…He recommends that Christians respect them and even 
honor them as long as they require nothing contrary to the Christian 
faith.92 
 
He continues saying it is not that the powers are evil in and of themselves; it is 
that the powers claim a false transcendence that makes them evil or satanic.   
Satan is always trying to usurp God’s power.  So, Girard is saying that if we 
recognized the powers, even if we gave way to the powers (as they are useful to 
a certain degree to restore harmony), this is fine.  “Although it has roots in 
deception, the false transcendence of violent religion is effective as long as all 
the members of the community respect and obey it.”93 But we should not think 
that there is anything divine about them or that the rituals of sacrifice have 
anything to do with connection to the real sacred.  
This leads one to ask what kind of earthly movement would be of God 
instead of Satan?  Certainly not a culture founded on sacrifice and murder.  For 
Girard, sacrifice may be understood as the foundation of “religion”; but it is not of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Girard, I See Satan, 97. 
91 Ibid., 98. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 100. 
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the true God.  There is the need for a new foundation and the adoption of rituals 
that connect one back not to murder and prohibition, but to life and creativity – to 
the idea expressed above (and which we will explore more below) called 
“positive mimesis.” 
 
Conclusion:  Modern Concern for Victims 
 
Girard does not offer anything akin to “positive mimesis” in I See Satan, but he 
does spend several chapters discussing the development of humanity’s concern 
for victims in the wake of Christianity.  “Wherever Christianity spreads, mythical 
systems decay and sacrificial rites disappear,” he says, “What does Christianity 
do now?”94  For Girard, Christianity provides a type of information unknown to 
previous societies.  We now understand forms of oppression and persecution in 
a way ancient societies did not.  Ancient societies did not notice them or just saw 
them as inevitable.  According to Girard, this understanding, which is 
fundamentally biblical, comes to light in the modern usage of the term 
“scapegoat.”95 
 Girard points out several typical forms scapegoating takes today (e.g. the 
wife for the boss)—they are not hard to identify; victims, he says, are substituted 
for the real object of anger, and scapegoats continue to play an important role in 
our society.  But, he continues, our use of them is 90% spoiled because we know 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ibid., 154. 
95 Girard provides definitions of a scapegoat in I See Satan as follows:  1) the victim of 
the ritual described in Leviticus; 2) all the victims of similar rituals known as rituals of expulsion; 3) 
all the phenomena of un-ritualized collective transference that we observe or believe we observe 
around us (160).  In the Hebrew Bible, the scapegoat is quite literal—it is a goat onto which the 
sins of the community are transferred.  The goat’s taking on the sins of the community is 
facilitated, further, by the nasty reputation of the goat, which smelled bad and was known for 
sexual promiscuity (154-5).  In the New Testament, Jesus is not referred to as a scapegoat, but a 
lamb of God.  This disassociates Jesus from the reputation of the goat, and replaces it with an 
animal connoting salvation, innocence, and sacrifice (156).  Girard points out that the modern 
usage and understanding of scapegoats is a reflection of biblical consciousness.  For s detailed 
history of the term scapegoat, see David Dawson, Flesh Becomes Word:  A Lexicography of the 
Scapegoat or, the History of an Idea (MI:  State University Press, 2013). 
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what we are doing and, further, the action of scapegoating is morally 
reprehensible to us. To have a moral consciousness that cannot tolerate 
scapegoating has caused a different kind of violence where we do not hunt the 
scapegoats; rather we are hunters of those who scapegoat.96  This is, of course, 
just a new way of scapegoating; but for Girard, this new way of scapegoating 
means that we have at least learned something from the Jewish and Christian 
revelations.  “The most effective power of transformation is not revolutionary 
violence but the modern concern for victims.  What pervades this concern and 
makes it effective is a true knowledge of oppression and persecution.”97  For 
Girard, our evolution is dependent upon the elimination of the permanent 
scapegoat structures that form the foundation of society, and this happens by our 
becoming aware of them.98 
 Girard goes even further to say that our world is characterized by 
reproaching our own violence.99  Modern society, he says, is characterized by 
our concern for victims.100  While I do not disagree with Girard’s thought here, I 
do think, however, that there needs to be some thought put into who exactly one 
conceives the victim to be in any given situation.  Even if we are conscious of 
oppressive and victimizing mechanisms and structures, it is not easy to always 
point out who is the victim and who is the persecutor.  How do we know who the 
”real” victim is?  Is there one party that is always innocent?  In the context of 
history, the victims seem to fluctuate, as do the persecutors.  For example, Jews 
experience being victims in one context, but are persecutors in another.  Early 
Christians, likewise, were victims, but became the oppressors over time and as 
they gained political power.  Girard asserts that in fact any group with a specific 
identity structure throughout history will create its scapegoats for, where there is 
a set identity, there must be those outside of it who provide contrast and “judged” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Girard, I See Satan, 158. 
97 Ibid., 168. 
98 Girard interestingly discusses Hitler and the Holocaust as an effort to erase the 
concern for the victim from our consciousness. 
99 Girard, I See Satan, 176. 
100 Ibid., 177. 
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difference – mimetic rivalry is bound to take hold and move toward reconciliation 
through a scapegoat sooner or later.   
 In Girard’s trajectory, the Christian revelation causes us to be aware of the 
scapegoating that we participate in, a system that, as aforementioned, will likely 
lead to an apocalyptic breakdown.  Girard asserts that Jesus distinguishes two 
types of peace:  1) the one based on principalities and powers, the one we 
currently know, which is the peace brought about by scapegoats; and 2) the 
gospels, which bring a different sort of peace.  This new sort of peace, however, 
cannot emerge without disturbing the old peace first, which is so far the only 
peace at our disposal.  Girard claims that apocalyptic is actually rational in the 
context of this revelation:  “Satan will fall like lightning from Heaven” (Luke 10.18) 
— with the end of Satan’s false transcendence and his reign through false 
accusation and violence, there will be an end to scapegoating and, in turn, an 
end to the foundation of our own culture.  For Girard, Satan will have nothing left 
to do but unleash himself at this point; but for human beings, importantly, there 
can be no reverting to the single victim mechanism.  Essential for Girard is the 
idea that we not revert to the single victim mechanism, but that we radically break 
out of the old pattern and raise up the voice of the unjustly accused victim.  And 
for this, we need something that pulls us toward it—something that breaks us out 
of our old cycle.  The resurrection, for Girard, is what can provide this—it is the 
model for what must happen in the world.  The paraclete is also the force that 
compels us to move beyond the current and destructive mimetic cycle.  The 
paraclete, for Girard, is the antidote to Satan. 
 
Where Can Judaism Meet with Girard? 
 
Girard is consistent through all of his works in his assertion that the Hebrew 
Scriptures were the first to diagnose the problem of mimetic rivalry and 
scapegoating.  For Girard, the authors of the Tanakh attempted a radical 
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revelation of these phenomena through a set of texts that speak in the voice of 
the victim.  Certain stories in the Tanakh are key texts for Girard.  The warring 
sibling stories of Genesis, the Book of Job along with the Psalms, and the 
Suffering Servant of Isaiah, are texts highlighting victimage and persecution.  The 
narrative cycle of Joseph also demonstrates the mechanism, and reveals an 
alternative model to reciprocal violence through forgiveness.  Importantly, Girard 
also demonstrates the Hebrew movement away from idolatry, that is, the false 
sacred, in Joseph’s specifically denying his divinity (which would have completed 
the arc of the “pagan” sacred) and instead affirming his humanity.101  
Forgiveness, in the Tanakh, is a very human quality, as it is a divine quality.  The 
humanization of the victim, therefore, replaces the generation of a sacred born 
out of violence.102  
Girard is not satisfied with the Hebrew revelation, though.  While they 
make powerful strides toward uncovering human’s entrapment in violence, Girard 
asserts that they never completely remove violence from the sacred and thus 
pose a mediocre at best revelation of the non-violent God.  According to Girard, 
the Hebrew Bible only partially reveals the mimetic cycle— it contains the first 
two parts, but is missing the third part, which is indeed the sacralization of the 
sacrificial victim.  Choosing to humanize the victim instead of deify the victim 
unfortunately, for Girard, does not sufficiently unmask the violent mentality that 
creates gods to blame for our own aggression.  In the Hebrew revelation, Girard 
says, the victim never rises again; God is never victimized and the victim is never 
divinized.  Viewing the Hebrew scripture in want of a deified victim will certainly 
leave one dissatisfied. 
The Hebrew Bible has its own way of reconciling the “deified” victim within 
its own belief system, though.  I suggest one way this is done is in the concept of 
holiness.  In the Hebrew Bible we learn of a particular place in the ancient temple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Girard, I See Satan, 119. 
102 Two scholars that have made contributions of import to the Girardian interpretation of 
the Joseph cycle are James G. Williams and Sandor Goodhart.  See James G. Williams, The 
Bible, Violence, and the Sacred:  Liberation from the Myth of Sanctioned Violence (PA:  Trinity 
Press International, 1991), 71-103; and Sandor Goodhart, “I am Joseph,” in Sacrificing 
Commentary:  Reading the End of Literature (Baltimore and London:  Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 99-121. 
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that was called the kipporet.  The kipporet was a literal “seat of holiness”; 
sacrifices were offered on the it, and it was believed to be the meeting place of 
the divine and the human, the place of greatest presence of the deity.  Over time, 
the seat of holiness became associated with the community of Israel, especially 
as sacrifices become spiritualized and internalized instead of literal.103  This idea 
of the community as the kipporet is expressed in the Dead Sea Scrolls, for 
example, by the monastic Qumran community that believed they themselves 
were the suffering seat of holiness; through their suffering all the world would be 
redeemed.  But the Jews in more general terms also developed the idea of the 
chosen ones – that is, the Jewish people as the ones who will reveal holiness to 
the world through their own example of communal trials and suffering.  It would 
not at all be inappropriate to state that the victimization of the Hebrews in the 
Scriptures reveal the mimetic cycle and victim mechanism of which Girard is 
speaking.  The “chosen” nation, too, emerges, literally as resurrected, on 
numerous occasions.  They are, for example, reborn out of slavery in the 
Exodus; and they are saved from extermination in the Book of Esther—literally 
given life when death seemed inevitable.  For the Hebrews, these were indeed 
miracles.  The Hebrew victims become the victors; the oppressed become a 
people in covenant with God.  Even if the Hebrews do not illustrate the 
divinization of victims, the victim is valorized.  It seems that one could 
demonstrate the full movement of Girard’s mechanism in the Hebrew Scriptures 
from victim to holy in this way.104 
While the “resurrection” of the victim is an important theme that would be a 
substantial topic for further study, (and emerges implicitly throughout this study), 
my goal here is neither to press the Hebrew revelation into a Christian (or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See Michael Fishbane for a history of the spiritualization of sacrifice in Judaism.  
Michael Fishbane, “Aspects of the Transformation of Sacrifice in Judaism,” in Ann W. Astell and 
Sandor Goodhart, eds., Sacrifice, Scripture, and Substitution (IN:  University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2011), 114-139. 
104 James G. Williams has written an excellent Girardian exposition on the text of the 
Exodus (and other key texts from the Tanakh including Joseph, as said above) in his book The 
Bible Violence, and the Sacred, but I do think that he, like Girard, misses this point.  See James 
G. Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred:  Liberation from the Myth of Sanctioned 
Violence (PA:  Trinity Press International, 1991), 71-103.	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alternatively “pagan”) paradigm, nor prove that literal or symbolic resurrection is 
even necessary for a text to reveal Girard’s mechanism.  The next three chapters 
will address three different texts from the Tanakh in an effort to test the 
compatibility of Girard and Judaism.  I have done my best to let the texts speak 
narratively, structurally, and theologically -- in a way that complements the 
interdisciplinary expertise of Girard—but free of the theological requirements of 
Christianity that Girard brings to his own exegesis.  
Contra Girard, I assert and will demonstrate that Judaism has recognized, 
revealed, and tried to rectify the problems of mimetic desire and scapegoating 
with substantial effect.  In talking about how Judaism has addressed the 
mechanism, however, one must necessarily put on a different set of glasses, 
speak in a different vocabulary, and think from a different theological vantage 
point; we must, if you will, address Judaism on its own terms.  Recalling the story 
of Joseph again, for example, humanizing the victim does stop the cycle in its 
tracks, and does not succumb to what might be a human inclination to deify and 
idolatrize.  The Hebrew Scriptures, as we will see in the coming chapters, puts a 
stronghold on human inclinations through emphases on study, reading (and 
hearing) Torah, self and communal effort and discipline, and ritual practice.  
Rather than placating certain “habits” if you will, the following chapters will show 
“antidotes” to mimetic rivalry and violence that focus on mental awareness, 
transforming models of thought, and exerting self-control.  Each text and 
corresponding ritual offers a vaccine to help one remember the satanic 
operations of the mechanism, and in addition prescribes how to go about 
managing and transforming humanity’s crisis of violence. 	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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The First Vaccine:  Jacob’s Birkhat ha-Banim and the Jewish 
Sabbath105 
 	  
Dear God,  
Maybe Cain and Abel would not have killed each other if they had 
their own rooms. That’s what my Mom did for me and my brother.  
 
–Larry106 
 
 
 
In Violence and the Sacred (V&S), Rene Girard remarks that when we think of 
siblings, we often think of affectionate relationships.107  He then proposes, 
however, that the stories that have come down to us through mythology and 
sacred scriptures often tell us otherwise.  Warring siblings are embedded deeply 
in history, religion and literature:  Girard lists Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau, 
Eteocles and Polyneices, Romulus and Remus, Richard the Lion-Hearted and 
John Lackland, as just a few examples of the fraternal rivalry in our collective 
consciousness.  The rivalries are so pervasive that Girard declares:  “the theme 
itself is a form of violence.”108  In both V&S and I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, 
Girard demonstrates how the biblical voice is groundbreaking in its exposure of 
mimesis and the sacrificial mechanism. Alongside this assertion, in Things 
Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (Things Hidden), Girard states: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 An earlier version of this Article originally appeared in Contagion, Vol. 19 (2012): 19-
39, under the title “The Jewish Vaccine Against Mimetic Desire.”  Copyright © 2012 by Michigan 
State University. 
106 Accessed July 2013, http://www.enlightened-spirituality.org/Spiritual_Humor.html. 
107 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), 61. 
108 Ibid. 
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I think it is possible to show that the texts of the Gospels manage to 
achieve what the Old Testament leaves incomplete.  These texts 
therefore serve as an extension of the Judaic bible, bringing to 
completion an enterprise that the Judaic bible did not take far 
enough, as Christian tradition has always maintained.109 
 
 
Girard’s expressed supersessionism, according to Sandor Goodhart, manages 
only to scapegoat the Hebrew Scriptures that are themselves responsible for 
revealing Girard’s hypothesis. Goodhart states in his article entitled “I am 
Joseph”:  
 
In opposing the Old Testament to the New, in reading the old God 
as the sacrificial God of vengeance and anger and the new as the 
anti-sacrificial God of love, have we not unwittingly already slipped 
into the very structure we have wished to displace, believing in a 
new law or a ‘part two’ which it has already been by definition, as it 
were, the goal of the Old Testament itself to reveal to us, an Old 
Testament which is thus that much richer by virtue of having 
foreseen our sacrificial misunderstanding of it.110 
 
 
Goodhart raises an extremely strong point in emphasizing the strength of the 
sacrificial way of thinking that has dominated humankind since, as Girard would 
say, “the foundation of the world.”  In the same way that Girard here sacrifices 
the Old Testament for its new sibling, brothers in Genesis do precisely the same.  
We seem to have this revelation before our eyes, but this violent mentality still 
exerts its iron grip on us.   
Using both the Tanakh and the rabbinic tradition, (culling from the early 
rabbinic midrash and/or the talmudim unless otherwise specified), I will 
demonstrate that, contra Girard, ancient Judaism did indeed “reveal,” address, 
and even attempt (and I believe successfully) to provide antidotes for mimetic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Rene Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann 
and Michael Metteer (CA:  Stanford University Press, 1978), 158. 
110 Sandor Goodhart, “I am Joseph: Rene Girard and the Prophetic Law”, in Violence and 
Truth, ed. Paul Dumouchel (CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 62-3. 
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rivalry.  We will also see, though, how even the early rabbis, like Girard, and 
indeed also the early Christians – all recipients of the biblical revelation of 
scapegoating violence—fail to stay in touch with its message and fall back into 
habitual sacrificial modes of thought.  I will demonstrate this throughout the 
chapter, specifically through an analysis of Genesis 48 in which Jacob blesses 
his grandchildren Ephraim and Manasseh, and its corresponding ritual of the 
Birkhat ha-Banim (“Blessing of the Children”).111   
The two sons of Joseph, the brothers Ephraim and Manasseh, are 
deserving of a Girardian analysis as a prominent sibling pair in the Book of 
Genesis that goes on to future prominence in Israelite history.  Any analysis of 
this pair in Girard or secondary sources is absent, and likely due to their 
protracted role in Genesis.112  These brothers are blessed by their grandfather, 
Jacob, as two of the future twelve tribes of Israel; but despite their historical 
import, these brothers play a very minor narrative role in Genesis.  Indeed, after 
Jacob blesses them, the book ends (possibly because there is no conflict to drive 
the tale).  Ephraim and Manasseh are the only peaceful brothers we encounter in 
Genesis, and it may be no coincidence that they arrive on the scene at the tail 
end of this book; they do not engage in the kind of mimetic competition of the 
brothers that came before them.  Did Girard overlook this absence of rivalry?  
This, I assert, is precisely why this story is of Girardian import and needs to be 
addressed.   
Perhaps not coincidentally, these brothers also occupy a central role in 
Jewish ritual:  Jews bless their children every week on the Sabbath, asking that 
God make their sons “like Ephraim and Manasseh.”  This ritual, I propose, is the 
weekly Jewish vaccine used to keep negative mimetic inclinations in check.  I will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Also, it is important to address how Jewish texts and rabbinic thought interpret the 
mechanism of which Girard speaks on their own terms.  We must start with the assumption that 
every religion is whole and complete in itself.  If Girard is correct, and if mimetic rivalry and 
sacrificial violence is a universally applicable theory at the heart of religion, every religious 
tradition must be capable on its own to reveal this mechanism, and propose a way to help its 
followers out of the sacrificial snare.  To show this in terms of Judaism is, indeed, one primary 
aim of this paper. 
112 The one exception is James G., Williams, who mentions Ephraim and Manasseh as a 
sibling pair of Genesis, but provides no analysis of their presence or function in the narrative or in 
Jewish ritual.  See Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred, 60. 
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propose that it is even more than this, too; that it is, in fact, a “peace” vaccine 
meant to proactively generate a new kind of order.113  The structure of the book 
of Genesis invites such a conclusion; the rabbinic explanations of Ephraim and 
Manasseh and the purpose of the Sabbath underscore it (as I will demonstrate).  
My ultimate goal is to determine to what extent this text and its ritual can really be 
effective in releasing humans from the sacrificial mentality.  I will examine how it 
operates in a particularist manner, on one hand, as sustenance for Jewish 
identity; and, on the other hand, how it is intended to operate universally for the 
transformation of human nature itself.  
 
 
The Birkhat ha-Banim, “Blessing of the Children” 
 
 
To summarize the narrative:  toward the end of the Book of Genesis (Genesis 
48), Joseph brings his two children, Ephraim and Manasseh, to see Jacob who is 
dying.  Jacob tells Joseph in this scene that he will make Joseph’s two sons as 
his own, and asks Joseph to bring his children forward so that he might bless 
them.  When Joseph brings them over, he is careful to place Manasseh, the older 
of the two brothers, before Jacob’s right hand (the right hand is traditionally the 
hand of spiritual primacy), and Ephraim before his left.  Jacob, however, crosses 
his hands so that his right hand is placed on the head of Ephraim and his left on 
the head of Manasseh.114  Joseph tries to correct what he perceives to be his 
father’s mistake, but Jacob knows what he is doing:  Manasseh, he says, will 
have a great future, but Ephraim will be the greater of the two.  Jacob then 
declares that “By you shall Israel invoke blessings, saying:  ‘God make you like 
Ephraim and Manasseh’”115 (Gen. 48.20a).  This is known in Judaism as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The analysis of the Birkhat ha-Banim as a “peace” vaccine, however, will be detailed 
in chapter five. 
114 The right hand is the preferred hand for the giving of mitvos (blessings) as it is 
associated with more spiritual power.  See Rabbi Nosson Scherman, ed., The Chumash (NY:  
Mesorah Publications, Ltd., 1993, 1994), 272. 
115 All biblical quotes are taken from the Jewish Publication Society’s new translation of 
the Tanakh unless otherwise noted.  See Jewish Publication Society, trans., The Tanakh:  The 
Holy Scriptures (Philadelphia, Jerusalem:  The Jewish Publication Society, 1985). 
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“Blessing of the Children” (Heb.: Birkhat ha-Banim) and is repeated in ritual form 
every week by parents and rabbis on the Jewish Sabbath.   
Jacob’s blessing of his grandchildren is called the “blessing of all 
blessings,” and is one that is given a place of importance in Jewish ritual.116 
Jewish tradition places great emphasis on parental blessings in general.  We 
might think of Isaac and Esau’s encounter after Jacob received Isaac’s blessing 
in place of his brother:  “When Esau heard his father’s words, he burst into wild 
and bitter sobbing and said to his father, ‘Bless me too, Father!’…’Have you not 
reserved a blessing for me?...Bless me too, Father!’  And Esau wept aloud” 
(Gen. 27.34, 36b, 38b).  Isaac has no more blessings to give, and Esau feels the 
deep physical and spiritual loss.  This feeling of loss was acute, too, for a 
blessing is effective language—blessings create reality and carve out a future for 
the one being blessed.  The parental blessing is considered prophetic in this 
respect –it is a linguistic blueprint for the protection and rewards the divine will 
provide.  What the blessing articulates is the future being prepared for the 
children.117  
The narratives that tell the stories of these blessings being passed from 
parents to sons in the Tanakh, though, are not straightforward.  In our example of 
Jacob’s blessing of his grandchildren above, Jacob deliberately crosses his arms 
to give the greater blessing to the younger son.  As the younger of two brothers 
himself, Jacob had to steal his birthright and blessing by deceit; one might 
conjecture here that perhaps Jacob, in blessing Ephraim and Manasseh as he 
does, is trying to rectify history – not only by ensuring that both children receive a 
blessing (poor Esau who never received one), but also by passing on the 
blessing to the younger son openly, legitimately and without the need for deceit.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 The New Interpreter’s Study Bible states:  “The blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh 
will be the standard by which all blessings are measured.”  Walter J. Harrelson, ed., The New 
Interpreter’s Study Bible (TN:  Abingdon Press, 2003), 81. 
117 When inquiring into the confusion regarding who received his blessing, Isaac declares 
about Jacob:  “Who was it then that hunted game and brought it to me, and I ate it all before you 
came and I blessed him?—yes, and blessed he shall be!” (Gen. 27.33)  After the destruction of 
the second temple, and the death of the priesthood in Judaism, the religious traditions changed to 
accommodate the Jews’ new circumstances.  One change consists in parents becoming kohanim 
(priests) and, as such, direct transmitters of divine blessings.  Whereas the Birkhat ha-Banim had 
once been uttered by the Temple priests, it is now uttered and made effective by parents. 
	   73	  
What Jacob does, from a literary point of view, is a beautiful completion of his 
past—it is perhaps how Jacob, in retrospect, would have liked his father to carry 
out this ritual.   
Referencing Girard, though, it is crucial to point out what Jacob’s prior 
deceit means in terms of mimesis and its consequential sacrificial violence.  In 
V&S, Girard points out how Jacob’s deceit is in his pretending to be his brother 
so that he might “steal” Esau’s blessing and birthright.  To accomplish this, Jacob 
must slaughter an animal, cook a stew out of the meat (to feed Isaac his father), 
and cover himself with the skin to feign Esau’s body hair (for when Isaac 
embraces him).  From a Girardian standpoint, the mimetic rivalry is obvious—
these are brothers competing for a birthright and blessing that they think will 
somehow grant them a being they desire.  This rivalry escalates to the point of 
mimetic doubling through Jacob’s literally disguising himself as his brother.  
Finally we have the presence of the sacrificial animal that serves, for Girard, as a 
kind of “protection”—the animal is the scapegoated victim who receives the 
violence in the place of those involved in the conflict.  Girard points out two forms 
of substitution at play here:  “one brother for another, and that of animal for a 
man.”118 
 
The kids serve in two different ways to dupe the father—or, in other 
terms, to divert from the son the violence directed toward him.  In 
order to receive the father’s blessing rather than his curse, Jacob 
must present to Isaac the freshly slaughtered kids made into a 
“savory meat.”  Then the son must seek refuge, literally, in the skins 
of the sacrificed animals.  The animals thus interpose themselves 
between father and son.  They serve as a sort of insulation, 
preventing the direct contact that could only lead to violence.119 
 
 
Girard distinguishes the “strange deception” underlying this sacrificial 
substitution.  He discusses how while the narrative gives us a glimpse into the 
kind of deception that is occurring, it does not however speak specifically about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Girard, V&S, 5. 
119 Ibid. 
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it.  It half reveals, and half conceals.  “There is reason to believe that the 
narrative touches upon the mythic origins of the sacrificial system.”120 
 Regarding Jacob’s role and character, Girard states:  “The figure of Jacob 
has long been linked with the devious character of sacrificial violence” and Girard 
links him to Odysseus who, like Jacob, executes a “splendid ruse” via animal 
fur.121  Girard’s analysis and analogy, based on the Jacob/Esau tale, may be apt.  
But I assert that Jacob’s role in the later narrative blessing Ephraim and 
Manasseh is not so clear; and thus Girard’s characterization of Jacob is perhaps 
premature.122  In the later narrative of Genesis 48, Jacob is deliberately repeating 
the past in one sense—he once again shakes up the family hierarchy by 
bestowing the greater blessing on the younger brother.  From a Girardian 
standpoint this is reminiscent of the bacchanal or festival in which social roles are 
swapped and a society totters on the edge of plunging itself into the danger of a 
mimetic crisis leading to sacrifice.  For Girard, the presence of brothers in and of 
themselves (in particular twins) embodies the danger of the effacement of 
difference and mimetic crisis.123  So perhaps Jacob might be said, here, to be a 
kind of trickster—the one that deliberately tries to stir up rivalry.  Yet perhaps 
Jacob’s intention is not this at all.  Jacob breaks from the past by blessing both of 
the children; his action is free from the constraints of past tradition, and illustrates 
an awareness grounded in abundance.124  Jacob is also deliberate in his 
movement in such a way as to “reveal” the constraining mechanism.  By 
reversing the hierarchy, Jacob is drawing attention to its acute potential for 
chaos.   
And yet no chaos ensues.  This narrative is missing elements of the 
sibling narratives preceding it:  it is above board; there is no deceit; there is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Ibid., 6. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Girard seems to interpret the whole of Jacob’s character in light of his usurpation of 
Esau’s blessing.  Jacob’s narrative throughout Genesis, however, details Jacob’s transformation, 
especially in Genesis 32 when Jacob wrestles with an angel (or perhaps God) and is renamed 
“Israel.”  Our ritual, the Birkhat ha-Banim, is based on the event of Jacob’s blessing of his 
grandchildren in Genesis 48, post-transformation. 
123 Ibid., 63-4. 
124 This notion will be discussed further below. 
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rivalry; there is no sacrificial substitution; there is no victim.  This narrative 
reveals the mechanism and at the same time provides an alternative.  Even if 
one insists that Jacob’s character remains devious, the brothers Ephraim and 
Manasseh have much to teach us from their response.  But I will assert below 
that there is much to learn from Jacob as a model as well.  This narrative is one 
of great significance for Jews, though it seems to have achieved little if no 
recognition from the other biblical religions.  What exactly did the Jews see in the 
narrative that prompted them to ritualize it and ask God to make their children 
like Ephraim and Manasseh?  Why do they not name Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, or 
Moses?  A look at rabbinic interpretation of the figures of Ephraim and Manasseh 
will yield deeper understanding of how they are linked to the idea of transcending 
mimetic rivalry and moving out of the sacrificial system. 
 
 
History of Interpretation of Ephraim and Manasseh:  Who Are They? 
 
 
Ephraim and Manasseh, having received their blessings from Jacob, are 
elevated to the status of his children, and they take their places as two of the 
twelve tribes of Israel in the remaining books of the Tanakh, replacing Joseph 
and Levi.  There are many strands of tradition that interpret the figures of 
Ephraim and Manasseh, and I will review just a few of these here, mostly with 
regard to Ephraim. 
 First, some interpreters have looked at the Hebrew canon as a whole, and 
have determined that Jacob’s blessing in Genesis is merely a later interpolation 
meant to justify or explain what comes later on, that is, the preeminence of 
Ephraim in comparison to his older brother, and the naming of Ephraim before 
Manasseh when they are named together.  Thus, there is an aetiological 
significance ascribed to this narrative.  This has been a popular historical critical 
interpretation of the passage containing Jacob’s blessing, and also an 
interpretation that validates the gift of prophecy attributed to Jacob.   
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Indeed it does seem Jacob was prophetic, too—there is a much deeper 
and more complex tradition history around Ephraim than there is around 
Manasseh.  There is a prime similarity, though, in how both figures denote a 
break from the past.  Joseph names his first child Manasseh because, he 
declares, “God has made me forget completely my hardship and my parental 
home.” (Gen. 41.51) The “hardship” and “parental home” refers to the animosity 
and violence to which Joseph was subject by his brothers.  Here, in naming 
Manasseh (meaning “forgetting”), he is letting go of the rivalries with his brothers 
– getting closure on his past so to speak—and this becomes important later on 
when he meets his brothers again and relinquishes his need for vengeance.  
Through Manasseh, one might say Joseph reconciles his past and breaks the 
cycle of violence just as Jacob reconciles his past and breaks the cycle of 
violence in blessing both of his grandchildren.  The allusions brought forth at the 
end of Genesis are both of ends and new beginnings.  
But there is even more to it than this when we start to delve into the figure 
of Ephraim.  In Tanakh, Ephraim goes from being the son of Joseph to a tribal 
head; to the most powerful tribe of northern kingdom; to a symbol of the northern 
kingdom itself; to a symbol of the entire people.125  In the Book of Jeremiah 31.9, 
the figure of Ephraim takes on theological overtones:  “For I am ever a father to 
Israel/Ephraim is My first-born”; Ephraim becomes Yahweh’s precious child.126  
We must look even deeper at the significance of this figure. 
Following the “clues” laid down in the Tanakh, Ephraim appears in 
rabbinic texts as an apocalyptic figure, even attaining the status of a messiah.127  
Ephraim becomes an eschatological figure within the context of what is 
commonly referred to as the “two-Messiah theory”:  the first messiah would be a 
descendent of Ephraim known as the “Messiah ben Joseph”; the second 
messiah would be a descendent of David, known as the “Messiah ben David.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 An excellent overview of the “rise” of Ephraim can be found in Samuel Dresner, 
Rachel (Minneapolis:  Fortress, 1994), 149-174. 
126 “Is Ephraim my dear son?/Is he the child I delight in?” (Jeremiah 31.20) 
127 Certain passages in the Tanakh are interpreted as referring to a figure or figures 
known as Messiah ben Joseph or Messiah ben Ephraim, e.g. Zechariah 12.10; Deuteronomy 
33.17, on which the rabbis based their commentaries. 
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According to scholar David Mitchell, the Messiah ben Joseph (with whom we are 
most concerned here) goes by various names including “Messiah ben Ephraim,” 
and sometimes, just “Ephraim.”128  I will refer to this messiah from this point on 
as the Messiah ben Joseph, which seems to be his most common designation.  
Mitchell adds that there are references to the Messiah ben Joseph “in rabbinic 
literature of all periods and genres.”129  Ephraim thus has quite an important 
legacy within Jewish thought through the ages.  How does Ephraim (a.k.a. 
Messiah ben Joseph) fulfill this role as a messiah, and how does this play into 
our Girardian understanding of the Genesis 48 narrative and its corresponding 
Birkhat ha-Banim?   
In general, Judaism presents the confluence of three types of messianic 
ideas:  conservative; restorative; and utopian.  Conservative has to do with 
maintaining the ritual prescriptions of the Torah; restorative has to do with the 
return to what is perceived to be an idyllic past; utopian has to do with the 
attainment of a future idyllic state (giving way to the apocalyptic visions).130  The 
exact nature of each of these messianic ideas is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but the main emphasis behind all three types is that there must be a 
tangible, material change in history.131 
Redemption, in mainline Judaism, is not just inward, but seen.  The 
Messiah ben David, as we will see, is this material change in history.  But very 
early strands of Judaism, and some would argue passages in the Tanakh, 
include a view that humankind must change internally before material change is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 According to David Mitchell, there are a number of ways of referring to the messiah I 
am calling the Messiah ben Ephraim or the Messiah ben Joseph in this paper:  1) “Messiah bar 
Ephraim” or “the King Messiah of the House of Joseph of the House of Ephraim,” as in the 
Targums; 2) “Messiah ben Ephraim,” as in the Aramaic Zohar and various additional texts (see 
full list in Mitchell’s article); 3) and even “a man of Ephraim ben Joseph” as in Pirkei Hekhalot 
Rabbati.  Mitchell points out that the Messiah ben Ephraim is interchangeable with the Messiah 
ben Joseph as a descendent of Ephraim is automatically a descendent of Joseph, who was 
Ephraim’s father.  See David C. Mitchell, “Messiah Ben Joseph:  A Sacrificing Atonement for 
Israel,” in Review of Rabbinic Judaism 10.1 (2007), 86-87. 
129 According to the JewishEncyclopedia.com, the earliest mention of the Messiah ben 
Joseph is in three statements attributed to Rabbi Dosa, in Suk. 52a, b,, which I will discuss in 
detail below.  See “Messiah,” Jewish Encyclopedia (2002-2011), accessed June 10, 2010, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/10729-messiah. 
130 Gershom Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism:  And Other Essays on Jewish 
Spirituality (New York:  Schocken Books, 1995), 2. 
131 Ibid. 
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possible.  The Messiah ben Joseph is given the task of effecting this internal 
change.  Mitchell, in his article “Messiah Ben Joseph:  A Sacrifice of Atonement 
for Israel,” discusses the rabbinic commentaries on this figure ranging from the 
early Tannaitic period through the seventeenth century.132  Not surprisingly, 
Mitchell discusses not only the various references to this figure, but its 
significance as an atoning and redeeming sacrifice for Israel.133 
In his article, Mitchell moves backwards through time, first citing examples 
from the renaissance to demonstrate how the Messiah ben Joseph has been 
construed as an atoning sacrifice for Israel.  Mitchell draws on a group of 
commentators who link the Messiah ben Joseph with the Suffering Servant of 
Isaiah, for example, Isaiah Horowitz (c. 1555-1630) and, before him, Naphtali 
ben Asher Altschuler (c. 1607).134  Mitchell draws out how both writers 
emphasize the innocence of this messiah, and the “severe” penalty that he pays 
on behalf of Israel.135 Mitchell then brings in Samuel b. Abraham Laniado ha-
Darshan (d. 1605) to corroborate the notion of the Messiah ben Joseph’s 
vicarious suffering:  “for he was…slain for the transgression of my people, the 
stroke intended for them being borne by him instead (v. 8)... Such is the sense of 
these verses, according to the opinion of those of our sages who apply them to 
the Messiah ben David, and to Messiah ben Joseph, who comes from 
Ephraim.”136  Lanaido ha-Darshan, significantly, draws on the sages in his 
interpretation here, in particular citing Rashi.137  This implies that there is a 
continuous thread of interpreting the Suffering Servant of Isaiah as the Messiah 
ben Joseph in this fashion through the generations.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 David C. Mitchell, “Messiah Ben Joseph”, 77-94. 
133 Mitchell writes this article against those scholars who have dismissed the idea of 
Messiah ben Joseph as an atoning sacrifice for a variety of reasons.  For example, Klausner 
dismisses the idea claiming it came about due to Christian influence; Rowley denies any 
connection between the Messiah ben Joseph and the suffering Servant of Isaiah 52-53; Castelli 
denies that there is proof of suffering before his death; etc.  I am persuaded by Mitchell’s view, 
and the antiquity of the theme.  See Mitchell,  “Messiah Ben Joseph”, 78. 
134 Both of these writers identify the Messiah ben Joseph as the Suffering Servant of 
Isaiah and clearly defend that there is a scriptural basis for the vicarious suffering and atoning 
death of this messiah.   
135 Mitchell, “Messiah Ben Joseph”, 79. 
136 Ibid., 80. 
137 Ibid. 
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To conclude the renaissance literature on Messiah ben Joseph, Mitchell 
draws on Moses Alshekh (1507-after 1593), who asserts that the Messiah ben 
Joseph can also be identified with the “pierced” one of Zechariah 12.10—the one 
who takes on the guilt and sins of all of Israel, and is slain in battle.  Both Alshekh 
and his contemporaries cited above discuss the vicarious suffering and 
atonement of the Messiah ben Joseph in a fashion that is suggestive of an 
ancient tradition rooted in the Tanakh.138 
Mitchell moves backwards in time to 1280-90 to discuss the mention of 
Messiah ben Joseph in the Zohar.  Interestingly, the Zohar discusses the 
Messiah ben Joseph as both dying and not dying.  In the passages where he 
dies (e.g., the description of the Messiah in the Garden of Eden from Vayyaqhel), 
the Messiah is described as taking on the sins and sicknesses of all of Israel, 
thus relieving Israel of the “punishments of the Torah.”  In the passages in which 
the Messiah ben Joseph does not die, it is stated that the “Faithful Shepherd” 
shall die in his place.  In either case, it is only of import here to underscore the 
necessity of a death for the atonement and healing of Israel to occur.  
Presumably, the Messiah ben Joseph would need to die if the “Faithful 
Shepherd” were not available for the undertaking, as Mitchell points out. 
The Geonic period is next, covering approximately the tenth century of the 
Common Era.  Mitchell cites two primary works in this section:  the midrash 
Nistarot Rav Shimon ben Yohai; and Saadia Gaon’s Kitab al-‘amanat wal-
I’tiqadat.  Both of these works, like the later commentaries, assert the Messiah 
ben Joseph’s connection to suffering and sin, but in a slightly different fashion.  
Mitchell cites from the midrash Nistarot:  “If they are not pure, Messiah ben 
Ephraim will come; and if they are pure, Messiah ben David will come.”139  
Saadia asserts the same view declaring that the repentant and righteous will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Mitchell points to the pre-Common Era origins of the Ephrite Messiah as well through 
its connection in rabbinic writings to suffering servant passages in Isaiah as well as the pierced 
hero passage in Zechariah.  Mitchell takes the notion of the sacrificial and atoning messiah even 
farther back in locating its source in Moses’ blessing of Joseph in Deuteronomy 33.13-17.  
Mitchell declares that the characteristics of this sacrificial and atoning messianic figure were well-
established in ancient Israel, even before the onset of Christianity.  See Mitchell, “Messiah Ben 
Joseph”, 94.   
139 Mitchell, “Messiah ben Joseph,” 84. 
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bring on Messiah ben David; Messiah ben Joseph will come only to the 
unrighteous as a “refiner’s fire.”140  It is clear from these two interpreters that the 
Messiah ben Ephraim appears only within the context of sin; his main purpose is 
to cleanse of sin so as to pave the way for the Messiah ben David.  Mitchell 
points out that neither of these writers specifically discusses the Messiah ben 
Ephraim as an atoning sacrifice, nor do they mention how the Messiah ben 
Ephraim will carry out the purification.  But it is clear that the role of Messiah ben 
Ephraim is to appear in the context of sin for the sake of atonement. 
After a brief mention of Sefer Zerubbabel (which I do not deem necessary 
to reiterate here), Mitchell moves farther back into the 5th and 6th centuries—to 
the Pesikta Rabbati.  I am citing here the first passage in pisqa 36.1 not just for 
how it, as the above texts, links Messiah ben Ephraim to the vanquishing of sin, 
but also to begin to connect it to Girard’s theological ideas in I See Satan.  The 
pisqa is as follows:   
 
And when he saw him, Satan was shaken, and he fell upon his face 
and said:  Surely this is the Messiah who will cause me and all the 
angels of the nations to be swallowed up in Gehenna, as it is said, 
He will swallow up death for ever; and the Lord God will wipe away 
the tears from all faces (Is. 25.8).  In that hour the angels of the 
nations, in agitation, will say to him:  Master of the Universe, who is 
this through whose power we are to be swallowed up?  What is his 
name?  What kind of a being is he?  The Holy One, blessed be he, 
will reply:  He is the Messiah, and his name is Ephraim Messiah, 
my righteousness.141 
 
 
Mitchell comments here:  “Messiah Ephraim’s sufferings effect destruction of 
cosmic evil.  By his sufferings Satan and the fallen angels who mislead the 
nations are consigned to Gehenna.”142  This passage brings the destruction of 
sin to a theological level, destroying not just sin itself, but that which tempts 
humankind into sin.  We will refer later back to the Messiah ben Ephraim’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Ibid., 85. 
141 Ibid., 87. 
142 Ibid. 
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connections to Girard, but it is crucial to make a preliminary comment about 
Girard’s theological assertion in I See Satan, in which Girard declares the cycle 
of mimetic desire and scapegoating to be a “satanic cycle” keeping humankind 
entrapped in a cycle of violence—expelling “Satan through Satan”—that is, using 
violence to avert violence.  Here we have a very preliminary glimpse of how the 
life and death of the Messiah ben Ephraim is a type of Jewish “Passion” meant to 
release humanity from its cycle of sin and death.  This understanding of the 
Messiah ben Ephraim as the one who releases humanity from the grasp of Satan 
also underscores the second messiah, the Messiah ben David, as the one who 
appears in a context of purity. 
Mitchell, last, moves even farther back in time to the earliest direct 
mention of the Messiah ben Joseph and the Messiah ben David by name, which 
appears in Tractate Sukkah of the Babylonian Talmud (commonly called the 
Bavli).143  The Messiah ben Joseph specifically appears three times in this 
tractate, which is of particular import within the body of rabbinic writings in 
general because of its early composition.  (The Bavli was compiled during the 
first through fifth centuries of the Common Era; Mitchell indicates a date for the 
particular material below as mid-first century CE.)  Page 52 of Sukkah presents 
the following debate: 
 
“And the land shall mourn family by family apart.  The family of the 
House of David apart and their women apart” (Zech. 12.12).  They 
said:  Is not this an a fortiori conclusion?  In an age to come, when 
they are busy mourning and no evil inclination rules them, the 
Torah says, “the men apart and the women apart.”  How much 
more so now when they are busy rejoicing and the evil inclination 
rules them.  What is the cause of this mourning?  Rabbi Dosa and 
the rabbis differ.  One says:  “For Messiah ben Joseph who is 
slain;” and the other says: “For the evil inclination which is slain.”  It 
is well according to him who says, “For Messiah ben Joseph who is 
slain,” for this is what is written, “And they shall look upon me whom 
they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him like the mourning 
for an only son” (Zech. 12.10); but according to him who says, “The 
evil inclination which is slain:”  Is this an occasion for mourning?  Is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 B. Suk. 52, in The Soncino Babylonian Talmud, ed. Rabbi Dr. I Epstein (London:  
Soncino, Press, 1935-1948), accessed April 29, 2011, http://halakhah.com/pdf/moed/Sukkah.pdf.	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it not an occasion for rejoicing rather than weeping? (Following 
Mitchell, Aramaic passages are in italics).144 
 
 
Mitchell explains the origins of this debate in the Mishnah, the specifics of which 
need not concern us here.  What is of concern to us is that what we have here is 
debate over the identity of an object of mourning during the ceremonies held for 
the Feast of Sukkot:  is it the Messiah ben Joseph that is being mourned (as 
Rabbi Dosa avers); or is it the evil inclination (opine those other than Dosa).  The 
redactor of the tractate upholds Dosa’s view, supporting the position with the text 
of Zechariah 12.10-14, which speaks of “the pierced one” who is mourned. 
Sukkah mentions the Messiah ben Joseph again just a few paragraphs 
down the page.  In this instance, the rabbis teach (as we have already learned) 
that the Messiah ben David will come after the Messiah ben Joseph.  It states: 
 
The rabbis taught: The Messiah b. David, who (as we hope) will 
appear in the near future, the Holy One, blessed be He, will say to 
him: Ask something of me and I will give it to thee, as it is written 
[Ps. ii. 7-8]: "I will announce the decree . . . Ask it of me, and I will 
give," etc. But as the Messiah b. David will have seen that the 
Messiah b. Joseph who preceded him was killed, he will say before 
the Lord: Lord of the Universe, I will ask nothing of Thee but life. 
And the Lord will answer: This was prophesied already for thee by 
thy father David [Ps. xxi. 5]: "Life hath he asked of thee, thou 
gavest it to him."145 
 
 
The exact nature of the two messiahs are not delineated in this tractate, but we 
do get the impression that there is not only a slain messiah tradition, but a well-
known two-messiah tradition already in place that includes the death of the 
Messiah ben Joseph succeeded by a Davidic Messiah who is given life.  And 
this, indeed, is the tradition that is further elaborated in the later strands of 
rabbinic writings we have explored above thanks to Mitchell’s exposition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 David C. Mitchell, “Rabbi Dosa and the Rabbis Differ:  Messiah Ben Joseph in the 
Babylonian Talmud,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 8.1 (2005), 77. 
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It seems fair, in my estimation, to agree with Mitchell and maintain that 
there was indeed a two-Messiah theory that began quite early in the history of 
ancient Israel, (possibly as early as the first century CE), featuring one Messiah 
who is slain and a second Messiah who lives.  In addition, it seems clear in 
rabbinic interpretation that the Messiah ben Joseph has a specific role to play as 
the messiah that appears in the context of sin in order to vanquish sin, and 
thereby pave the way for the Messiah ben David.  And it is this--- it is the 
Messiah ben Joseph’s role as one who is slain in the context of sin—even by 
sin—and in order to vanquish sin—that we begin to see how this figure becomes 
“Girardian” and a possible revelation of the sacrificial violence of which Girard 
speaks.  Is the Messiah ben Joseph, a.k.a. Ephraim, a sacrifice meant to end all 
sacrifices?  Is he meant to break humanity out of its satanic cycle of sacrificial 
violence?  Is this the sacrificial messiah that the world requires before the non-
sacrificial messiah and the new world order can arrive?   
Aharon Agus also writes of the Messiahs ben Joseph and ben David, with 
an emphasis on their ontological and theological purposes.  For Agus, the two 
messiahs have very specific roles to play, each one denoting and effectuating a 
specific occurrence in human being(s) and in the world.146  Agus fleshes out the 
significance of a two-messiah theory both in terms of how it relates and tells 
something of human nature, as well as how it clarifies differing perspectives on 
deliverance – one perspective being deliverance within history, the other 
deliverance transcending history. 
According to Agus, the way the Messiah ben Joseph will provide 
deliverance can be interpreted on many levels, all which correlate, and all of 
which prepare the world for the advent of the subsequent Davidic Messiah.  On 
the most literal level, the Messiah ben Joseph (as aforementioned) is a figure 
that will cause deliverance of humanity by dying, literally and heroically, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Aharon Agus, The Binding of Isaac and Messiah:  Law, Martyrdom and Deliverance in 
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battle.147  The texts that thus speak of the death of the Messiah ben Joseph may 
be taken at face value, the death of this messiah being a literal sacrifice, and 
indeed a “revelatory” sacrifice meant to end sacrifice.  (Thus the Davidic messiah 
will be enabled to live.)  Even, therefore, if the death of the Messiah ben Joseph 
is a literal one, its effect may have many layers:  1) it presents a psychic shock 
that alerts humankind to the sacrificial mechanism they have been playing out 
and enables the process to end the sacrificial cycle; 2) it theologically effects 
atonement for sin, thereby also granting a renewal in humankind and release 
from the sacrificial cycle; 3) it symbolically represents the death of something in 
humankind – whether a mentality or sin—that creates a real and tangible 
difference in human nature itself.  Agus confirms that the deliverance of the 
Messiah ben Joseph must be experienced through cataclysmic suffering, even 
death, termed the “pangs of the Messiah.”148  The transformation that will be 
brought on will be no small change.   
The sacrificing death of the Messiah ben Joseph, however, while it has 
sometimes been understood literally, has also been understood symbolically as 
either the actual death of the evil inclination (Heb,, yetzer ha-ra) residing in 
humans, or as the cause of it. 
 
 
The Yetzer ha-Ra or “Evil Inclination” 
 
 
Let us turn briefly back to our earlier text from the Bavli that features Rabbi Dosa 
and the mourning of the Messiah ben Joseph in order to explore the connection 
between the Messiah ben Joseph and the yetzer ha-ra, (which is most often 
translated as “the evil inclination” or “the evil impulse”).  The rabbis in this text 
(other than Dosa and the redactor) seem to view the evil inclination as separate 
from the slaying of the Messiah ben Joseph.  Mitchell, however, interprets that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 In the Middle Ages, Kabbalistic Judaism has often been linked with interpreting the 
sacrificial death of the Messiah ben Joseph through the lens of martyrdom, misrepresenting what 
a Girardian interpretation would understand to be an anti-sacrificial revelation.  For a detailed 
discussion of the Messiah ben Joseph and martyrdom, see Agus. 
148 Agus, 208. 
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Dosa (and the redactor) do not; Dosa and the redactor seem to understand the 
death of the Messiah ben Joseph as connected to, even causative of, the death 
of the evil inclination.  Mitchell suggests that Zechariah 12.10-14 and 13.1 are the 
proof-texts declaring how the mourning of the Messiah ben Joseph (as discussed 
in Zech. 12.10-14) “opened the fountain that slew the evil inclination” (Zech. 13.1, 
which directly follows Zech. 12.10-14).149  For Mitchell, we have here not just a 
passage from the Tanakh, but also a Talmudic source that imply “a causal link 
between his slaying (i.e. the slaying of the Messiah ben Joseph) and the slaying 
of the evil yetzer.”150 
This suits our purpose in this dissertation, that is, to bring to light Jewish 
resonance with Girard, as the evil inclination is uncanny in its resemblance to 
what Girard calls mimetic desire.  The evil inclination, in short, is considered a 
part of creation, and thus “good”; it is said in Genesis Rabbah that the evil 
inclination is what compels us to marry, build a house and trade.151  This 
inclination is necessary to the workings of the world.  A homily by Amora Rav or 
Rabbi Johanan (the exact source is uncertain) makes clear why the evil 
inclination is necessary to the world.  The homily goes that around the time of the 
Second Temple, a prayer was circulating to eradicate sexual sin (personified as 
an attempt to slay the tempter who incites humanity to such).  Urbach quotes 
from this homily:  “Said a prophet to them: ‘Beware, you will slay the whole world, 
if you slay him.’  But then when they needed a fresh laid egg for a sick person, 
they couldn’t find one!  So they let him go after three days.”152  While the evil 
inclination is necessary to the workings of the physical world, it is also part of 
humanity’s base nature, and the impulse that drives humanity toward rivalry, lust 
and envy.  Cain, for example, defended himself before God for having slain Abel 
by arguing that God had implanted in him the yetzer ha-ra.153  In I See Satan, 
Girard similarly discusses the intrinsic function of mimetic desire for human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Zechariah 13.1 states:  “On that day a fountain shall be opened for the House of David 
and the inhabitants of Jerusalem, to cleanse them from sin and impurity.” 
150 Agus, 79.  
151 Gen. R. 9. 9, in Agus, 290. 
152 Ephraim E. Urbach. The Sages:  Their Concepts and Beliefs (Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem:  The Magness Press, 1979), 475. 
153 Tan., Bereshit, 25, ed. Buber, 10, from Agus, 291. 
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being.  Mimetic desire, he asserts, is not in itself bad, even if it is responsible for 
violent acts that distress us.154  As Girard points out, if there were no mimesis, 
our being and actions would be reduced to instinct like the animals.  Without 
mimesis, there would be neither freedom nor humanity.  Mimesis, however, is 
also what leads humanity into rivalries that, still to this point, produce violence.  
To correlate Girard’s idea with rabbinic language, then, we might postulate that 
Girard’s mimetic desire is, if not identical to, at least a very similar concept to 
what the rabbis call the evil inclination. 
One finds further correlations between the yetzer ha-ra and Girard’s 
mimesis in terms of the mechanism by which they both operate, as well as how 
they can be managed.  According to the rabbis, our innate evil inclination cannot 
be denied.  We are not, however, supposed to combat it by withdrawing from the 
world; we must conquer it within the world.  The rabbis teach that though the evil 
inclination was created by God, and may wreak havoc in the world, God also 
gave man the antidote:  “My children, I have created for you the Evil Inclination 
(but I have at the same time) created for you the Torah as an antidote.  As long 
as you occupy yourselves with the Torah, he (i.e. the evil inclination) shall not 
have dominion over you…”155  Similarly, in the School of Rabbi Ishmael it was 
taught:  “My son, if this hideous (wretch) encounters you (i.e., the evil inclination), 
drag him along to the schoolhouse; if he is of stone, he will dissolve, and if of 
iron, he will be shattered…”156  For the rabbis, the evil inclination could only be 
staved off and disciplined through study of the Torah.   
The rabbis also give some indications about the mechanics of the evil 
inclination, acknowledging its power, and in an attempt to understand its inner 
workings.  For example, rabbinic teachings begin to illustrate how the evil 
inclination became equated with idolatry—the antithesis, if you will, of Torah.  
The two teachings above are just two of many Tannaitic teachings that associate 
the evil inclination with other gods.  “The very fact that ‘other gods’ are identified 	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155 Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages:  Their Concepts and Beliefs (Hebrew University, 
Jerusalem:  The Magness Press, 1979), 472. 
156 Ibid. 
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with the Evil Inclination is evidence of the power attributed to him, and the 
consoling thought that he would be eradicated in the future was insufficient to put 
their minds at rest.  Many therefore investigated his devices and methods.”157  
What are these methods?  One of the primary methods by which the evil 
inclination operates is in how it begins small but gradually takes over – it is 
“sweet in the beginning but horrible in the end.”158  The evil inclination may 
present itself, for example, as an idea that breaches Torah, but according to 
one’s own judgment, seems okay.  The rabbis point is that this practice will 
escalate and lead one farther and farther astray, making room for the evil 
inclination to usurp power over one’s life:   
 
…by doing evil he may become obtuse and the forbidden as 
permitted and even deprive himself of the possibility of repenting.  
He may consider the Evil Inclination itself as his god as Rabbi 
Jannai put it:  ‘Whoever listens to his (Evil) Inclination is, as it were, 
an idolater.  What is the reason?  ‘There shall no strange god be in 
thee’….make not the stranger within you sovereign.159 
 
 
The point seems clear:  listening to one’s own judgment instead of the Torah is 
nothing more than bowing to the idol that is one’s own mind.  And this happens 
within humans because of the evil inclination. 
The evil inclination is also that which keeps the good inclination in prison, 
and here it is associated with escalation of anger:160 
 
‘He that is slow to anger is better than the Mighty, and he that ruleth 
over his spirit than he that taketh a city.’ (Proverbs 16.32) Ben 
Zoma also identifies the evil inclination with tendency to anger and 
impatience:  ‘If a man pulls out his hair, rends his garments, breaks 
his vessels, or scatters his money in his wrath, regard him as no 
better than an idolater.  For if his yetzer would have said to him “Go 
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and worship idols,” he would have done so, for such is the work of 
the evil inclination.’161   
 
 
The main idea here seems to be that the evil inclination gives way to a kind of 
irrational behavior—a kind of behavior one associates with anger, or a cloudy 
mind—the opposite of the good inclination which would be Torah-inclined, the 
sustained ability to reason, study, and keep a clear mind.  When the mind is 
clouded with anger, the good inclination, which would have one study Torah or 
think reasonably, is kept at bay by the strength of the angry emotion.  The 
concept of the yetzer ha-ra is strikingly similar to the Girard’s concept of mimesis, 
and so is the effect of mimesis on the mind of humankind—both mimesis and the 
evil inclination operate in a way that leads to a kind of frenzy, an irrationality, that 
causes self-deception and clouds the mind.  The mechanics of these two 
principles also seem to correlate.   
The rabbis teach of the power of the Torah to help in the struggle against 
the escalation of the evil inclination; but they also indicate that as long as the 
Torah is in the possession of man, it is impossible to uproot the evil inclination 
entirely.  It is said that any distance between man and God creates room for the 
evil inclination to act.  The tractate from the Bavli cited above in this chapter, 
however, recalls a tradition that speaks of the death of the evil inclination in 
association with a discussion of the Messiah ben Joseph.  This reflects a rabbinic 
tradition that esteems the overcoming of the evil inclination—an accomplishment 
that will bring on a new way of being in the world.  The tradition cites that the 
slaughtering of the evil inclination is “as if one had sacrificed all the sacrifices 
together”162 – this accomplishment will have no small effect.  It will be the death, 
literally, of a part of what is human nature—it will be the death of humanity’s will 
to power, to idolatrous ways of thinking, to competition and covetousness.  The 
alternative to this cycle of “satan” dominated by the evil inclination (and mimetic 
rivalry) will be, for Jews, living according to the Torah.  The alternative to satanic 	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living is also conceived as the way of repentance, which calls for strength of will, 
knowledge and understanding in man’s fight against his passions.163  Of course, 
the way of repentance, and the death of the evil inclination, is also the return to 
God and the doing of His will, as commanded in the Torah.164  This spiritual, 
internal slaughtering of this base part of human nature, and the return to the way 
of repentance, must happen before any type of historical redemption can occur.  
The slaughtering of the evil inclination is identified, in this line of rabbinic thinking, 
as the spiritual change first, (i.e. Messiah ben Joseph), which is the necessary 
pre-condition for the material change sought in history (i.e. Messiah ben David).  
The scenario of the Messiah ben Joseph, as the death of the evil 
inclination or the cause thereof, is nothing short of a transformation of human 
nature itself; it can be no surface or superficial kind of change:  “it is a total 
wrenching from one’s past, from the dimension of the past in one’s 
being…messianic repentance is a wrenching away from the very nature of man, 
regardless of whether he has sinned.”165  A total break with the nature of man as 
it has unfolded through the dimension of history must take place—this is the 
arena of the Messiah ben Joseph, and the death of the evil inclination.   
In the strand of rabbinic thought we have been reflecting upon, we have 
seen the figure Ephraim as the harbinger of the Messiah, sometimes referred to 
as the Messiah himself, who must die symbolically as a representation of the 
sacrifice of the evil inclination which wreaks havoc on the world and prevents the 
redemption of history (a.k.a. the Messiah ben David).  Ephraim is God’s precious 
child, declared his first-born; he becomes connected, in a strand of rabbinic 
tradition, to a sacrifice of atonement, an agent of reconciliation, the link between 
the world now and world to come—the movement from the world dominated by 
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the evil inclination to the world of compassion and peace.  Whether the death of 
Ephraim (or the Messiah ben Joseph) is meant to be actual or symbolic, the 
result is meant to be a psychic transformation, redemption, and deliverance from 
our own human nature, from our evil inclination.  In order for transformation to 
occur, it seems there still has to be a sacrifice—whether literal or otherwise.  
And, importantly, the means of offering this sacrifice is through study of the 
Torah.  Torah is both the vehicle and the antidote. 
 
 
The Sabbath Vaccine 
 
 
The Torah, as the antidote to mimetic rivalry and the machinations of the yetzer 
ha-ra, is said to contain 613 commandments.  Certainly, however, the Ten 
Commandments are primary.  I See Satan opens with a discussion of the Ten 
Commandments, in fact, to demonstrate that the bedrock of biblical religion is 
indeed the understanding of mimesis and mimetic rivalry.  In I See Satan, as 
discussed in chapter one, Girard looks specifically at commandments six through 
ten, all of which express prohibitions around different kinds of violence (i.e. 
stealing, adultery, murder, bearing false witness, and coveting your neighbor’s 
wife).  Girard presents a unique interpretation of the commandments in that he 
sees commandments six through nine as ultimately explained by the tenth 
commandment.  The tenth commandment (prohibiting coveting one’s neighbor’s 
wife, etc.), different from the rest, specifically prohibits desire itself.  For Girard, 
the connection is clear:  desire is the root of violence, and thus commandments 
six through nine are really just working up to the ultimate commandment, which is 
the ground of them all, in the prohibition of desire itself.166 
 But what about the first five commandments?  Girard leaves these out.  In 
establishing the connection between mimetic desire and the yetzer ha-ra, though, 
it becomes clear how mimetic desire can be understood as the basis of at least 
two more (even three) of the commandments:  do not practice idolatry 	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(Commandments 1 and 2); and remember the Sabbath day—to keep it holy 
(Commandment 4).  The connection of idolatry to mimesis has been addressed 
above.  How is keeping the Sabbath connected? 
 The purpose of the Sabbath, by no coincidence, is “aimed at freeing man 
from enslavement to his impulses, and from routine, tension, and the lower 
spiritual level of the workday.”167  It is a day commanded for holiness, and for 
striving to the highest possible level of compassion, joy and communion.  The 
rituals and practices that are commanded for the Sabbath celebration are 
specifically to help Jews achieve mastery over their evil inclination.  The 
commandment to not “work,” for example, helps to shelter the Jew from the 
typical daily activities that are routine and create rivalry (there are the physical 
routines, some of which may be necessary to navigate the world, but there are 
also the automatic mindsets that accompany these routines.)   
The Sabbath is also thought to be metaphysically different; the Sabbath is 
a time when Jews are endowed with an extra soul (the shekinah) that protects 
them from the yetzer ha-ra, but also fills one with divine-infused freedom.  The 
commandment to keep the Sabbath is then, in one sense, appropriately about 
humankind’s need to understand the mimetic impulses that are inclined to take 
over and compel idolatry.  The commandment to keep the Sabbath might be, in 
fact, a direct command to keep mimetic rivalry at bay.  With metaphysical aid, 
Jews are able to practice releasing themselves from mimetic rivalry, from the 
workings of the yetzer ha-ra, once every week.  But the Sabbath is not just a rest 
from the evil impulse; it is a proactive being with family, community, and the 
divine – it is a re-orientation while in the world.  Rabbi Luria has in this respect 
called the Sabbath “a taste of the world to come.”168 
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Girardian Implications, Jewish Identity, and the Transformation of 
Humankind 
 
 
In light of the Sabbath’s purpose to cultivate the higher aspects of humankind, it 
is certainly appropriate that the Birkhat ha-Banim, the Blessing over Ephraim and 
Manasseh, is bestowed upon children on this occasion.  We have discussed 
Ephraim’s symbolic persona as the Messiah ben Joseph as a break from the 
past, from the workings of the yetzer ha-ra, and the transformation of human 
nature in preparation for the Messiah ben David.  It appears, in fact, that all the 
sibling narratives of the book of Genesis are leading up to this point.  The 
narratives develop over the course of the book in a progression that begins with 
murder (Cain and Abel), moves into forgiveness (Joseph and his brothers), and 
finally into the peace of no conflict at all (Ephraim and Manasseh).  Strikingly, the 
“wrenching” of human nature that needs to occur, and which is symbolized by 
Ephraim and Manasseh, may be open to challenge; there may in fact be more of 
a gradual advancement toward this transformation than is often acknowledged.  
On the way from Cain and Abel to Ephraim and Manasseh, for example, there is 
not only the example of Joseph (which has gained a lot of attention from Girard, 
James G. Williams, and Sandor Goodhart),169 but other brothers who healed 
from their initial mimetic conflicts.  The scapegoats of the Genesis narratives are, 
in a sense, “resurrected,” and may perhaps serve as models of “the forgiving 
victim.”170 
These “resurrected” figures appear in Genesis and are none other than 
Ishmael and Esau, who reappear somewhat unexpectedly in the main narrative.  
In Genesis 25.9-10, for example, Isaac and Ishmael appear together at the grave 
of their father Abraham.  The text of this scene is sparse, but its author seems 
almost oddly nonplussed at the brothers’ appearing together.  The reader may be 
struck by the brothers’ presence together, too, especially because of Ishmael’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 See especially Girard, I See Satan, 118-119; Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the 
Sacred; and Goodhart, “I am Joseph.” 
170 A term coined by independent scholar James Alison for a lecture series produced by 
The Raven Foundation, 2013. 
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complete silence, and the lack of any type of conversation or drama.  The 
brothers simply co-exist to pay respect to their deceased father.  Their 
reappearance and implied reconciliation may, coincidentally, rest only in the 
context of their father’s death.  But Abraham’s death was certainly not induced by 
violence from these brothers. 
There is more substance to the story of the reconciliation of Jacob and 
Esau in Genesis 32-33, which recounts Jacob’s wrestling with a mysterious 
divine force—God or an angel (though sometimes translated as “man”)-- in 
preparation for the meeting.  It is generally understood that Jacob undergoes 
some kind of inner transformation during his wrestling encounter, which enables 
him to meet successfully with Esau.  Jacob is given victory over the angel and is 
reborn and, in turn, renamed Israel.  Jacob, here, has wrestled with God, seen 
the face of God, and lived.171  Jacob’s trepidation around meeting with his 
estranged brother, however, proves to be unfounded.  Esau meets Jacob with 
open arms, warmth, a kiss, and a genuine joy at their reunion.  Esau, in fact, 
gives the reader much to learn from; as the slighted brother, the “victim”, Esau 
notably shows up as fully healed, and with the air that forgiveness has fully taken 
place in his heart.  The reader has not been informed about Esau’s healing 
process, but it is clear he has come to terms with the past.  He shows genuine 
love for his brother.  Jacob, on the other hand, seems unable to fully relinquish 
his guilt over the past and his fear of retaliation.  But none occurs.  James G. 
Williams delivers an insightful Girardian exegesis of the Jacob and Esau cycle, 
and makes the astute point that Jacob even returns the blessing he had formerly 
stolen.  Jacob, in this way, undoes what he knew was wrong in order to assuage 
his own guilt and reconciles himself with his past-- and ironically Esau had 
already forgiven him.  We have here, thus, an exemplary sibling rectification and 
reconciliation.  Jacob and Esau have both, it is sure, wrestled with mimesis itself 
to get to this place of mutual embrace.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 For a detailed exposition of the use of the word “face” (Heb., panim), and the 
associations the text makes between the “face” of God and Esau, see Williams, 53. 
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In light of the examples set by all of these brothers, it is interesting to 
return to one of Girard’s statements cited at the beginning of this chapter.  After 
naming a few rivalries between brothers to illustrate Girard’s idea about how 
sibling conflict seems so pervasive, I noted Girard’s succinct statement about 
brothers:  “the theme itself is a form of violence.”172  Is it possible to sustain this 
argument given the examples here brought forth?  While it is clear that this 
dissertation has taken on the view of sibling rivalry as a lens through which to 
analyze mimetic rivalry (and one cannot discount that where there are brothers, 
there is very often violence as we have seen and will see in further chapters), this 
lens may in effect filter out what possibilities other than violence exist when 
brothers are encountered.  I offer the following alternatives:  “The theme of 
brothers itself is an opportunity for progress” is one possibility; or perhaps “the 
theme of brothers itself is an opportunity for learning”; or, if I might be bold, “the 
theme of brothers itself is an opportunity for peace.” 
Ephraim and Manasseh, though, with no conflict at all to speak of, are in 
an entirely different league from our other sibling pairs.  Jacob’s blessing of the 
children at the end of Genesis in and of itself demonstrates a break from the 
past.  Though Jacob is still prophetically pronouncing a greater blessing for 
Ephraim, both Ephraim and Manasseh are the recipients of the blessing—and 
this is a dramatic break from previous narratives in which only one child could 
receive this honor.  Jacob himself, in this way, is wrenching us from the violent 
past (including his own violent past) and creating an alternative that may help to 
stave off the deep impulse toward rivalry from the start. 
Examples of sibling compatibility that occur following Jacob’s blessing, in 
the next book of the Tanakh (i.e., Exodus), may be used to affirm the case of 
Ephraim and Manasseh as a vaccine that can keep mimetic rivalry at bay, and 
also as a “follow up” to see if our peaceful brothers at the end of Genesis have a 
lasting influence.  Rabbi David Kalb, for example, has pointed to two moments in 
the Book of Exodus that are acute exemplars of a healthy sibling relationship.  
The exemplars feature Moses and Aaron, who are the next brothers we meet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Girard, V&S, 61. 
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upon completion of the Book of Genesis.173  Kalb asserts that these examples 
from Exodus convey to the reader that the problem of sibling rivalry has been 
resolved, and he asserts this after a well-informed analysis of the rivalry that 
pervades Genesis, significant for my purposes agreeing with my thesis that 
Ephraim and Manasseh are symbolic of a transformation.174   
In the first of Kalb’s examples, he points to a moment not long before the 
Exodus from Egypt, when Aaron finds out that his brother Moses is going to be 
the leader of Israel in spite of the fact that Moses is younger.  In Exodus 4.27, 
Aaron goes to meet his brother as Moses returns to Egypt from Midian: 
 
The Lord said to Aaron, “Go to meet Moses in the wilderness.”  He 
went and met him at the mountain of God, and he kissed him.  
Moses told Aaron about all the things that the Lord had committed 
to him and all the signs about which He had instructed him.  Then 
Moses and Aaron went and assembled all the elders of the 
Israelites.  Aaron repeated all the words that the Lord had spoken 
to Moses, and performed the signs in the sight of the people  
(Exod. 4.27-30). 
 
 
This brotherly support and affection displays no sign of jealousy or animosity by 
Aaron to Moses despite Moses’ being cast “as God” or “in the form of the Lord” 
for his older brother (Exod. 4.16; Num. 12.8).  The rabbis also make careful note 
of Aaron’s joy at seeing and kissing his brother, demonstrating sincere happiness 
over his brother’s rise to glory.  The Song of Songs Rabbah recounts how Aaron 
is rewarded for his brotherly support: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 There is a long scholarly tradition that questions whether Moses and Aaron were 
literally brothers, or whether this was a term simply referring to a personal or communal 
relatedness.  Regardless of whether the term is literal or figurative, Moses and Aaron 
demonstrate how “brothers” can behave in a mimetically positive way. 
174 Kalb discusses several defining moments leading up to the transformation of sibling 
relationships in Genesis, and further in the Book of Exodus, in one of his Torah commentaries.  
Interestingly, he states that “family” is not cherished until the nation of Israel becomes enslaved in 
Egypt.  It is the enslavement of the entire Hebrew nation that “teaches the value of family and 
solves the problem of sibling rivalry.”  Rabbi David Kalb, personal email to author, January 10, 
2011. 
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Indeed, Aaron was to find his reward, says Simon ben Yoḥai; for 
that heart which had leaped with joy over his younger brother's rise 
to glory greater than his was decorated with the Urim and 
Thummim, which were to "be upon Aaron's heart when he goeth in 
before the Lord."175 
 
 
The reward of urim and thummim that Aaron receives here is a great 
honor.  These terms can be interpreted in a variety of ways, such as 
“lights and perfections” or “oracles and commands,” even “revelation and 
truth.”  No matter how we specifically translate these gifts bestowed upon 
Aaron, it is clear that control of one’s mimetic impulses--- or stated in the 
affirmative, exemplifying positive mimesis—reaps great divine honor.176   
The rabbis also praise Moses for his brotherly role and laud him for the 
respect and concern he shows for Aaron.  The rabbis point to the call of Moses 
and interpret Moses’ desire for God to send someone else in Exodus 4.13 (“But 
he said, ‘Oh my Lord, please send someone else.’”) as Moses’ hesitation to 
accept a position of leadership in place of his brother who had served in such a 
capacity for so long.  Moses is therefore portrayed as respectful of Aaron’s 
feelings and position; he accepts the blessing God grants him (he is really given 
no choice), but with articulated hesitation.  The rabbis highlight the mutuality of 
the relationship by noting the number of times “Moses and Aaron” are cited 
together in the Tanakh, singing the praises of their united virtues, even 
interpreting some of the poetry of the Song of Songs as bringing further attention 
to such brotherly love and support.177  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Cant. R. i. 10, in “Aaron,” The Jewish Encyclopedia, accessed August 3, 2013, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4-aaron. 
176 The Jewish Encyclopedia cites further rabbinic praise of these brothers, emphasizing 
the value of both of their respective roles, and their harmony together:  …of them it is written:  
"Behold how good and how pleasant [it is] for brethren to dwell together in unity!" (Ps. 
cxxxiii.1).  Of them it is said (Ps. lxxxv. 10): "Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and 
peace have kissed [each other]"; for Moses stood for righteousness, according to Deut. xxxiii. 21, 
and Aaron for peace, according to Mal. ii. 6. Again, mercy was personified in Aaron, according to 
Deut. xxxiii. 8, and truth in Moses, according to Num. xii.7 (Tan., Shemot, ed. Buber, 24-26). 
177 The rabbis draw further attention to the virtue of sibling support in general through 
citing chapter 8.1 of the Song of Songs:  “O that you were like a brother to me/who nursed at my 
mother’s breast!/If I met you outside, I would kiss you/and no one would despise me.”  Though 
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The role of both of these leaders is held in high regard, and often with the 
focus on how they related to one another.  In light of several midrashim on Aaron 
and Moses, we seem to significantly have a second sibling pair that follows the 
example of Ephraim and Manasseh:  two brothers, each with their own blessing, 
and supportive of one another.  Even though their blessings may seem unequal, 
they are indeed both blessed.  The reader is further benefitted here by the 
narrative examples of how Moses and Aaron have enacted their ongoing positive 
relationship.  This is a benefit that the reader does not have in the case of 
Ephraim and Manasseh.  Aaron and Moses are true “descendants” of Ephraim 
and Manasseh in their ability to embody “positive mimesis.”178  Together, they 
make the statement that the problem of sibling rivalry has been healed; brothers 
now know how to get along. 
Kalb’s second example also features Aaron and Moses stating that their 
relationship as peaceful brothers is reinforced in the book of Exodus 17.11-12, 
when the nation of Amalek battles with Israel.  He points out that during the 
battle, as Moses looks on, something very interesting happens.  According to the 
scripture, whenever Moses lifts up his arms, Israel prevails in battle.  When he 
lets his arms down, Amalek prevails in the battle.  In the story Moses’ arms, 
however, become weak and he can no longer hold them up.  In response, Aaron 
and Hur (the son of Miriam and the nephew of Moses and Aaron’s brother-in-law) 
help to support Moses’ arms so that they can remain raised, and this enables the 
Jewish people to be victorious over Amalek.  Like the earlier example above, 
when Aaron greets Moses with a kiss, joyful in heart at his brother’s calling, this 
is one more poignant example of brothers not in rivalry, but working together.  
Moses and Aaron stand as one, the older the support for the young leader, 
without a trace of animosity, united to help the Jewish people succeed.  What we 
are seeing in these moments in Moses and Aaron is “the first modeling of shared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
one can take these verses as referring to Aaron and Moses specifically, the verses point more 
generally to the positive affect between siblings—even a longing for a sibling to love. 
178 Please see chapter 5 for a detailed exposition of “positive mimesis.” 
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leadership in the Torah,” but even more significantly for our purposes, we have 
acts of positive sibling mimesis.179 
One might say that the precedent for Aaron and Moses’ loving and 
supportive relationship, and all future “sibling” relationships (where “brother” or 
“sister” might mean one of the same parents or more generally of the human 
family),180 has now been set down at the end of Genesis with the brothers 
Ephraim and Manasseh.  The birthright that future siblings will inherit is the 
blessing of peace, and every Sabbath one is baptized into this new life and 
future. 
And yet, the force of mimetic rivalry is powerful, even for leaders such as 
Moses and Aaron.  Their ideal relationship is undercut by one instance that is 
narrated in chapter 12 of the book of Numbers.  To set the context for this 
chapter, one finds the Hebrews in rebellion because they have no meat, and they 
complain that their time in Egypt was more pleasant.  God therefore sends a 
month’s worth of quails, literally drowning their desire in a plague of game.  The 
rebellion of the Hebrews, however, spreads to Aaron and Miriam, who begin to 
question whether they are not as worthy as their brother:  “They said, ‘Has the 
Lord spoken only through Moses?  Has He not spoken through us as well?’”  
(Num. 12.2)  After they speak as such, God calls the three siblings together, 
reprimands Aaron and Miriam for aspiring to be as Moses (who “beholds the 
likeness of the Lord” (Num. 12.8c)), and strikes Miriam with leprosy for seven 
days.181  Though the biblical text states that only Miriam is punished, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Kalb, 2011. Of course one might find this second example of Aaron and Moses’ sibling 
support bittersweet only in the sense that their rival, the Amelekites, are descendants of Esau.  
Nonetheless, it is important to separate Esau from his grandson, Amalek, as two separate 
individuals, especially considering Esau’s former reconciliation with Jacob. 
180 Recalling the earlier footnote on the multiple interpretations of Aaron as Moses’ 
“brother.” 
181 Some conjecture that Aaron is not afflicted because of his priestly duties.  See Walter 
Harrelson, ed., The New Interpreter’s Study Bible (Nashville:  Abingdon Press, 2003), 209.  Rabbi 
Abraham Kook (the first Rabbi of pre-state Israel) explains, however, that the Sages seem to 
agree that Aaron did receive some kind of punishment—some believe Aaron, like Miriam, was 
stricken with leprosy (though for a shorter period of time), or that his punishment was God’s 
reprimand.  See Rabbi Abraham Kook, “Aaron’s Punishment”, accessed August 31, 2013, 
http://ravkooktorah.org/BEHAAL61.htm.  Williams contends that Aaron’s punishment was glossed 
over due to the central importance of these brothers in the wider context of the tradition history of 
the exodus and covenant.  See Williams, 85. 
	   99	  
understood by the rabbis that Aaron is guilty and punished as well.  Despite 
Ephraim and Manasseh’s vaccine and the strong and positive mimetic 
relationship we see in Aaron and his brother, this scene shows how easily one 
can still fall into dangerous rivalry.  God’s punishing their lapse into jealousy 
further serves to highlight the importance of positive mimesis as the divinely 
desired mode for sibling relations. 
What we have, therefore, are at least two kinds of sibling examples.  
Ephraim and Manasseh, and Moses and Aaron, engage in positive mimesis from 
the start, with only an instance of rivalry cropping up in the case of the latter pair.  
Ephraim and Manasseh are the vaccine, and Moses and Aaron have been 
vaccinated.  The examples of Isaac and Ishmael and Jacob and Esau, 
alternatively, show an initial violence followed by reconciliation.  Jacob’s example 
even shows us something of what it takes to engage in the struggle to heal the 
violent past in one’s mental and emotional memory—a necessary healing and a 
rite of passage, even for the perpetrator of the crime.182  It seems that all of our 
brothers, with the exceptions of Abel, Ephraim and Manasseh, go through an 
implied transformational process.  Thus in the end we find siblings together, at 
least mostly, and perhaps fully healed of past wounds.  
In light of these various examples of brothers reunited, or simply peaceful 
from the start, it seems Genesis both reveals and provides paradigms for 
controlling and transforming the yetzer ha-ra.  The process of its transformation 
may be tedious (as in the case of Jacob and Esau) or entirely unnecessary (as in 
Ephraim and Manasseh).  Despite this substantial progress Genesis makes 
towards non-violence, however, the two-Messiah theory does not seem to agree 
that the yetzer ha-ra can be so easily controlled, less transformed; and the 
rabbinic tradition that puts forth the two-Messiah trajectory responds to this 
difficult task with a reversion into the sacrificial.  In contrast to the Tanakh that 
affirms success following the struggle for reconciliation, and expresses faith in 
humanity’s effort and default wholeness, the interpretation of Ephraim as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Williams interestingly notes that the younger brothers must go through their own 
experience as victims:  Isaac in the binding of Isaac; and Jacob in wrestling with the angel.  See 
Williams, 60. 
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sacrificial Messiah adds to our Sabbath ritual the notion that transformation is 
less an attainment of wholeness than an externalizing and killing an unwanted 
aspect our humanity.  In typical fashion, the plea for redemption regresses into 
an act of violence – the slaughter of Ephraim, the Messiah ben Joseph, the 
yetzer ha-ra, and our own human nature.  To note, the violence that had 
previously been formerly been projected outward between sibling pairs is now 
projected inward; the “victim” is innate, and the scapegoat in the end is that 
which lies within our selves.  In a Girardian sense, we might consider that this 
habit of relying on violence for reconciliation will continue to create literal, 
external scapegoats, if we do not first extinguish the problem in ourselves.  
Tanakh disagrees with this sacrificial mentality, however, and may indicate that 
every child is blessed and whole, and already transformed. 
Girard’s assertion that “the theme itself (i.e. the appearance of brothers) is 
a form of violence” does not hold water if compared to our biblical passage from 
Genesis 48.  There is simply no violence in the passage.  And to reiterate, we 
have two peaceful brothers who still become absorbed into a strong sacrificial 
tradition.  What else can we make of this?   
On one hand, we find in this ritual a strong affirmation of Jewish identity 
and an incitement to maintain identity-distinction.  This is integral as the 
maintenance of a healthy identity is central to averting mimetic crisis.  We return 
to Jacob and his actions:  Jacob blurs distinctions in this narrative of Ephraim 
and Manasseh that could easily break down into more sibling chaos.  Yet, the 
startling, deliberate and almost humorous way the narrative action unfolds 
implies that Jacob knows exactly what he is doing:183 he is revealing the 
sacrificial mechanism that he has come to understand.  Traditional Jewish 
interpretation of Jacob’s blessing on Ephraim and Manasseh is of import here.  
Ephraim and Manasseh are children born to Joseph and his Egyptian wife, and 
are raised as Jews in the midst of a foreign land.  Traditionally, Jews bless their 
children as Ephraim and Manasseh as an affirmation of Jewish identity in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 The narrative is startlingly self-conscious, with a twinge of tension and perhaps humor 
as Joseph tries to correct his father’s deliberately crossed arms.  One could imagine Joseph 
thinking, “Come on dad, not again.  Let’s not create a problem.”   
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midst of exile.  Jacob’s undoing of each child’s given role, and emphasizing a 
lack of differentiation in those already brothers (and for Girard the embodiments 
of sacrificial crisis), may also serve as a deeper understanding, and indeed 
warning against assimilation, which by definition includes a loss of identity.  The 
traditional Jewish interpretation of this ritual, and the past and current Jewish 
plight in exile, is a warning against ascending to a level of sameness that can 
only lead to disastrous results.  The Sabbath and the Birkhat ha-Banim are thus 
reminders to maintain distinction, maintain identity, keep the Torah, control the 
yetzer ha-ra and mimetic impulses that will inevitably lead to rivalry, idolatry, 
assimilation, and ultimately violence if not contained.184  The blessing is in this 
vein also considered the granting of a type of protection upon one’s children.  
The maintenance of distinction is nurtured within the community, passed down 
through the generations, and supported by peaceful relations.185 
There is a larger, universal meaning that can be gleaned from this 
Sabbath ritual, too.  Its universal meaning is to control mimetic impulses in the 
context of a humanity that is not in control.  Ephraim and Manasseh may be 
exiles in a foreign land, charged with maintaining an identity against the grain of 
the culture; but in fact all humans that strive to control their mimetic impulses are 
in exile—foreigners trying to carve out a space for themselves.  Manasseh in 
particular is charged with this task.  It is true that Ephraim is granted more 
“fame”; he is granted an historical, spiritual and theological purpose.  Manasseh, 
on the other hand, is given a very human task, though I might argue it is even 
more spiritual than his brother’s—he is to withstand receiving the secondary 
blessing, and as such he must build the ability to transcend his human nature 
and inclination toward rivalry through intense self-control.  Manasseh, in a sense, 
was required to let go of his desire and surrender to his unique calling.  This is 
the “greater jihad” so to speak —it is to accomplish Manasseh’s kind of openness 
and self-control in the midst of a humanity that is still driven by rivalry, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Compare to Williams discussion of the attainment of differentiation between Jacob 
and Esau after their reunion in Genesis.  Williams, 50-54. 
185 As will be discussed in depth in chapters 5 and 6, it is this identity or boundary 
maintenance that in fact enables positive mimesis to be realized. 
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competition and violence.  Manasseh embodies exemplary restraint and 
extraordinary surrender. 
The universal meaning found in this text and ritual is also intrinsic to 
Judaism.  Keeping the Sabbath and performing the Birkhat ha-Banim is a 
phenomenological way to understand how one is to be Jewish—but Judaism also 
calls for deep reflective practice about our humanity, our drives and impulses, 
and how to control them and channel them.  This is the greater meaning of this 
narrative of Jacob, Ephraim and Manasseh, which is brought out through a 
reading of it in the context of Girard’s notion of mimetic rivalry.   
Jacob’s blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh is a passage in the Tanakh 
that may have been inserted simply in order to justify these two grandchildren as 
legitimate tribal leaders next to the sons of Jacob.  One could also read it rather 
literally as a prophetic passage foretelling the future greatness of Ephraim.  But 
this narrative is, as I hope I have demonstrated, so much more.  This scene and 
its ritual reverberate from a complex history of sibling rivalry and competition for a 
blessing.  On the surface, perhaps, it seems all is well with Ephraim and 
Manasseh.  And this is the ultimate goal—to be just like these peaceful brothers.   
But projected onto this peaceful pair is the steam of a mimetic crisis that 
habitually demands a sacrifice for reconciliation.  In the end, Jews bless their 
children as Ephraim and Manasseh to break from a violent past of mimetic rivalry 
and violent expulsion; they aim finally to transcend mimetic impulses, cast off 
idolatry, act in the transformed freedom of Jacob, and keep the Torah to usher in 
the Messiah ben David.  But instead of remaining within the purview of the 
Hebrew Scriptures, in which we seem to have a clear and proactive blessing of 
peace—the rabbinic tradition adds that something must die to attain this positive 
mimetic quality.  As I will demonstrate in the coming chapters, this pull back into 
the sacrificial mentality is nearly impossible to deny, or even, in many cases, 
detect.  The sacrificial mentality has such a grip on us that we get reenrolled in it 
even when we believe we are free.  This reversion is what the rabbis seem to 
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have fallen into, perhaps for a multiplicity of reasons.186  Overlaid upon our 
sibling pair, thus, is another version of what Girard would call “good” violence, 
though it is ontologized, theologized, and spiritualized. 
After all this, have we really found an antidote to mimetic rivalry and 
sacrificial violence?  Yes and no.  While Ephraim and Manasseh are peaceful, 
they are still brothers whose very presence is to remind us of the real threat of 
mimetic crisis.  We also have Jacob who, though providing a creative and 
proactive blessing grounded in abundance, still draws our attention to the boys’ 
unequal gifts.  We this have an antidote, but must remain on guard; we must be 
careful to avoid laying sacrificial interpretations upon a text that contains no 
violence.  This is why, in Jewish tradition, as soon as one finishes reading the 
Torah, one immediately returns to the beginning and starts to read it again.  
When one does this, one moves through the narrative arc from violence to 
peace, from scarcity to abundance, from one singular blessing to multiple 
blessings.  At the end of the arc one discovers all the children are blessed.187   
The same redundancy manifests in the Sabbath and its ritual Birkhat ha-
Banim.  Jews are commanded to keep the tradition and get the booster shot 
every week.  Like a real vaccine, there is a bit of mimetic desire in the booster, 
narrative memories of rivalry and violence, just to ensure that one does not catch 
the disease.  But also like a vaccine, this booster is to gradually transform the 
human system; the process of immunity may be slow, but it is slowly making the 
systemic changes.  Once the systemic changes take hold, one may realize all 
along that what we really have in this ritual is a peace vaccine.  The ritual has 
nothing of the old order in it; it is fully of the new order.  The Hebrews of the 
Tanakh, after all, are about to enter into the next phase of history in the Book of 
Exodus, in which they will need to unite, free themselves from oppression, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Mitchell locates the sacrificial theory of the Messiah well within ancient Judaism and 
significantly pre-dating Christianity, implying a real practical need for help (and possibly hope) in 
managing the evils of mimetic rivalry within the community. 
187 Further, as I will discuss in greater detail in chapter five, the children are blessed out 
of a spirit of abundance and freedom—a spirit that in itself wills the unique contribution of each of 
the children.  Free of a past tradition caught up in the meaning of birth orders and birth rights, 
Jacob manifests true generosity.  The way that Jacob blesses proves contagious in its 
affirmation, and the brothers can literally rest in their wholeness, as all Jews on the Sabbath. 
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become a nation.  In the words of Rabbi Arthur Waskow:  “Genesis is unable to 
come to an end until there is a peaceful pair of brothers:  Ephraim and 
Manasseh.  Only then can the Bible turn to other problems.”188 	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Arthur Waskow, Godwrestling (NY:  Schoken Books, 1978), 15. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Second Vaccine:   
The Book of Esther and the Holy Day of Purim 
  
Best thing you can do is take the bull’s eye off your back.  But unfortunately 
sometimes you find yourself in a situation where the best you can do is shift the 
bull’s eye to someone else. 
                                                                              -John Dyckman189 
 
The second “vaccine” against mimetic desire is enacted through the Jewish 
celebration of Purim, which is a holiday mandated in the Book of Esther.  The 
Book of Esther as well as its corresponding holiday is by no means without 
controversy within the Jewish tradition itself—there have been many scholars 
throughout the years that have been averse to Purim and to the content of the 
Book of Esther.  There are indeed many grey areas within the book that have put 
its inclusion in the biblical canon into question.  For example, God’s name is 
never mentioned in the book; no copy of Esther has been found at Qumran 
(implying this book was left out of their corpus on purpose); the violence in the 
book, even if one views it as necessary self-defense, is exaggerated and horrific; 
and then there is the problem of the enacted genocide itself.  Several rabbis, 
going as far back as the Talmud, have objected to the book’s inclusion in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 John Dyckman, interviewed by Dr. Mike Riera, Family Talk, October 31, 2003.  
Dyckman is also the author of Scapegoats at Work.  See John Dyckman and Joseph A. Cutler, 
Scapegoats at Work: Taking the Bull’s Eye Off Your Back (Westport, CT: Praegar Publishers, 
2003). 
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canon.  Megillah 7a records some of these objections.190  The Talmudic rabbis 
questioned whether the Book was written with proper divine inspiration; and if it 
“defiles the hands” properly as other sacred books.191  They also raise objections 
based on the absence of God’s name and explicit providence in the Book, as well 
as the book’s generally non-Jewish atmosphere.  (Though there are a significant 
number of intra-biblical allusions in the Book of Esther, most agree that the book 
is, in terms of genre, a Persian romance; and in terms of its corresponding ritual, 
adaptation of a pagan carnival.)  In addition, the Talmudic rabbis expressed 
concern that the book might raise anti-Jewish sentiment (which, unfortunately, it 
has on a number of occasions.)  Others, finally, claim a lack of admirable 
characters in the book.   
 Christians have expressed objections to the book as well:  Martin Luther, 
in one of his table talks, commented on the Book of Esther as follows:  “I am so 
great an enemy to the second book of the Maccabees, and to Esther, that I wish 
they would not have come to us at all, for they have too many heathen 
unnaturalties."192  Sentiment among Christians, in general, has been “historically 
cool,” seeing no evidence of the book’s influence in the New Testament, nor any 
relevance for the Church overall.193   
 Most recently, in terms of Jewish response, Professor Aaron Tapper of the 
University of San Francisco writes,  
 
Although I am aware that some scholars say that the megillah is a 
brilliantly written farce, the Jewish communities that I have been 
exposed to in my life have not focused upon this literary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  Talmud Bavli--Mas. Megillah 7a, accessed December 14, 2011, 
http://halakhah.com/pdf/moed/Megilah.pdf.	  
191 For a detailed discussion of what the rabbis might mean by “defiles the hands” and 
how this phrase is relevant to Esther’s canonical status, see Adele Berlin, Esther:  The Traditional 
Hebrew Text with the New IPS Translation (Philadelphia, PA:  The Jewish Publication Society, 
2001), xliii-xlv. 
192 William Hazlitt, trans., “Luther’s Table Talk,” The Lutheran Publication Society, 2004, 
accessed December 10, 2011, http://cat.xula.edu/tpr/works/tabletalk. 
193 “Scroll of Esther”, Jewish Virtual Library and Encyclopedia Judaica, The Gale Group, 
2008, accessed December 9, 2011, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. 
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interpretation. Instead, at Jewish day schools, in Jewish summer 
overnight camps, at synagogue services, and in various yeshivot, I 
have been invited to cheer and applaud King Ahashverosh's 
sentencing and hanging of the character Haman, as well as his ten 
sons, alongside the killing of more than 75,000 others at the hands 
of Jews.194    
 
Tapper emphasizes the misinterpretation of the book that triggered the ancient 
rabbis’ objections (at least in part) by also calling forth a number of violent acts 
that Jews have committed against non-Jews on this holiday.  Perhaps the most 
disturbing of these events is when Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 Muslims and 
injured over 100 others while they were praying in Hebron’s Cave of the 
Patriarchs.  Elliott Horowitz devotes an entire academic enterprise on the 
Goldstein massacre as well as other examples of violent “revenge” committed by 
Jews on Purim in his book Reckless Rites:  Purim and the Legacy of Jewish 
Violence.195 
 The skepticism with which the Book of Esther has been met, in addition to 
its occasional incitements to violence, compels further investigation into this 
book’s real meaning and purpose.  The few objections I mention above are not 
the only ones that have surfaced.  The Book of Esther has been the springboard 
for innumerable interpretations, rabbinic commentaries, rewrites, plays, and 
works of art since its inception, (which I put in the time frame of 400-200 BCE 
following Adele Berlin, as discussed below).196  I believe that a look at The Book 
of Esther and its holiday Purim through a Girardian lens in particular, however, 
will yield one possible answer as to why, ultimately, the Book was included in the 
canon despite its blatant violence and seeming Godlessness.   
 My working hypothesis in this regard is that the Book of Esther uses the 
literary form of what Girard calls a ‘persecution text.’  The book contains two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Aaron J. Tapper, “Toward a Jewish Theology of Nonviolence”, Tikkun Magazine, 
March/April 2005, accessed November 23, 2011, http://www.tikkun.org. 
195 Elliot Horowitz, Reckless Rites: Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
196 Berlin, Esther, xli-xliii. 
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complete persecution texts back-to-back, in fact:  the “preface” in which we find 
the expulsion of Vashti; and the main body of the book in which Haman and other 
Jew-haters in the kingdom are killed.197  While these two persecution texts are 
such in structure, though, they also constitute a breakdown in the mechanism.  
The first text featuring Vashti represents an intermediary stage—a segway or a 
bridge, if you will, between the generic “pagan” persecution text told in the voice 
of the persecutors, and the biblical persecution text, which is told from the voice 
of the victim.  The second persecution text of Esther bursts forth in the voice of 
the victim, but is notably still enmeshed in the scapegoating narrative structure.  
It is a possibility that the unfortunate and seemingly unnecessary violence we 
find at the end of the book is due to the biblical victim emerging victorious, while 
ironically remaining within the confines of the classic structure of persecution that 
requires death for reconciliation.  The Book of Esther reveals in not so subtle 
fashion that the mechanism requiring “good” violence is continually operative 
despite the redemption of the victim, and necessary to open the door to the 
possibility of true transformation. 
 Additionally, there are two sub-themes that I will touch upon through this 
analysis.  First, the literary form in itself is mimetic.  The scenes in the Book of 
Esther, when broken down, display a clear tit-for-tat—each scene repeated twice, 
the second time in reverse.  In this way, the literary form mirrors the rivalry of the 
characters it is presenting.  Second, the literary form of the book mirrors the 
Jews' actual historical situation in exile.  The Jews are forced in narrative as well 
as in history to live within the confines of a culture that is other than their own, 
and also within the confines of a violent mechanism, whether the Jews turn out to 
be the scapegoats themselves or not.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, this 
is a kind of spiritual exile, too.  Those who aim to keep the yetzer ha-ra in check 
(Jews and otherwise) necessarily find themselves in a world in which mimetic 
rivalry and the evil impulse run rampant.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 I discuss a third persecution text below that occurs between the other two, that is, the 
eunuch’s plot against the king, but it is not complete according to Girard’s structure, as I will 
discuss later on. 
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 The Book of Esther is therefore a book full of ironic juxtapositions:  it is 
about how to be oneself within the confines of otherness; it is about the victory of 
the victim within a mimetic structure that feeds on victims.  One may encounter 
the book’s continued relevance today as the voice of the victim is still emerging 
out of (and is often still submerged within) a structure of violence.  My hope is 
that bringing Girard to bear upon the Book of Esther will show one more way the 
Jews were trying to expose mimetic rivalry and the victim mechanism.  I hope 
this interpretation will also serve to resolve some of the aforementioned issues 
that have brought Esther and Purim negative press.198 
 I will do three things henceforth in this chapter.  First, I will bring the Book 
of Esther and its various incarnations into focus.  What I will show through this 
exposition is how the earliest communities were troubled by this book and sought 
to “correct” it.  Second, I will provide an overview of Girard’s “persecution text” 
and demonstrate how the Book of Esther conforms to yet breaks away from its 
pattern. Third, I will turn my attention to select rituals enacted on Purim—rituals 
that function as vaccines against the mimetic violence of the world in which the 
Jews find themselves, literally and literarily, trapped.  As a subtheme throughout, 
I will bring forth the rabbinic commentary on Esther and Purim to see how the 
midrashim add interpretive layers to the text we have in the Tanakh, and what 
these layers convey.  
  
The Redaction History of the Book of Esther 
 
It seems the only place to begin an interpretation of the Book of Esther, is to first 
give a brief summary of its interpretive history.  One gets the sense of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 For example, this interpretation allows one to interpret the violence at the end of the 
book as a reflection of the prevailing cultural mechanism at work.  The violence is neither an 
expression of the “bloodthirsty” Jews, nor excusable as self-defense.  The violence is the 
scapegoating mechanism at work, requiring blood for reconciliation.  The Jews are indeed 
trapped within this structure in exile.  The Book of Esther makes this structure crystal clear while it 
presents a case for its transformation. 
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controversial nature of this book from its very inception.  So it seems important to 
give an idea of its redaction history, which will, in turn, give a glimpse inside what 
the authors (and possibly their respective communities of faith) were concerned 
with in the time periods subsequent to its inception. 
 To begin, the typical time frame in which the MT (Masoretic Text) Book of 
Esther was written is 400-200 BCE.199  Berlin places the book into the latter half 
of this window, 300-200 BCE, indicating a late biblical and early postbiblical 
authorship.  This is also the late Persian/early Greek period.  Berlin attributes MT 
Esther to this period for logical reasons:  1) linguistic comparison to 
contemporaneous biblical books such as Ezra, Nehemiah and Chronicles; 2) 
genre of the book as a farce about the Persian court (which would make sense 
only if the Persian court were still in power); 3) an assumed political setting in 
which the Jews are ultimately safe, suggesting a time before the Maccabean 
revolt (167 BCE); and 4) the similarities between Esther and the early Greek 
writings on the Persian court (which came about in 400-300 BCE).200   
 Further, Berlin classifies Esther as a Jewish Diaspora story, similar to the 
Book of Daniel, and the apocryphal books of Judith and Tobit.  She states:  
 
All of these books are entertaining fictional narratives that present 
models of successful behavior for Jews living in the Diaspora.  
They are designed to promote pride in Jewish identity and solidarity 
within the Jewish community and with Jewish tradition.  They reflect 
a situation in which Jews were a minority in a larger society and 
where it fell to the individual Jew, not the state, to ensure Jewish 
continuity.201 
 
The primary difference between MT Esther and the other Diaspora stories is 
Esther’s lack of religiosity.  In MT Esther, there is neither mention of God, nor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Berlin, xliii. 
200 For her complete arguments see Berlin, xli-xliii. 
201 Ibid., xxxiv. 
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adherence to ritual.202  The “secular” nature of Esther has been an obvious issue 
as evidenced by the rewrites and commentaries to which we now turn. 
 There is a long list of translations, versions, rewrites and commentaries 
(midrashim).  These versions of the Book of Esther are quite varied, some of 
them receiving canonical status within different biblical traditions.  The Septuagint 
Book of Esther (LXX), for example, contains a number of additions—some are 
more matters of translation-- but there are also entire narrative passages that 
alter the nature of the book and add elements that put it more in line with other 
biblical texts.  The Book of Esther is also the only entire biblical text to be 
included in the Bavli.  The number of versions written and amount of attention 
this book received so early on in its history is significant.  A brief look at a few of 
the versions we have will highlight not only the problem of Esther’s secularity, but 
the other kinds of issues that were at stake. 
 There are a few versions of Esther that were written before the Common 
Era.   First, there is the MT version of Esther, which is part of the Hebrew canon.  
As stated above, I will agree with Berlin that the MT Esther was written about 
400-200 BCE.  There are also two Greek versions of Esther written around 0:  
the Septuagint version (LXX) (known as the B-Text or BT); and the A-Text (AT), 
which is shorter than the LXX, and contains material from the MT and LXX, but 
also passages that are quite different from them both.203 
 Matthew Fox, in Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther, and more 
substantially in his monograph The Redaction of the Books of Esther (1990), 
advocates for the idea that there was also a discernable “Proto-AT,” which 
accounts for the anomalous passages found only in the AT version, and which 
was written before the MT.204  He adds that the Proto-AT was likely derived from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Ibid., xxxiv, xli.  Berlin adds that the theme of the “wise courtier” and Esther’s allusions 
to other biblical books further classifies it as a Diaspora story.   
203 Berlin notes that the AT is also sometimes referred to as the “Lucianic recension”, or 
just “L”.   See Berlin, xlix. 
204 Matthew Fox, Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther (Columbia, SC: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1991); The Redaction of the Books of Esther (Society of Biblical 
Literature,1990). 
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a Proto-Esther, from which the MT was also derived.  Some scholars advocate 
that Proto-Esther contained religious elements that the MT author removed; 
others that it did not.  Even if Proto-Esther is beyond reach, Fox has put together 
an approximation of Proto-AT that seems legitimate, and which brings a very 
interesting perspective to what we currently have in both the MT and later 
versions. 
 According to Fox, Proto-AT is missing the following elements of the MT:  
1) the assumption of the inalterability of Persian law; 2) the expansion of the 
battle reports; 3) the second day of fighting and celebration; 4) the Purim 
etiology; and 5) the epilogue in 10:1-3.  In addition, Proto-AT contains a few 
references to God (though it does not come across as very religious), and 
presents Esther as less clever and slightly fearful.  What is most striking, 
however, is not its character portraits nor mild religiosity, but its simplistic “happily 
ever after” ending: 
 
And the king summoned Mordecai, and he bestowed on him all that 
was Haman’s.  And he said to him, “What do you want—I shall do it 
for you.”  And Mordecai said, “That you annul the letter of Haman.”  
And the king put into his hands the affairs of the kingdom (viii 15-
17). 
And a decree concerning these matters was issued in Susa, and 
the king empowered Mordecai to write whatever he wished.  And 
Mordecai sent words via letters, which he had sealed with the 
king’s ring, to the effect that his people should remain each in his 
own place and hold celebration unto God.  And the epistle that 
Mordecai sent contained the following:  “Haman sent you letters 
saying thus:  ‘Make haste swiftly to send the disobedient Jewish 
people to destruction for me.’ But I Mordecai inform you that the 
one who did these things has been hanged before the gates of 
Susa and his household has been executed, for he sought to kill us 
on the thirteenth day of the month, which is Adar (viii 33-38). 
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Proto-AT, as Fox describes it, is “a salvation tale:  two Jews clash with a wicked 
enemy and defeat him.”205  In Proto-AT, Fox continues:   
 
The power of the state is essentially reliable.  Though it may be 
deflected by its proper course by lies and deceit, the state 
possesses the mechanisms to correct itself.  The practical problem 
is how to reach the king, the guarantor of stability who stands at the 
source of power…The Jewish people, other than the protagonists, 
are spectators to the working-out of their fate.206  
 
Proto-AT avoids the problem of the MT when Haman’s decree cannot be revoked 
because of irreversible Persian law.  Proto-AT thus avoids many difficulties of the 
MT, which necessitates full-blown war, in favor of a centralized, simplistic ending, 
with minimal violence that is done unto Haman and his family alone.207  One 
might argue that Proto-AT loses some dramatic power in its effortless undoing of 
Haman’s decree.  It would have nonetheless gotten most of the more traditional 
points of the text across in a seemingly “safer” fashion.208 
 The LXX (and here I refer to the B-text) in general is a basic translation of 
the MT text, remaining essentially true to its source.  The real difference between 
the MT and the LXX are the additions.  There are 6 additions to the MT that the 
LXX adds: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Fox, Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther, 261. 
206 Ibid., 262. 
207 In analyzing Proto-AT further, one might also come to the conclusion that one does 
not get the opportunity to assess the degree to which there are “haters” of Jews not only inside 
the court (e.g. Haman), but outside the court.  Without the fighting at the end, those who would in 
fact attack the Jews would remain “hidden.”  Both Jews and anti-Jews are thus revealed by the 
MT version in a metaphorical apocalypse:  Esther’s previously concealed Jewish identity is 
revealed in battle; and the identities of the anti-Jews are as well.  This apocalyptic interpretation 
of Esther has its home in the later mystical schools of Judaism. 
208 E.g., reversals, security in exile, appropriate behaviors for success in the Diaspora, 
God’s providence and salvation for the people of Israel, etc. 
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• Addition A:  beginning of the story:  dream of Mordecai foreshadowing 
destruction (two great dragons), and Mordecai’s discovery of the plot 
against the king. 
• Addition B:  follows 3:13:  wording of the edict against the Jews 
• Addition C:  follows 4:17:  the prayer of Mordecai and prayer of Esther 
asking for deliverance 
• Addition D:  follows Addition C:  an account of Esther’s appearance before 
the king 
• Addition E:  follows 8:12:  gives the contents of edict on behalf of the Jews 
• Addition F:  end of story after 10:3:  an interpretation of Mordecai’s dream 
in relation to story.209 
   
The LXX additions insert religious elements, prophetic dream, prayer, and God’s 
name.  All of these elements bring Esther in closer narrative relationship with 
other books of the period such as Daniel and Ezra/Nehemiah, though the 
addition also lend a different character to the primary players in the book, in 
particular Esther, Ahasuerus and Mordecai.  The LXX additions reflect its 
redactor’s context of Hellenism as well.  In the Hellenistic context, religion 
replaces ethnicity; religious elements are thus brought into Esther and 
emphasized.210   
 Most important for our purposes is the change that occurs by bringing in 
prophetic dreams, in which “two great dragons came forward, both ready to fight, 
and they roared terribly.  At their roaring every nation prepared for war, to fight 
against the righteous nation.”211  The dreams foretell the events that will happen 
through the book, making the conflict between Mordecai and Haman, and the 
Jews and Persians in turn, the unfolding of the divine plan, changing the Book of 
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210 R. Frye, quoted in Berlin, l. 
211 Harrelson, New Interpreter’s Study Bible, 1403. 
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Esther “from a court novella into an apocalyptic drama pitting Israel against the 
nations.”212  The NISB interprets Addition A, stating: 
 
The upheaval of the natural world signals God’s absence and the 
breakdown of the social order…Although usually dragons 
symbolize nations, here they symbolize two individuals, one of 
whom is Mordecai.  This personal conflict causes the nations to 
prepare to fight the righteous nation Israel.213  
 
Though the actions of humans unfold the drama, they are somehow put into a 
predetermined divine context, alleviating humans from some of the responsibility.   
 Moving into the first few centuries of the common era, there is a “third” 
Greek account (the other two being the LXX and AT) written by Josephus in his 
book The Antiquities of the Jews, (Book II, chapter 6); and numerous midrashic 
collections, including a midrashic exposition of the entire book of Esther in B. 
Megillah 10b-17a of the Bavli.214 
 Josephus’ paraphrase of the book was written in the first century CE.  
Josephus, like the early rabbis, was well aware of the anti-Jewish sentiment that 
could emerge in response to Esther, and made certain emendations to combat 
anti-Jewish stereotypes.  Josephus, for example, tried to make Jewish values 
align with Greco-Roman values.  Josephus also makes the strong point that 
Haman was an Amalekite (a term not used in MT or LXX) so that he can attribute 
Haman’s hatred to a family feud and personal grudge rather than to Jews’ 
misanthropy, distinctiveness or eternal Jewish-Gentile conflict.   Josephus also 
demonstrated a concern for law and order:  for example, Mordecai could not bow 
down to Haman because the laws of his own people forbade it.  The Persian 	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214 The midrashic collections are:  Esther Rabbah; Abba Gorion; Panim Aherim (two 
versions); Leqah tov; Midrash Meggillat Esther; Aggadat Esther; Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer, chapters 
49-50; Yalkut Shimoni; Midrash Shoher Tov (midrash on two psalms – Esther interpretation in 
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legal system is also represented more seriously, and less in terms of the parody 
of the MT.215 
 The Babylonian Esther Midrash was composed in the time frame of the 
third to fifth century CE, and is a uniquely rich source of information, unique also 
in the sense that it is the only midrash in the Talmud of an entire biblical book.  
This Babylonian midrash, according to Eliezer Segal, (who has completed the 
most extensive study of it), was originally a homiletical collection on the biblical 
book perhaps begun in Palestine, but which became adopted into the curriculum 
of the Babylonian yeshiva thus assuming characteristics of the yeshiva-driven 
exegetical tradition.216  The details of his analysis can be read in his three volume 
critical commentary, but will not hold us up here.  The import of Segal’s 
interpretation of the Bavli Esther here is that it gives us a glimpse of how the 
content of Esther was being used for sermons and expositions of Jewish ideas 
and values, and also how the rabbis, after some time had passed, came to 
interpret the biblical story.  The themes that I will draw out of the Bavli Esther 
concern:  Mordecai’s ancestry as a Benjaminite and as the final link in an ancient 
struggle between Israel and Amalek; the variety of reasons the rabbis filled in as 
to why Haman held such a personal grudge against Mordecai; the uncertain 
moral character of Ahasuerus; and the link to the biblical antagonist, the 
Babylonians, through Vashti, whom the midrash identifies as a descendent of 
Nebuchadnezzar.217 
 The account here already demonstrates how the Book of Esther has 
gripped the imagination of Jews and others from the biblical era, and this is just a 
very scant list of interpretations and rewrites that exist.  We have many strains of 
interpretation that focus on the piety of Esther and the religiosity of the text in 
general, inserting God in to the picture at various points, and seeing God 	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216 Eliezer Segal, The Babylonian Esther Midrash:  A Critical Commentary, vol. 1 (GA:  
Scholars Press, 1994), 11-12. 
217 Ibid., 258.  The Palestinian (or Yerushalmi) Talmud, also composed in the general 
time period of the Bavli, follows the more common thread of linking the rivalry of the Jews to 
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providentially in the background where not explicitly mentioned.  For our paper, 
however, what must simply now be noted are the strains of interpretation that 
assign multiple seats of blame, outlining various rivalries, each representing an 
ancient, almost mythical struggle.  Sticking to the MT (as this is the text of the 
Hebrews and the one to which the rabbinic commentators adhered), it is now 
time to look more deeply into the MT text of Esther, its characters, and the 
struggles of which they speak. 
 
The Preface to the Book of Esther as Persecution Text:  Vashti as the 
‘Pagan’ Scapegoat 
 
One might say that the preface to the Book of Esther is unnecessary to the rest 
of the book.  The book, admittedly, could be read in its absence; the effect of the 
surprising reversals and Jews’ victory would not be diminished.  So, one must 
ask the very same question as King Ahasuerus:  “What ought to be done with 
Queen Vashti?” (Est. 1:15)  But if we are to say that no word has made it into the 
Bible by accident, then the presence of this preface must serve some purpose.  
Jacques Derrida wrote in an essay on Hegel: 
 
Prefaces, along with forwards, introductions, preludes, 
preliminaries, preambles, prologues, and prolegomena, have 
always been written, it seems, in view of their own self-
effacement…this subtraction leaves a mark of erasure, a remainder 
which is added to the subsequent text and which cannot be 
completely summed up within it.218 
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Annihilation, and Esther (London, England; New York: Routledge, 1997), 29.  
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According to Derrida, even if the purpose of the preface is not explicit, it creates 
a context inside of which the rest of the book is read.  Its erasure, its being left 
behind in itself, leaves us with an absence that resonates.  What is it exactly, 
then, that is being left behind in the Book of Esther?  It is my assertion that this 
preface about Vashti is a presentation of what Girard calls a “persecution text.”  
In this section I will demonstrate that the preface to Esther reveals a mimetic 
crisis, and utilizes the scapegoat mechanism (in which Vashti is the scapegoat) 
to reconcile the community in distress.  While it is in most aspects a classic text 
of persecution, however, I will also demonstrate that it provides a critique of the 
mechanism, opening the door to a new perspective on victimage later in the 
narrative. 
 Persecution texts, in general, present three fundamental moments for 
Girard:   
 
(1) dissolution in conflict, removal of the differences and hierarchies 
which constitute the community in its wholeness [in which the 
dissolution is due to mimesis, my addition]; (2) the all against one of 
collective violence; and (3) the development of interdictions and 
rituals.219 
 
Each of these ideas was parsed out in the first chapter of this dissertation, but 
deserve a brief overview here.   
 The first aspect is, as stated, the dissolution in conflict, or simply the 
“crisis.”  There may be varied types of external causes for a crisis such as natural 
disasters, plague, etc.; or there may be internal causes such as political uproar or 
religious dissention.  Regardless of the seeming cause, however, the real crisis, 
according to Girard, is in the dissolution of social differences caused by intense 
mimetic rivalry—“mimetic doubling” as Girard calls it, which is mimetic rivalry to 
the point where mimetic opponents are mirrors of each other, the object of desire 	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being lost to the opponents’ focus on the rivalry itself.  In this atmosphere, there 
is an unsettling feeling of sameness; there is a breakdown in the known order of 
things, creating a kind of shock, leading to feelings of confusion and 
overwhelming alarm.  Whatever kind of crisis at hand, “the experience of those 
who live through them is the same.  The strongest impression is without question 
an extreme loss of social order evidenced by the disappearance of the rules and 
‘differences’ that define cultural divisions.”220  The ‘crimes’ committed by those 
who are persecuted are fundamental, and are such that “they attack the very 
foundation of cultural order, the family and the hierarchical differences without 
which there would be no social order.”221 
 The second aspect of the persecution text is the “all against one” of 
collective violence, meaning the community in crisis begins to restore unanimity 
through finding a victim to blame for the crisis.  Those who are chosen as 
scapegoats tend to share certain characteristics.  They tend to be marginal 
figures that somehow have one foot in, one foot out of mainstream society.  
Those who are most often persecuted thus fit into certain categories such as king 
or other symbols of authority, or on the opposite end of the spectrum the young 
or weak.  In essence, the scapegoat must be one who, in some sense, has 
certain shared characteristics with the dominant group, but who also possesses a 
social vulnerability.   
 The accusations that fall upon the scapegoat also tend to fall into certain 
categories—the crimes typically being either sexual or religious in nature.  A 
scapegoat, for example, may be accused of incest or bestiality; or otherwise 
idolatry or profaning the sacred.  Girard states that these “crimes” may be simple 
misunderstandings.  In The Scapegoat, Girard defines the victim as “a person 
who comes from elsewhere, a well-known stranger.  He is invited to a feast which 
ends with his lynching.  Why?  He has done something which he should not have 
done; his behavior is perceived as fatal; one of his gestures was 	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misinterpreted.”222  Perhaps the stranger was only acting according to his or her 
own customs.  But the “smallest misunderstanding can be disastrous.”223 
 To explain why a gesture or action that may have been innocent could be 
so vastly misconstrued, Girard emphasizes the irrational exaggeration with which 
the accuser(s) analyzes the action of the one blamed:  “Instead of seeing the 
microcosm as reflection of imitation of the global level, it seeks in the individual 
the origin and cause of all that is harmful.”224  One informed by reason might look 
to context (familial, cultural, etc.—that is, the macrocosm) in order to understand 
the cause of an individual’s behavior (and thereby “understand” or display 
“empathy” for the stranger).  The persecutor of whom Girard speaks, contrarily, 
finds crisis concentrated in the individual and projects it onto the world, seeing in 
this individual (or group) the collapse of the whole.  The persecutor is thus prone 
to a gross and dangerous tendency for stereotyping and paranoia.  The fear 
conjured by the persecutor is then contagious, leading to mimetic snowballing in 
which a collective unanimously unites against a victim. 
 The third characteristic of the classic persecution text is the development 
of an interdiction or ritual.  In the classic arc of the persecution text, the 
scapegoat creates a reunified community and is at once blamed for the crisis 
and, at the same time, glorified for restoring peace.  Communities will thus:  1) 
create a prohibition or taboo in order to prevent the threat of chaos from 
returning; and/or 2) ritualize the expulsion of the scapegoat to recreate 
reconciliation even in times when it may not entirely needed. 
 The preface to Esther presents all three of these persecution text 
characteristics and, in my estimation, deliberately presents the reader with a 
scapegoat narrative in order to reveal the mechanism.  A parsing of what I am 
calling the “preface”, i.e. chapter 1 of the Book of Esther, will demonstrate how 
this gets accomplished.   	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 The Book of Esther begins as a folktale, “It happened in the days of 
Ahasuerus…”225 and proceeds to describe in great detail the setting in which we 
are placed:  it tells of the expanse of the king’s territories “from India to Ethiopia”, 
and the expanse of his wealth and majesty through his over 180 days of 
hospitality followed by a seven-day banquet with “couches of gold and silver on a 
pavement of marble…And there was royal wine in abundance as befits a king. 
And the rule for the drinking was, ‘No restrictions!’”  The opening scene presents 
the reader with an image of gross excess and exaggeration, qualities that also 
apply to the mental state of the king and his courtiers, as we find out next.226   
 
On the seventh day, when the king was merry with wine, he 
ordered Mehuman, Bizzetha, Harbona, Bigtha, Abagtha, Zethar, 
and Carcass, the seven eunuchs in attendance on King Ahasuerus, 
to bring Queen Vashti before the king wearing a royal diadem, to 
display her beauty to the peoples and the officials; for she was a 
beautiful woman.  But Queen Vashti refused to come at the king’s 
command conveyed by the eunuchs.  The king was greatly 
incensed, and the fire burned within him. (Esther 1:10-12) 
Then the king consulted the sages learned in procedure…”What,” 
[he asked,] “shall be done, according to law, to Queen Vashti for 
failing to obey the command of King Ahasuerus conveyed by the 
eunuchs?” 
Thereupon Memucan declared in the presence of the king and the 
ministers:  “Queen Vashti has committed an offense not only 
against Your Majesty but also against all the officials and against all 
the peoples in all the provinces of King Ahasuerus.  For the queen’s 
behavior will make wives despise their husbands, as they reflect 
that King Ahasuerus himself ordered Queen Vashti to be brought 
before him, but she would not come.  This very day the ladies of 
Persia and Media, who have heard of the queen’s behavior, will cite 
it to all Your Majesty’s officials, and there will be no end of scorn 
and provocation!  (1:16-18) 
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The king takes Memucan’s subsequent advice, expels Vashti from the kingdom, 
and sends to “all the provinces” what could only be interpreted as a ludicrous 
edict:  “all wives will treat their husbands with respect, high and low alike” (Est. 
1:20b). 
 What we have here, in this opening scene, is indeed comic.  That the king 
needs to lay down a law for husbands to respect their wives only points to his 
own weakness and inability to be “king of his own castle.”  (And yet he has far-
spread lands to rule!)  It is funny, and also pitiable.227  But despite the joke, there 
is a very serious dynamic of persecution at play here.   
 The scene illustrates the three stages of Girard’s standard persecution 
text cited above.  To reiterate the description of what happens in the first stage of 
a persecution text:  “the strongest impression is without question an extreme loss 
of social order evidenced by the disappearance of the rules and ‘differences’ that 
define cultural divisions.”228  The biblical text is quite sparse throughout the Book 
of Esther, and also here in what I call its “preface.”  Nonetheless, the author 
gives us just enough information to deduce that there is a likely power struggle 
between these two powerful monarchs.  For example, the text tells us that while 
Ahasuerus holds a banquet, Vashti holds her own banquet for the women.  It is 
further stated in the text that Vashti holds her banquet in “the royal palace of King 
Ahasuerus” (Est. 1:9).  The Bavli rabbis certainly imagined a rivalry between the 
two monarchs.  In the Bavli, Rabbi Abba bar Kahana notes that, “Vashti made 
the party in the king’s palace rather than in the women’s quarters, or harem, and 
this suggests that both Vashti and Ahasuerus had immoral intentions.”229  Other 
rabbinic midrashim and aggadot about Vashti do not portray her in such negative 
terms, but they equally illustrate the power struggle.230  In most midrashim and 	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aggadot, the rabbis depict Vashti as strong and of royal origin; Ahasuerus, 
contrarily, is often depicted as of lowly origin, raised to royal status only by virtue 
of his marriage to Vashti.  A competition for status and rank is the imagined 
struggle between these two characters, and that this is the core issue that is 
playing out during the banquet.  One might infer that the biblical author intended 
this, too—that the author intentionally set up a case of mirroring between these 
two characters through their parallel feasts, though the biblical text conveys no 
certainty.    
 Following the rabbis’ trajectory, the violent context of mimetic rivalry for 
status and authority provides the emotional charge for an exaggerated reaction 
based on a fear of social “similarity” – a lack of control over social roles, and 
ultimately, social chaos, setting the stage for the scapegoat mechanism to play 
out (the all against one of collective violence, which is the second aspect of 
Girard’s persecution text).  The breakdown of social distinctions is acutely felt by 
the king and those in his company:  the private/public role of husband/king has 
been opened up to criticism by Vashti’s refusal—the male authority rebelled 
against and overruled, their respective social roles collapsing into a struggle of 
wills played out by mimetic doubles.  The king and his advisors thus interpret 
Vashti’s act of refusal as quite dangerous; they see it as an imminent threat, 
creating a state of crisis, and requiring an immediate response.231  According to 
Girard, the persecutors within the persecution text commonly form this type of 
exaggerated response. 
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Ultimately, the persecutors always convince themselves that a 
small number of people, or even a single individual, despite his 
relative weakness, is extremely harmful to the whole of society.  
The stereotypical accusation justifies and facilitates this belief by 
ostensibly acting the role of mediator.  It bridges the gap between 
the insignificance of the individual and the enormity of the social 
body.  If the wrongdoers, even the diabolical ones, are to succeed 
in destroying the community’s distinctions, they must either attack 
the community directly, by striking at its heart or head, or else they 
must begin the destruction of difference within their own sphere by 
committing contagious crimes such as parricide and incest.232   
 
While we do not have literal parricide or incest in relation to Vashti and 
Ahasuerus, there is a destruction of male authority—a symbolic parricide, if you 
will.  The impetus for the crisis is precisely the threat of chaos if social identities 
such as husband/wife, king/queen, man/woman, collapse. 
 The drunkenness of the king (and likely of his advisors as well) is the 
narrative’s way of indicating that what we also have at work is an irrational and 
exaggerating mentality—precisely the kind of mentality that creates a “crisis” out 
of what is perceived as a threat, or perhaps as Girard suggests above, a “mere 
misunderstanding.”  Vashti has become a popular subject for modern feminist 
commentators who suggest, for example, that her refusal may have been an act 
to preserve her dignity.  There is no attempt to understand Vashti in the biblical 
narrative, though; her refusal signifies, for the king and his advisors, absolute 
chaos in the midst of an otherwise “orderly” kingdom.  The sense of order in the 
kingdom is reflected in the narrative:  everything from the couches of gold and 
silver to the seven eunuchs attending the king seems orchestrated, deliberate, 
and in its place.  Except Vashti.  Vashti’s guilt or innocence is not debated here, 
nor is it even relevant.  Reparation, within the schema of a persecution text, will 
not require justice per se, but rather a re-establishment of difference.  Grave 
action must be taken to ensure the hierarchical structure of the kingdom, and 
Vashti is the cause of the chaos.  All for the sake of order and social distinctions 	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therefore unite illustrating the second mark of the persecution text:  the all 
against one.  All agree Vashti must be expelled, and she is.  
 The third characteristic of the persecution text is in the creation of a 
prohibition, law or ritual, which we also have in this preface to Esther.  Girard 
makes a striking statement about the myth of the founding of Rome, which 
elucidates the irrationality, yet seeming necessity, of the expulsion of Vashti and 
the king’s subsequent edict to husbands and wives.  Girard says:   
 
Remus did not respect the ideal limit traced by Romulus between 
the inside and the outside of the city.  The motive for the killing is at 
once insignificant—since the city does not yet exist—and crucial, 
literally fundamental.  In order for the city to exist, no one can be 
allowed to flout with impunity the rules it prescribes.  So Romulus is 
justified.  His status is that of sacrificer and High Priest; he 
incarnates Roman power under all its forms at one and the same 
time.  The legislative, the judiciary, and the military forms cannot 
yet be distinguished from the religious; everything is already 
present within the last.233 
   
The juxtaposition that I find so striking in here is “since the city does not yet exist” 
with “in order for the city to exist.”  Whether we have in Esther a comical edict or 
not, the mechanism beneath its surface is serious:  a rule for order between 
husbands and wives is literally “founded” by Ahasuerus upon an act of violence.  
Further, the violence is seen as justified (though illogical) in that Vashti 
transgressed a law that had yet to be established.  Her transgression creates the 
law much in the same way Remus’ did, and in a way also reminiscent of Cain.  
The Persian law on marital relations (as a microcosm of the larger order of 
things) may indeed be said to have a violent origin. 
 Interpreting this scene structurally, then, and according to Girard’s 
delineation, this preface follows the pattern of the persecution myths:  there is a 
mimetic crisis in the kingdom; Vashti is perceived as the inciter of the chaos and 	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becomes the scapegoat; her expulsion reinstates and newly defines the order.  In 
this opening to the book of Esther, we thus immediately find the “three great 
moments” of persecution myths Girard defines.234 
 Yet there is a difference between this biblical narrative and its 
corresponding pagan texts.  The typical text of persecution, according to Girard, 
would be written from the point of view of the persecutor, and would present the 
victim as indisputably guilty of the crime of which they are accused.  In the 
preface to Esther, the line between persecutor and victim is not so clear.  In 
Esther, the author seems more intent on making the king appear weak and drunk 
than on commenting on Vashti’s motives, guilt or innocence.  The very “disorder” 
Ahasuerus’ advisors say will be caused by Vashti is, for example, discussed by 
the king and his advisors who, as aforementioned, have been drunk for seven 
days.  The comedy in which the tale is told makes the mimetic mechanism even 
more pronounced:  if we take the side of the persecutors, we are excessive, 
drunk and paranoid, too (not to mention a persecutor!)  We might be able to see 
the king and his advisor’s point:  we might also want a way of retaining order; 
societies depend on it.  At the same time, the biblical author keeps us at a 
distance from the king.  We cannot side with him.  So what should be done about 
Vashti?  With whom does the reader identify?  
 Taking the side of Vashti, the “victim” in this opening narrative, presents its 
problems, too.   Girard speaks of how the biblical narratives begin to unravel the 
scapegoat mechanism through their clearly discernable defense of the innocence 
of the victim and condemnation of the murder: “…even if Cain is invested with 
what are basically the same powers, and even if he has the ear of the deity, he is 
nonetheless presented as a vulgar murderer…The condemnation of the murder 
takes precedence over all other considerations.”235  But do we have in the text 
what we could call a clear condemnation of Vashti’s expulsion?  Max Weber 
adds to Girard’s insights when he asserts that the Jews, having experienced so 	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many catastrophies through history, and having had little historical success 
compared to the cultures around them that had formed empires (e.g. Persians, 
Babylonians, Romans, etc.), have a definitive prejudice in favor of victims.  They 
“spring to the victim’s defense” and have an “undeniable tendency to take the 
side of the victim on moral grounds.”236  To the modern reader, Vashti seems the 
undeniable victim (proven by the many feminist commentaries written in her 
defense.)  But in the narrative, she is neither known to be innocent nor 
redeemed.  She falls away almost forgotten.  This seems decidedly unbiblical, 
and so we must inquire more deeply. 
 The Talmud presents a mostly consistent picture that affirms Vashti’s guilt 
and elaborates a degrading end for her. 
 
The vilification of Vashti, while it finds no apparent justification in 
the details of the biblical account, should not surprise us as a 
midrashic motif…we have noted on several occasions how her fate 
was identified with that of her ancestors Nebuchadnezzar and 
Belshazzar. From a midrashic perspective, the very fact that she is 
punished at the conclusion of the episode provides evidence that 
she was a sinner.237 
 
Vashti, for the Talmudic rabbis, is associated with Babylon (those responsible for 
the destruction of the Temple and the dispersion of the Jews), and would not 
have been viewed as a victim by most Jews of the era, no matter what her 
fate.238  The rabbis elaborate further that Vashti was not only sent away (as the 
biblical tale ambiguously states), but was “slaughtered naked on the Sabbath” 
adding insult to injury.239  
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237 Segal, v.1, 252-3 
238 In one sense, this biblical book sets Vashti up against Esther as a typological rivalry 
between Babylon and Israel for the king (God.)  But this is not a line of interpretation we will follow 
here. 
239 Talmud Bavli, quoted in Segal, v.1, 255. 
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 Though the rabbis advocate for Vashti’s guilt and just expulsion, we do not 
know Vashti’s guilt from the scriptures.  I assert that the biblical text, rather than 
implying Vashti’s guilt and just end, in fact opens up the question of her having 
been wrongfully expelled.  Chapter 2 of the Book of Esther states:  “Some time 
afterward, when the anger of King Ahasuerus subsided, he thought of Vashti and 
what she had done and what had been decreed against her” (2:1).  The rabbinic 
view of this verse is absolute:  “As she had done, so it was decreed against 
her.”240  The rabbis’ interpretation asserts with confidence that Ahasuerus 
displayed no ambivalence in this verse; he was satisfied with what had passed in 
a “measure for measure” kind of way.  The biblical text, however, gives no 
definitive indication of this.  The biblical text itself may in fact present an 
Ahasuerus that had sobered up and realized the full import of what had occurred.  
His servants, in an attempt to relieve the king of his regret, rush to find him 
virgins.  Perhaps the king missed his wife and regretted the decision he had 
made.241  Perhaps Ahasuerus, in this passage, almost “hears” the voice of the 
victim.  But the biblical narrator is not ready to unfold redemption for the 
Babylonian “victim.”  The narrator lets Ahasuerus be distracted.  He lets the so-
called victim’s voice be drowned out by the voices of new women, to begin a new 
mimetic cycle. 
 This is the place we must make a preliminary and Girardian character 
analysis of the king.  Girard makes an in depth analysis of the beheading of John 
the Baptist, which was not to be written until perhaps 400 years after Esther.  
Still, Girard’s analysis of this reinterpretation of the Esther narrative (if I may call 
it that) is very helpful to understand the king’s mimetic character, and why 
although he almost hears the voice of the victim, it remains concealed.242   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Talmud Bavli, quoted in Segal, v.1, 255. 
241 Segal, v. 1, 275 (footnote 131).  Some Talmudic sources in fact agree with this 
interpretation.  The Yerushalmi has Ahasuerus, who regrets his decision about Vashti, send the 
seven advisors to their death.  This difference in interpretation is contextual.  The Yerushalmi and 
Bavli tend to demonize their respective geographic and historical enemies, polarizing Israel and 
the “Other” in their exegesis. 
242 Girard states:   
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 First, it seems quite obvious that Ahasuerus desires, perhaps above all 
else, an orderly kingdom.  We have already seen in the case of Vashti, how a 
threat to order is met with violence.  But it is not Ahasuerus alone who decides 
these fates.  Ahasuerus is more like a blank slate; he is the “coming into being” of 
the desires of those who happen to be around him.  In other words, Ahasuerus 
takes on the desires of those around him; he is a purely mimetic creature.   
 Girard might liken Ahasuerus to a child who by nature lacks in being, and 
who takes on the desires in imitation of the caregiver(s).  This is precisely what 
Ahasuerus has done, twice now, just in the preface to the book.  First, we saw 
the king take on the counsel of his advisors to eliminate his queen.  There was 
no counterargument made by the king—no line of questioning to indicate a 
weighing of options, or how to mete out justice.  Based on Girard’s interpretation 
of similar texts, I believe Girard here would determine that Ahasuerus mimetically 
took on the desire of Memucan in this scene.  Second, the king imitates the 
desire of his attendants who seek out beautiful virgins for him, immediately 
turning away from the content of his own thoughts.  We have in Ahasuerus a 
chameleon; one who mimetically replicates the desires of those around him.  If 
there is a core being within him, it is seen only briefly in his reflection about 
Vashti—a being that evaporates just as quickly, supplanted by the wishes of 
others. 
 The king, in this light, is not “bad” in any moral sense.  In fact, we might 
see him as a tragic character meant to provide a lesson on how mimesis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For there to be an effective, sacralizing act of transference, it is necessary that the victim 
should inherit all the violence from which the community has been exonerated.  It is 
because the victim genuinely passes as guilty that the transference does not come to the 
fore as such.  This piece of conjuring brings about the happy result for which the lynching 
mob is profoundly grateful… (Things Hidden, 169)   
 
In order for a text to be “mythic”, it would have to take “no account of the arbitrary and 
unjust character of the violence which is done to Jesus.  In fact the opposite is the case:  
the Passion is presented as a blatant piece of injustice.” (Things Hidden, 170)   
 
Girard states this in relation to Jesus, but it is applicable here.  This is an appropriate prelude to a 
story that intends to unravel this myth, by first exposing it for what it is.  Vashti’s seemingly unjust 
demise also puts the reader on alert for what will eventually confront Esther.  Will Esther become 
a scapegoat, too?  This is what the author leads the reader to expect. 
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operates.  The king is completely mimetic—a blank slate.  He takes on the 
desires of those within his influence; his desire is entirely patterned after the 
desires of others.  Timothy Beal puts it well:  “In the absence of God, King 
Ahasuerus is a kind of trick mirror, reflecting that absence in his own 
vacuousness.  His void mimics the void of divine power/presence/authority in the 
story world…He is profoundly superficial…literally, farced:  stuffed with the 
interests and objectives of those around him.”243  Thus, significantly, it is only 
when Ahasuerus is alone (and to note without alcohol or anger) that his own 
thought emerges.  We do see this briefly in the account above as well as later on 
when the king has insomnia.  But when the king is among others, we will 
consistently see that he gets caught up in the mimetic contagion of those around 
him, exerting no will that one could call his own, catching the disease of mimetic 
violence. 
 It is my sense that this preface, then, in which we have a typical 
scapegoating scenario, we also have a departure from the persecution texts.  
The biblical narrator includes just a moment of literally sober reflection on the 
scapegoating event:  the king’s deliberation about what he had done to Vashti 
opens up doubt about the punishment inflicted, also raising the possibility of the 
innocence of the victim.  What had been done in anger and insobriety could have 
been wrong.  Thus, I assert, there is just the inkling of an attempt in this preface 
to “redeem” the narrative, even the Babylonian “victim.”  But despite the fact that 
there is an attempt to hear the voice of the victim, it does not prevail.  The 
cultural context in which the voice of the victim is trying to be heard is still closed 
off to it.  How come?  Because the cultural context in the preface to the Book of 
Esther is a kingdom that uses the scapegoat mechanism as its operating 
principle.  As in all other persecution texts, this victim is accused and then swept 
under the rug, erased.  The differentiating factor in this narrative from its pagan 
counterparts is that those who are operating the mechanism are drunk, unaware, 
and ludicrous.  Thus, the contemporaneous Jewish reader would neither have 	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identified with the Babylonian “victim”, nor with the vacuous and drunken king.  
The persecution text as it is written in Esther cannot be endorsed by the Jew; 
rather, it is construed as exaggerated, even ludicrous.  But even as the reader 
might understand the system to be in error, as of yet there is no structure to 
replace it.   
 This episode leaves the reader with a temporary if unsettling peace, but 
alas—the mechanism does work to effect a fragile reconciliation, so one can at 
least move on (until mimesis strikes again.)  The preface to the Book of Esther 
brilliantly serves to reveal the prevailing scapegoat mechanism, exposing the 
Jew’s inability to be inside of the narrative, while at the same time giving just a 
hint of an opening.  Queen Esther will be brought into the narrative soon, and will 
provide an obvious parallel to Vashti.  But as the true voice of the “victim” from 
the perspective of the biblical narrator, Esther will be redeemed.  
 
An Ancient Sibling Rivalry Continued:  Haman and Mordecai 
 
I assert above that the preface to the Book of Esther, which runs from chapter 1 
through chapter 2:4, is a classic persecution text, with a glimmer of self-
awareness of its own nature as such in the regret of the king over Vashti’s 
expulsion.  This is an important foreshadowing of what is to take place in the 
main body of the book, which I will demonstrate is another persecution text, 
though this time entirely unveiled, and turned on its head in favor of the 
“victim.”244   At the same time, I will demonstrate that this redemption cannot yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 The narrative beautifully parallels the revelation of the mechanism.  Esther, at first, 
must keep her identity as a Jew concealed, which takes place inside of the mechanism unfolding 
through the story (Haman is in rivalry both with Mordecai and the king, and the Jews are the 
scapegoats about to be slaughtered.)  When Esther reveals herself to the king, the mechanism is 
made visible, the scapegoats are redeemed, and justice is served upon Haman. 
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be complete, as it is literarily and historically stuck within the framework of a 
sacrificial system.245 
 Before moving on to how the event of scapegoating is transformed, it is 
necessary to unfold the narrative and its new cast of mimetic characters.  In this 
next section of the Book of Esther, one reads about an archetypal “sibling” rivalry 
between Mordecai and Haman, illustrating in no uncertain terms how mimesis 
operates and escalates.  I will examine these two characters and their 
interrelations in detail.   
 Chapter 2, verse 5 introduces Mordecai into the story.   
 
In the fortress Shushan lived a Jew by the name of Mordecai, son 
of Jair son of Shimei son of Kish, a Benjaminite, who had been 
exiled from Jerusalem in the group that was carried into exile along 
with King Jeconiah of Judah, which had been driven into exile by 
King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon (Est. 2:5-6). 
 
Berlin comments that:  “Mordecai is given top billing…The information given 
about Mordecai suggests to the reader that he is a clearly identified and 
prominent Jew of the Babylonian exile, with an obliquely expressed link to King 
Saul.”246  Two features of Mordecai’s introduction stand out:  his genealogy; and 
his exilic status.  To address the latter point first, the root for exile (g-l-h) is 
mentioned three times in this short introduction, emphasizing Mordecai’s status 
as an exiled Jew.  Berlin offers that this enabled the readers of Esther in the 
Diaspora to easily identify with Mordecai; Levenson offers that this emphasizes 
the powerlessness and vulnerability of the Jews in contrast to the luxury and 
power with which the Persian court was introduced.247  Mordecai is, further, 
“foster father to Hadassah—that is, Esther—his uncle’s daughter, for she had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 The notion of a redeemed persecution text that takes action in favor of the victim is 
correlative to the working of the modern justice system, i.e. the guilty party is punished.   
246 Berlin, 24.    
247 Ibid., 25. 
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neither father nor mother” (Est. 2:7a).  The image of Mordecai as exiled, and 
presumably a single parent to an orphan girl, paints a humble image – one 
senses the extra burdens that would be upon the shoulders of these two 
uprooted individuals.  
 Despite the powerlessness that Levenson would emphasize, though, 
Mordecai’s genealogy and associations characterize him as a prominent Jew.  
“Genealogies are often designed to give the reader information about the status 
or location of a character, rather than a scientifically accurate family tree…by 
virtue of Mordecai’s being a yehudi and a Benjaminite he is a symbol of the 
authentic exilic Jew.”248  The Talmudic rabbis affirmed Mordecai’s stature as a 
scholar, as a wise and learned man, as well as one with leadership quality.249 
 Chapter 2 continues and tells the story of Esther’s rise to become 
Ahasuerus’ new queen, all the while following the advice of Mordecai.  Mordecai 
stayed as close to Esther as possible during her trial period in the harem.  Once 
Esther is secure in her role in the palace, Mordecai continues to stay as near her 
as possible—“at the palace gate”-- always checking in on her.  It is while 
Mordecai was at the palace gate in chapter 2:21 that he overhears a plot by the 
angry eunuchs Bigthan and Teresh to overtake the king.  Mordecai immediately 
reports the plot to Esther who in turn reports it to Ahasuerus.  Mordecai’s 
information is proven correct, and the eunuchs are impaled on stakes. 
 The plot of the eunuchs takes place over only two verses, and seems, like 
Vashti’s narrative, a rather insignificant episode.  Yet it is an integral set-up for 
the rivalry that informs the rest of the book of Esther.  Commentaries will point 
out how this episode foreshadows the events following it in the book, and how 
Mordecai’s act of informing the king of the eunuch’s plot is necessary to receiving 
his reward later in the story.  All of this I find to be part of an accurate 	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249 Fox lists the qualities which have made Mordecai an ideal figure in many threads of 
rabbinic tradition and Jewish interpretation:  his Jewishness; wisdom; pride; courage; loyalty to 
the king; leadership; loyalty to the Jewish people; lack of personal ambition; and directness.  Fox, 
Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther, 185-190. 
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interpretation.  What we also have here in this mini-episode, however, is yet a 
second example of mimetic rivalry and scapegoating.  As Berlin explains:  “This 
episode is recounted succinctly, with no motives ascribed to the culprits, which 
gave rise to a range of speculations to fill the gap, including jealousy of Mordecai, 
jealousy of Esther, and anger at the king for his treatment of Vashti.”250  It is true, 
as Berlin states, the narrative is bare and promotes speculation—this is a 
characteristic of the book on the whole.  But this bare bones narrative 
underscores once again the basic operation of the mechanism:  there is a clear 
rivalry between the eunuchs and the king, the presence of anger, a threat of 
imminent chaos because of dissention within the kingdom, and the scapegoating 
of the king (for what will remain an undisclosed reason).   
 While the structure remains consistent, the episode of the eunuchs does 
present a shift in content.  Unlike in the Vashti episode, the scapegoat (i.e., the 
king) is not the one who receives the punishment in this case.  Rather, there is a 
judicial inquiry, the conspirators are found guilty, and they receive punishment in 
kind.  The narrative provides the sense that justice has been served, and a 
scapegoat situation avoided—though there is still blood (i.e. the blood of the 
eunuchs) necessary for reconciliation.  The eunuchs episode provides a step 
away from the problematic persecution of Vashti in the preface, revealing the 
same persecution mechanism that was underway with Vashti now targeting the 
king.  Here, however, the lynching is intercepted by Mordecai, the target is 
reaffixed to the backs of the eunuchs themselves.  The eunuchs episode is a 
clear foreshadowing of Haman’s demise later in the narrative, which we will 
speak of shortly. 
 Chapter 3 begins right after Mordecai’s disclosure of the eunuch’s plot and 
oddly states that:  “Some time afterward, King Ahasuerus promoted Haman son 
of Hammedatha the Agagite; he advanced him and seated him higher than any 
of his fellow officials” (Est. 3:1-2).  The reader expects Mordecai to have been 
advanced for his good deed, but instead we meet a new character, Haman.  Why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Berlin, 31. 
	   135	  
Haman was promoted is not stated; further, his advancement is emphasized, 
even glorified, through repetitious vocabulary (e.g. “promoted”, “advanced”, 
“higher”).   
 We are then told:  
 
All the king’s courtiers in the palace gate knelt and bowed low to 
Haman, for such was the king’s order concerning him; but Mordecai 
would not kneel or bow low.  Then the king’s courtiers who were in 
the palace gate said to Mordecai, “Why do you disobey the king’s 
order?”  When they spoke to him day after day and he would not 
listen to them, they told Haman, in order to see whether Mordecai’s 
resolve would prevail; for he had explained that he was a Jew.  
When Haman saw that Mordecai would not kneel or bow low to 
him, Haman was filled with rage.  But he disdained to lay hands on 
Mordecai alone; having been told who Mordecai’s people were, 
Haman plotted to do away with all the Jews, Mordecai’s people, 
throughout the kingdom of Ahasuerus (Est. 3:2-6). 
 
For the third time in only three chapters (indeed, once per chapter), we hear of 
the connection of anger and violence:  Vashti’s refusal created anger in the king, 
and her expulsion followed; the eunuchs were reported to have been angry and 
seeking the king’s harm, and they wound up impaled; and here we have Haman 
angered because of Mordecai’s refusal to bow.251  All three episodes share a 
strange absence of explicit motive as well.  The text never tells us why Vashti 
refused to come before the king; neither do we learn why the eunuchs wanted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 251 We have already discussed the connection of anger with the yetzer ha-ra, the evil 
inclination, in chapter two.  Jewish sources are in most cases extremely critical about anger.  
They consider anger the result of the evil inclination, even likening it to idolatry.  Ecclesiastes 7:9, 
for example, states that, “Anger dwells in the bosom of fools;” and the Talmud states: "Whoever 
is enraged, all kinds of demons have power over him."  In the case of Ephraim and Manasseh, 
we discussed Ephraim’s sacrifice as the sacrifice of the evil inclination that would precede the 
coming of the Davidic messiah.  We also pointed out Manasseh’s ability to control his evil impulse 
even when given the lesser blessing.  Unlike Cain, Esau, or Joseph’s brothers, Manasseh kept 
his yetzer ha-ra in check, and avoided the mimetic rivalry that would have led to yet one more 
instance of sibling violence.  Haman’s uncontrolled anger is even more noteworthy given this 
context.  Haman was promoted, not Mordecai, thus we have the one who ironically received the 
blessing yet still failed to be whole. 
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kill the king; nor do we learn why Mordecai refuses to bow down to Haman.252  
The motive is clearly rivalry, though where the rivalry stems from in the first two 
cases is unknown according to the text.  Regarding the third instance concerning 
Mordecai and Haman, however, the biblical text gives us a very big hint. 
 There is a long-standing rivalry between the families of Mordecai and 
Haman.  There is thus not only the surprise of Haman receiving the king’s 
promotion instead of Mordecai, but the shock of who Haman is:  Haman is “son 
of Hammedatha the Agagite” (Est. 3:1).  This declaration of lineage, like that of 
Mordecai, would have been immediately recognizable to the ancient Jew.  
Mordecai’s link through Benjamin to King Saul stands in direct tension with 
Haman’s link to King Agag (the Amalekite) mentioned in Samuel 15:8, calling up 
a memory of battle and ancient hatred in the history of Israel.  In Samuel 15, King 
Saul is commanded by the Lord to destroy the Amalekites led by King Agag.  The 
prophet Samuel communicates this message to Saul:   
 
The Lord sent me to anoint you king over his people Israel; now 
therefore listen to the words of the Lord.  Thus says the Lord of 
hosts, ‘I will punish the Amalekites for what they did in opposing the 
Israelites when they came up out of Egypt.  Now go and attack 
Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have; do not spare them, 
but kill both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel 
and donkey’ (I Samuel 15:1-4). 
 
As the story goes, however, Saul has mercy on King Agag and does not kill him.  
This act of mercy costs Saul the kingship, and leads to the necessity of Samuel 
killing Agag the next day in order to fulfill the divine command.  In a midrash on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 The various scapegoating episodes are linked linguistically, too.  Verse 6 states that 
Haman “disdained” to lay hands on Mordecai alone—where “disdain” (b-z-h, disdain, despise or 
scorn) is the same word used in the preface to Esther when describing what Memucan fears the 
women do (Est. 1:17).  The words “lay hands on” (b-q-sh, seek, plot) are also repetitive of the 
verbs used to describe the eunuch’s plot in chapter two of Esther, drawing a further link between 
Haman’s creating a scapegoat, and the episodes of Vashti and the eunuchs.  See Berlin, 37. 
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the Book of Esther, the rabbis assert that in the one night King Agag remains 
alive, Agag impregnates a woman whose lineage leads directly to Haman. 
 
Mordecai responded to Esther saying:  “…[R]emember that you 
come from the descendents of King Saul of Israel; and it was told to 
the king of Israel to destroy the memory of the dynasty of Amalek 
from beneath the heavens.  But he had pity on Agag, their king, and 
kept him by his side.  That very night a woman became pregnant 
from him, and Haman arose from his descendants [and] has been 
seeking to buy all of the Jews and to uproot them completely.  As a 
consequence of your ancestor having had pity on their king Agag, 
he became a stumbling block for [Israel].”253 
 
The rabbis continue:  “Lo, a scion shall spring forth from him who shall inflict on 
you hardships like thrones in your eyes and pricks in your sides.  Who will this 
be?  Haman, who decreed to destroy, to kill and to annihilate.”254  Through 
Haman, Amalek, the hater of the Jews, is understood to remain in the world. 
 Segal also expounds upon the rivalry between Haman and Mordecai’s 
ancestors, and remarks that the failure of Saul to kill Agag is a primary motif of 
the rabbinic midrashim on the Megillah.  Segal continues that:  
 
…most biblical commentators would agree that by tracing the 
ancestries of Mordecai and Haman to Saul and Agag respectively, 
the author of Esther expected his readers to make precisely that 
connection and to interpret the drama in Shushan as a playing-out 
of the fundamental war between Israel and Amalek.255 
 
Segal also adds in a note that, “This association is of course central to the 
liturgical function of the Megillah-reading, which is invariably linked to the Amalek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Targum Sheni 4:13 quoted in Elaine Rose Glickman, Haman and the Jews: A Portrait  
from Rabbinic Literature (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1999), 26. 
254 Esther Rabbah Proem 7, quoted in Glickman, 26.    
255 Segal, The Babylonian Esther Midrash, v. 2, 20. Segal cites P. Haupt and C.A. Moore 
as commentators who have stated agreement on this point. 
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passages of the Pentateuch.”256  Segal here is referring to the texts linked to 
Esther in the liturgical days surrounding Purim.  For example, on the Sabbath 
before the celebration of Purim, the chumash reading in synagogue is Exodus 
17, which recounts the original attack of Amalek upon the Hebrews in the desert.  
The reason for the vicious attack on the Amalekites and King Agag in I Samuel 
quoted above has its root in this Exodus passage.  Right after the Hebrews flee 
Egypt to worship Yahweh in the desert, it is reported that the Amalekites attacked 
them at Rephidim (Exod. 17:8).  Rabbinic tradition adds that the attack on the 
Hebrews by Amalek was particularly hateful for two reasons:  1) they were the 
first to attack the freed nation, thereby opening the door for others to attack them; 
and 2) they attacked those at the back of the group – those who were slower, 
namely, the elderly, the weak, and the children.  For these two reasons, the 
Amalekites are particularly hated.  To an archetypal extent, the name of the 
nation boiled down to a single entity “Amalek” to denote those who violently prey 
on the weak and underrepresented.  The liturgical context for the Book of Esther, 
its holiday Purim, and the character of Haman, is the evil of Amalek who preys on 
the weak. 
 The biblical text is not merciful on Amalek in the episode from Exodus, 
and makes clear that Amalek is not just this violent nation, but a symbol that will 
resonate for future generations and across cultures.  After Moses manages to 
defeat Amalek in this episode, the Lord declares:  “Write this as a reminder in a 
book and recite it in the hearing of Joshua:  I will utterly blot out the 
remembrance of Amalek from under heaven” (Exod. 17:14).  Moses responds by 
building an altar to the Lord, saying:  “The Lord will have war with Amalek from 
generation to generation” (Exod. 17:16b).257  From this passage, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Ibid. The Midrash Esther also emphasizes prayer as Mordecai’s principal weapon in 
the struggle with Haman, of course reflecting a rabbinic value in general, but finding support in 
certain biblical passages like Esther 4:1, too.  See Segal, The Babylonian Esther Midrash, v. 2, 
38. 
257 This passage in Exodus gives the divine command for the reading of the Book of 
Esther aloud on Purim, and for the “blotting out” of Haman, which is reenacted not only in the 
Esther narrative, but in ritual. 
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understands that this rivalry—this war—will extend far into the future through 
Haman and beyond. 
 The history of hatred, violence and revenge does not just span future time, 
however; it also goes farther back in time than even the attack of the Amalekites 
on the Hebrews.  This rivalry goes all the way back to Jacob and Esau, the rival 
twin brothers we have already had the occasion to discuss, in the Book of 
Genesis.  Amalek, indeed, is said to be Esau’s grandson; thus Haman’s lineage 
stems from Esau as well.  The rivalry between Esau and his brother is famous, 
centered on Jacob’s usurpation of his brother’s blessing and birthright in Genesis 
27.  The enmity of Esau toward his brother after this episode is explicit in Esau’s 
words:  “So Esau said in his heart, ‘The days of mourning for my father shall 
draw near and then I shall kill my brother Jacob’” (Gen. 27:41).  The biblical 
author gives the sense that we are still in the realm of Cain and Abel, as the 
vitriol is apparent in Esau’s oath to murder his brother over a blessing.   
 In the biblical text, however, it must be remembered that Jacob does not 
steal his brother’s birthright without some sense of complicity from Esau.  Esau, 
we are told, sells it for a “mess of pottage” (Genesis 24: 27-34).  The rabbis get 
air under their wings from this episode and boldly characterize Esau as absolute 
evil, ascribing to Esau a multitude of sins in addition to those the scriptures 
explicitly state.  A few examples of the sins they ascribe to Esau are as follows: 
 
Another comment on “The fool has said in his heart, “There is no 
God’” (Psalms 14:1).  “Fool” refers to the wicked Esau.  Why was 
he called fool [naval]?  R. Judah explained in the name of R. 
Samuel:  Because he filled the whole earth with obscenity [navelut].  
Everywhere he set up thrones for gods who are no more than 
thorns, refuges for deities who are mere refuse, ribald theaters, and 
bloody circuses.258 
R. Phineas and R. Hilkiah taught in the name of R. Simon…Like the 
boar which displays its cloven hoof, as if to say:  “I am clean,” so 
wicked Esau displays himself so openly on the seats of justice that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Midrash Psalms 14:3, accessed January 19, 2012, http://www.sacred-texts.com. 
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the legal tricks whereby he robs, steals, and plunders appear to be 
just proceedings. (Midrash Psalms 80:6) 
“[Isaac] called Esau, his elder son, saying to him, ‘My son,’ and 
Esau replied, ‘Here I am’” (Genesis 27:1).  The Holy Spirit also 
proclaims:  “’When [Esau’s] speech is gracious, do not believe him; 
for there are seven abominations in his heart’” (Proverbs 26:25).259 
   
And Esau’s demise does not end here.  In the Rabbinic literature in particular, the 
conflict between Jacob and Esau also becomes an archetypal rivalry.  Esau is: 
 
…identified with Edom (Genesis 36.1) and, on the critical view, the 
Esau-Jacob narratives reflect the conflict between the Israelites and 
the neighboring people of Edom.  In the later Rabbinic period, 
Edom is identified with Rome and the narratives are read as a 
foretelling of the love-hate relationship between Rome and the 
Jewish people.  Later still Edom (Rome) is identified in Jewish 
literature as the Christian Church, the narratives now being read as 
reflecting the rivalry between the two religions of Christianity and 
Judaism.260 
 
As early as the Second Temple (as evidenced in the Qumran scrolls, for 
example), Esau is Rome—he is a symbol of anti-Jewish hatred, idolatry, 
oppression and evil.  Further, hatred is inherited.  Thus Esau’s enmity against the 
Jews is passed down from generation to generation: 
 
…and Amalek was Esau’s grandson, as it is said:  “And Timna bore 
to Eliphaz Amalek” (Genesis 36:12).  R. Aha taught:  Why did Esau 
command Amalek his grandson and not command Eliphaz his son?  
Only because Eliphaz had grown up in the bosom of Isaac and 
would not heed [Esau’s command] to kill Israel and make war upon 
them.  Thus Esau commanded Amalek.  What did Amalek do?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Tanchuma Buber Toledot 8, quoted in Glickman, 19-20.  A similar text can be found in 
Genesis Rabbah 65:11. 260	  Louis Jacobs, The Jewish Religion:  A Companion (US:  Oxford University Press, 
1995),149. 
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When Israel came out of Egypt immediately he came upon them, 
as it is said:  “Then came Amalek” (Exodus 17:8).261  
  
As Glickman explains:  “The mantle is passed to another generation; the 
characters change, but the theme remains the same.  The enemy—once Esau, 
now Amalek—still pursues God’s beloved—once only Jacob, now the collective 
people Israel.”262 
 What we have in these ancestors of Haman and Mordecai is therefore a 
deeply entrenched mimetic rivalry spanning generations all the way back to 
Jacob and Esau.  It seems these current two “brothers” forgot that their ancestors 
made peace, though.  It is unfortunate and yet a profound example of how both 
Ephraim (the destruction of the evil inclination) and Manasseh (letting go of the 
past) are forgotten, even denied; the mind and heart slip into the familiar pattern 
of rivalry and violence.  We will return to this idea later, and in terms of how it 
pertains specifically in the context of Esther.  For now, to bring this entrenched 
rivalry into the context of our current analytical structure, I will discuss how the 
rivalry between Mordecai and Haman fulfills the three criteria of the persecution 
text.   
 According to Girard’s analysis of the generic persecution text, as we have 
previously discussed, this kind of intense mimetic rivalry creates the mimetic 
crisis in which there is a “dissolution in conflict, removal of the differences and 
hierarchies which constitute the community in its wholeness.”263  In parallel 
structure to the opening preface of the Book of Esther in which Vashti refuses the 
king, here Mordecai refuses Haman.  As in the Vashti episode, too, Vashti’s 
refusal was irrationally projected outward as a threat to the entire kingdom; her 
refusal was interpreted as the act that would incite a confusion of social roles and 
gender roles throughout the land, causing mayhem and social breakdown.  
Mordecai’s refusal to bow down before Haman is equally construed by Haman.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Midrash Hagadol Vayishlack, Genesis 36:6, quoted in Glickman, 21. 
262 Glickman, 22. 
263 Girard, Things Hidden, 141-2. 
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His act not only creates a sense of social resistance to Haman’s authority, 
though; given the history or rivalry between the ancestors of these two 
characters, Mordecai’s refusal is one more example of disrespect to the “first-
born” by the younger sibling.  Jacob takes the birthright and blessing meant for 
Esau—Jacob reverses the family hierarchy.  Here, Haman (like Esau) is the one 
in the natural position of power, but Mordecai does not acknowledge his status.  
Mordecai’s refusal, like Vashti’s refusal, is understood as a rebellion against 
social hierarchy and a threat to social order. 
 Haman is incensed by this collapse into “sameness.”  Mordecai’s refusal 
to bow puts him on equal footing with Haman—they are still the rivaling twins, 
Jacob and Esau, fighting for superiority.  Haman, threatened by this sameness, 
however, differentiates Mordecai from himself according to his religious beliefs 
and sets out to use the power of King Ahasuerus and his kingdom to eradicate 
the Jewish community that, according to Haman’s edict, operates according to its 
own laws.  Professor Rabbi Jonathan Magonet draws on the lineage of Haman 
from Amalek to comment on the sameness generated between these rivals: 
 
We forget that the information that he is an Agagite tells us not only 
that he comes from the line of Israel’s enemies, but also that he, 
too, is an outsider in the Persian court.  When he speaks of the 
people scattered throughout the land whose laws are different from 
those of every other people (3:8), he is also describing, in a 
projection, some aspect of his own outsider status.  For Haman, 
too, is insecure, part of a minority group, relying on his wealth or 
other keys to power to maintain his position, ready to invent a 
scapegoat to insure the continuance of his power.  Haman is 
nothing more than the alternative face of Mordecai, a distorted 
reflection of the same character…and perhaps it is that deeper 
relationship that Rava is pointing towards when he says that a man 
is obliged to drink so much wine on Purim that he becomes 
incapable of knowing whether he is cursing Haman or blessing 
Mordecai.264 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Jonathan Magonet, Talking to the Other:  Jewish Interfaith Dialogue with Christians 
and Muslims (London, NY:  I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003), 180.  Emphasis added. 
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Beal comments on Magonet’s words:   
 
It is Haman’s identity with Mordecai as mutual outsiders, other to 
the present political regime, that in turn leads to Haman’s projection 
of what he hates about himself onto Mordecai and the Jews.  
Mordecai is Haman’s negative image.  In this sense, Esther is not 
about the distinctiveness of the Jew over and against Haman, but 
the ambiguity of identity, the fuzzy area between and among 
identities.265 
 
Magonet and Beal are both drawing on the same condition of sameness that, 
according to Girard, constitutes a mimetic crisis that leads to the all against one 
phenomenon and the creation of a scapegoat.  Beal and Magonet draw on the 
sameness in terms of foreignness, however, while using Girardian analysis, I 
explain the sameness due to their legacy of, literally, twin brothers at war.  In 
fact, what Magonet and Beal overlook in their interpretation is precisely that 
these two rivals share more than being foreigners-- they are actually related to 
each other. 
 Beal’s analysis of the Esther text, in focusing on self-projection, looks over 
one other crucial point that emerges when Mordecai and Haman are interpreted 
in the context of their ancestry:  Haman is in fact the one who attains the 
“blessing” and is promoted; Mordecai, despite his good deed and demonstrated 
loyalty to the king, is passed over.  Haman, therefore, is the “brother” with the 
upper hand—he is the one in power—and like the “first-borns” before him, 
Haman seems to have gotten his position due to some kind of unwritten 
primogeniture.  The text does not explain why Haman was promoted; but it is 
clear that Haman was promoted despite Mordecai’s demonstrated loyalty and 
conscientiousness.  Also, despite the text’s implication that Haman’s promotion is 
unwarranted, and while there is clearly some inherited ire on both ends of the 
Mordecai-Haman relationship, Mordecai maintains his self-control while Haman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Beal, 58. 
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becomes angry.  As we have seen in previous instances, too, anger is a clear 
indication in the text that there is an imminent mimetic crisis.    
 It is at this point that we enter the second phase of the persecution text:  
the all against one.  The “one” here is not a single individual scapegoat, however, 
but a communal scapegoat, that is, all the Jews.  Haman focuses not only on 
persecuting Mordecai, but plans full-scale genocide of “all of Mordecai’s people.”  
Haman goes to the king to request the Jews’ extermination as follows: 
 
There is a certain people, scattered and dispersed among the other 
people in all the provinces of your realm, whose laws are different 
from those of any other people and who do not obey the king’s 
laws; and it is not in Your Majesty’s interest to tolerate them.  If it 
please Your Majesty, let an edict be drawn for their destruction… 
(Esther 3.8-9). 
 
In response to Haman’s request, the king proves to be as impressionable as he 
had been earlier when advised to expel Vashti.  The king is unaware the identity 
of the people of whom Haman speaks, but he is clearly still operating inside of 
his role as a blank mimetic slate, responding to Haman:  “…the people are yours 
to do with as you see fit” (Esther 3.11b). 
 The text at this point reads with repetition and exaggeration to emphasize 
that Haman sends his edict “to destroy, massacre, and exterminate all the Jews, 
young and old, children and women, on a single day, on the thirteenth day of the 
twelfth month—that is, the month of Adar—and to plunder their possessions” 
(Esther 3.13b) out to “every people” and “every province,” and “to every people in 
their own language” (Esther 3.12).  In contrast to the somewhat comical edict in 
the Vashti episode, (i.e. for all husbands and wives to respect each other), what 
we have here is not funny at all; Haman’s edict calls for nothing short of a full-
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blown genocide.  Haman sets a day for the battle of all against one—the Jews 
are set for annihilation.266 
   What happens next in this second stage of persecution-- this all against 
one and the creation of the communal scapegoat to strengthen Haman’s ties to 
the king-- is where the Book of Esther radically departs from other types of 
persecution texts, including that of Vashti.  The radical turn we see in Esther is 
only foreshadowed by the short tale of the eunuch conspiracy in which the 
scapegoated king is saved, and the guilty conspirators executed (foreshadowing 
the substitution of Haman for Esther in the events following).  The reader may 
take some solace in the fact that justice is and will be served, and the guilty party 
executed, in both of these episodes.  But there is something else -- a crucial 
occurrence that makes this persecution text even more distinct from the other 
two we have examined, as well as from their pagan antecedents:  Esther is the 
link between Haman and Mordecai—she is in the royal court, yet a Jew—and the 
perfect victim.  Yet even as the self-proclaimed victim, she has the power to 
orchestrate her own sacrificial ritual, ending with a sacrifice in which she is 
released from her victimhood.  She accomplishes this through extraordinary self-
control, self-disclosure, knowledge of the scapegoat mechanism, and voluntary 
self-sacrifice.  Though Jewish ritual has often focused on Mordecai as the hero of 
this book, the book resides in Esther’s name.  I assert this is so, as I will 
demonstrate, because she is the only one in the narrative who has knowledge of 
the mechanism and the courage and skill necessary to carry it out on her own 
terms. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Unlike the earlier Vashti episode, too, here we have not a Babylonian Queen as our 
scapegoat, but rather Mordecai and the Jews—thus the intended reader is likely immediately 
empathic.  Here is a “victim” with whom the reader identifies, for the reader is implied to be one of 
Mordecai’s people scheduled for extermination.  Even if one admits that Mordecai’s refusal to 
bow was an act of stubbornness or pride (and I believe the correct interpretation is that his dignity 
would not allow him to bow to an ancestor of Amalek), all the Jews that will suffer on account of 
his one act of refusal are certainly “innocent” victims in their being the subjects of undue blame, 
likely the reader included. 
	   146	  
Esther:  A Redeemed Scapegoat in a Scapegoating World 
 
When Esther walks into the inner court of the king, she understands that she may 
be walking to her own death.  The reader might have expected a strong 
emotional plea to the king, or perhaps a request for vengeance.  Yet Esther does 
neither.  Instead of heating up in fury at Haman’s despicable edict, she in fact 
slows time down, cools things off, and commands a fast.  Esther displays 
extraordinary strength of character through her own effort; she is grounded, fully 
rational, unable to be ruffled, with keen understanding of the ways of those 
around her; she has a mind for strategy, and tangible self-control.267  An analysis 
of the sequence of the events surrounding Esther’s self-disclosure as a 
scapegoat will demonstrate her courage as well as her impeccable control over 
her mimetic inclination and yetzer ha-ra while she navigates a dire situation.  In 
addition, she demonstrates such insight into the workings of the mimetic and 
scapegoating mechanism that she succeeds in substituting Haman as the 
scapegoat for herself.   Through my demonstrations, I will show that Esther is in 
complete control of what she is doing throughout the next episode of her book—
she in essence designs and orchestrates a ceremonial ritual to save the Jews, 
and turn the tables on Haman.   
 From the beginning of Esther’s appearance in the book, she earns favor 
from all those who come into contact with her.  She won the favor of “Hegai, the 
guardian of women” (Esther 2.8), and indeed “won the admiration of all who saw 
her” (Esther 2.15).  It is not a surprise to the reader that, when her time to meet 
the king had come, “the king loved Esther more than all the other women, and 
she won his grace and favor more than all the virgins” (Esther 2.16).  Not 
coincidentally, Esther is placed in direct parallel to Vashti by the text, which then 
notes:  “So he (the king) set a royal diadem on her head and made her queen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 In contrast, we witness Haman’s continued emotional rage.  Haman continues in his 
incessant need for admiration, wounded pride, and frivolous exercises to take out revenge on 
Mordecai, culminating in his building of a stake as tall as a seven-story building on which to 
impale his rival.  
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instead of Vashti” (Esther 2.17).  It was Vashti who had refused to wear the royal 
diadem before the king in the preface to the book.  Here we have Esther wearing 
that diadem, and specifically declared Vashti’s replacement.  The text sets Esther 
up as the next Vashti, recalling Vashti’s fate from the preface, and preparing the 
reader for the possibility that Esther, as the next queen, may meet a similar fate. 
 We read only one chapter further into the book, in fact, until Esther, like 
Vashti, is indeed faced with a life or death situation.  The situation is one of her 
own life and death, and also the life and death of all her people.  In chapter four, 
Esther learns of Haman’s edict to exterminate the Jews from Mordecai, thereby 
affirming Esther’s parallel to Vashti as yet another queen who faces expulsion.  
The exchange between Esther and Mordecai takes place through Esther’s 
eunuch messenger, Hathach, who delivers messages back and forth.  The 
exchange is significant.  As Michael Fox explains: 
 
The turning point in Esther’s development comes at the end of the 
scene, in 4:15-16.  It is abrupt and surprising.  She resolves to do 
her duty, and a change immediately comes upon her…Esther is 
assuming a role of a religious and national leader…She has taken 
control, giving Mordecai instructions, enjoining a fast on the Jews, 
and deciding to act contrary to law.  Her resolute behavior marks a 
woman determined to work her way through a crisis…”268 
 
Though I disagree with Fox’s narrow view of leadership, I do agree that it is in 
this scene that Esther becomes the key figure in the book.  She is faced with an 
impossible situation:  either stay concealed and face the death of her people (and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Fox, Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther, 199-200.  To this point, Fox 
explains, Esther had been a passive character to the extent of being (in Beal’s words) nothing 
more than ‘an object of exchange between men’.  Fox states that, “Esther is putty—not because 
of any personality flaw, but because of age and situation.  Nothing has ever challenged her to be 
anything more” (Fox, Character and Ideology, 197).  I take issue with both Beal and Fox’s 
characterizations of Esther as passive ‘object’ – even given her role early on in the book.  
Esther’s actions and character always seem appropriate to her circumstances.  Equating 
leadership quality to “active,” as opposed to “passive” responsibilities, is to restrict leadership to 
stereotypical “masculine” personas.  Esther, I would argue, demonstrates leadership in both her 
passive and active roles. 
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possibly herself); or seek presence with the king and face execution due to 
disobeying the king’s law.  The Book of Esther has previous to this point 
scapegoated both Jews and a Queen—and Esther is both.  Her prognosis does 
not look good.  The reader is very interested in what she will do.  And she reveals 
exactly what she will do next.  After a strong prompt from Mordecai in 4.13, 
Esther comes forth with a striking command and declaration:  “Go, assemble all 
the Jews who live in Shushan, and fast on my behalf; do not eat or drink for three 
days, night or day.  I and my maidens will observe the same fast.  Then I shall go 
to the king, though it is contrary to the law; and if I am to perish, I shall perish!”   
 Esther’s command to her community and declaration of self-sacrifice 
constitute an astounding act of leadership and courage, and her words are 
important for two immediate reasons:  her counter-action to the mimetic crisis 
Haman created, and her willing self-sacrifice.   
 First, in commanding a fast, Esther manages to immediately counteract 
the mimetic turmoil that had taken over Shushan due to the release of Haman’s 
edict.  Esther organizes the community of Jews, commands a fast, and focuses 
their energy on a single purpose, at once eliminating chaos and fostering order 
and control.  One can only imagine that the city quieted down in fasting; instead 
of the city being “dumbfounded” and “in turmoil”, the inhabitants act with purpose.  
Further, fasting is ritualistically an act that encourages control of the base human 
impulses, bringing to awareness and subduing the yetzer ha-ra.  Esther, in 
commanding a fast in the midst of a mimetic crisis, seems to be saying:  ‘do not 
give in to rivalry or to violence; regain your control; stay calm.’  I agree with Fox 
that Esther reveals herself as a public leader:  Esther instills hope, confidence 
and calm in her people; Esther generates order and focus in direct opposition to 
Haman whose commands generate only chaos and frenzy.  Even without an 
expulsion, Esther is able to begin de-escalating a situation of mimetic crisis—she 
organizes a fast to rekindle a sense of self-control among the people, and she 
unites them in action in line with her purpose.  Under threat of violent 
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extermination, Esther “organizes her troops” with non-violent and mindful 
direction. 
 The second point of interest here is that Esther voluntarily puts her own 
life on the line for her people; in Girardian terms, she takes on being the victim 
for her people.  We have here, in fact, one of the most important distinctions of 
the book:  Esther is Girard’s “Logos of Love” – a figure who “puts up no 
resistance; it always allows itself to be expelled by the Logos of violence.”269  And 
Esther is twice vulnerable to attack as both queen and Jew.  As queen, she is in 
no way different from Vashti.  Esther makes it very clear as well, that entering the 
presence of the king unbidden will mean transgressing a law and making herself 
vulnerable to death.  In ironic contrast to Vashti, Esther will break a law by 
entering the king’s presence whereas Vashti had broken the law by refusing to 
show herself.  The reader, and likely Esther, is aware of her predecessor’s fate; 
Esther is voluntarily putting her life on the line.  As Jew as well, Esther is twice 
the potential scapegoat.  Not coincidentally, Esther’s identity as Jew has been 
concealed to the court thus far in the book.  Revealing her identity (as she soon 
will) will make her vulnerable, like the rest of her community, to death. 
 After Esther declares her commitment to her people, and her own self-
sacrificing act, she embarks on a plan that is equally remarkable, displaying not 
just her ability to subdue her mimetic inclination, but a ritual sensibility—a plan 
which is more a rite, a series of choreographed actions, which will require an 
appropriate, and sacrificial, finale.  After fasting herself for three days (replacing 
what beauty routines might have made her more attractive to the king for a clear 
mind, controlled emotional state, and purified body), Esther puts what seems her 
carefully ritualized plan into action.270   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Girard, Things Hidden, 274. 
270 Fasting in Judaism and other world religions is intended not just for purification of the 
body, but for the spirit.  Fasting in Judaism, in particular, is to lend external support for the control 
of the base instincts constituting the yetzer ha-ra.  This point will be taken up further in chapter 
four. 
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 The context in which Esther comes forth with her request, i.e. the banquet, 
is the arena for such a ritualized sacrifice to take place.  Girard, as 
aforementioned, provides no analysis of the Book of Esther, but he does provide 
an analysis of the beheading of John the Baptist in his book The Scapegoat – a 
scene that has similar attributes.  In his analysis of John the Baptist’s beheading, 
Girard comments on the mimetic nature of banquets in general.  He states:  “The 
suitable occasion, Herod’s birthday, has a ritual character; it is a feast that recurs 
every year; festive, or ritual, activities take place on the occasion.”271  Girard 
continues:  “All the activities mentioned by the text are also found in ritual and 
usually culminate in a sacrificial immolation.  John’s murder occupies the place 
and moment of sacrifice.”272  What Girard is saying here is that the banquet 
during which Saint John the Baptist is executed, is in fact a ritual in itself that 
replicates the mimetic crisis and scapegoating mechanism.  The beheading, 
further, becomes necessary as the capstone of the mimetic escalation generated 
through the banquet (in particular through Salome’s dance).  In fact, for Girard, 
understanding the banquet as a mimetic event is the only way the text becomes 
understandable:   
 
Far from neglecting the ritual and institutional aspects of the text, by 
using desire to interpret them I am creating the only framework that 
makes ritual intelligible.  It not only resembles the final stages of the 
mimetic crisis that are resolved spontaneously by the scapegoat 
mechanism, but it is also a complete replica of the crises from 
which it cannot be distinguished.  This replication is perfectly 
feasible because, as we have seen, ritual is the mimetic repetition 
of an original mimetic crisis…It is totally mimesis, imitation, the 
scrupulous repetition of the crisis.  The rite does not provide any 
real solution, it merely recopies the solution that occurred 
spontaneously.  There is therefore no structural difference between 
the rite itself and the spontaneous, natural course of the mimetic 
crisis.273 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Girard, The Scapegoat, 138. 
272 Ibid., 139. 
273 Ibid. 
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For Girard, the banquet is the same as the rite that inevitably ends with an 
expulsion; it is yet one more imitation of the violent, originating event. 
 I propose that the author of Esther understands the banquet in this same 
way.  One might in fact analyze the Book of Esther and its series of banquets in 
this Girardian sense—as rites that end with a sacrifice.; they are mimetic feasts, 
if you will, characterized appropriately by drunkenness, irrationality, and excess.  
The Book of Esther, to demonstrate, begins with two grand banquets (a king’s 
banquet and a queen’s banquet), at the end of which Vashti is expelled.  A 
banquet likewise occurs when Esther is made queen, after which the eunuchs’ 
plot is discovered and they are impaled.  Further, the king and Haman sit down to 
feast after the Jews’ annihilation is announced.  For every banquet, there is an 
affiliated mimetic rivalry and death.   
 It is in this context that Esther calls banquets of her own.  Esther’s 
banquets may or may not be (the reader is not told) characterized by the same 
excess; but the reader does get the sense that Esther purposefully controls and 
ritualizes them.  For example, each time Esther interacts with the king during the 
execution of her plan, the king states:  “What is your wish?  It shall be granted 
you.  And what is your request?  Even to half the kingdom, it shall be fulfilled” 
(Esther 5.6; 7.2; also 5.4 when Esther approaches the king on his throne).  And 
each time, Esther responds the same way:  “If it please Your Majesty and Haman 
come today to the feast that I have prepared for him” (Esther 5.4; 5.8).  This 
interaction between Esther and the king occurs three times, building up the 
suspense, but more importantly ritualizing the behavior, establishing a linguistic 
pattern for the “sacrificial banquet,” and preparing the reader for the true climax 
of the rite/narrative.  The ritualized behavior seems as intoxicating as the feast as 
well, and when Esther finally reveals her request, it is perhaps as shocking to the 
king (and also to Haman) as Salome’s asking for the head of John the Baptist.   
 Esther’s banquet ends with a sacrificial immolation as well—just as Girard 
would predict—but she is no longer the victim.  In response to the king’s final 
articulated desire to fulfill Esther’s request, Esther states:  “…let my life be 
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granted me as my wish, and my people as my request.  For we have been sold, 
my people and I, to be destroyed, massacred, and exterminated” (Esther 7.3a). 
As before, Esther’s words are carefully chosen.  She, first, avoids any speech 
that would make the king face his own culpability (placing blame upon him would 
be unhelpful and would have only accomplished perpetuating a cycle of 
blame.)274   Instead, Esther explains the situation softly, revealing herself as one 
of a scapegoated people about to be killed.275  Unlike pagan or, looking forward, 
Christian texts, which divinize their scapegoats, Esther is here alternatively 
“humanized.”  In her self-revelation, she is made vulnerable.  At the end of a 
series of ritualized linguistic exchanges, Esther in essence lays herself bare as 
the sacrificial finale, revealing her identity as one of the scapegoated, asking for 
her life to be spared. 
 And Esther’s life is spared.  The king asks, then, who would be to blame 
for plotting against the queen’s life, to which Esther responds.  But Esther does 
not ask for Haman’s execution in return.  Rather, as in previous episodes, the 
king becomes angered and leaves the room.  When he returns, the king is just as 
shocked to find Haman pleading with Esther for his life, which he interprets as 
Haman’s making sexual advances towards his queen.276  Haman is about to 
meet his end, becoming the scapegoat in place of the Jews he had prepared as 
scapegoats.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Fox, Character and Ideology, 200-202.  Fox also notes Esther’s carefully strategized 
plan. 
275 The past chapter has shown Ahasuerus’ very favorable response to Esther, even 
when she enters his presence without being called; it is clear that he loves her and he has the 
capacity to save her life.  King Ahasuerus, hearing the situation explained in this fashion, 
perceives Haman’s edict as yet one more in a series of plots against the throne.  It becomes 
personal for the king.  Yet Levenson, on the other hand, remarks on how still the king is unable to 
make his own choices, requiring the advice of a lowly advisor.  Jon Levenson, Esther (KY:  
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 105. 
276 Interestingly, Girard asserts that religious and/or sexual infidelities are the most typical 
accusations made against the scapegoat.  Even more, I reiterate what I quoted above from The 
Scapegoat where Girard defines the victim as “a person who comes from elsewhere, a well-
known stranger.  He is invited to a feast which ends with his lynching.  Why?  He has done 
something which he should not have done; his behavior is perceived as fatal; one of his gestures 
was misinterpreted.” (The Scapegoat, 32)  Haman is indeed a typical Girardian victim. 
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 In this third cycle of persecution, then, the all against one shifts twice:  first 
the Jews are the collective ‘one’; then the focus turns to Esther as the self-
sacrificing scapegoat; and finally the all against one shifts to Haman.  It is 
important, too, that it is not just Esther and Ahasuerus that constitute the all when 
Haman is the accused one-- there is a conveniently situated eunuch who testifies 
against Haman in the moment the king’s anger is in flare, saying, “What is more, 
a stake is standing at Haman’s house, fifty cubits high, which Haman made for 
Mordecai—the man whose words saved the king” (Esther 7.9).  With this 
encouragement from the eunuch, the king declares:  “Impale him on it!”  As in our 
previous persecution texts, the king takes on the mimetic desire of an “advisor” 
(here the eunuch) demonstrating again his extreme mimetic susceptibility.  
Esther, while not the advisor who suggests the sacrifice, has spun a scene as 
Salome, conjuring up a mimetic web, into which both the king and the eunuch fly.  
Esther has done this through the control and power of a ritual ceremony, though, 
which in the end has shown to be more effective than the erratic, desire-ridden, 
and frivolous efforts of Haman. 
 And here is perhaps the most critical point:  Esther seems, according to 
our analysis, masterful at orchestrating ritual—she is self-controlled and strategic 
instead of emotion-driven-- she also lives in an environment that is quite the 
opposite, operating according to mimetic and scapegoating structures.  I assert 
that Esther (meaning, to be clear, the author of the Book of Esther) knows that 
her environment operates according to this structure and uses it to her 
advantage to save herself and her people.  Fox discusses certain commentaries 
on Esther that have painted her figure as cunning, manipulative, and even 
immoral.277  Perhaps she is, for she does generate her own sacrificial ritual of 
Haman—even if she does not ask for his expulsion herself.  However, from our 
text we know that Haman is guilty—and Esther is innocent.  She used the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Fox discusses the need for Esther to use tactics that are both contrary to Vashti (i.e., 
subtle, not strong-willed) as well as effective in the Persian court in general—tactics involving 
“manipulating the man in power” such as Haman and the king’s advisors have been seen to do.  
Fox is in agreement that Esther needed to employ these devices, but other scholars believe 
Esther, seen in this light, is acting in an unsavory fashion.  Fox, Character and Ideology, 201. 
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prevalent sacrificial structure to save her people, scapegoating the guilty party 
instead of those who are innocent.278  She culls the power from sacrificial ritual, 
which was perhaps the only way she thought she could succeed. 
 Maybe this is troubling—for essentially what we have in this Purim text is 
at once a Logos of Love who is willing to sacrifice herself for her people, but who 
at the same time employs the sacrificial mechanism to entrap the guilty.  In the 
end, one must admit that Esther does not renounce violence, but saves the 
innocent victims from within the system.  She is not, even though the reader may 
wish her to be, free.  Girard’s words on Hamlet provide some perspective:   
 
No one wants to initiate a cycle of revenge that might literally 
annihilate humanity, and yet no one wants to give up revenge 
entirely.  Like Hamlet, we are poised on the fence between total 
revenge and no revenge at all, unable to make up our mind, unable 
to take revenge and yet unable to renounce it…The enterprise is 
sick.279 
 
Esther may indeed be literally, and literarily, trapped within a scapegoating 
structure, with no hope of success employing an alternative strategy.  I assert, in 
fact, that her figure is trapped within the mythic structure of the persecution text.  
Her narrative is third in a series of persecution narratives as I have shown.  
Though one might wish she could completely renounce violence, Esther 
ultimately fails to escape the literary structure that provides a ritualistic, imitative, 
and familiar narrative; neither does she escape the organizing ritualistic 
mechanism (the banquet) of the Persian enterprise in which she lives and is 
indeed queen.  Both her narrative structure and cultural context are driven by 
mimetic rivalry and scapegoating—and I hope I have shown that the best way to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 This is why Esther, and not Mordecai, needed to self-sacrifice (Mordecai was still 
caught up in the mimetic rivalry with Haman and was an unfit sacrifice.)  Esther truly was an 
innocent scapegoat.  Girard, though, important to note, does not require scapegoats are 
innocent—they simply need to fulfill the role of sacrificial victim within his structure. 
279 René Girard, A Theatre of Envy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 286. 
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cope with this, according to our narrative, is to know how the mechanism works, 
and maintain control over one’s self.  Extending Esther’s specific predicament to 
the Jews, neither could they escape from their existence in exile.  Perhaps what 
we have here in the Book of Esther is precisely the revelation of the sacrificial 
mechanism, how it works, and how best to exist within it until an alternative 
structure is found.280 
 
Excursus:  Esther Caught in the Web of Literary Mimesis 
 
Caught in the web of the cultural mechanism that demands victims, Esther is also 
caught up in a literary mimesis that seeks violent resolution.  The Book of 
Esther’s literary structure may indeed be called mimetic in the sense that it is a 
series of carefully constructed reversals; the book proceeds according to a 
clearly peripatetic design.  While some have understood its peripety as the work 
of God behind the scenes or moral just desserts (“measure for measure” 
retribution), a Girardian might express the peripety in terms of how it exemplifies 
mimesis.  The narrative presents a literary tit-for tat.  For example, the edict 
written by Haman must be countered by an edict written by Mordecai; Vashti’s 
refusal to appear before the king must be countered by Esther’s going to the king 
unbidden; the gallows meant for Mordecai are the gallows for Haman; what 
would have been the slaughter of the Jews is turned around to be the slaughter 
of the aggressors upon them; etc.   
 Fox, in Character and Ideology, quotes Robert Alter when he writes:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 The stark revelation of the mechanism here, and the inability of escape, is in fact 
reminiscent of Girard’s assertion in I See Satan that the “good” violence of religion may not 
necessarily be bad in and of itself.  As stated on page 61 of this dissertation, “It is not that the 
powers are evil in and of themselves; it is that the power claim a false transcendence that makes 
them evil of satanic.”  I advocate the same principle with regard to the next chapter in the Book of 
Esther, in which the Jews are forced to fight to save themselves from their attackers due to the 
“unchangeable” Persian law.  Though Esther and Mordecai do not wish the Jews to fight, they are 
forced to within the cultural and legal structure in which they exist – a structure that requires blood 
for reconciliation.  This structure, at the same time, enables the Jews to overcome all those who 
would aggress against them.  Thus while the violence cannot be declared “bad” in any absolute 
sense, it is still a sacrificial structure. 
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An idea which is part of the value-system of the narrative [is a 
theme]…The most important structural theme in Esther, one that 
organizes much of the presentation and wording of events, is the 
idea that an event intended to harm the Jews eventuates in its 
opposite.  This is the theme of peripety:  the result of an action is 
actually the reverse of what was expected.281 
 
   
 
This theme is emphasized throughout the narrative through literary mimicking.  
“Repetition of the vocabulary of the theses in the antitheses is the most 
distinctive marker of their mirror relationship.”282  Fox provides several examples 
to illustrate the literary peripety of the book, classifying them as A) Haman’s 
Authority/Mordecai’s Authority; B) Haman’s Decree/Mordecai’s Decree; C) 
Counsel of Haman’s Wife and Friends/Despair of Haman’s Wife and Friends; D) 
Haman’s Pride/Haman’s Disgrace.  He marks these reversals as literary mirrors, 
and they constitute the heart of the narrative between chapters three and eight.  
Fox acknowledges that the “envelope” (that is, the opening scene in which Vashti 
is deposed and Esther is made Queen; and the closing battle narrative) also 
contains reversals, but he claims there are no mirror narratives in these.   
 Fox asserts that this serious of reversals, as the guiding principle of the 
narrative, is a conscious one.  He states that the narrative itself declares it to be 
so in 9:1: 
 
 
Now on the thirteenth day of the twelfth month, the month of Adar, when 
the king’s word and his law were to be carried out—on the very day when 
the enemies of the Jews had expected to gain control over them, things 
would be turned about in that the Jews would gain control over their 
adversaries. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Fox, Character and Ideology, 158. 
282 Ibid., 159. 
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Fox notes the explicit mention of reversals in these additional biblical verses:  
9:22a, which tells how the month “turned from misery to merriment”; and 9:25b, 
when Mordecai states “let the evil plan that he formed against the Jews recoil 
back upon his own head.”283 
 While Fox notes the structural mimesis of the Esther narrative as a whole, 
however, he misses the full arc of the mechanism that Girard has identified, and 
the mimetic need for a victim.  While Fox (and also Beal, though toward a 
different end) recognizes the imitative qualities of the narrative and the 
characters, this need for a victim, for blood, whether the victim is guilty or 
innocent, for the purpose of reconciliation, is overlooked.  This is, too, why Fox 
fails to recognize the full import of the envelope to the rest of the narrative.  The 
narrative occurs in phases—discrete incidents of persecution that build in 
revelatory power, the driving force beneath all of them being mimetic rivalry.  
Peripety is therefore the engine, but it is not the overarching structure or “guiding 
principle” of the narrative.  The “Proto A” text, for example, would not have been 
a revelation of the full mechanism because it ends happily and without 
bloodshed.  The violent point of the narrative structure makes the book more 
controversial precisely because it reveals the sacrificial mechanism in which its 
characters, the Jews, and indeed the world, are inscribed. 
 
The Purim Vaccine:  The Annual Reading and Performance of the Megillah 
 
There is, in fact, the third stage of the persecution text, which until this point has 
been absent in this portion of the discussion.  The third stage, to recall, is the 
creation of an interdiction or ritual.  As I have shown in the previous chapter on 
the Birkat ha-Banim, the biblical narrative reveals the mechanism (as in the 
stories of Genesis), and the ritual is how one receives the vaccine and avoids 
falling prey to the disease of mimetic rivalry.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Ibid., 163. 
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 The Book of Esther itself commands the ritual observance of Purim to 
commemorate the Jews’ freedom from extermination, providing easy evidence 
that what we have here is, indeed, the third stage of the persecution text.  The 
observance of Purim includes many ritual activities including giving to charity, the 
Purim banquet, and exchanging gifts.  Though not commanded in the book itself, 
other rituals include fasting, and also more boisterous events including 
masquerades and purimschpiels.  Central to the observance of Purim is also that 
one must hear the reading of the Megillah twice—once by day and once by night.  
The public reading and hearing of the Megillah has become a cornerstone of 
Purim observance.284  I will briefly relate some commentary on a few of the rituals 
here to demonstrate how they have, unfortunately, developed out of a reversion 
into the sacrificial mentality.  I will then focus attention on the hearing of the 
Megillah, the primary ritual functioning anti-sacrificially, protecting against 
mimetic desire and scapegoating violence.  
 In his commentary on Esther, Matthew Fox remarks on the ritual to hear 
the Megillah:  
 
The public reading of the Scroll is not ordained in the book itself, 
yet the reading is rooted in the book’s ideology.  The only festival 
practice the author envisaged was festivities which replicate the 
Jews’ rejoicing of year 12.285  The Jews of subsequent generations, 
rather than commemorating something that happened to their 
ancestors, celebrate their ancestors’ experience.  The holiday has a 
reflexive, inner-directed quality; the people remember its own 
experience, and that is accessible only through story, the vehicle of 
memory.286 
 
One might say that all the Purim rituals have this very purpose:  to enable the 
people to celebrate their ancestors’ experience.  Brevard Childs, comments on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Fox details that “The Mishna (tractate Megillah) does not directly command the 
reading of the Scroll, but rather assumes that is a recognized obligation and proceeds to discuss 
the details of the practice.”  Fox, Character and Ideology, 152. 
285 Meaning the events of chapters 8 and 9 of the Book of Esther. 
286 Fox, Character and Ideology, 152. 
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the memory as the “heart of Israelite cult and Deuteronomic understanding.”287  
Reenacting the past is the way, says Childs, to “form a solidarity with the 
fathers.”288 
 Berlin comments on the Purim carnivale and purimshpiel to recount how 
even the violence in the narrative is brought into the experience of Jews on this 
holiday:   
 
Carnival celebrations, best known from the Greek Dionysia, the 
Roman Saturnalia, and the English May Day (and in modern times 
the Mardi Gras, Halloween, and New Year’s Day), often contain 
elements such as eating, drinking, carousing, masks and disguises, 
parades and processions, and combat and mock battles.  There is 
an air of wildness, boisterousness, and violence that is made 
acceptable, perhaps only barely acceptable, because it is done 
within the bounds of a socially sanctioned festive occasion.  
Carnival permits the release of one’s urge for violence and revenge 
in a way that channels the violence so that it is not actually 
destructive.289 
 
Berlin, in her commentary, emphasizes the nature of the Esther text as comedy, 
and interprets the text’s violence in the context of Aristotle’s theory of comedy as 
“cathartic.”  What Fox, Childs and Berlin seem to offer in their interpretation of 
Purim ritual is emotional identification without reflection—somehow presenting 
ritual as an emotional outlet for catharsis or connection, instead of causing a 
learning and transcendent experience, i.e. a revelation.290  The idea of catharsis, 
to recall, is contra how a vaccine in fact operates.  A vaccine immunizes against 
violence toward the eventual transformation of the human system. 
 Against the above interpretations, I hope I have shown that the Book of 
Esther does not in fact present a community of Jews that revel in violence; there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287  Brevard Childs, Memory and Tradition in Israel (IL: Studies in Biblical Theology, 
1968), 74. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Berlin, xxi-xxii. 
290 Refer back to my discussion of “vaccine” in the introduction. 
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is no indication that there is a repressed hatred and need for violent retribution in 
the text.291  There is no need for catharsis.  The Book of Esther, situated as 
biblical wisdom literature, appropriately presents the ironic juxtaposition of a 
value system that declares “to kill one person is as if one has killed the entire 
world” with a derogatory need to succumb to violence due to one’s exilic 
existence within a violent cultural context.  This is serious comedy.  The public 
reading of the Megillah is not a cathartic strategy to let the Jews get violence out 
of their system; it is meant to help (s)he who is listening hear the mimetic 
workings of world, just as Esther did.  This is why one does not just read or listen 
to the reading of the Megillah.  One must hear it. 
 Still, something is “founded” upon the violence of the Book of Esther that 
is appealing, and which is the cause of the Purim celebrations.  Just as violence 
precedes the founding of Rome, the death of Abel the founding of civilization, 
and the death of the world in Noah’s flood a new civilization, what is founded 
here is a temporary peace for the Jews in exile.292  The “victory” of the Jews in 
the book is not final, (many “Hamans” have arisen throughout history), but at 
least provides a temporary respite from the world’s rivalry and violence.  The 
strong currents of anti-Semitism present since the days of ancient Judaism are 
incarnate in the voice of Haman:  the Jews live by their own laws; they are 
separatist; they are a threat.  The reality of the Purim miracle for Jews, and the 
hope of not even salvation, but mere survival, it brings, cannot be 
underestimated.  The cycle of anti-Semitism also continues; and the miracle of 
being saved is very much due to Esther’s use of the mechanism and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Some might argue that Esther occurs as “bloodthirsty” when she asks for a second 
day of fighting in Shushan.  I interpret this as part of a mimetic scenario in which the aggressors 
blindly follow an edict to exterminate a people against all rationality and sense of humanity.  In 
certain strands of interpretation, the Jews will be vulnerable on the second day, just as on the 
first, should any aggressors remain. 
292 Perhaps the mystical schools of Judaism interpreted Haman as the yetzer ha-ra due 
to their aversion to the explicit violence in the book.  The slaughter of Haman became the 
sacrifice of the evil inclination that would bring on the Days of the Messiah ben David.  There is 
an apocalyptic interpretation that expresses:  “this is the last sacrifice that will occur.”  It is at first 
quite odd that there are such divergent figures as Ephraim and Haman representing the yetzer 
ha-ra.  But perhaps there is a logic to it.  Whereas Haman is full of sin, Ephraim is pure—an idea 
correlative with the two goats of Leviticus that are sacrificed on Yom Kippur.  This would provide 
a very interesting avenue for further research. 
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transference of the target onto Haman.  One might recall Girard’s assertion in I 
See Satan at this juncture:  the satanic sacrificial mechanism is not evil in and of 
itself; the only evil is when this mechanism claims a false transcendence.  This 
“good” violence is of the world as it is presently occurring; for oppressed peoples 
who can use it to their advantage, it may provide some solace.  This “good” 
violence is not, however, of the divine. 
At the same time, Esther is a universal narrative conveying the instability 
of the scapegoating structure.  In The Book of Hiding:  Gender, Ethnicity, 
Annihilation, and Esther, Timothy Beal makes a remarkably Girardian (and 
chilling) statement: 
 
In Esther, no wholehearted resolve or final solution can be 
certain…In this sense, even the fairy-tale settlement in chapter 10, 
at which point Esther disappears while Mordecai rises to be the 
king’s right-hand man, is no more final than the end of chapter 3 
depicting Haman and the king drinking together while the city 
outside the palace walls is thrown into pandemonium…How can 
this final shoring up ever hold?293 
 
Reading Esther, as Beale admits, is like reading the Torah-- as soon as one 
finishes, one is commanded to go right back to the beginning and start over.  It is 
a repetitive cycle that revisits the history of rivalry and violence ad infinitum.  
Esther must end with violence (as opposed to the “happy” fairy tale ending of 
Proto-AT) because blood is necessary for a new beginning -- this is the self-
propagating way of the world.  But in this very context, there are also striking 
elements of communal identity and peaceful collaborative action that push at the 
seams of the narrative.  The fast of Esther and the Jews slows the narrative 
down and controls the urge to get irrationally caught up in the crisis.  The 
centered fasting and ritual action in the midst of a death threat is indeed 
remarkable. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Beal, 121-22. 
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The reading of the Megillah, then, is a yearly vaccine for this reason:  
every year one must remember the sacrificial tendency of humanity and the 
world, and one must deny the false transcendence that this mechanism tries to 
claim.  The vicious violence of the Book of Esther keeps us aware of the terminal 
disease of violence and, being injected annually, it might even make us sick.  
The ritual of the purimschpiel, as mentioned, is one way humanity has been 
made sick by the Esther vaccine; these plays which focus on “blotting out the 
name” of Haman are humanity’s reversion into the sacrificial mindset, celebrating 
Purim as catharsis, and not as a transformative vaccine.  The attempts to “find 
God” in the narrative over the thousands of years of biblical interpretation is 
another reversion into the sacrificial.  These acts are, unfortunately, founded 
upon having misheard the book.  The Purim vaccine, rather, keeps us aware of 
the separation between sacrificial violence and God; and pushing through this 
violence is the community that mourns and fasts, that slows down the midst of 
crisis, but is ultimately (and unfortunately) locked in the grip of its own exile.  
Thus, though Esther reveals the scapegoating mechanism, even redeems the 
scapegoat, one is still caught up in its structure.  It will be a worldly fight until the 
vaccine takes hold not just among the Jews, but also among humanity.  There 
are yet to be scapegoats and Hamans until immunity to violence is achieved 
across the nations.   
Without this type of Girardian reading, one is literally and literarily trapped 
in the vicious mimetic cycle of the book.  This entrapment is, I aver, what has 
bothered commentators back to the times of the Talmud, too.  How could one 
accept the violence at the end of the book – the so-called “immutable” Persian 
law?  This immutable law is the scapegoating mechanism of which Girard 
speaks—that there must be blood to reconcile the conflict.  One must read the 
Megillah and understand the ways of the world, and one is well to be bothered by 
what it reveals.  The commentators’ estimations, in this sense, were quite 
correct.  But at the same time, one must also recognize the parody the book 
provides of itself.  As Girard comments on Shakespeare:   
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…could not Shakespeare be playing according to the rules of the 
game at one level and undermining these same rules at 
another?...Indications abound that in many other plays he is doing 
precisely that, still providing the crowd with the spectacle they 
demand while simultaneously writing between the lines, for all 
those who can read, a devastating critique of that same 
spectacle.”294 
 
Though the story of Purim is one of salvation for the Jews, it is also a criticism of 
the very mechanism by which this salvation comes.  Though a comedy, the 
violence toward the end of the book reveals that perhaps it is not meant to be 
thoroughly enjoyable.  Whether one reads of the brutal impalement of Haman 
and his sons, or the unavoidable slaughter of the 75,000, or the irrational threat 
of genocide—if one is really willing to hear the text, it will reveal the fragility of 
relationships upon which the world is based, and the uncanny laws that are 
necessary to sustain a fragile peace.  Hearing the Megillah has become central 
to the observance of Purim so that one might be exposed to the mimetic 
mechanism, understand how it operates, and slowly work within it until the 
vaccination takes hold and creates immunity.  This vaccine is for the Jews, and 
all humanity. 	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Girard, Theatre of Envy, 287.	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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Third Vaccine:  The Reading of Jonah on Yom Kippur 
 
We all tend to blame someone else—the competitors, the press, the changing 
mood of the marketplace, the government-for our problems.  Systems thinking 
shows us there is no separate “other”; that you and the someone else are part 
of a single system.  The cure lies in your relationship with your ‘enemy.’ 
                                                 --Peter Senghe295 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, we have discussed two different kinds of “vaccines” 
against mimetic desire.  The first vaccine, the Birkhat ha-Banim, is a ritual 
designed for the Sabbath, based on a passage at the end of the Book of 
Genesis, which offers a groundbreaking double blessing on Joseph’s two 
grandchildren.  At the end of the Genesis cycle of sibling competition, rivalry and 
scapegoating, we find Joseph’s children, Ephraim and Manasseh, blessed, 
conflict-free, and ready, together with Joseph’s brothers, to found what will 
become the twelve tribes of Israel.  The Birkhat ha-Banim is a peace vaccine, 
generated from the free and generous inspiration of Jacob, and resulting in the 
first pair of non-competitive brothers.   
Rabbinic midrash, however, adds an interpretive layer to the narrative 
ritual; the rabbis propose there is a sacrifice of the evil inclination that 
accompanies the non-violent, anti-sacrificial blessing of the Birkhat ha-Banim.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization,  
(Doubleday: Currency, 1990), 67. 
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For the rabbis, if one is to avoid rivalry and scapegoating and truly be like 
Ephraim and Manasseh, one must be able to effectively subdue one’s yetzer ha-
ra.  While the midrashic sacrifice of Ephraim as the Messiah ben Joseph may be 
a later regression into the more literal sacrificial, there are certainly Sabbath 
prescriptions that aid the subjugation of the evil impulse and support self-control.  
The reading of the Torah is, in particular, associated with this subjugation.  One 
returns after every cycle to the beginning of the Torah to be reminded of one’s 
duty—to be vaccinated by hearing the narrative dramas of its conflict-driven 
brothers towards immunity from sibling violence.  Human beings are also 
endowed with an extra soul on the Sabbath, further aiding self-control, but also 
granting a wholeness of being that is immune to the trap of negative mimesis.  
While the Torah narratives keep the possibility of negative mimesis fresh in the 
reader’s mind, the Birkhat ha-Banim speaks firmly of a greater future; it 
vaccinates with the peace of a new order.296 
 The second vaccine takes place on Purim and involves the reading of the 
Book of Esther—familiarly called the Megillah.  Esther presents a series of what 
we have distinguished as ‘persecution texts’ that subtly reveal the dynamics of 
mimetic desire and Girard’s scapegoat mechanism, deterring us from its violence 
while confirming that the scapegoat mechanism is, for now, the ‘immutable law’ 
of human social interaction.  Commanded to read the entire Book of Esther on 
the holy day of Purim, one reads about being trapped in a violent cycle—even 
Esther had to succumb to its violence or have her people exterminated; but its 
message is to understand how to live in exile and use the means at one’s 
disposal to sustain what can only be temporary and fragile states of peace.  
Within the human realm, Esther’s message seems to be that there is no full 
alternative yet available.  Thus we can receive the Esther vaccine to protect 
ourselves against the mechanism, and slowly build prevention and immunity 
through exposure.  While Esther contains very slight glimmers of anti-sacrificial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 This statement is not to overlook the fact that Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, 
Joseph and his brothers, etc. all reconcile within the book of Genesis.  Their examples involve a 
learning process while the case of Ephraim and Manasseh are conflict-free from the start, 
presenting the idea that a new future is already in motion. 
	   166	  
action, the book as a whole does not contain enough peace antigens to inject us 
with the biological memory of a new order. 
 The earthy and perhaps uncomfortable message of the Book of Esther is 
eclipsed by the book that receives center stage during the highest Holy Day of 
the Jews—that is, the reading of the Book of Jonah on Yom Kippur.  Whereas 
Esther reveals the inner workings of the Girardian mechanism but leaves us 
without an immediate alternative – (escaping victimage only through a ritualizing 
of the mechanism itself, and reliant upon a potentially very long series of 
inoculations before immunity to such violence develops) – the Book of Jonah 
takes the reader out of the vicious cycle of competition and retribution through a 
stunning act of mercy and forgiveness.297  A rabbinic midrash in fact adds a 
sentence to the end of the Book of Jonah:  “Conduct your world according to the 
attribute of mercy!”298  Whereas in Esther we have a seemingly unabashed use 
of the mechanism for personal and communal ends, in Jonah we have a model 
that actively avoids violence and scapegoating.  As with the Book of Esther, too, 
the Book of Jonah is by no means unequivocal.  There are many questions that 
loom in interpreting the text—questions such as:  who is Jonah?; what does it 
mean that he flees from God?; why did he flee from his commission as a 
prophet?; how are we to understand the immediate and exaggerated repentance 
of the Ninevites?; has Jonah learned anything by the end of the book?; what is 
the book’s connection to the Yom Kippur liturgy?; etc.  In her work The 
Murmuring Deep: Reflections on the Biblical Unconscious, author Avivah Gottleib 
Zornberg writes, "The book of Jonah invites interpretation from the first verse to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 The Book of Esther, indeed, is about the physical realm in which scapegoating 
persists despite our best efforts.  The Vilna Gaon, a reputable rabbi who lived in the 18th century 
in Lithuania, remarked on the inclusion of the name Purim in Yom Kippur-im, “a day like Purim.”  
Rabbinic literature also attests to these two days as ones that will persist in the World to Come.  
The relationship is based on the idea that Yom Kippur is focused on spiritual pursuits while Purim 
is focused on physical pursuits.  Purim, for example, recounts a physical death sentence for the 
Jews that is miraculously turned around; and Yom Kippur may likewise seem as such.  Because 
all human beings fall prey to sinning (“missing the mark”), it seems no one would be able to 
escape God’s judgment on judgment day.  And yet one can.  Purim deals with physical salvation, 
Yom Kippur with spiritual salvation. 
298 From Midrash Jonah, ed. Jellinek, p. 102, quoted in U. Simon, The JPS Bible 
Commentary: Jonah (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1999) introduction to 
commentary, 12. 
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the last; but its elusive meanings are never fully netted. There is no conclusive 
answer to its questions."299  
 Despite the innumerable possibilities of interpretations that can be made 
when studying the Book of Jonah, this text, like Esther and our Genesis 
narrative, demonstrate ideas that may be distinguished by looking through a 
Girardian lens.  Ephraim and Manasseh exerted self-control and avoided the 
trappings of sibling conflict; Jacob blessed in the spirit of proactive creation; 
Esther demonstrated impeccable self-restraint in her ritualistic and carefully 
strategized unveiling of Haman’s scheme; and the Book of Jonah also reveals a 
self-control and a profound freedom that illustrates what, indeed, positive 
mimesis may look like.  Below, therefore, I will address how the text of Jonah and 
its corresponding ritual activities of Yom Kippur constitute our third vaccine. 
 
History of Interpretation 
 
One might typically include a few words on translation and the history of 
interpretation in a chapter on any book of the Bible.  This was, indeed, a 
necessary topic to cover in dealing with the Book of Esther, which has a very 
complicated interpretive history.  Esther existed in many versions, and the 
differences between them were significant—in particular the differences between 
the Masoretic text (asserting the immutability of Persian law leading to the 
genocidal violence at the end of the book) and what Fox called the “Proto-AT” 
(the version with the simplistic fairy tale ending) in which justice reigned down on 
Haman and everyone lived “happily ever after.”  To recall, my insight in light of 
these two versions of Esther was that the Masoretic text canonized the violent 
version of Esther precisely to reveal the workings of what Girard distinguished as 
the scapegoat mechanism.  The Masoretic version declares that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Avivah Gottleib Zornberg, The Murmuring Deep: Reflections on the Biblical  
Unconscious (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2009), 83. 
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scapegoating mechanism is the unavoidable, immutable structure of the physical 
realm. 
 The Book of Jonah does not have such an elaborate and difficult 
interpretive history, but a few main questions have been debated over the years.  
One of these questions has been the question of its “authenticity”—that is, 
whether the book can be called historical.300  It does seem against the odds that 
the rather extravagant happenings of Jonah would allow the book to be cast as 
history.  In one sense, the narrative may be understood to be an elaborate 
sequence of miracles:  the sea calmed once Jonah is thrown overboard; Jonah 
being swallowed and then regurgitated by a fish; his psalm while in the fish’s 
belly; the five word foreign language prophecy to the Ninevites; the immediate 
conversion of the whole city; the tree that grew in one night and was then 
hollowed by a worm; etc.301 Despite these supernatural happenings, attempts 
have been made to prove Jonah’s historical character as recently as 1956 (in the 
Catholic Encyclopedia) and 1962 (in Protestant dictionaries), attempts inspired 
perhaps by the use of certain seemingly “historical” data within the narrative.  
Jonah, for example, is introduced as “Jonah the son of Amittai” in 1.1—a name 
coming directly from 2 Kings 14.25, which states:   “Jeroboam II restored the 
border of Israel from the entrance of Hamath unto the sea of Arabah, according 
to the word of the Lord, the God of Israel, which he spoke through his servant 
Jonah the son of Amittai, the prophet, who was of Gath-Hapher.”  A second 
historical reference in Jonah is to “Nineveh, that great city” (Jon. 1.2) – a 
reference implying Nineveh at the height of its power as the capitol of Assyria. 
 While it seems useful to have these external reference points to situate 
and perhaps date the text of Jonah,302 we encounter the issue that the servant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Andrew Lacocque and Pierre-Emmanuel Lacocque, Jonah:  A Psycho-Religious 
Approach to the Prophet (SC:  University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 8. 
301 Ibid. 
302  Though there is no conclusive evidence to date the composition with certainty, most  
scholars will date Jonah to the post-exilic period using standard tools for biblical analysis  
such as genre (and whether it contains “historical” accuracy); the nature of the text as a  
unified composition or composite; comparison and evidence of adopting from earlier or  
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Jonah son of Amittai, who operated under King Jeroboam II, did not overlap with 
Nineveh in its prime (i.e. a city “three days wide”).  To be more specific, the reign 
of Jeroboam II lasted from 786-746 BCE; yet Nineveh did not grow into a large 
city, eventually becoming the capitol of Assyria, until the reign of Sennacherib 
between 705 and 681 BCE, over 40 years later.  After the reign of Sennacherib, 
Nineveh remains the Assyrian capitol until it is destroyed by the Babylonians in 
612 BCE; and the Babylonians, in turn, destroy Jerusalem in 587 BCE, exiling 
the Judeans from the land to which they were not to return until 539 BCE.303  
Given the lack of historical congruence between the reign of Jeroboam and his 
servant Jonah with the eminence of Nineveh, Lacocque and Lacocque lobby 
against attempts at Jonah’s historical “authenticity” and, following James D. 
Smart, maintain that the only real option is to deem the book fiction.304  The 
historical “facts” give the allusion of history to an otherwise fictional narrative.305  
 Coming to terms with what Jonah is not, we still must declare what it is.  
And this is the second main question pervading the book’s interpretation history.  
Fortunately, most scholars, including Smart, Bickerman,306 and Cary, will deem 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contemporaneous literature; linguistic comparisons; and social and theological arguments.  A 
comprehensive analysis of these features can be found in Sasson’s Anchor Bible Commentary on 
Jonah.  Sasson’s conclusion is to date the final redaction of Jonah to possibly the exilic, but more 
likely the post-exilic period.  See Jack M. Sasson, The Book of Jonah: A New Translation with 
Introduction, Commentary, and Interpretation (NY: Doubleday; The Anchor Bible, 1990), 27.  
Scholar Phillip Cary dates Jonah with more certainty than Sasson, also to the post-exilic period.  
See also Phillip Cary, Jonah (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2008), 36.  I am hopeful that examining 
Jonah through a Girardian lens may yield how the scapegoat mechanism was fully disclosed in 
this post-exilic period through our contemporaneous examples of Esther and Jonah. 
303 Cary suggests the following book for a complete history of this period in his text on 
page 35:  The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 3.2:  The Assyrian and Babylonian Empires and 
Other States of the Near East, from the Eighth to the Sixth Centuries B.C., ed. John Boardman et 
al.; 2nd ed. (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1991.) 
304  James D. Smart, Jonah:  Introduction and Exegesis, The Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 6 
(Nashville:  Abingdon Press, 1956). 
305 There are other telltale clues that the book is not historical including, for example, the 
title “king of Nineveh,” which is a title uniquely used in the book of Jonah.  The only king of 
Nineveh we hear about in scripture is the Assyrian Emperor Sennacherib, who was called “the 
great king, king of Assyria.”  We do not know who the king in the book of Jonah is—we are not 
told his name, lineage, wars, etc.  We might consider this king, then, as one who presents a 
model for what a king could do if faced with such a situation.  Cary puts it this way:  “The book of 
Jonah tacitly invites us to compare him [Sennacherib] with this anonymous king of Nineveh and 
ask:  Which one of these two behaves like a true king?”  See Cary, 113. 
306 E.J. Bickerman, Four Strange Books of the Bible:  Jonah, Daniel, Koheleth, Esther 
(NY:  Schocken Books, 1967). 
	   170	  
the book of Jonah a type of parable.  They will also, however, disagree on its 
ultimate point.307 
 Smart, for instance, declares the aim of Jonah to be a post-exilic diatribe 
to undercut hostility expressed toward non-Jews in Israel.  For Smart, Jonah’s 
absurd, sulky, and juvenile character is denouncing one who would reject God 
because of God’s mercy.  As Segal affirms:  “Jonah himself, in his shortsighted 
determination to avert the rescue of Nineveh, does not come across in a very 
favorable light.”308  It is often this depiction of Jonah that emerges within the 
context of the universalistic interpretations of the book as well, declaring Yahweh 
as the God of all the nations, and not just of Israel.  One might say that Smart 
follows the trajectory of the early rabbis who put forth a universalistic 
interpretation of Jonah as expressed in the Talmud, particularly in the Bavli, and 
perhaps less so in the Yerushalmi, which tends to take a more particularist view.  
This universalism finds popular expression in many Yom Kippur services today, 
alongside or sometimes in place of the more particularist interpretations as I will 
explain below.   
An emphasis on Jonah’s universalism has often been the interpretation 
endorsed by the church as well, which has unfortunately had the counter-
productive effect of fueling the opinion of Jews as a narrow-minded, stubborn, 
and ultimately self-concerned people.  The book of Jonah has been used as fuel 
for anti-Semitism since the days of the early church.  Segal relates a story about 
Saint Ephrem’s (who dies 373 CE) charged use of Jonah: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 The interpretation of Jonah as a parable is just one of several possibilities, though, 
and the interpretive lens I will use following.  One viable (Zohar-inspired) alternative is presented 
by Rachel Adelman, who views Jonah as a Messianic figure, in her paper, “Jonah through the 
Looking Glass:  Pirqe de Rabbi Eliezer's Portrait of an Apocalyptic Prophet,” (paper presented at 
the WCJS Conference, August 2009), accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.jewish-
studies.org/.upload/Adelman_Rachel_%282%29.pdf.   
308 Eliezer Segal, “The Repentance of Nineveh,” accessed September 16, 2012, 
http://people.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/Shokel/950921_Jonah.html.   
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In a possible reaction to the strong influence of Jewish practices 
and ideas in the Syrian Church, [Christian writer] Efrem [the Syrian] 
did not pass up this opportunity to berate the Jews for their reliance 
on the merits of their forefathers, and for valuing the Law more than 
the God who gave it. Efrem concluded his account by having the 
people of Nineveh praise God "for humiliating the Jews by means 
of the gentiles.309 
 
Further Christian commentaries relate the kindness the Ninevites extend to 
Jonah, only to be met by Jonah’s utter embarrassment at the unrighteousness of 
his own people.310 
 Bickerman follows a different trend in ancient rabbinic interpretations of 
Jonah that have been put forth mainly in the Yerushalmi.  A trend of the 
Yerushalmi is in seeing Jonah not as a miserable and resistant prophet, but 
rather as a staunch “Friend of Israel” who knows that Nineveh will someday soon 
prove to be Israel’s archenemy.311  Thus Jonah is unwilling to betray his own 
people to preach repentance to Nineveh.  (A popular comment on Jonah is to 
say, “he chose the son, not the father.”)  Jonah, in this nationalistic interpretation, 
is shown to be in strong solidarity with his people, willing even to die in the sea to 
save them.  The Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael, a later treatise, also depicts Jonah 
as a fierce defender of Israel, believing that any prophecy not delivered onto 
Nineveh will come back and be visited upon his own people.312  Saint Jerome put 
forth this opinion as well:  the prophet knew that “the repentance of the Gentiles 
would be the downfall of the Jews.”313  Phyllis Trible, in her book on Jonah called 
Rhetorical Criticism, states that this is the interpretation of Jonah most typically 
presented in the synagogue on Yom Kippur.314 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Adelman, 7. 
313 Lacocque and Lacocque, 9. 
314 Phyllis, Trible,  Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method, and the Book of Jonah, ed. 
Gene M. Tucker (Augsburg Fortress, 1994). 
	   172	  
 Both Smart and Bickerman, following strands in early rabbinic and 
Christian tradition (and harmonizing with certain later traditions as well), provide 
insight into the interpretations of Jonah as a parable that justifies one religious 
tradition over another—and one set of religious persons over another.  On one 
hand, the Jews are denounced for denying the love and mercy of God toward 
Gentiles; on the other hand, Jews are seen as simply protecting themselves 
against their future destruction.  The extension of mercy and forgiveness to 
Gentiles that occurs in the book of Jonah is compounded by the identification of 
the Gentile recipients of God’s compassion as the Ninevites, the nation that will 
destroy the northern kingdom of Israel within about 50 years of being acquitted 
by Yahweh.  Contextualizing the subject matter of the book in this traumatic 
history makes a reconciling interpretation tricky.   
As I have discussed in previous chapters, the ambiguity of the biblical text 
leaves room for many interpretations.  It is the rabbinic (and here also early 
Christian) commentary on the biblical text that tends to polarize.  The Bavli 
typically upholds the universalistic interpretation of Jonah as a source revealing 
God’s message of universal repentance and forgiveness, endorsing Nineveh as 
a model to be studied and emulated.  Many strands in the Yerushalmi contrarily 
demonize Nineveh, declaring their repentance as superficial.  Segal explains: 
   
These texts [i.e., the texts of the Yerushalmi] accuse the people of 
Nineveh of staging an elaborate deception, of feigning their 
repentance, and even of impudently threatening to cause suffering 
to innocent beasts unless God will agree to exercise compassion. 
As for the people's declaration "Let every one turn from his evil way 
and from the iniquity which is in his hands," the midrashic sources 
read this in a narrowly legalistic manner:  Only those ill-gotten items 
that were literally in their hands at the time did they agree to 
restore--but articles that were kept in chests and coffers were 
excluded from the commitment.315 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Segal, “The Repentance of Nineveh.” 
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This dichotomization is typical given the cultural context of the development of 
Christian and Jewish ideologies and identities not only in distinction from each 
other, but also against other, external, pagan challenges.  The Book of Jonah, 
like the Book of Esther, provides easy fuel for inter-religious criticism, and was 
used as a polemical work both against Jews, and by Jews.  The mimetic rivalry 
over the holy land, and which community was the real chosen one, was also a 
subtext for how a book like Jonah was interpreted.   
Significantly, both these types of interpretations are apologetic in nature, 
in the true sense of being defensive of a faith over and against another.  The 
Yerushalmi’s defense of Judaism from external threats, and in the aftermath of a 
long history of displacement, is understandable, and is often a popular view still 
today (given the continued history of displacement).  The Palestinian rabbinic 
distrust of the Ninevites is understandable in the context of history.  This strand 
of interpretation is nationalistic (or particularist) and must be considered as an 
expression of the fight for survival similar to what we have in Esther, and the 
Birkhat ha-Banim’s affirmation of Jewish identity in Egypt.  But neither this 
interpretation nor the Christian interpretation that claims religious superiority 
actually deals with the relationship between the Jews and Gentiles, preferring 
instead to maintain interpretations that fuel a mimetic rivalry between them.    
 Phillip Cary, in his book simply titled Jonah, presents an interpretation of 
the book that speaks more to its meta-language and structure rather than 
providing a defense of one people over another, echoing the more universalistic 
type of interpretation we have also seen in previous chapters.  Cary sums up his 
position as follows: 
 
The book of Jonah is not a historical report about the activity of the 
prophet in the time of Jeroboam II but a parable written for returning 
Judean exiles about what might have been—and indeed about 
what could still happen, depending on how the original readers, the 
Judeans coming back to their homeland in the sixth century, handle 
their equivalent of Jonah’s situation at the end of the book…For 
what the book of Jonah aims to get us thinking about is the 
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situation faced by the Judeans with respect to Babylon, the capital 
of the empire that swallowed up Judah, as it is illuminated by the 
situation of Jonah with respect to Nineveh, the capital of the empire 
that swallowed up Israel.316 
 
Jonah, for Cary, represents a situation that is repeated ongoing in history—a 
cycle, if you will—which is by nature repetitive, and will be very dangerous if not 
managed properly.  Cary points to a repetitious history, which includes traumas 
of war, destruction and exile—the very lives of people are at stake in how these 
relationships between the nations are managed.  For Cary, the parable inquires 
into precisely this:  how Jonah (and in turn the Israelites) handled their 
relationship to Nineveh before their defeat by Nineveh’s hands.  The parable 
indirectly asks also:  how might the Hebrews have related to Babylon before their 
own defeat and exile?  Jonah, like Esther, may reveal something surprising and 
counter-cultural about how to manage inter-group relations and rivalry.   
 Lacocque and Lacocque, with J.D. Crossan, go so far as to call Jonah a 
subversive parable, specifically “a story subverting the world”317 and reversing 
“mythic expectations.”318  Roland Barthes elaborates on this idea when he says, 
“readers want a text that is ‘readable’…a text that does not disturb them in their 
habits…in order to be comfortable, the hoped-for text must confirm the options of 
the past and the projects for the future of the reader.”319  As Jonah himself is 
disturbed in his text, his text also disturbs the reader on many levels.  It is 
certainly not comfortable.  The text forces one to confront the very task of 
bringing redemption to one’s enemies-- one might compare Jonah’s going to 
Nineveh in the 8th century BCE to a Jew’s going to Berlin in the 1930’s—would 
one have the courage to carry out such a seemingly insane mission?  The text 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316  Cary, 36. 317	  Lacocque and Lacocque, 19, 27.	  
318 John Dominic Crossan, The Dark Interval:  Toward a Theology of Story (OR:  
Polebridge Press, 1994), xii.   
319 Lacocque, and Lacocque, 27. 
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challenges the reader to think about whether we, too, might flee as Jonah did.  It 
also confronts us with the question will we be saved or will we perish?   
 But it is not just this question that is disturbing—it is in how one must 
change in order to avoid perishing that is so penetrating.   
 
[The Ninevites] deserve one thing:  total destruction within forty 
days.  The only redeeming factor is not their superior culture, their 
philosophical humanism, or their religious tolerance, but their 
capacity to repent, that is, in fact, to stop being what they used to 
be.320 
 
Paul Ricoeur distinguishes the main characteristic of narrative as that which 
disorients and reorients our imaginations.  The reorientation “constitutes a real 
breakthrough in the circularity of our existence because the message, heard in 
reality for the first time, indicates a direction, an orientation, to our life 
movement.”321  Jonah certainly presents a text that is not what one would expect, 
especially in its portrait of an acquiescent and submitting “evil” that fulfills the 
demands the Israelites so failed to fulfill in the earlier prophets.  The Ninevites, 
indeed, showed a personally confronting lack of resistance in their immediate 
turn around.  And this is disorienting, to use Ricoeur’s term.  It is also, following 
Ricoeur, reorienting in that it shows a possibility inside of a situation in which we 
had previously seen none.  Sodom and Gemorrah were not saved despite 
Abraham’s pleas.  What the reader expects here is radically overturned by a new 
possibility—and there is a full-blown shift necessary to bring this possibility into 
being.   
 The lack of historical congruity in Jonah, then, bolsters the idea that there 
is something different to get out of this book; not an historical prophet, Jonah has 
a trans-historical message to convey.  There is something more structural, and 
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321 Paul Ricoeur as quoted in Lacocque and Lacocque, 26. 
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also more personal, to get out of this book, which seems, in light of this portion of 
its interpretive history, to be intricately related to inter-group relations and 
rivalries.  The interpretations of Jonah, however, both in certain rabbinic circles 
and otherwise, fall short of this kind of analysis; they have typically been one-
sided, focusing on either a defense of Jonah or a denigration of him, instead of 
looking at his role within the structural processes Girard defines as mimetic 
rivalry and scapegoating.  Below, it is my hope that a fundamental message of 
Jonah will be revealed through a look at the book through the Girardian lens. 
 Coming back to now to the textual history of Jonah, the translation of 
Jonah over time is, compared to the book of Esther, relatively uncomplicated.  
The vocalized text of the Biblica Hebraica Stuttgartensia, for example, which 
dates to about 1008/1010 CE proves nearly identical in terms of consonants to 
the Jonah scroll found at Qumran dating from approximately 1000 years earlier.  
Sasson, the author of the Anchor Bible commentary on Jonah, asserts that:   
 
The discovery, therefore, nicely attests to a relatively stable 
transmission of Jonah, at least since the destruction of the Second 
Temple.  Occasionally, however, copyists continue to enter 
divergences (mostly in vowels) down to the present era, and these 
too prove not to be significant.322 
 
Similarly, Phyllis Trible, who wrote what is typically considered the authoritative 
analysis of the linguistics of the Book of Jonah, states of the Septuagint 
translation that:  “the LXX of Jonah is a faithful translation of its Hebrew Vorlage 
(our Textus Receptus).”323  Even Jerome, who translated the Jonah text into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Jack M. Sasson, The Book of Jonah: A New Translation with Introduction,  
Commentary, and Interpretation (NY: Doubleday; The Anchor Bible, 1990),10. 
323 Phyllis Trible, Rhetorical Criticism:  Context, Method, and the Book of Jonah (MN:  
Augsburg Fortress, 1994), 98. 
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Latin around 400 CE—and for a Christian audience-- interprets the Hebrew along 
the lines of what we now have as the Masoretic text.324 
 There is one translation of the book of Jonah, however, that is deemed of 
special importance for this study—and this is the Aramaic translation known as 
the targum to Jonah.325  Like the targum to Esther, the targum to Jonah was in 
part concerned with removing language that could be interpreted as “Christian,” 
as Jews were distinguishing themselves from the Christians during this formative 
era.  The primary function of the targumim in general, however, was didactic, and 
Jonah’s targum in particular “was to teach that God’s forgiveness is extended to 
whoever abandons evil.”326 
 According to Etan Levine, who wrote a comprehensive study of Targum 
Jonah, it seems Jonah was not only used liturgically for the Day of Atonement 
ceremony, but also served as a general didactic vehicle read during times of 
crisis, which may explain its early translation into what was becoming the 
common language.  “The book of Jonah was quoted during public fasts imposed 
on the community during periods of prolonged drought, impending attack, 
earthquake, pestilence and other communal dangers regarded as punishments 
for disobeying God’s word.”327  According to Levine, the earliest usage of Jonah 
was not, in fact, tied to Yom Kippur, but was a more general remedy to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Sasson,10. 
325 The targum to Jonah (and in fact, the targumim of all the prophets) is attributed to 
Jonathan ben Uzziel, who was a disciple of Hillel the Elder in the first century CE in Palestine.  
These targumim constitute translations of the scriptures into the common spoken language of the 
time, making them accessible, according to rabbinic legend, “to mortal man.”  Aramaisms in the 
biblical texts provide evidence of the gradual erosion of Hebrew as the common language, and 
thus targumim were provided in much the same way the Septuagint provided a translation for 
Greek-speaking Jews.  What therefore becomes apparent in the targum to Jonah is where the 
Aramaic emphasizes aspects of the text, revealing what the ancient translator was emphasizing 
for didactic purposes.  Therefore, along with this stable and fairly uncontroversial interpretive 
history, most analysis below will be based on the Masoretic text, and I will include information 
from the targum to Jonah where it might serve to emphasize how its message was understood.  
For detailed information on the Targum to Jonah in particular, see Etan Levine, The Aramaic 
Version of Jonah (Jerusalem:  Jerusalem Academic Press, 1975), 7-9. 
326 Levine, 8. 
327 TB Rosh Hashanah 16B et TB Taanit, passim, quoted in Levine, 8.  The TB Taanit 
contains an extensive list of how to determine if there is a communal crisis and what to do about 
it.   
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communal crisis.  This early liturgical use of Jonah supports its supra-historical 
quality as a book that deals with something more innate and structural rather 
than a specific historic event.  For example, Jonah has something to say about 
how individuals and communities respond to crisis.   
 The import of Jonah to Girardian studies becomes apparent in Jonah’s 
earliest, and indeed its ongoing usage.  Jonah, as I will demonstrate, has a 
liturgical usage and a literary content that support, perhaps more emphatically 
than any of the texts already included in this dissertation, the reigning in and 
control of mimetic impulses, a break from the dominant sacrificial and violent 
structure, and a message about intergroup relations.  To demonstrate this most 
effectively, I will continue below with an exegesis of the text of Jonah.  Then I will 
bring the discussion back around to the liturgical reading of Jonah and how this 
constitutes the third vaccine against mimetic rivalry. 
 
The Book of Jonah in Two Parts 
 
The Book of Jonah may very conveniently be broken up into two distinct parts.  
The first part of the Book of Jonah constitutes chapters 1 and 2.  These chapters 
recount: the calling of Jonah by God (1.1-2); Jonah’s fleeing the call by booking 
passage to Tarshish (1.3); his experience on board the vessel (1.4-14); and the 
sailors’ casting him (unwillingly) into the sea to save their lives (1.15-16) at which 
point Jonah is swallowed by the great fish (2).  The second part of Jonah 
constitutes chapters 3 and 4.  In these chapters, God once again calls Jonah to 
prophesy to Nineveh (3.1-2); Jonah fulfills his mission (3.3-4); Nineveh repents 
(3.5-10); and Jonah sits frustrated outside the city (4). 
 According to Cary, who is a Christian theologian, “Jonah is a blessing to 
the Gentiles despite himself” in both halves of the book.328  Jonah is the only 
Israelite in the story and, to Cary, it is because of him that everyone else is saved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Cary, 20. 
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by God:  “a boatload of Gentiles in the first half, and the great city of Nineveh in 
the second half.”329   Cary asserts that there are distinct differences between the 
two halves of the Jonah story, though, and the key to interpreting the narrative is 
in distinguishing these differences.330  For Cary, the differences are to be found 
in how the characters, including Jonah, relate to God.  He asserts that the first 
half of the book “goes better” than the second half in that the sailors know the 
name of God (YHWH) and worship Him, whereas the Ninevites only come to 
know God very generally as Elohim.331  Cary also asserts that Jonah’s position is 
clear and his life is saved at the end of the first half of the book (by the fish), 
while he remains in limbo as to his position at the end of the second half.   
 One might say that Cary, with this exegesis, supports a “sacrificial” 
interpretation of the book of Jonah.  He resonates more fully with the first half of 
the book because it illustrates the familiar sacrificial and scapegoating 
structure—a structure that “goes better” only in the sense that there is closure, 
that is, the death of a scapegoat and the subsequent salvation for the community 
of sailors.  All the while, however, the sailors are resisting this seemingly 
inevitable end for Jonah.  It does not really seem to “go well” for the sailors who 
are conscious of the blood they are being required to shed, even if, in the end, 
they are not punished for it.  Although, granted, the sacrifice the sailors finally 
make of Jonah makes for a tidy narrative and a storyline with a distinct, God-
centered ending.    
 I bring Cary’s analysis in here to demonstrate how a Girardian reading will 
actually reverse Cary’s conclusions, making the anti-sacrificial nature of Jonah 
clear, as well as Jonah’s struggle (and perhaps the readers’ struggle) with this 
very message.  The sailors’ consciousness of Jonah as a victim is the first step to 
the fully mature narrative of the second half, which becomes overtly anti-
sacrificial; and in the second half of the book, there is no scapegoat-- the would-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
331 The interchanging names of God in the Book of Jonah is a theme in its interpretive 
history, with no solid conclusions as to its significance.  Cary does provide analytical insight of 
import with regard to the use of the names of God here, though I disagree with his conclusions. 
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be animal sacrifices do not become objectified ritual victims, but are instead 
dressed up and “humanized” in mourning garb.  Cary’s analysis, based on a 
sacrificial theology, misses the import of the text as a self-conscious revelation of 
the mechanism, and a polemic against sacrifice in which even the animals mourn 
(and indeed celebrate) the death of the sacrificial system.   
Before moving forward with this analysis, it must be clarified that there are 
two types of “sacrifice” occurring in the Book of Jonah, and each is a certain type 
of vaccine.  The sailors, for example, perform two successive, literal sacrifices:  
first, they throw Jonah overboard; second, they make burnt offerings.  The sailors 
perform the type of sacrifice standardly associated with “pagan” religious ritual 
that uses a controlled dose of violence to prevent contagion, and creates a 
violent sacred out of the result.  The structural meta-narrative of the text, 
however, will be shown to reveal this as a religious “lie,” turning what the sailors 
do into an anti-sacrificial sacrifice; that is, the text is a revelatory vaccine to 
expose us to the violent mechanism of sacrifice, and serve as a polemic against 
it.  Bringing Girard to bear, it seems irrefutable that the first half of the Book of 
Jonah consciously constructs a scapegoating incident that is anti-sacrificial, and 
anti-violent.  Unfortunately, Jonah’s resistance to change puts the sailors in the 
position of believing they have to expel him, and they interestingly make the 
necessary theological adjustments.  Thus, part one reveals how a lack of 
repentance (and responsibility) makes scapegoating necessary (even if 
undesired), also leading to a violent sacred.  This vaccine is of the same ilk as 
the vaccine we have in Esther; it vaccinates with exposure to violence (while 
sustaining a critique thereof). 
The second kind of sacrifice brings Jonah beyond the territory of Esther, 
and offers a new possibility.  This second kind of sacrifice is the spiritual sacrifice 
of a mentality, and it is a transformation more than revelation.  This second kind 
of sacrifice is, if you will, the sacrifice of the “sacrificial mentality” itself; it is the 
release of the “pagan” structure that causes the cycle of violence to persist.  In 
this way, this “good” sacrifice is also, ironically, anti-sacrificial.  For cross-
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reference, it may be considered akin to the sacrifice of the Messiah ben Joseph, 
symbolic of the yetzer ha-ra, explained in chapter two; the destruction of the evil 
inclination is the move into the anti-sacrificial.  The Ninevites are the exemplars 
of this second type of sacrifice in Jonah.  Though Jonah himself is challenged 
with this kind of transformation, it is the Ninevites who do what Jonah could not.  
The anti-sacrificial repentance of the Ninevites is therefore put forth in the book 
as one of our “peace vaccines,” a model to be followed that transcends the 
vicious cycle of human violence, and effectively removes the projection of 
violence onto the deity.  This vaccine is meant to produce a contagious “mimetic 
of blessing,” too—a model for the community to imitate, and also a model for the 
relationship between humans and their god.  Let us now look at how the varied 
sacrifices of the Book of Jonah constitute a vaccine against negative mimetic 
desire as well as a vaccine for mimetic peace in more detail. 
 
Part I (A):  Jonah’s Expulsion by the Sailors:  Active Resistance to 
Scapegoating  
 
The first few verses of Jonah tell of Jonah’s call from God to prophesy and 
“declare doom” upon the wicked Ninevites.  After receiving this call, Jonah finds 
and boards a ship headed toward Tarshish, which is in the opposite direction 
from where he was commanded by God to go.  While the biblical text remains 
ambiguous about Jonah’s reasons for fleeing his call, rabbinic commentaries 
seem to agree overall that the primary reason for Jonah’s flight was due to his 
understanding that Nineveh, which was the central city of the Assyrian empire, 
would eventually defeat Israel.332  According to the rabbis, (both the Bavli and 
Yerushalmi rabbis generally agree333), Jonah knew that God would forgive 
Nineveh after Jonah’s prophecy was given, and so Jonah wanted to avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 This historical foreknowledge on Jonah’s part makes perfect sense in the context of 
Jonah as a post-exilic parable or folktale. 
333 This explanation as to why Jonah fled is sustained in both the more universalistic and 
particularist strands of rabbinic exegesis. 
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“saving” Nineveh in effect to “save” his own Israel.  Jonah admits later in the 
narrative, for example, that he knew of “God’s abounding mercy”, and could not 
bring himself to go against his own sense of justice by prophesying and bringing 
forgiveness to Nineveh.  The rabbinic interpretation of this initial scene, 
especially when brought into the context of the Yerushalmi’s denigration of 
Nineveh, is in alignment with the rabbinic interpretations that tend to polarize 
Israel and “the nations,” embodying a reversion into the sacrificial.  Whether 
Jonah (or the author) knew of Israel’s eventual demise because of Nineveh is 
unclear in the text, and may be irrelevant to understanding why Jonah fled.  On 
an emotional level, the demand upon Jonah to step into the land of Israel’s long-
time adversary might, truly, have been frightening, terrifying, so much so that 
Jonah would, indeed, rather have died.  This alone, without knowing the future, 
would have been enough reason to run in the other direction.334  But no matter 
what the real reason for Jonah’s action, the text is clear to inform the reader that 
Jonah is in avoidance of his call, and that this will be the cause of the problems 
brought forth in the next part of the narrative. 
 Only four verses into the narrative, there is what one might call a mimetic 
crisis:  “The Lord hurled such furious winds toward the sea that a powerful storm 
raged upon it; the ship expected itself to crack up.  Terrified, the sailors 
appealed, each to his own god(s), and, to lighten their load, they flung their 
equipment overboard” (Jonah 1.4-5a).  According to Girard, and as explored in 
the previous section on Esther, natural crises are standard causes for creating a 
breakdown in society and feelings of social disorder—a level of sameness occurs 
when a community is faced with survival-- rivalries snowball and violence brews.  
We do see a certain sameness here in the case of the sailors, too—each of them 
is appealing to their personal divinity, and working to lighten the load of the ship 
to prevent what seems like imminent disaster.  Remarkably, the sailors do not, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Other interpretations attribute Jonah’s avoidance to a fear of humiliation at his 
prophecy not coming true (he is afraid of being deemed a false prophet.)  Jonah had reason to 
feel this way, too.  Jonah’s task (before this one) was to warn Jeraboam II, Jehu’s successor, to 
mend his ways or be punished. To Jonah’s surprise, Jeraboam did mend his ways, and was not 
punished, and this angered Jonah because he felt that it made him look bad and that people 
would no longer believe his prophecy.  
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however, demonstrate the chaotic “all-against-all” response to the crisis; rather, 
the sailors are working in an orderly fashion, each making an effort toward their 
survival. 
 Jonah, contrary to the sailors’ efforts, had “descended into the vessel’s 
hold” and fallen into a “trance.”  Though the author provides no information as to 
why Jonah dissociated himself and glazed over, one might guess that Jonah was 
struggling deeply with the trouble he was causing for others.  He must have felt 
caught up in an impossible situation—avoiding the divine call was putting others 
at risk, and he was horrified—frozen like a deer in the headlights. 
 What is truly remarkable about the remainder of this chapter, though, is in 
how the sailors treat Jonah despite his culpability, and in the midst of the crisis.  
The next few verses read: 
 
The captain came and said to him [Jonah], “What are you doing 
sound asleep?  Get up, call on your god!  Perhaps the god will 
spare us a thought so that we do not perish.”  The sailors said to 
one another, “Come, let us cast lots, so that we may know on 
whose account this calamity has come upon us.”  So they cast lots, 
and the lot fell on Jonah.  Then they said to him, “Tell us why this 
calamity has come upon us.  What is your occupation?  Where do 
you come from?  What is your country?  And of what people are 
you?” 
Then they said to him, “What shall we do to you, that the sea may 
quiet down for us?”  For the sea was growing more and more 
tempestuous (Jonah 1.6-8, 11). 
 
One might imagine that a crisis such as this, one in which death lurks close by, 
might bring a more intense chastisement upon Jonah who is found “sleeping” in 
the hold.  Further, Jonah is discovered to be the one guilty of causing the crisis!  
Despite this context in which any mistreatment of Jonah by the sailors might be 
understandable (even if unacceptable), the sailors demonstrate the same calm 
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as certain military Special Forces operatives.335  As Sasson puts it, “formalities 
triumph over terror.”336  Sasson remarks on the sailors’ response as follows:   
 
By casting lots, the sailors eventually discover that Jonah is the 
cause of their troubles.  That in the midst of a tempest they would 
politely pose a series of questions (not all of which can be of 
immediate benefit to them) obviously retards the tale’s thrust; that 
the sailors would ask Jonah, the designated guilty party, to instruct 
them on the way to behave, certainly tests our credulity.337 
 
Sasson’s words reveal how he thinks most people would respond in such a 
situation—that is, the pinpointing of a guilty party in the midst of crisis would likely 
not be the venue for a polite interrogation.  Sasson may implicitly share Girard’s 
own viewpoint here:  under stress of crisis, humans fall prey to mimetic rivalry, 
irrational “herd” mentality, and violence.  And conflicts around the world will 
support this conclusion.  But this is not the situation we have in Jonah.  Contrary 
to what Girard has shown as the irrational mimetic snowballing that takes root in 
crisis (as I discussed in the opening chapter through The Bacchae and the Myth 
of Apollonius), the sailors’ response is surprisingly calm, diplomatic and forgiving.   
They provide, in fact, a lesson in what I might call “how not to get caught up in a 
mimetic crisis” and “how not to fall unconsciously into violent scapegoating.” 
 There are a few distinct ways that the sailors demonstrate their ability to 
stay in control.  First, it is important to reiterate how the sailors worked in an 
orderly fashion, each sacrificing to their god and each unloading the ship’s 
contents, in response to the storm.  The narrative does not mention interreligious 
tension or competitiveness; they work together as a team with a common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Yale psychiatrist Andy Morgan, for example, has been conducting studies of Special 
Forces recruits to test their responses to extremely stressful situations.  Many of the recruits, 
despite being put into situations simulating tortures and enemy capture, maintain extraordinary 
calm and mental clarity.  Retrieved on October 11, 2012. http://www.futurepundit.com/ 
archives/007953.html.  
336 Sasson, 341. 
337 Ibid.  
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purpose.  Once Jonah is found, the sailors simply and directly enjoin him to do 
his part.  Then, as Jonah is shown to be guilty by lots, the sailors demonstrate 
their ability to stay calm and in control by asking questions.  Sasson calls this 
“retarding the tale’s thrust.”  It is as if the narrative, in the midst of a tumultuous 
storm and the exposure of a criminal, decides to step back and take a deep 
breath. 
 This slowing down is reminiscent of how the author of Esther also slows 
the pace down before having Esther respond to Haman’s threat.  Esther, 
significantly, fasts and prays, calling her community to do so as well, before 
making her first contact with the King.  Esther also takes time in the midst of a 
crisis to think rationally about how best to proceed.  The sailors do as Esther did; 
they remain calm and in control, posing questions as Esther took time to breathe 
through fasts and banquets.  
 But this episode is also remarkably different from what we have in Esther.  
Sasson names what the sailors of Jonah do in this scene as “formalities.”  While 
Esther certainly engages in formalities, ritualizing the process of scapegoating 
through banquets, she carefully refrains from including Haman in the solution to 
the crisis.   Indeed, the intense mimetic rivalry of Haman with the other 
characters in the Esther narrative might have made giving Haman a voice very 
dangerous – the king, as a mimetic sponge, may have turned on Esther had she 
allowed Haman to contribute.  In addition, Esther was the “one” against the “all.”  
It is interesting to think about what might have happened had Esther not turned 
the tables on Haman and instead asked him about the cause of his crusade.  But 
it may not have gone well.  The deck was stacked against Esther’s success. 
  The sailors here, unlike Esther, are the majority – there is safety in 
numbers as they say.  Considering this it is even more remarkable that they 
remain calm and, further, avoid placing blame upon Jonah.  They do not 
dichotomize.  Indeed, they find no threat in Jonah and ask questions of him to 
include him in the problem-solving.  The sailors, in a sense, are on a practical 
truth mission—they want to know what has caused the problem and how to fix it.  
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Even though Jonah is guilty of bringing on the crisis, the sailors, rather than 
blame him, place responsibility on him to help rectify what is happening.  Jonah 
is called to responsibility by the sailors both when he is caught “in a trance” and 
when he is determined the guilty party by lot.  The sailors give Jonah the 
opportunity to help fix the problem he caused rather than objectifying him and 
affixing him with irreparable blame.338 
 If the sailors’ cordiality is striking above, the next part of this scene is even 
more striking, and makes further, direct commentary on the scapegoat 
mechanism.  After asking Jonah what the sailors must do to stop the storming 
seas, Jonah admits to his guilt and tells the sailors that they must throw him 
overboard.  The sailors’ respond as follows:  “Nevertheless, the men rowed hard 
to bring the ship back to land; but they could not, for the sea grew more and 
more stormy against them” (Jonah 1.13).  The sailors, given permission from 
Jonah himself to perform the sacrifice of throwing him overboard, demonstrate 
here their outright denial to give in to violence.  The sailors’ aversion to sacrificing 
Jonah was not overlooked by rabbinic commentators either.  Midrash Jonah, for 
example, tells a humorous tale to underscore the compassion of the sailors (even 
upon a guilty party) and the impossible situation they faced: 
 
They took him and placed him into the sea up to his knees, and the 
storm abated.  They lifted him back on board, and the sea became 
agitated against them.  They placed him back up to his neck, and 
the sea-storm abated.  Once again they lifted him back among 
them, and the sea again agitated against them.  Finally they cast 
him in entirely, and immediately the sea-storm abated.339 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Trible, Rhetorical Criticism, 138.  Trible points out that the sailors’ choice of the word 
“evil” (ra’a) to describe their experience on the ship recalls Yahweh’s description of the Ninevites 
in 1.2 as also “evil.”  This creates symmetry between Jonah (the cause of the evil befallen the 
sailors) and Nineveh (who chose evil and who come before the face of the divine.)  This 
symmetry emphasizes the mirror image of Jonah and his “enemy” making a mimetic rivalry all the 
more obvious.   
339 Quoted from Levine, 68-69; and in Sasson, 141. 
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The sailors are insistent upon respecting the humanity and life of Jonah, even in 
spite of Jonah’s own insistence otherwise and his increasing liability to their own 
safety.   
 Another notable feature of the sailors’ response to crisis is their sense of 
group cohesion.  The sailors in this text are always referred to as a group, with 
the one exception of the captain who only appears in verse 6.  Note these 
examples: 
 
• In verse 5, the sailors “were afraid, and each cried to his god.”   
• In verse 7, “The sailors said to one another, ‘Come, let us cast lots, so that 
we may know on whose account this calamity has come upon us.’” 
• In verse 8, “they” questioned Jonah.   
• In verse 13, “the men rowed hard to bring the ship back to land.”   
 
One might expect a leader to emerge among the sailors—especially when a 
crisis is at hand.  One might especially expect one sailor, not the group as a 
whole, to cast the lots, or pose the questions to Jonah.  But this does not occur.  
There is no sense of individual identity among the sailors—no one among them 
is fighting for their own survival.  Unlike in a typical mimetic crisis, where each 
person’s sense of individual identity gets caught in the web of rivalry and 
competition, here there is only one collective identity.  The mimetic of the group 
is as powerful here for “blessing” and compassion as the group mimetic toward 
rivalry and violence is in Girard’s “pagan” examples.  In this context of 
cooperation and group cohesion, there would be no need to sacrifice a victim; the 
cohesion that is often attained by creating a scapegoat is already present. 
 Unfortunately, the sailors are seemingly in a no-win situation.  The sailors 
believe they have done everything they could to avoid meeting their end in the 
sea—they prayed to their own gods, they tried to row back to shore, but to no 
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avail.  They failed.  Thus, they see only two possible solutions:  either they all die, 
or they must sacrifice Jonah.  The moral consciousness the sailors seem to 
demonstrate in their perceived need to create a “victim”, however, is important to 
note.  The text explains:  “They then appealed to the Lord, ‘Please, Lord, do not 
let us perish because of this man’s life.  Do not make us guilty of innocent blood; 
for you, O Lord, have done as it pleased you.’ So they picked Jonah up and 
threw him into the sea; and the sea ceased from its raging” (Jonah 1.14-15).  
Many commentators interpret these verses as evidence of the sailors’ heightened 
sense of duty, morality, and justice.  Greenberg, for example, states: 
 
Their prayer climaxes their service to the story as a spiritually 
sensitive foil to the unresponsive, finally lethargic, prophet.  While 
he slept in the teeth of the storm, they made prayers each to his 
God; while he refused to warn Nineveh away from disaster, these 
heathen sailors risked their lives to save his; whereas he was in 
rebellion against his God, they acknowledged his sovereignty in 
their prayer to him. 340 
 
The sailors, I agree, initially act with a heightened sense of communal 
responsibility and spiritual consciousness, as Greenberg states.  Their petition to 
God seems to underscore this heightened sense of spirituality and morality as 
well; it certainly sounds as if they are aware of the crime they are about to 
commit.  But despite their understanding of the wrong, I will argue that they are 
not as spiritually enlightened as one might initially believe.  If we dissect the 
petition of the sailors, we see that they unfortunately, ‘catch’ Jonah’s sacrificial 
inclination, and get swept up in the ease of correcting their situation through an 
act of scapegoating, and through the convenience of passing blame.  
 Both Sasson and Levine point out that the sailors make two separate 
appeals to God to somehow “neutralize” the guilt for committing a seemingly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Moshe Greenberg, Biblical Prose Prayer as a Window to the Popular Religion of 
Ancient Israel (Berkeley:  University of California Press,1983), 16.  And “similar sentiments are 
expressed by most commentators.”  See Sasson, 142, footnote 19. 
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unavoidable crime.341  First, the sailors ask:  “Please, O Lord, we pray, do not let 
us perish on account of this man’s life” (1.14a).  In other words, the sailors ask 
that God not blame and punish them because of what they are about to do.  The 
Targum, interestingly, translates this verse as:  “Lord let us not perish [for the 
guilt of] this man’s life.”342  According to Levine, the sailors here are emphasizing 
their merit as they did not willingly accede to Jonah’s request that he be thrown 
overboard.343  The passage cited from the Midrash Jonah above affirms this 
rabbinic viewpoint, namely that the sailors are taking Jonah’s life unwillingly.  
This initial plea does seem to imply that sailors are quite self-aware, and that 
they understand they are going to commit an undeniably wrong act.  This plea 
also indicates awareness that they may receive retribution for their act.  The 
sailors are aware of the cycle of vengeance that could take place, and see the 
divine as operating according to this same machinery.  (They do not receive 
retribution, however, foreshadowing the mercy Yahweh bestows upon Nineveh 
later.  The divine, even in this early episode, does not participate in the cycle of 
violence.)  
 The sailors’ second appeal—in Tanakh – however, reads, “do not make us 
guilty of innocent blood.”344  Sasson points out here that the phrase “innocent 
blood” can refer to both the act of shedding blood and the blamelessness of the 
victim.   The Targum again supports the idea that the sailors are asking to be 
absolved for the act of killing Jonah.  The Targum reads:  “And do not lay upon 
us [the guilt of] innocent blood.”345  The combined Hebrew and Aramaic 
connotation of both shedding blood and the blamelessness of the victim drives 
home that the sailors understand themselves as doing something that is very 
wrong.  The comedy of this scene, of course, is in the irony of Jonah’s obvious 
guilt contrasted with the sailors’ goodness.  And the sailors are indeed 
praiseworthy in their generosity towards Jonah.  In the final moment of reckoning, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Sasson, 132; Levine, 68. 
342 Levine, 68. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Sasson, 132. 
345 Levine, 68. 
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the sailors express no sense of vindictiveness toward Jonah for having caused 
the crisis.   
The final clause of the sailors’ petition casts a different light on the matter, 
though.  While the sailors do not place blame upon Jonah, they find another 
culprit.  The sailors end their plea with the words:  “For you, O Lord, have done 
as it pleased you” (Jon. 1.14b).  Up until this moment, the sailors seemed 
remarkable in their treatment of Jonah, in their sense of equanimity, and in their 
reasoned and calm fairness.  They also, in their petition to this point, seem to 
express an acute awareness of their imminent violent act.  But in this last clause, 
a shift occurs which squarely transfers the blame for the act from the sailors and 
onto God.  The Midrash Jonah drives the point home that, indeed, the only way 
to abate the storm is by sacrificing Jonah, seemingly falling into this same 
sacrificial trap.  While this very short episode of the sailors has demonstrated a 
very deliberate set of non-violent techniques for handling a crisis, and we even 
have a conscious aversion to creating a scapegoated victim out of Jonah, the 
sailors fall short of authentically taking responsibility for their crime.  In fact, it 
may be because they understand that scapegoating violence is a crime, that they 
quickly and subtly pass the blame.  At the last moment, they slip into their petition 
that God has set them up and has required them to perform this vicious act 
against their will. 
 The sailors’ consciousness of scapegoating as a crime demonstrates 
profound anthropological and ethical awareness of creating victims for the sake 
of safety and peace.  They know this is the wrong way to save themselves, but 
they have no other means yet of doing so, and so they rationalize their act 
through the erroneous idea that God is requiring their violence.  This Girardian 
reading of the chapter has not only demonstrated specific steps that might be 
employed to avert a mimetic crisis from leading to violence, it also offers an anti-
sacrificial reading of a sacrifice, underscoring the horror of the very mechanism it 
is portraying, and demonstrating how humans will project violence and blame 
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onto a deity with utter facility—such ease, in fact, that it escapes our notice 
nearly every time. 
 Sasson, for example, though he correctly interprets each of the passages 
on their own, unfortunately misconstrues what I consider to be the final anti-
sacrificial intent of this chapter.  Sasson concludes that the point of the sailors’ 
petition is that they “are not completely convinced of the truth conveyed by 
Jonah” and that “the sailors have not yet completely and obediently yielded to 
God’s will.”346  While this theological interpretation is possible, emphasizing the 
omnipotence of the divine, it gives in to the sacrificial mentality that attributes the 
necessity of violence for reconciliation to God.  In line with my own interpretation 
above, that God requires violence in this text, is nothing more than an 
assumption-- the text does not say God requires Jonah’s sacrifice.  According to 
the text, Jonah himself is the only one declaring that he must be thrown 
overboard to save the ship, and the reader of this text must be careful to avoid 
projecting Jonah’s own human solution onto God.347   
 The sailors, in my estimation, in finally succumbing to a sacrificial remedy, 
and assuming God is requiring such, illustrate the gravitational pull of the 
sacrificial mentality upon humans.  Jonah is entrenched in the sacrificial, and 
offers himself up several times before the sailors ultimately acquiesce.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Ibid., 134. 
347 This urge toward sacrifice is in line with Jonah’s way of thinking throughout the text.  
As we will see in the analysis of the Ninevites, Jonah remains trapped in a type of binary, 
retributive mindset that cannot avoid violence for resolution.  Trible also emphasizes Jonah’s 
responsibility here, in fact emphasizing the manipulation he uses to force the sailors into 
committing a crime.  Trible states:  “Jonah seems willing to pay the price.  He offers himself as 
sacrifice to save the sailors.  The solution appears magnanimous, courageous, and altruistic.  But 
appearance masks continuing disobedience.  If neither flight nor sleep has saved Jonah from the 
divine imperatives, then perhaps drowning will.  Concern for the sailors masks self-concern. 
Altruism discloses, even as it hides, egocentrism.  Deception and irony abound in Jonah’s 
character to entrap the sailors who surround him.”  See Trible, 147.  Trible further points out how 
Jonah “traps” scholars!  She points to Allen, “who thinks here Jonah ‘realizes his guilt before God’ 
(Leslie C. Allen, Books of Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, and Micah (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1976), 210f); also Sternberg, who thinks that the story ‘starts by opposing a 
compassionate Jonah to a wrathful God…’ (Meir Sternburg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative (Indiana 
University Press, 1987), 56).  Trible does not call up Girard in her discussion of Jonah, but seems 
in line with the Girardian insistence that the violence in this text is demanded by the human being 
(specifically here by Jonah) and not by God.  See Trible 147, footnote 73. 
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sailors start off as a model of non-violence, but get pulled into the mechanism of 
sacrificial offering; Jonah’s mentality proves contagious.  One might ask, then:  
what would God have willed here if it were included in the text?  My thought is a 
repentant Jonah.  Had Jonah repented, might the tempest have abated?  I think 
so.  A Girardian reading of text (thanks to the insights and interpretations of 
James Alison) reminds one in general to focus on the dilemmas humans are 
actually creating for themselves—that violence happens due to our own mimetic 
inclinations and desire to cast off blame.348  It is indeed tempting to blame God 
here and let the sailors absolve themselves of responsibility in the matter.  What 
other options were available?  The sailors might have pressed Jonah further with 
questions.  Instead, the scapegoat mechanism provided a quick and efficacious 
solution in the midst of a death threat.  Jonah was not willing to repent; and the 
sailors, in the end, prove they, too, lacked the patience, persistence, and 
creativity to resolve the crisis in a non-violent manner.  In the end, they gave in.  
They did commit a crime, and it was Machiavellian—the storm abated after the 
sacrifice.  The end justified the means.  And they got to blame their violence on 
God. 
 That the sailors cannot be let off the hook for their violence is affirmed in 
the text.   How odd, it seems at first, that the sailors offer up sacrifices to God 
after the tempest abates.  It is as if their sacrificial “crime” was discovered to be 
the right thing to do.  Just because God received Jonah in the sea does not 
mean that Jonah was returned in the right way.  How might the sailors’ making 
sacrifices, after they experience the efficaciousness of the “sacrifice” of Jonah, 
then fit into the Girardian schema?  Without delving into psychological types of 
rationalization, Girard has asserted (as discussed in chapter one) that sacrificial 
ritual is a re-enactment of an originary event in which crisis was averted through 
the ritual killing of a sacrificial victim.  One may not be able to know what the 
intention of the author of Jonah was, nor what went through the minds of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Compare to Girard’s analysis of the Joseph cycle in Genesis in I See Satan, 118-119.  
Girard declares the Joseph cycle unique in its strong stand against idolatry:  rather than 
demonize and then divinize Joseph, his brothers humanize Joseph thereby resisting the urge 
toward idolatry, in turn keeping collective violence out of the divine realm. 
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characters in this tale, but it seems possible to state a very simple fact about the 
structure of the narrative:  that sacrifices are offered after the initial and 
immediately effective act of scapegoating.  What we have here in this first 
chapter of Jonah, then, is a human movement away from sacrifice, countered by 
the gravitational pull that sacrifice has on human mentality.  This text asserts, in 
Girardian fashion, how violence so quickly and readily becomes rationalized and 
sacralized.  The text asserts that although sacrifice is initially confessed to be 
wrong, sacrificial violence becomes displaced as a desire of the deity, which is 
then met with further human sacrificial activity.  This section, then, far from 
declaring the efficacy of sacrifice, is rather a conscious revelation of and polemic 
against the sacrificial mechanism.  The sacrifices to this point are contained 
under the umbrella of this anti-sacrificial meta-narrative. 
 
Part I (B):  Expulsion, Despair, and the Cycle Repeats Itself 
 
The theme of transferring blame and violence to the deity is brought out in the 
next chapter of Jonah as well.  At the end of chapter 1, Jonah is cast overboard 
and is immediately swallowed by a “great fish” appointed by the Lord.349  The 
narrator tells us that Jonah remained in the fish for three days and three nights 
after which he is vomited up on land.  The time that Jonah spends inside the fish 
is narrated through a psalm. 
 The psalm has been the source of much debate for more than a century.  
Source critics have argued for the psalm being a later addition to the book, 
neither composed nor included by the original author.350  Trible and others have 
convincingly spelled out the arguments for different authorship.  The psalm is, 
indeed, a generic type of thanksgiving psalm that seems inserted to move the 
narrative forward in some way.  The question really is what exactly its meaning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 To note is that God did provide the great fish to save Jonah.  The biblical text is quite 
clear in God’s saving activity, with any violence projected by humans onto the deity. 
350 Trible,160.  She offers a long list of scholars taking this position in footnote number 8. 
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is, and how one can understand this type of psalm coming out the mouth of 
Jonah at this point in the book.  Whether authorship may or may not prove 
consistent (and resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation), the function of the psalm is continuous with the rest of the book 
inside the context of this Girardian analysis, as I will now discuss. 
 Whether or not one sympathizes with the character of Jonah, this psalm’s 
structural function certainly gives insight into the scapegoated individual’s 
psyche.  What is perhaps most interesting and pertinent for our purpose here is 
how Jonah is unable to see himself as responsible for his predicament, but 
instead sees it as something orchestrated by Yahweh:   
 
You cast me into the depth, into the heart of the seas. 
A current whirled around me;                                          
Your breakers and waves all swept over me. 
 
The narrative in the preceding chapter, unlike the words of this psalm, describes 
Jonah being hurled into the sea by the sailors at Jonah’s request (1.15).  There is 
thus a shift here from the sacrifice being Jonah’s request to Jonah’s placing the 
responsibility for the sacrifice onto Yahweh.  The projection of this sacrificial 
violence onto the sacred is subtle and barely noticed by the reader of the text 
who likely assumes all activity is orchestrated by the deity.  Jonah himself, a 
person of faith, likely viewed God as responsible for all events as well.  The 
narrator, contrarily, is quite clear in how only Jonah is responsible for his own 
expulsion.  The sailors’ ironic rendering of Jonah as “innocent” in the previous 
episode may, in fact, also emphasize the author’s opposite point of Jonah’s guilt.  
The reader can well note the humor in remarking of the fleeing and sleeping 
prophet as “innocent.”  Far from being innocent, Jonah carries a sacrificial 
mentality throughout the book, and infects the sailors as shown, illustrating how 
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all, to this point, have quite unconsciously participated in blaming the act of 
scapegoating on the sacred. 
 Trible maintains that the psalm is of different authorship, and details how 
other aspects of the psalm disagree with the surrounding narrative.  She points to 
the vocabulary of the psalm as divergent from the typical vocabulary of the 
narrative text, as well as the general theologizing of the text.  The differing 
vocabulary is not pertinent for us here, and may be pursued if of interest through 
Trible’s work.  The theologizing of the text is pertinent, however, in how it 
illustrates a more general biblical tendency to project nature, but more 
importantly human nature, onto the sacred.  Using Jonah’s psalm, Trible gives 
the example of how the narrator’s “belly of the fish” becomes the psalmist’s 
“womb of Sheol.”  Later on in time and in a similar vein, we see how the fish’s 
belly becomes the allegorical site for Christ’s harrowing of hell.   
 There is a tendency to infuse religious meaning into natural and historical 
occurrences in both the Hebrew and the Christian imagination; also to propose 
the divine as the purposeful mover of the world.  But what happens when one 
theologizes the violent aspect of human nature as we have here?  Cary and 
others, as Trible pointed out and I discuss above, are tricked into believing that 
Jonah had to be cast into the sea as a sign of the sailors’ acquiescing to God’s 
will.  Jonah himself seems to believe this, too.  Even the sailors, in the end, 
believe they need to propitiate the violent deity.  Scholars, indeed, have fallen 
into the same problematic delusion as Jonah and our sailors, which might be said 
to be a type of unconscious avoidance.  Jonah, in this psalm, gives voice to his 
own unwillingness to accept responsibility for his own expulsion; Jonah, in a 
sense, cannot even see that his refusal to repent and pray to God necessitated 
the sacrifice.  Instead, Jonah declares in a seemingly sycophantic fashion, that 
he is grateful for Yahweh’s having cast him into the depths, and then heard his 
cries:  “From the belly of Sheol I cried for help—You heard my voice.”  In doing 
so, Jonah creates a pharmakon out of himself—i.e. a victim become redeemed—
	   196	  
but also a type of pharmakon out of God, that is, a God that must victimize so 
that he can save.351 
 This very subtle but poignant aspect of dissonance between the narrative 
text and the psalm reveals the sacralizing arc that Girard has defined as the 
“pagan” sacred; that is, the sacred that emerges out of sacrificial violence.  Trible 
adds a further point supportive of this arc as well.  Trible distinguishes the 
psalmist as thanking God and performing cultic acts, versus Jonah who “defies 
Yhwh to the end.”352  These cultic offerings of the psalmist are acts of repetition 
to a deity who we believe requires propitiation and thanksgiving—a human 
offering thanks to the divine for “saving” them from a situation that they (wrongly) 
blame on the deity to begin with.  This kind of “religion” is, in this sense, 
something of a fallacy—it is projecting responsibility for violence and salvation 
outward instead of using these dramatic events to look inward and at the 
processes that cause this type of cycle to repeat itself.  Jonah’s defiance, as 
Trible calls it, seems the more honest interpretation of what is happening in the 
narrative, but becomes lost underneath a heavy theological and poetic lens.  
While Jonah’s psalm may be authentic, it is neither truthful nor responsible.  It 
shows that Jonah, like the reader, is lost in what Girard would call the poetic or 
“romantic” lie.   
 Chapter 2 of Jonah, in this light, is the perfect conclusion to the first half of 
the book whose purpose is to shine the spotlight on humankind, and challenge 
the reader to shed the violence from their hands.  This does not mean to place 
the violence on the divine.  It is to sacrifice violence, and the evil inclination, 
altogether, realizing the violence and the tendency to blame is within us.  The 
sailors provide an excellent model to emulate to a point—they do manage to 
avoid the trappings of mimetic rivalry and violence even under severe conditions 
of crisis.  But in the end the non-violent project is a failed one and their 
submission to the sacrificial mentality and to violence in turn has them create a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 The sailors similarly fall into this pit of becoming victims (subject to the will of a violent 
God), only to have this violent God extend mercy and redeem them. 
352 Trible, 160. 
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violent deity to absorb their guilt.  Further violent offerings are then sacrificed for 
this violent sacred, beginning their entrapment in the romantic lie.  The psalm of 
chapter 2 continues to harp on this anti-sacrificial polemic, revealing how these 
failed attempts turn “poetic” in our imaginations under the guise of sacrificial 
theology and a sacrificial God.  The book of Jonah continues its revelation of 
these Girardian principles in the second half of the book to which we now turn.   
 
Part II (A):  Resetting the Stage—Experimenting with a Different Paradigm:  
Reconciliation without Sacrifice 
 
Part two consists of chapters 3 and 4 of the book of Jonah, which are something 
of a retake of the first half of the book.  Chapter 3 resets the scene with the Lord 
calling out a second time to Jonah.  Whereas in chapter 1 the Lord calls Jonah 
and Jonah flees, here the Lord calls again and Jonah does as commanded:  “So 
the word of the Lord came to Jonah a second time, saying:  ‘Arise!  Go to 
Nineveh, the great city; let her hear the proclamation I am telling you.’  Jonah 
arose and went to Nineveh as he had been told by the Lord” (Jon. 3.1-2).    
 Jonah’s obedience allows attention to shift, at least temporarily, to 
Nineveh, which is described as a “great city before God, a three days’ walk” 
(3.3).  It is uncertain why exactly Nineveh is described in such a fashion; it does 
seem sure, however, that the greatness of Nineveh is here extending beyond 
size.  What most commentators agree upon is that the phrase suggests that 
Nineveh is of importance in God’s eyes—that perhaps God has ordained 
greatness for the city, or perhaps it suggests a divine abode (“great-for-God”).353  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Trible, 178.  The designation as such is particularly odd given the “greatness” of 
Nineveh’s evil according to other sources.  According to John Craghan, for example, Nineveh 
“connotes war, oppression, and brutality.  Nineveh was the quintessence of insolence and 
unbridled inhumanity…to think that God would send a prophet to offer Nineveh the chance to 
repent seemed the greatest folly, if not the greatest contradiction.  By choosing Nineveh, the 
author suggests the worst form of pagan life.” See John Craghan, Old Testament Message:  A 
Biblical-Theological Commentary (Wilmington, Delaware:  Michael Glazier, Inc., 1982), 166-7.  
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The repeated use of the term “great” also recalls the “great” wind, the “great” 
fear, and the “great” fish of which the reader has already heard—all wonders of 
miraculous proportion—indicating once again that Nineveh will be the site of 
something out of the ordinary.  And indeed it is. 
 The next few lines consist of Jonah’s entering the city and proclaiming, 
though his proclamation does not conform to the standard prophetic formula.  
Jonah gets about one day’s walk into the city, indicating that he is only shy about 
one half-day from the city center, and called, “Forty days and Nineveh will be 
overturned!”  This is perhaps the shortest of all biblical prophecies, with what is 
also perhaps the most dramatic response.  Though only five words in Hebrew, it 
is this short proclamation that makes clear the choice given to human beings to 
either remain embedded in the violent sacrificial structure of the past, or to 
embrace the opportunity for change.    
The nature of this choice between continuity and change is inherent in the 
equivocal language of the proclamation.  For Trible, the words Jonah utters are 
inherently unstable and invite “characters and readers to exploit meanings.”354  
She points, for example, to the lack of the prophetic formula “Thus says 
Yahweh”, going so far as to question the authenticity of Jonah’s 
pronouncement.355  Given Jonah’s defiance throughout on the one hand, and the 
fear that was likely present in traveling into enemy territory on the other, one can 
conceive of this pronouncement as a quick “let me just proclaim something and 
run” type of action.  Trible also brings out the ambiguity that can be found in the 
language of Jonah’s pronouncement:  the ‘od (“yet”) plus the conventional ‘forty 
days’, for example, “signifies an unspecified time of trial and testing that does not 
forecast the outcome.”356  Forty days also signifies, however, a complete number 
in the scriptures, connoting that during this period a complete process will occur. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Trible, 180. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid. 
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 Even more important is of what this forty day process will consist.  Jonah’s 
short prophecy declares that Nineveh, in forty days, will be “overturned.”  Trible 
discusses the “mercurial” verb form of “to [over]turn” that contains opposites 
within its meaning and seems deliberately ambiguous.  Sasson also comments 
on the ambiguity of the verb form used here.  The narrative reports that Nineveh, 
in the Hebrew, is to become nehpaket, an “N form” of the verb hpk, which can be 
either passive or reflexive, the verb hpk itself comprehensively meaning either 
destruction or deliverance.  The verb is the same verb used of the overthrow of 
Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19.21, 25, 29) and “becomes part of a biblical cliché 
used to describe wrath and destruction” that is as bad as Sodom and Gomorrah’s 
demise.357   
 The verb is also used to indicate a type of transformation of one thing into 
another—giving the message, according to Cary, that things might not be as they 
seem.  Cary cites numerous examples of how this verb denotes transformations 
including:  Moses’ staff turning into a snake (Exod. 7.15); the waters of Egypt 
turning to blood (Exod. 7.17); Joel warning the sun will be turned to darkness and 
the moon to blood (Joel 2.31); feasting turned to mourning (Lam. 5.15; Amos 
8.10); and mourning turned to joy (Esth. 9.22; Ps. 30; Jer. 31.31).  Perhaps most 
striking is the use of the verb in I Samuel 10.6 when Saul is “turned into another 
man.”  A few verses later the narrator also describes how Saul’s heart was 
turning into another heart (10.9).358  These transformations—significant 
transformations of the natural world and of human nature—come across as 
immediate and dramatic.  They exist outside the realm of the ordinary, and 
constitute a complete 180 degree turn around, whether it is Saul turning from 
rancher to ruler, or a piece of wood into a snake. 
 There are many translations possible of this one phrase upon which 
Nineveh’s fate seems to rest, providing no certain outcome.  Either Nineveh will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Cary, 108.  Cary points to other biblical narratives that use this verb:  it is used for 
Babylon (Isa. 13.19; Jer. 50.40); for Israel (Deut. 29.23; Lam. 4.6; Amos 4.11); and of Edom (Jer. 
49.18). 
358 Ibid., 109. 
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meet the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, or it will perhaps, like Saul, receive 
another heart.  According to Sasson, the reflexive sense of the verb was often 
preferred by the early rabbis who translated the passage as “Forty more days, 
Nineveh is to turn over.”  That is, “reform”—providing a clear and definitive result.  
For the rabbis, this translation would avoid a deity who purposefully tests (e.g. 
Gen. 22), provokes (Exod. 7.13), misleads (Judg. 14.4), or deceives (I Kgs. 
22.19-23), in addition solving the potential theological problem of God changing 
his mind.359  Perhaps there is also irony in that, while God intended the verb to 
denote deliverance, Jonah was using the verb in its opposite sense—to indicate 
that in forty days Nineveh will be overturned and destroyed. 
 Most rabbinic tractates demonstrate preference for interpreting the verb as 
purposefully ambiguous, though, and many commentators have followed suit.  
The Talmudic tractate Sanhedrin (89b), for example, dwells on this point:  “Jonah 
was originally told that Nineveh would be turned, but did not know whether for 
good or evil.”360  Sasson enumerates the scholars that have written in favor of 
this position:  scholars writing in the medieval Jewish commentaries as 
mentioned in Zlotowitz; and those writing modern commentaries mentioned by 
Clements, Halpern and Friedman.361  Sasson mentions only Konig who has 
spoken out against this interpretation.362   
 The more popular rabbinic interpretation of Jonah’s proclamation as 
deliberately ambiguous is in line with the discussion to this point about the book’s 
emphasis on taking responsibility for change instead of apportioning blame; in 
addition, there is the injunction that one may need to change on a dime.  The 
earlier rabbis, who had an underlying concern for God’s immutability, also, by 
implication, put forth an anthropology of human immutability.  If Jonah’s prophecy 
was unequivocally about Nineveh’s destruction, then the Ninevites had no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Sasson, 234. 
360 Soncino Talmud 1935a: 594, quoted in Sasson, 235. 
361 Meir Zlotowitz, Jonah: A New Translation with a Commentary Anthologized from 
Talmudic, Midrashic, and Rabbinic Sources, 2nd ed. (NY:  Mesorah Publications, Ltd., 1980), 122; 
Ronald E. Clements, “The Purpose of the Book of Jonah,” VTS 28:  16-28 (1975); B. Halpern and 
R. Friedman, “Composition and Paronomasia in the Book of Jonah,” HAR 4 (1980), 79-92.  
362  See Sasson, 235. 
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opportunity to participate in their own fate.  The later rabbis’ possibility for 
change, however, opens the door to a humanity that is able to take responsibility 
for their future.  God, in the end, may or may not accept their restitution, but the 
possibility of salvation is open.  The deliberately ambiguous verb use, which can 
lead to either deliverance or destruction, denotes the hinge upon which fate can 
so easily turn, and whether one will actually wake up and do what is 
necessary.363  The next question is whether they will do it in time. 
 The Ninevites sense this urgency and waste no time in the next verses.  
As quickly as Jonah’s proclamation is spilled out, the Ninevites respond.  Verse 5 
tells the reader:  “And the people of Nineveh believed God, and they called a fast 
and put on sackcloth from the greatest to the least of them.”  The immediacy of 
this statement about the Ninevites’ belief signals a radical shift in the story.  
Whereas Jonah’s proclamation was inherently ambiguous and unstable, leaving 
the fate of this city undetermined, the city’s inhabitants do not respond in kind—
there is no ambiguity in their response.  With utter conviction, the totality of the 
population that “believes” and takes on acts of penance is indicated in the phrase 
“from the greatest to the least of them.”  As Trible points out, both the reference 
to “the people of Nineveh” and the further detail provided by “the greatest to the 
least of them” signifies the total population.364  Why the Ninevites respond so 
decisively and immediately remains unknown from the text, but their lack of 
resistance certainly stands in stark contrast to Jonah’s obstinacy.365 
   The remainder of chapter 3 of Jonah follows suit and depicts Nineveh as 
a city of collective effort, true community, hierarchy yet equality, and a distinct 
(and surprising, given their reputation) lack of any type of conflict, rivalry or 
struggle.  The text reports how, once the news reached the king, “he rose from 
his throne and stripped off his royal mantle; he put on sackcloth and sat on dirt.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 This, of course, is also the foundational hinge for the holiday of Yom Kippur, the day 
on which one’s actions and intentions are scrutinized by the divine.  One will either be inscribed in 
the Book of Life for the coming year, or one will not. 
364 Trible, 181. 
365 For a list of how rabbis and commentators have tried to fill this gap, see Sasson, 244. 
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The king responds just as the people of his kingdom—with immediacy and 
humility.   
 What is also striking here is that the king is never given a name; Sasson, 
in fact, calls “the king of Nineveh” a “bogus designation” as such a title has never 
been historically documented.  (The typical designation was King of Assyria—
never king of Nineveh.)366  Searches for who this king could have been are 
numerous, but inconclusive.  Instead, one might ask why the king is deliberately 
not named in the text—the answer perhaps being that the narrator’s point is not 
about an individual personality.  Rather, it seems like the king is deliberately 
unnamed just as the sailors go unnamed, connoting a distinct lack of ego in 
leadership, and a deliberate attempt to avoid getting bogged down in details of 
character.  The import of this chapter is on the immediate and communal 
penitential response—and not on praising the responders’ identities or distinct 
personalities. 
 That the king sits on “dirt” is also worthy of comment.  Most translations 
render the Hebrew word (‘eper) as “ashes”, bringing to mind images of burnt 
sacrifices, especially in light of both the sailors and Jonah’s promises of these 
sacrifices earlier in the book.   As Sasson points out, however, this Hebrew term 
is “precise only in referring to soil, whatever its ingredients; the same can be said 
of Greek spodos, which the LXX uses in translation.”367  Acknowledging the more 
specific translation of this term as “soil” highlights the absence of any sacrificial 
activity accompanying the king’s response.  There is no sacrifice ordered in the 
king’s edict, nor in his own action, as a vehicle through which to gain God’s 
mercy.  To further emphasize this absence of sacrificial activity, the king then 
orders all of the inhabitants of Nineveh, including animals, to fast, wrap 
themselves in sackcloth, and appeal to God with fervor.  The inclusion of animals 
in the penitential activity of Nineveh has piqued the curiosity of many 
commentators who have typically scoured the scriptures and classical texts 	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looking for parallels.  Within the schema of our Girardian analysis, however, the 
inclusion of animals in penitential activity only underscores the value and the 
fragility of their lives over and against their functional usage as scapegoats for 
human salvation.  There is no substitution of any kind here—no transference of 
blame or guilt.  Bringing the animals into the collective mourning emphasizes 
how each person, and the community as a whole, is taking responsibility for their 
previous behavior. 
 If the behaviors of Nineveh so far denote a humble, peaceful, and 
supplicating response to Jonah’s proclamation, the king’s decree that is uttered 
next confirms that the Ninevites are embracing an inner change and not just an 
outward display of ritual.  The king’s command explicitly details this inner change, 
and calls on his people to relinquish violence:  “Each person must forsake his evil 
conduct and/all must turn away from the/violence they plan against others/Who 
can tell?  God himself may consider a change of mind and draw away from his 
anger, so that we may not perish” (3.8b-9).  The word for violence here is hamas, 
which refers to “the physical violence that issues from wicked design and 
purpose.”368  The Ninevites are clearly being urged away from not just evil deeds 
in this passage, but of evil intentions (“violence they plan”).369  Sasson adds that: 
 
This [linguistic] construction encourages the mind to imagine a 
whole series of paired hands; consequently, it particularizes and 
individualizes the bearers of violence even as it distributes their 
culpability upon and among the whole community.  The violence to 
which the king is alluding is internal to Nineveh’s citizenry.370   
 
Sasson’s assertion that the violence is “internal to Nineveh’s citizenry” conveys 
the idea that the violence is embedded in the structure of Nineveh’s communal 
relations.  He seems to indicate that the problem of violence belongs to each 	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369 There are numerous scriptural parallels that tell of how hamas is provocative, entailing 
either punishment of the wicked or saving of the innocent (e.g. Gen. 6.11-13). 
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individual, but is also the problem of the residents on the whole.  As Sasson also 
adds, this violence can refer to specific acts (which the rabbis emphasized), but 
also an ethical stance (which is prevalent in scriptural passages such as Job 
16.17 or 1Chr. 12.18).371  In Girardian terms, Sasson is here referring to the 
sacrificial mentality that has been the founding structure of society—and this is 
what must now be “overturned.” 
 Such a dramatic and immediate change—for this seems to be nothing less 
than a complete transformation of perspective and, in turn, behavior—is captured 
in the verb suv, which indicates “to turn.”  This verb is characteristic of the Jewish 
notion in general, “to return,” which is a central concept I will discuss in more 
detail below.  For now, to note is how the Ninevites, who “turn”, call for a mimetic 
response from the deity to “turn” from his anger and have mercy—a kind of quid 
pro quo exchange.  The Ninevites put in the effort in what seems a genuine 
attempt to cull a positive response, while actively acknowledging the ambiguity of 
their fate:  “Who knows?” expresses this uncertainty, yet also the positive 
possibility that deliverance may prevail.   
 The Ninevite theology is, in fact, cognizant of a perspective that upholds 
the power of human will and action to determine one’s fate.  The Ninevites 
understood the ambiguity involved in their own situation—perhaps they 
understood they were teetering on the edge of destruction and deliverance—an 
ambiguity that perhaps Jonah did not quite understand.  The tone of Nineveh’s 
reflection seems open to a relationship with a deity who responds to human 
effort, whereas Jonah’s proclamation seemed more a reified pagan oracle of 
doom than a verbal message of opportunity. 
 The final verse of chapter 3 tells the reader of the response one might 
expect from such a dramatic turn around and relinquishing of violence.  The 
reader is told God’s immediate response to Nineveh’s repentance:  “When God 
himself examined their deeds—for they forsook their evil conduct—he renounced 	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plans for the disaster he had threatened against them and did not carry it out.”  In 
the text here it is certainly God who is said to be responsible for the continued 
existence of Nineveh.  Inside a Girardian perspective, one might for a moment 
de-theologize the text here as well, to think about how penitential, peaceful, 
communal responses to crisis may in fact be more productive ways to approach 
crisis (and preserve life) than utilizing the scapegoat mechanism (which gets 
born of the violence of uncontrolled mimetic rivalry).  Instead of violent rivalry 
here, one has a mimetic of blessing—a positive, penitential turning that is met 
with a positive, life-giving response.  Nineveh ceases violence, and God ceases 
violence.  It seems no doubt that a positive mimetic is at work here where 
blessing is returned with blessing.   
 The rabbis (particularly the Bavli rabbis) emphasize the continued efforts 
made on the part of Ninevites as well; they suggest that the Ninevites’ 
repentance involved not just what is accounted for in the Tanakh, but additional 
concrete deeds of kindness.  According to the commentaries, the Ninevites “did 
not stop at fasting and praying.  They took actions that showed they were 
determined to lead a better life.”  One specific midrash, for example, recounts 
how they returned objects they had stolen, and confessed to undiscovered 
crimes they had committed before the courts.  Another midrash tells the story of 
a Ninevite man who found a treasure on the lot he had recently bought from his 
neighbor.  He went to the seller and offered him the treasure, explaining that he 
had bought the land and nothing more.  But the seller insisted that the sale of the 
lot carried with it all that it contained.  Both men refused to take possession of the 
treasure and, with the help of the court, went in search of its legitimate owners.  
When God saw the behavior of these two Ninevite men, and of all the 
others who not only admitted their faults but engaged in acts of repair and 
kindness, there could be no doubt, the city had be spared.372  These midrashim 
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do not only point to the reciprocity possible between humankind and the deity, 
but importantly portray a positive, beneficial mimetic between persons.  The 
generosity of the individuals in these stories is as contagious as mimetic rivalry, 
showing how acts of kindness may well be met similarly. 
 How easily the Ninevites seem to have turned the tables and understood 
the importance of preserving life, sacrificing only sacrifice itself.  They so easily 
seem to have renounced rivalry and violent conflict, instead calling for peaceful 
coexistence and the preservation and communion with animals.  For Girard, this 
goes against the grain of humankind’s frustrating inability to escape mimetic 
violence, proactively creating a life-affirming mimetic of blessing.  The resolution 
of the crisis may be understood on the simple human plane—that is, a crisis 
resolved by human means through penitence—and also, as a divine-human 
relationship in which the community has repented and is saved by God. 
 Trible calls on form criticism in her identification of Jonah as a crisis text, 
distinguishing the sitz im leben of Jonah as similar to other texts in which a 
people faces disaster, responds in penitence, and receives deliverance.  She 
puts forth that Jonah 3, and its parallels in Jonah 1, belong to a community of 
literature with conventional speech for crisis settings.  While the Jonah texts do 
not conform to all six of the categories she mentions, it does embody five of the 
six (all the following except #3):  1) The crisis involves the whole community; 2) 
Individual leaders emerge in the crisis; 3) Cultic sites often provide the setting for 
the crisis (not in Jonah); 4) Penitential acts characterize responses to disaster; 5) 
Penitential acts lead to deliverance; and 6) Conventional vocabulary marks these 
conventional situations (e.g. cries of anguish, turning from evil, repent, who 
knows, etc.).373   
 In the earliest and formative days of Judaism, what we therefore have is 
this text, which provides a direct “antidote” to crisis that seems remarkably new, 
unique, and anti-sacrificial.  Interestingly, Sasson recalls a Mari prophetic text 	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from the Ancient Near East as a parallel to Jonah.  Sasson (in my estimation, 
erroneously) describes this text as asserting “spiritual renewal is made more 
concrete by the cessation of violence.”374  The text speaks of the god Dagan who 
warns the king that “there will be a ‘consumption’ [i.e. plague].  Demand from 
each town that they return tattooed objects.  A man who had done a violent act 
must be ejected from town.”375  Sasson gives nothing further of the ancient text, 
nor further analysis than this.  It seems, though, that the ejection of the man who 
had done violence means, to Sasson, a relinquishing of evil and a cessation of 
violence similar to what we have in the Ninevites’ action.  What Sasson does not 
see is that the banishment is in itself a form of violence and recourse to the 
scapegoat mechanism to solve the crisis at hand in that text.  Further, it is 
unclear the process by which the community mentioned will determine who it is 
to be banished.  Such an unclear judicial process combined with what seems 
obvious blame and expulsion in the seeking of relief from a plague, is a classic 
form of persecution—and a typical ‘persecution text’ by Girard’s standards.   
 Contrary to such Sasson’s analogy, the Ninevites are inclusive in their 
response to crisis—they fast, mourn, and maintain self-control—they 
acknowledge their responsibility in the matters of their past, their present, and 
their future—and refuse to put their sins onto a scapegoat.  In the first half of the 
book, though the sailors are remarkably calm and also communal in response to 
their crisis, they still resort to blame-casting (i.e. casting lots), and in the end to 
scapegoating (in my estimation there were other options available.) Their 
sacrificial offerings of thanksgiving, and Jonah’s promise of offerings from the 
belly of the whale, demonstrate a sustained mentality of violence, despite certain 
efforts to the contrary.  The Ninevites, alternatively, present a radically new 
paradigm—a paradigm that does not even consider the literal sacrifice of the 
sailors.  The Ninevites have sacrificed only their sacrificial mentality; they have 
completed a spiritual overturning that speaks nothing of blame, but answers the 
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divine warning with humility, kindness, and surrender.  Costumed animals 
complete the picture of this ironic and comical anti-sacrifice.  
 
Part II (B):  Who Will Be “Overturned”? 
 
Chapter 4 is the final chapter of the book of Jonah and has been wrought with 
oddities and ambiguities for most biblical commentators.  Its general thrust is 
clear, however, in that it presents the reader with a series of interactions between 
Yahweh and his prophet, all of them in some way exploring the divine response 
to Nineveh on one hand, and Jonah’s human response on the other.  While 
Jonah witnesses the profound transformation of a “great city,” he himself is 
caught up in anguish over God’s extension of mercy.  In this last chapter, the 
reader becomes acutely aware of Jonah’s deep struggle with the new paradigm 
of non-violence being put forth, and the release of rivalry and sacrificial models.  
The conversation between Jonah and Yahweh in this last chapter presents ways 
in which the deity, in effect, tries to help Jonah “overturn” to a new way of 
thinking and behaving that leaves sacrifice behind.  The chapter begins by 
providing Jonah’s reaction to events in Nineveh and makes use of key words that 
set the tone.  We are introduced here to Jonah’s “burning”, which occurs as a 
“great evil” to him, such a severe emotional response that Jonah recites a prayer 
in which he wishes to die.  Yahweh responds by asking if the “burning” is 
desirable.  The text reads: 
 
And it was evil to Jonah, a great evil, and it burned to him.  And he 
prayed to Yahweh and said:  “Ah!  Yahweh, was not this my word 
when I was in my homeland?  Therefore I hastened to flee to 
Tarshish because I knew that you, God, are gracious and merciful, 
long of nostrils, and abundant of faithfulness, and repenting about 
the evil.  And now, Yahweh, take, please, my life from me for better 
my death than my life.  And Yahweh said, “Is it good it burns to 
you?” (4.1-4)  
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Trible’s reading of these verses brings out the importance of how the narrator is 
using wordplay to emphasize the major themes found in the book of Jonah on 
the whole, specifically anger and evil, here applied to illustrate Jonah’s difficulty 
with the mission he had been given, and the result it produced.376  Jonah’s 
himself must in fact now confront what others in his book have already 
conquered:  God was able to turn from the “burning of his nostrils”; Nineveh was 
able to turn from their evil and the violence of their hands; and now both burning 
and evil have come upon Jonah.  The question is will Jonah be “overturned”?377   
 The themes here are less important, however, than the structure of 
thought that has given the text its shape.  Whereas Trible (as many 
commentators) focus on the themes of the text, Girard focuses on the scapegoat 
mechanism as the structural principle that organizes religious texts; the 
scapegoat “cannot appear in the text though he controls all of its themes…He 
cannot become the theme of the text that he shapes.  This is not a theme, but a 
mechanism for giving structure.”378  In Girardian terms, the “themes” of which 
Trible speaks are in fact the principles that reveal the mentality that has produced 
the text.379  In myth, of course the scapegoat mechanism operates behind the 
scenes and remains undisclosed, the victim blamed and left without a voice to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 The midrash also indicates the destructiveness of this emotion, as discussed in 
previous chapters.  As further examples, Pirke Avot states:  "Ben Zoma said: Who is strong? He 
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man, and he who masters his passions is better than one who conquers a city" (Proverbs 16:32)."   
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(which is how it is commonly interpreted) in as much as it about the reversal of a death sentence.  
The opposites contained in Jonah’s proclamation of nhpk (“to overturn”) represent a roll of the 
dice:  will Nineveh receive destruction or deliverance?  Given the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, 
and also the fate that meets Haman, one might expect, like Jonah, that destruction will follow.  
And so we are all perhaps surprised at the result.   
378 Girard, The Scapegoat, 118. 
379 Whereas in myth, this mentality is unconscious and sacrificial, the scapegoat 
mechanism operating but not revealed, the text we have here is disclosing the problem of 
sacrifice with full awareness. 
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create the “good” of a reconciled and peaceful community.  The biblical witness 
such as we have here, contrarily, overtly discloses to the reader the sacrificial 
mentality that is giving the text its structure.  This overt disclosure was seen in 
how the sailors and Jonah openly discussed the violence of scapegoating, while 
resorting to scapegoating!  The Ninevites, on the other hand, explicitly command 
the renunciation of all violence, revealing the immediate resolution and 
reconciliation that can result when this sacrificial structure is abandoned.  
Structurally, in the sailors’ episode, sacrificial offerings follow the expulsion of the 
scapegoat, heaping violence upon violence in a vicious structure of conflict and 
abatement that is self-perpetuating.380  The Ninevites abandon all violence for a 
complete reconciliation that requires nothing further.  The sailor’s tragic structure 
that perpetuates violence is contrasted with the comical “happily ever after” of the 
Ninevites.   
 This current episode is focused on Jonah alone, and in turn the reader:  
will Jonah be able to step out of the structure that has formed him?  Will he be 
able to step into the new paradigm as both Nineveh and Yahweh have done—the 
one that utilizes the mimetic of blessing over sacrifice?  Will Jonah let the evil 
that has taken over him die to let a new structure reign?  Will he at least make it 
as far as the sailors, that is, to be aware of the violence of his structuring, though 
unable to transform?  In these episodes, “overturning” does indeed require 
destruction—but it is the destruction of a mentality, not of a scapegoat.  
Structurally, the text itself will need to abandon conflict, as in the narrative of 
Ephraim and Manasseh, if one is to believe Jonah has made this change himself.  
 To this point, it is uncertain whether Jonah will make this change.  Despite 
Jonah’s obedient behavior in chapter 3, there has been no further evidence to 
indicate greater self-awareness or internal transformation.  We have only seen 
his tendency to think in terms of the old structure of blame and sacrifice, and thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Recall here Girard’s notion of “good” violence (i.e. sacrifices, which are acceptable 
within the confines of religious practice) casting out bad violence, which is how he interprets the 
gospel passage “Satan casting out Satan.”  See chapter 1 above. 
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the text continues its dialogue in a fashion that persuades the reader of Jonah’s 
sustained internal struggle. 
 For example, Jonah’s prayer to Yahweh in verses 2-3 of this chapter is 
less of a prayer than a kind of “I told you so.”  The reader is let in on an 
explanation for why Jonah fled his calling to prophecy in chapter 1, which Jonah 
declares was not due to a problem in Jonah himself, but due to Yahweh’s 
merciful nature.  Using the form of prayer, for a second time, Jonah is actually 
blaming Yahweh for the prophet’s own misery, and is now asking for rescue 
through death.  The Midrash Jonah may indeed support this interpretation, which 
has Jonah realizing God’s compassion only after the miracle of Nineveh.  Given 
this, one might say Jonah is retroactively justifying his past actions through 
blaming Yahweh’s character.381  More importantly, using prayer as a structure to 
cast blame upon God is presenting a superficial piety as we saw Jonah do before 
while in the belly of the fish.  The conflict between the structure of Jonah’s 
speech and the content of his speech illustrates the irony of a religion that uses 
sacrificial violence to atone for one’s acts of violence.  Jonah casts out God 
through his prayer, as God is cast out through sacrificial violence. 
 Jonah, further, does not consider opening up to another point of view.  
This strikes a similar note to his episode aboard the ship, too:  Jonah failed to 
consider repenting as a means to save the sailors and ship in chapter 1, 
preferring death over life; he might well have known repenting would have 
resolved the crisis, but he did not let on he knew this, and was certainly unwilling 
to change his heart.  In the episode we have here in chapter 4, Jonah similarly 
fails to consider an alternative perspective on the matter.  The reader has slowly 
but surely been exposed to Jonah’s inner world, and one sees that Jonah simply 
cannot bear Yahweh’s bestowing forgiveness to Israel’s enemies.382   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Quoted in Sasson, 279. 
382 As aforementioned, rabbinic commentators will often interpret Jonah’s fleeing from his 
call as an action demonstrating his allegiance to Israel (as a prophet, Jonah knew Nineveh would 
again “turn” and defeat Israel.)  They therefore construe nobility in his character, and courage in 
his desire to stand up for Israel, even if it means going against his divine call.  As the Mekilta, 
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 Sternberg asserts that the text “overturns” the reader here in chapter 4 on 
an ideological level as well:  the narrative “plays a dangerous game in misleading 
the reader almost to the end…[the sparing of Nineveh and Jonah’s angry prayer] 
shatters the entire model of the narrative and the narrative world and world 
view…” to demonstrate that God is merciful and Jonah wrathful.383  Trible adds:  
“the overturning (hpk) that happens within the story also happens between the 
story and the reader.”384  As detailed in chapter one of this dissertation, Girard’s 
anthropological interpretation of scripture, especially the New Testament, makes 
the point of violence as a human problem that, through sacrificial theology, got 
projected onto the sacred.  For Girard, however, the revelation of the cross--a 
revelation that began with the Hebrew Scriptures--was to make humanity’s own 
violence apparent.  This is a shift in perspective removing violence from the deity.  
Sternberg discusses how this shift is happening within the very text of Jonah 
above, lending support for Girard’s thesis.  Inside the text of Jonah, the reader is 
able to discern the tendency to project wrath onto God, radically shifting the 
problem of violence back onto humanity. 
 This shifting of violence back onto humanity and off of God places 
responsibility for change back into human hands as well.  This is something to 
which Jonah’s inclination to blame makes him blind.  From the beginning, Jonah 
seems to overlook Nineveh’s mature response to his proclamation—they were 
the ones responsible for the outcome, not Jonah, and not even Yahweh.  (Had 
the Ninevites remained violent, surely they would have been destroyed rather 
than delivered.)  Jonah implicates only God in his struggle, though:  it is because 
of Yahweh’s mercy that Jonah is angered and wants to die; it is because of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pisha says:  “Jeremiah sought the honor of [God] and the honor of [Israel];…/ Elijah sought the 
honor of [God] and not the honor of [Israel];…/ Jonah sought the honor of [Israel] and not the 
honor of [God].”  Quoted in Sasson, 323.  Both Jonah and Esther may be interpreted in this 
nationalistic sense, but in my view this type of interpretation misses the revelation of mimetic 
rivalry and violence that comes out of the text.  It is possible that a nationalistic interpretation can 
work, but only if boundaries elicit generosity, and not rivalry.  (This idea of boundaries will be 
discussed in the next chapter in the context of positive mimesis.) 
383 Meir Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative:  Ideological Literature and the Drama of 
Reading (IN:  Indiana University Press, 1987), 318-320; Trible, 203. 
384 Trible, 203. 
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Yahweh’s mercy that Nineveh will grow and one day defeat Israel.  Jonah 
similarly sees Yahweh as responsible for his ill experience being cast off the 
ship, as I detailed in the above section.  Though couched in the language of 
prayer, Jonah is neither humble nor supplicating.  Jonah is unable to face his 
own self-absorbed viewpoint; moreover, he is a bad theologian, stuck in a 
theology of rigid conformity based on retribution.  Jonah, indeed, is stuck.385 
 Yahweh continues to work with Jonah in the next episode, but through a 
different, more experiential, approach.  The previous episode left off with 
Yahweh’s asking Jonah if the evil “burning” in him was good.  One might 
rephrase this as “Is it good to be angry?” or “Does it feel good to be burning with 
anger?”  Jonah did not answer Yahweh’s question regarding his anger, but 
instead removed himself from the city to “see” what develops at a distance.  
Trible points out that the verb used here “to see” contrasts Jonah with the 
deity.386  Earlier on in the narrative, God “saw” (with the same verb as Jonah 
“sees”, i.e., wayyar’) what the Ninevites did and the deity “changed his mind” and 
“drew away from his anger” (3.9).  Jonah now sits to “see” (3.10) (as if playing 
God), though Jonah, unlike Yahweh, sits there “burning.”  Jonah is not yet able to 
change his mind about Nineveh, and he is unable to turn from his anger.  Jonah 
feebly builds a hut from where he watches, giving the impression that he is 
sulking like a frustrated child in the corner, insisting that the world is unfair.   
 Verse six tells that God caused a qiqayon plant to grow over Jonah’s head 
to provide him shade “and to deliver him from his evil.”  Jonah was “absolutely 
delighted over the plant.”  For one day, God’s “divine” plant enabled Jonah to 
experience something positive, and perhaps get a feeling of comfort.  God 
induced a momentary, if superficial, “turning” for Jonah, through an equally 
superficial scenario.  The following morning, however, God sends a worm to 
destroy the plant; it dies, and then God sends a fierce east wind while the sun, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Trible discusses this portion as illustrating Jonah’s self-centeredness, especially 
through his justification of past actions, and the overuse of the pronouns “I”, “me” or “my”, which 
occur nine times in this short opening.  See Trible, 201-203.  
386 Ibid., 206. 
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once again, beats down upon Jonah’s head.  The text continues:  “As the sun 
pounded on Jonah’s head, he swooned and, longing to die, he thought, ‘Death is 
better for me than life.’”   
 To this point all evil has been dispelled except for the evil that is in Jonah, 
and in this section of the narrative Yahweh attempts for the last time to open up 
an alternative mindset and, indeed, deliver Jonah from his evil and his consistent 
desire to stay, stubbornly, in his comfort zone, both physically and mentally.  The 
scorching sun is the spotlight turned on high upon Jonah, mirroring his internal 
state.  Burning questions loom, and Jonah wants to collapse under the heat.   
Yahweh again asks:  “Is the burning to you good about the plant?”  Again Jonah 
responds, “It is good-- it burns me unto death.”   
 Commentaries have spent much effort to try and determine a fitting 
explanation for the lesson Yahweh is trying to teach Jonah here, but none seem 
to quite take hold.  The repetition of certain words such as burning, evil, 
deliverance, and shade, give a clue as to where meaning lies in this episode.  
Out of the ordinary is also the emergence of Jonah’s “delight” with the plant—the 
first time such an emotion enters into the story, not to mention an emotion that is 
radically different from Jonah’s typical attitude of despair.  On one level, I 
propose that the qiqayon is an allegory of Jonah himself who is being eaten alive 
by the evil within him (i.e., the worm).  Being consumed by this worm, the plant, a 
miracle of God, meets a premature death and simply withers.  One senses this is 
how Yahweh sees Jonah:  as a miracle and a delight, who is nonetheless 
helpless in fighting the emotions that consume him. 
 As the plant may symbolize Jonah’s potential, it is also symbolic of the 
“rise” of Nineveh, which Jonah is waiting to witness.  In immediate response to 
hearing Jonah’s proclamation earlier in the narrative, the king “rose” and sat 
himself on the dirt, in a sense foreshadowing the rise of the qiqayon.  One might 
imagine that Yahweh “delights” in the flowering and flourishing of Nineveh as he 
would with all of his creatures, in the same way that Jonah delights in the 
miraculous growth of the plant.  This imagery also suggests that when Yahweh’s 
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creatures turn to evil, God himself burns as in 3.9, when the king of Nineveh asks 
whether repentance may cause God to “turn from the burning of his nostrils.”   
The withering of the plant is like one’s demise due to embroiling anger, and thus 
the deity causes Jonah literally to burn under the scorching sun of his own 
unwillingness to abandon evil.  The delight, for God, is the rise and glory of his 
creatures, in which he has placed an enormous investment.  The imagery here is 
that God cultivates his creatures and that they are capable of miraculous and 
immediate spurts of growth.  Like the plant, though, the creatures are also fragile 
and will wither if something evil inside them takes over.  Jonah’s return to his 
death-wish denotes that the plant did not accomplish its purpose.  Jonah is 
“overturning” in the sense of destruction just like the qiqayon; he is not 
overturning into deliverance like Nineveh. 
 Yahweh’s lesson and question to Jonah following the demise of the plant 
and Jonah’s return to his death-wish would seem to make sense in light of our 
interpretation.  The text reads: 
 
The Lord then said, “You yourself were fretting over the qiqayon 
plant, on which you did not labor, nor did you cultivate it, a plant 
that came up one night and perished the next; yet I myself am not 
to have compassion on Nineveh, that large city, where there are 
more than twelve myriads of human beings, who cannot discern 
between their right and left hands, and animals galore?” (4.10-11) 
 
These are the last verses of the book, leaving the reader hanging on a question 
that they must also answer for themselves.  How are we “seeing” the 
“overturning” of Nineveh?  This is also asking whether one can appreciate the 
deliverance and rise of one’s rival, perhaps even knowing that this rival will cause 
destruction to one’s self or nation down the road.  God is showing Jonah’s 
hypocrisy to himself through the plant.  The spotlight is also burning on the heads 
of all who may be charged with renouncing the cycle of mimetic rivalry, the 
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idolatry of an unyielding retributive theology, and put simply, having mercy on 
one’s enemies. 
 Yahweh’s motivation for delivering Nineveh must not erroneously be 
construed as a result of Nineveh’s repentance, though; this, too, would limit God 
to being in reaction to human behavior.  Yahweh here does not mention that he 
delivered the Ninevites because of their cessation of violence, throwing a wrench 
in how one might understand the narrative’s earlier episode.  If Jonah was stuck 
in the rigid dogma of a tit-for-tat theology in which Nineveh’s evil should have 
caused their demise; neither should we be caught in a tit-for-tat theology in which 
Nineveh’s repentance caused their deliverance.  If one construes God as a divine 
change-machine, then one is no more than an idolater.  The divine, indeed, is not 
a creature run by mimesis, and may not be subject to “causation” by human 
beings; rather, the divine reveals himself as a free, spontaneous and creative 
force, moved by compassion for the creatures whose flourishing is a great 
delight.  There is no movement within a set structure—there is no question about 
whether Nineveh should die so that Israel may live.  There is no question about 
whether Nineveh should die so that Jonah’s reputation as a prophet might be 
saved.  There is no measuring, even, of Nineveh’s penitence and whether they 
merit salvation.  What does exist is an opening of the heart—the desire to be 
merciful and delight in the flourishing of human beings.  In the end, it might have 
been the Ninevites’ whimsical vulnerability that moved the divine to save.  There 
is no formula; but there is a positive contagion between our human and divine 
parties. 
 The question at the end of the book of Jonah, therefore, seems to be:  can 
we give up engagement in mimetic rivalry?  Can we give up believing in our own 
sacrificial mentality instead of in the creative dynamism and freedom of God?  
Can we give up these forms of rigidity, idolatry and violence?  This is a “burning” 
question—and not just for Jonah.  Can we give up the thought that Nineveh 
should die so that Israel might live?  Can we relinquish the idea that Nineveh 
should die so that Jonah may be justified as a prophet?  Can one release the 
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need to sacrifice a living being, a one for the many, for salvation?  Can we 
sacrifice all mental constructions of substitution and sacrifice?   
 The qiqayon plant seems clear in its message that something only dies 
when it is eaten away from the inside.  Nineveh’s violence was certainly eating 
away at their opportunity for life.  And Jonah is withering in his inability to 
disengage from his binary mental model that keeps “Israel” and “Other” 
(Nineveh) in silos, insisting that the two cannot successfully and peacefully co-
exist and be blessed.  Yahweh, too, is “Other” for Jonah—a being that he still 
thinks can be evaded or blamed—despite ample evidence to the contrary.  Jonah 
is caught up in a mimetic rivalry no different from the sets of brothers we know 
from Genesis who vie against each other for their father’s birthright and blessing.  
Jonah has not learned the meaning of the Birkhat ha-Banim—that, indeed, there 
are two blessings, one for each brother; and indeed blessings likewise for 
Nineveh and Israel.  Neither does Jonah recognize that Nineveh is indeed 
Israel’s brother—no different from the Hebrews before the covenant was made 
with Yahweh.  The inability of Jonah to forgive Nineveh’s moral failure is like 
condemning Israel’s own childhood. 
 The dissertation to this point, however, has demonstrated that even in the 
context of seeming non-violence, something must die.  Interpreting the book of 
Jonah on its own as well as in the context of Yom Kippur, it is clear that the only 
way forward is to sacrifice the mentality, and the violence of sacrifice itself.  If 
violence and sacrificial structures, which are grounded in fear, rivalry and 
substitution (e.g. Nineveh for Israel, or Israel for Nineveh, or any sense of 
vicarious sacrifice), persist, humanity will burn up and wither away from its own 
internalized violence.  As comical as Nineveh’s repentance may seem in our 
imaginations, with animals galore dressed up in sackcloth and perhaps even 
praying, they provide a happy ending that is so unusual in biblical literature, (and 
indeed in reality, too).  The episode is coincidentally very similar to our narrative 
from Genesis of Ephraim and Manasseh.  Like Ephraim and Manasseh, the 
Ninevites provide no conflict to drive the tale on.  The conflict is in fact (and 
	   218	  
always has been) with Jonah.  We are left at this junction in an ongoing narrative 
with Jonah who must decide if he will sacrifice his old patterns of thought and 
behavior—his evil inclination—and relinquish the need for rivalry, conflict, anger, 
and other forms of violence, or if he will not.  And he must decide now.  Only then 
will his free, peaceful and happy ending be possible.  Or he can choose to 
remain in the structure of Esther, where violence and scapegoating provide the 
immutable law of interrelating.387  This, too, is the choice put before the reader 
who may well sit, as Jonah, immobile and angry, just waiting to see what 
happens. 
 
The Trans-Liturgical Function of Jonah:  Towards the Opening of the Heart 
 
Perhaps a true benefit of reading biblical scripture is that there is always a 
different interpretation than one’s initial interpretation that is possible.  The 
equivocality of biblical narratives is what lends them to relevance in every era, 
and to a wisdom that comes from opening up a multiplicity of perspectives.  As 
Yahweh may be understood to express creative and spontaneous acts of 
freedom, so does the text that speaks knowledge of the deity.  This equivocality 
in the text is necessary to avoid the trappings of idolizing our own thoughts about 
God.  In the end, for example, God rewards Nineveh neither for their repentance 
(quid pro quo), nor out of sheer compassion (spontaneous generosity)--- but 
indeed as the result of both.  Any attempt to lock an interpretation in will be met 
with a different interpretation.   
 Jonah’s struggles in the text illustrate clearly the difficulty that comes with 
rigidity of thought, both in relation to the deity and to others.  Three models of 
thought, in fact, come through the reading of the book of Jonah, as I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 The benefits of this interpretation for a peaceful and united humanity are clear though 
it presents certain issues given the Jewish people and their historical oppression and exile.  We 
are thus caught between what is perhaps the “ideal” of Jonah and the “reality” of Esther—and 
must refrain from downplaying, and worse denying, the reality of scapegoating and victimage in 
the history of Jews and other groups.  This interpretive problem will be addressed more 
thoroughly in the afterword to this dissertation. 
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outlined above:  1) the sailors who are aware of their own violence yet succumb 
to the scapegoat mechanism and sacrificial religion (conveying the full Girardian 
arc that produces the pagan sacred); 2) the Ninevites who in word and deed 
renounce all (literal) sacrifice and evil and achieve immediate reconciliation with 
the deity; and 3) Jonah who is unaware of his own sacrificial mentality and burns 
in his struggle when confronted with an interaction that does not conform to his 
own rigid theology.  On the holiest day of the Jewish year, Yom Kippur, it seems 
reading the book of Jonah may hold up a mirror to help one assess one’s own 
structure of consciousness and, in particular, to reflect the damage that a 
sacrificial mentality brings on oneself and one’s relationships. 
 The reading of the book itself is commanded as an act to be performed in 
the late afternoon of the holy day, right before the break of the fast.  Like the 
reading of the Torah through the liturgical year, and the reading of the book of 
Esther on Purim, the reading of Jonah in itself is an act that brings with it merit.  
As Michael Fishbane remarks, 
 
We should not miss…the powerful claim of a culture for which study 
was the great ritual par excellence...  Indeed, in Rabba’s mind, it 
would seem, the role of actual sacrifices was thoroughly 
transcended:  one who studies them has no need of sacrificial 
offerings—for Torah-study is efficacious in its own right.388 
 
The reading of Jonah itself, then, like the reading of the Torah in general, is 
considered a true religious substitute for animal sacrifice.  But this is not a 
substitutionary metaphor in the sense of a substitute or ritual “victim,” for what, in 
the end, is sacrificed as the result of our study?  If I have read these texts 
correctly (at least in the Girardian sense, but I have intended in the Jewish sense 
as well), then only the sacrificial mentality must die.  Even if temple sacrifices 
were (and to some still are) considered holy within the context of the history of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Michael Fishbane, “Aspects of the Transformation of Sacrifice in Judaism,” in Ann 
Astell and Sandor Goodhart, eds., Sacrifice, Scripture, & Substitution:  Readings in Ancient 
Judaism and Christianity (Indiana:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 128. 
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Judaism, the rise of the command to read about sacrifice instead of literally 
sacrifice is in itself an anti-sacrificial command.  Jonah, therefore, liturgically as 
well as literarily, is, like our other vaccines, anti-sacrificial.  Jonah addresses not 
just the rote behaviors that come from a sacrificial mentality and a ritualized 
religion, but the structures of thought that lay beneath them.   
 The Day of Atonement is actually preceded by a period of 10 days that are 
known as the Days of Awe in Jewish tradition, days focused on forgiveness and 
the renouncing of rivalry.  The mood of the whole ten days is one of repentance.  
According to Rabbi Sharon Brous, the Days of Awe are:  
 
the time of year where Jews and non-Jews are judged in the scales 
of good and evil, but the theme is, as we say in the second prayer 
of the day, that we can avert the evil decree by various acts.  So it’s 
very much in keeping with the Jewish notion that it’s not just a 
matter of God’s grace, but a matter of human energy. Men and 
women hurt each other, we do bad things, but men and women can 
repair the damage they’ve caused.389 
 
The emphasis here is on human responsibility—these days are focused on 
relationships—how one has been in relationships, and seeking and bestowing 
forgiveness where it is needed.  In the end, it is humankind’s responsibility to 
make these efforts for, in Judaism, divine forgiveness is not a substitute for 
human forgiveness.  Humans are responsible for reconciling with themselves. 
 The Days of Awe directly follow the Jewish celebration of the New Year, 
Rosh Ha-Shana, as well, and liturgically imply that humankind is typically, at the 
end of every annual cycle, asleep in their ways with a need to be reawakened.  
The blowing of the shofar, or ram’s horn, is a ritual designed to awaken those 
who have fallen into an automatic routine:  “The blowing of the shofar is not 
pretty.  It is meant to be loud and harsh—a real wake-up call.  It is blown to wake 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Sharon Brous, interviewed by Krista Tippett, Days of Awe Radio Show/Podcast 
(September 2, 2010), accessed March 2012, http://www.onbeing.org/program/days-awe/82. 
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you up and tell you that you really can transform your life—for example, how you 
relate to your mother, or what kind of mother you have been.”390  The focus is 
both inward and outward.   Following this wake up call and the repentance 
sought amongst human beings during the Days of Awe, falls Yom Kippur, during 
which one hears the book of Jonah, and may become aware of the kind of 
violence that has been residing in their interrelations.  There are several rituals 
on this High Holy Day that work in an orchestral manner to support anti-violence 
and self-control, subduing the yetzer ha-ra, and reconciliation with the other.  
Fasting is one practice, and one external way of eliminating automatic behaviors 
and turning focus inward—fasting induces bodily discomfort to awaken us 
viscerally to our physical routines.  Fasting always reminds me of a quote my 
grandmother had taped to our refrigerator growing up:  “Eat to live, do not live to 
eat.”  The reading of Jonah, as an enjoinder to fasting, induces our emotional 
discomfort by asking how far we are willing to open our heart to compassion.  
Overall, Yom Kippur may be a day of discomfort.  
 Fasting and reading alone do not create the equivalent blessing, though, 
and even as such can fall into automatic and empty ritualism.  The rabbis, like 
the biblical prophets, have put emphasis on the state of the heart over empty 
practice, too; they assert one must analyze what is in the heart.  The Mishna 
Ta’anit, for example, acknowledges the sacrificial practices of the community, but 
“corrects” these practices, stating instead the importance of anti-sacrificial deeds 
as exemplified by the Book of Jonah.  The Mishna “describes the communal 
fasting in ancient Palestine and the homiletic centrality of the Book of Jonah 
intended to inculcate a sense of guilt and contrition, motivate the populace to 
mend their behavior and thereby appease God.”391  The Mishnah portion reads 
as follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Ibid. 
391 Levine, 8. 
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This is the order of service for fast days.  The ark is taken out to the 
city square.  Wood ashes are placed on the ark, on the head of the 
Nasi, and on the head of the Ab Bet Din.  Everyone else places 
ashes on his own head.  The elder among them addresses them, 
with words of admonition, saying ‘Our brethren, scripture does not 
say of the people of Nineveh, “And God saw their sack-cloth and 
their fasting,” but rather, “And God saw their deeds, that they had 
turned from their evil way (Jon. III.10).”’392 
 
According to this passage, the religious leaders, the people, even the Torah Ark, 
are brought into the public square and humiliated by the elder, who scolds them 
for practicing superficial rituals.  Interestingly, one can see the impetus for this in 
two lights.  One:  it is possible to understand this anti-ritualism in the context of 
Nineveh as having feigned their repentance (as certain strands in the Yerushalmi 
indicate), emphasizing the importance for Israel to repent in a genuine way.  In 
this context, Nineveh would be an anti-example.  Or two:  it is possible to pick up 
on the positive Bavli midrashim on Nineveh that laud the nation for its anti-
sacrificial and authentic return to God.  The second possibility seems likely here, 
following the Bavli’s general acceptance of Nineveh as a paradigm for 
repentance, especially as the verses indicate divine acceptance of their deeds.393  
But either way, it seems a drama enacted, if you will, to ritually make the point 
against ritual!  This is an anti-ritual ritual of sorts in which the admonishment 
against ritual is indeed part of the ritual.   
 The Jewish Theological Seminary further comments on Mishna Ta’anit:  
 
In the agriculture-based economy of ancient Israel, any delay of the 
winter rains was experienced not only as a hardship, but as a 
rebuke from heaven. When the rainy season progressed without 
precipitation, the sages would declare a series of public fasts of 
increasing severity to demonstrate repentance to God. This 
mishnah is quite extraordinary. The most dignified object and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Mishnah Ta’anit, II.1. 
393 A reason for why Nineveh’s authentic repentance was likely the more popular 
interpretation as well.  Otherwise, one would have a divine who was fooled by their act. 
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most dignified leaders are humbled by the placement of ash upon 
them. Yet even such dramatic demonstrations did not suffice. The 
elder would appeal to the people not to let external demonstrations 
suffice, but to repent within.394 
 
The JTS commentary may not have latched on to the irony inherent in setting up 
this anti-ritual drama.  It is noteworthy, however, that this commentary again 
stresses authentic repentance and forgiveness even (and especially) in the midst 
of crisis; and the Ninevites in Jonah are used as models for behavior. 
 As the Jewish Theological Seminary commentary does indicate, the fasts 
grew more intense the longer the crisis.  The Mishna states that with the onset of 
the crisis scholars would fast first, then if rain did not fall, the entire community 
took on fasting.  If rain still did not fall, the community fasted still, with increasing 
restrictions such as ceasing to bathe, engage in marital relations, and work.  If 
the drought continued still, commerce was slowed down and social affairs 
delayed.  In essence, the rabbis slowed society down as drought persisted—
minimizing social interactions, and reinforcing introspection and self-control.  One 
might also understand the fasts as helping those in the drought literally minimize 
their food consumption—thereby minimizing and/or eliminating competition for 
scarce goods.  Taking the anti-ritual focus on the integrity of one’s heart, coupled 
with the strict physical and communal measures to ensure self-control and social 
regulation, I assert that what we have is a powerful recipe to prevent the mimetic 
contagion that Girard pinpoints as so dangerous in the wake of a crisis. 
 This early usage of the book of Jonah cannot be underestimated in its 
contribution to the field of Girard studies.  This example of how the book of Jonah 
was used in ancient Judaism is a direct counter and alternative to how the typical 
“pagan” ‘persecution text’ defines communal response to crisis.  Girard’s analysis 
of the persecution text, to recall, begins with a communal crisis—often a natural 
disaster, religious dissent, etc.  It is in the midst of the crisis that social order 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 “Mishnat Hashavua:  Ta’anit 2:1,” accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://www.jtsa.edu/Conservative_Judaism/JTS_Torah_Commentary/Mishnah_Taanit.xml?ss=pri. 
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breaks down into chaos, a feeling of sameness becoming pervasive, mimetic 
snowballing causing the pace to pick up, intensifying competition and violence.  
The chaos of this mimetic rivalry creates the Hobbesian all-against-all in which 
any possibility for introspection is replaced with irrational zeal, turning eventually 
into an all-against-one in the creation of a scapegoat, the sacrifice of the 
scapegoat “saving” society (e.g. Oedipus, Appolonius, et. al.).   
 The Mishna Ta’anit, in contrast to the “pagan” response, states that chaos, 
and typical fear and survival responses such as competition and violence, are 
not, in fact, a foregone conclusion.  The Mishna Ta’anit declares that in response 
to a crisis, one must fast and analyze one’s heart—in addition, from a very 
practical perspective, one is to regulate availability of goods and social 
interactions.  In the midst of crisis, therefore, the rabbis assert a practice of active 
resistance to the pull of mimetic desire and the chaos that would inevitably 
ensue.  The rabbis, quelling competitive impulses, instill practices of extreme 
self-control and introspection.  One might imagine, too, that in time of drought, 
there would be a shortage of food.  The religious response of fasting to a food 
shortage is quite remarkable, replacing what must have been rampant feelings of 
fear and scarcity with a sense of responsibility, control over oneself, and faith in 
one’s own ability to “turn” God’s heart in response to one’s own repentance.  The 
Ninevites’ repentance in the book of Jonah is the prime example of how even the 
most evil of communities can turn away from violence and live. 
 The Mishnah continues to state what kinds of acts should be forsaken to 
obtain mercy:  “the ritualistic blowing of the ram’s horn, formal prayer, public 
humiliation of community leaders, symbolic banishment of the Torah ark and 
public fasting.”395  It is curious and significant that these named rituals include 
aspects of public humiliation and expulsion—attributes Girard has distinguished 
as typical to the ritual preparation of scapegoats.  Indeed, in the cultic practice of 
ancient Israel, the high priest often was the person who took on the sin of the 
community, performing sacrifices to purify and expunge guilt.  The Mishna here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Levine, 8. 
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“corrects” these rituals; when faced with pestilence, drought, or a plague, the 
Mishna is declaring that one must no longer, in effect, ritually scapegoat.  There 
is no need to expel sin, or project or recast blame.  Rather, one must 
demonstrate one’s turning from sin in one’s deeds.  Targum Jonah amplifies and 
emphasizes the text of the biblical scripture to underscore the Ninevites’ turn 
from evil and acts of personal repentance.  As Lamentations 3.41 declares:  “Let 
us lift up our heart with our hands unto God in the heavens.”396  Letting evil fall 
away from one’s hands, (hands are understood to be the tools of violence), and 
using hands instead to embrace the heart, is the inner type of “return” or 
repentance that is sought.  There is no sacrifice, public display, public 
humiliation, or expulsion involved.  There is no transfer of blame.  It is literally 
and simply an act of return.  The emphasis in Targum Jonah makes it clear that 
this was the common message in ancient Judaism—the message for all people. 
 The notion of return (t’shuvah) is central to Judaism in general, and is the 
pivotal idea that came to take center stage on Yom Kippur, the Day of 
Atonement.  Examples of what it means to return to God occur, for example, in 
Deut. 4.30 and 30.2; Isa. 10.21 and 19.22; Jer. 4.1.  This doctrine holds that man 
can at any time return and be accepted by God.  “The simplicity of this idea is 
deceptive…What the Hebrew tradition stresses is not the mere state of mind, the 
repentance, but the act of return.”397  Thus the Book of Jonah is read in 
synagogues on the Day of Atonement, relaying how the king of Nineveh called 
on his people “to return, every man, from his evil way and from the violence on 
his hands.”398  Nineveh was the capital of the Assyrians who had conquered the 
kingdom of Israel, laid waste Samaria, and led the ten tribes away into 
destruction.  Yet “when God saw what they did, how they returned from their evil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Quoted from Levine, 8. 
397 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kauffman (NY:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1970), 36. 
398 Ibid. 
	   226	  
way, God repented of the evil that he had said he would do to them and did it 
not.”399 
 Interestingly, Kauffman, who translates Buber’s I and Thou, considers the 
New Testament and points out that: 
 
the theology of Paul is founded on the implicit denial of this 
doctrine…Paul’s elaborate argument concerning the impossibility of 
salvation under the Torah and for the necessity of Christ’s 
redemptive death presuppose that God cannot simply forgive 
anyone who simply returns.  If the doctrine of return is true, Paul’s 
theology collapses and ‘Christ died in vain.’…Man stands in a direct 
relationship to God and requires no mediator.400   
 
The book of Jonah does support this view, and the Ninevites are forgiven directly 
by God, in a powerful message that lacks even a glint of literal sacrifice or 
mediation.  If in fact there can never be a pure structure in which all violence 
ceases, though, what then would die?  As chapter 4 of Jonah seems to relate, 
perhaps the only ones banished, in this new model, are those like Jonah who 
struggle against it. 
 The content of the Book of Jonah thus supports the earliest liturgical 
function of Jonah as a model to “return” in the midst of crisis.  This function, if you 
will, has sustained itself until today in the context of Yom Kippur.  Yom Kippur is 
itself a crisis, if you will—it is the day when all souls are up for grabs.  Perhaps 
the charge of Yom Kippur has been lost in practice over the years, but one can 
imagine that in the early years of Judaism, Yom Kippur was truly a day of 
reckoning—one would make it into the Book of Life, or one would not.  How one 
responds to this crisis may be of the utmost importance. 
 As mentioned above, the book of Jonah, not coincidentally, is read in the 
late afternoon—it is the last reading before one leaves temple to break the fast.  	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One is at one’s most vulnerable at this time—having already fasted for almost 24 
hours.  The last thing one wants at this point during the fast is to be told that 
external demonstrations are trite—and what really matters is the state of one’s 
heart.  And yet this is what the rituals of Yom Kippur all set out to accomplish—
fasting, wearing uncomfortable clothing, and refraining from typical activities, like 
an extended Sabbath observance, are there to ensure that we take ourselves off 
of autopilot.  The rigidity of ideology and the rote reversion into a sacrificial 
theology, cannot be sustained during the days focused on forgiveness and mercy 
for all people with whom one is at odds.  Jonah cannot be in a healthy 
relationship with God, indeed, until he “overturns” his relationship with Nineveh.  
Jonah has made an idol of the sacrificial structure itself, which can only reconcile 
through violence and the finding of something, or someone to blame.  And when 
Jonah is unable to cast out another, he casts out himself.  It is the reading and 
study of the anti-sacrificial sacrifices in Jonah on Yom Kippur that 
correspondingly provides an anti-ritual ritual in the midst of traditional practice.    
 On the most sacred and serious of all holidays, indeed, we read of a 
prophet who snores through a storm and an “evil” nation who tenderly dresses 
their animals in sackcloth.  This is an absurd world indeed that Jonah depicts.  
But perhaps it is through this very absurdity one might glimpse the creativity, 
peace and freedom that are possible when violence is abandoned.  What will 
replace exactly it cannot be known, but it seems worth the effort.  So as one’s 
stomach burns with hunger on this holiday, one struggles with Jonah.  
Yesterday’s “solution,” in the Book of Esther, was good enough—it lay in utilizing 
the scapegoat mechanism to transfer the target to another party, and thereby get 
the target off of oneself.  The Jews in Esther were momentarily saved, though I 
maintain that the overarching hermeneutic of the book denies any attempt to be 
proud of the manner in which this salvation is achieved.  What we have in Jonah 
addresses this problem of method head on.  What we have in Jonah is a more 
precise critique of the mechanism itself, and Jonah’s inability to escape from the 
vicious persistence of its influence.  Nothing that exists within the realm of 
sacrificial and competition-based thinking will save according to the wisdom of 
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this book; it is not the quid pro quo of an act of retaliation as we have in Esther.  
Rather, it is beginning a new cycle free of the mentality of the past, based on the 
future—based on mercy—based on a free, creative mind that acts accordingly, 
chooses life, and forgives. 	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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Simple “Scripts” and Positive Mimesis:  Girard’s Shaky 
Foundation of the World? 
 
 
 
It is in light of the analyses of the three previous chapters that we must now 
return to the seeming problem of mimesis and what humanity might be able to do 
to create a future that is not of the same violent mold.  To this point, the 
dissertation has provided detailed arguments to illustrate two different types of 
vaccines.  The first type of vaccine is more traditional in that it attempts to control 
and prevent a rampant disease through administering a dose of the poison; we 
have distinguished heretofore that the commandment to read certain violent texts 
of the Tanakh are ways to inoculate us against negative mimetism, and thereby 
build up immunity.  The book of Esther as a whole was one example of this.  This 
more traditional type of vaccine will build up immunity to violence in the human 
system over time through gradual and deepening self-awareness.  But this 
traditional vaccine will not be able to provide an alternative structure to replace 
the outmoded sacrificial one. 
The second type of vaccine will therefore be the focal point of this chapter.  
The second type of vaccine is what I have called the “peace” vaccine, which is 
less a remedy to disease than a proactive tonic.  I have argued that certain 
narrative actions herein, namely the Birkhat ha-Banim and the repentance of 
Nineveh, represent examples of the peace vaccines that model this new type of 
human behavior.401  It is my assertion that these peace vaccines are, in fact, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 I have also asserted that, while we might each need to reckon with our own “evil 
inclinations” to get to peace, this would indeed be the only type of “sacrifice” found in these 
proactive examples; otherwise, these examples have no violence in them.  The Birkhat ha-Banim 
	   230	  
examples of what Girard has called “positive mimesis” or, alternatively, 
“innermost mediation.”  It is therefore time to delineate how Girard explains this 
notion of positive mimesis, and how the examples in this dissertation correlate. 
Before moving on to positive mimesis, however, there are a few other 
types of narrative actions that have emerged out of this study and that require 
some systemization.  These narrative actions are a bit different from our 
vaccines; they are more like straightforward prescriptions, simple “scripts,” that 
are used in conjunction with the vaccines for optimal health.  These scripts are 
implemented to reestablish order (physiological, biological, sociological or 
otherwise) through controlling an already in progress mimetic crisis.  Unlike our 
traditional vaccines, then, they are implemented after the onset of crisis, and they 
try to alleviate the occurring crisis in an organized manner (like a prescription 
antibiotic, hence my calling them “scripts.”)  As such, they are also distinguished 
from peace vaccines.  As this discussion progresses, we will see that peace 
vaccines by their very nature, in fact, defy standardization or ritualization.  These 
scripts, on the other hand, seem to be repeatable, systematic ways to respond to 
the disease of mimesis.  While our “simple scripts” are thus pretty 
straightforward, our peace vaccines fall under the more complex category of 
“positive mimesis” or “innermost mediation.”402   
There are thus two kinds of “medicine“ to cover in this chapter:  1) simple 
scripts for curtailing mimetic rivalry and crisis, focusing on regaining order and 
control; and 2) positive mimesis (also known as “innermost mediation”), which 
focuses on generating a new paradigm proactively.  The Hebrew texts, in their 
often-considered practicality, will I hope add value for regulating mimetic desire, 
intervening in conflict, and building positive mimesis, thereby filling a broad gap 
in providing practical (and Jewish, though not exclusively so) solutions within the 
primarily theoretical Girardian scholarship.  Some of the scripts and examples of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the repentance of Nineveh are anti-sacrificial vaccines meant to enculturate our system into a 
new, healthy, and peaceful mode of being.   
402 Though to this point in the dissertation I relied most heavily on Girard’s Violence and 
the Sacred and I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, it is necessary to bring two of Girard’s other 
works, namely Deceit, Desire and the Novel and Battling to the End, into this discussion for the 
valuable information they hold concerning Girard’s exposition of mediation and mimesis.  These 
two additional works will be considered below. 
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vaccines below may be particular to Judaism, but many of them can span 
traditions, and may also be pertinent to the secular life.   
 
 
Simple Scripts for Curtailing Mimetic Rivalry 
 
It seems apparent from our exegeses in this dissertation that instructions for 
curtailing mimetic rivalry emerge out of the texts we have covered, in particular 
Esther and Jonah.  Once a mimetic rivalry has taken hold, Girard has adeptly 
pointed out, (and this author affirms), that a period of mimetic snowballing tends 
to occur, leading to a mimetic crisis that is typically diffused by an act of 
scapegoating violence.  In the Hebrew Scriptures, we have seen three different 
examples of mimetic crises, and may now point out the various practices that one 
can use to help navigate these highly charged situations.  In these texts we find 
striking similarities in terms of how communities of any kind can effectively 
respond to crisis.  What we find in these texts is also counter to what the western 
cultural imagination typically teaches, as I will discuss in some detail.  So what 
are these biblical prescriptions?  What do our characters do?  There are four 
essential practices: 
 
 
1) A call for fasting 
 
In the Book of Esther, Esther faces a situation of a community of Jews being 
prepared for extermination.  This situation could very easily lend itself to a period 
of chaos and confusion.  To offset any mimetic frenzy, Esther calls for a fast, 
which will bring self-control to the foreground both mentally and physically.  
Communal fasting also unites the group such that internal rivalries do not tear the 
people apart in this time of high emotions.  Esther, in addition, redirects their 
attention off of their possible (even probable) future and onto God.   
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In terms of ritual, fasting is prescribed both on Purim and on Yom Kippur.  
Both holidays, each in its own way, represent a life or death crisis, Purim of the 
body and Yom Kippur of the spirit.  As discussed, fasts were also prescribed 
alongside the Book of Jonah in times of natural disaster, averting the violence 
that would come from competing for scarce goods.  Fasting instills community 
solidarity and self-control amid crisis times, and even controls the use of limited 
resources. 
 
 
2) Slowing the action down 
 
Fasting may be one way to also slow the action down to regain control over 
mimetic impulses.  Another technique we saw to accomplish this came out of the 
Book of Jonah.  When the sailors cast lots that fell on Jonah, an unusual period 
of questioning began right in the midst of their ship being tossed about.  The 
sailors wanted to know all about Jonah, who he was, where he had come from.  
They deliberately took time to learn about him and to figure out what they could 
possibly do to settle the crisis peacefully.  Questions specifically are not 
necessary here, but in general what seems required is communication to slow 
down the activity in the midst of crisis.  A rational approach must be taken to try 
and understand each person and each situation.  Slowing the action down and 
taking time to communicate is a second way to make good, informed choices, 
and prevent irrational mimetic violence.  
 
 
3) Enjoining the whole community in the effort 
 
We saw this technique in both Esther’s calling the communal fast and in the 
sailors’ questioning Jonah.  The community, especially in our Jonah example, 
works together toward the same goal.  Most important here is the example of the 
sailors’ enjoining Jonah in fixing the problem.  While they know Jonah to be the 
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source of the problem, they actively engage him to be a part of the solution.  
They do not cast blame; they count on him to contribute to a remedy. 
Another example of communal effort is illustrated through the actions of 
the Ninevites, who even enjoin their animals in repentance.  The Ninevites, like 
the sailors, do not blame or create a scapegoat to wipe away their sin.  As a 
community they take on the project of repentance immediately, and together.  
The king of Nineveh calls upon his city for this effort and it is accomplished. 
 
 
4) Reading and hearing scripture 
 
 
Reading scripture is part of the liturgical practice of each holy day we have 
brought to this study—the Sabbath, Purim and Yom Kippur.  The practice of 
reading scripture and hearing scripture is a direct remedy for the yetzer ha-ra 
according to the rabbis, who enjoin Jews to “Get thee to the schoolhouse!”  In 
chapter two, it is stated:   
 
 
Whether the death of Ephraim (or the Messiah ben Joseph) is 
meant to be actual or symbolic, the result is meant to be a psychic 
transformation, redemption, and deliverance from our own human 
nature, from our evil inclination.  In order for transformation to 
occur, it seems there still has to be a sacrifice—whether literal or 
otherwise.  And, importantly, the means of offering this sacrifice is 
through study of the Torah.  Torah is both the vehicle and the 
antidote. 
 
 
According to this dissertation’s analysis, the very act of hearing the Torah on the 
Jewish holy days is a way to re-vaccinate oneself against the forces of negative 
mimesis. 
 The reading and study of scripture is finally emphasized in the history of 
Judaism as a substitute for sacrifice itself.  After the destruction of the Second 
Temple, literal sacrifices were replaced by the reading of the Torah.  The reading 
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of Torah becomes even more efficacious as a means of atonement than any 
number of literal sacrifices performed together.403  Thus reading scripture, 
studying scripture, and hearing the message of scripture are commandments and 
acts of atonement.  Reading the Torah, for Jews, is like interfacing with the 
divine—it provides the vehicle for reconnecting with the will of God so that the 
individual ego may be diminished.  Connecting with the will of God is returning 
from our journey into our own thoughts, and quelling mimetic inclinations that 
lead to negative rivalry.  This is the message of the Torah, as this dissertation 
has shown, and so the Torah commands the reading of itself in order to receive 
its words. 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
While these four prescriptive actions to quell crisis situations and the escalation 
of mimetic frenzy toward violence may seem trite, it is significant that they go 
against the grain of human instinct.  In situations of crisis what would be 
predictable is a Girardian-type escalation—either, for example, scurrying for 
goods in case of natural disaster, or perhaps retaliatory mob vengeance in return 
for violence.  These prescriptions, therefore, while seemingly quite simple, go 
against the grain and break human force of habit.  
Right now is in fact an extraordinary time to live and write about these 
prescriptive actions.  Just a few weeks ago, in August of 2013, there was an 
alleged use of chemical weapons on civilians in Syria.  Current President of the 
United States, Barak Obama, was considering an immediate retaliatory strike to, 
essentially, teach Syria a lesson, and also, presumably, to uphold the moral 
standard of the United States in world affairs.  But he chose a different course of 
action.  Obama has taken a highly unique course, in fact.  Instead of making the 
unilateral decision to retaliate, which was within his purview as President, he 
called congress into session to debate and vote on whether or not to take the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 See Fishbane, “Aspects of the Transformation of Sacrifice in Judaism,” 114-139. 
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military action.  While immediate action was thought to be necessary, Obama 
was assured military action, if mandated, would be just as effective in one week 
from now.  What Obama effectively did was as follows:  1) he slowed down the 
process to allow time for reflection and conversation; 2) he involved the entire 
community in making the decision; and 3) he and congress will research and 
refer to “scripture” (i.e., the constitution) to inform their decision-making.  I agree 
with Amy Davidson who wrote the following for The New Yorker magazine:  
 
 
This may be the first sensible step that Obama has taken in the 
Syrian crisis, and may prove to be one of the better ones of his 
Presidency—even if he loses the vote, as could happen. Politically, 
he may have just saved his second term from being consumed by 
Benghazi-like recriminations and spared himself Congressional 
mendacity about what they all might have done.404 
 
 
Obama essentially slowed down a would-be mimetic crisis, and prevented others 
from making him a scapegoat. 
Pope Francis took different, similarly relevant action in response to the 
Syrian crisis.  Pope Francis, slowing down and reorienting global response to 
Syria in his own way, called for a global day of fasting during which he stated:  
“Violence and war lead only to death, they speak of death!...As if it were normal, 
we continue to sow destruction, pain, death!"405  Francis continued:  "At this point 
I ask myself: Is it possible to change direction? Can we get out of this spiral of 
sorrow and death? Can we learn once again to walk and live in the ways of 
peace?"  And then as if calling the nations to be as Nineveh, he implored:  "Each 
one of us, from the least to the greatest, including those called to govern nations, 
to respond: Yes, we want it!"  Significantly, Francis also shed his ceremonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Amy Davidson, “Going to Congress:  Obama’s Best Syria Decision,” The New Yorker, 
August 31, 2013, accessed August 31, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/08/going-to-congress-obamas-best-syria-
decision.html. 
405 This quote and the following from Philip Pullella, “Pope, in Syria Peace Appeal, Calls 
for End of Spiral of Death,” accessed September 8, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/07/us-syria-crisis-pope-idUSBRE9860G120130907, 
Vatican City, September 7, 2013. 
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robes for the service calling for the fast.  He wore instead a simple white 
garment.  Pope Francis has understood the Book of Jonah’s call to shed the 
violence from our hands.  Playing the role of the king of Nineveh, he calls for the 
global renunciation of mimetic rivalry--- the global renunciation of the need to 
strike in vengeance.  These biblically inspired actions, called forth by two current 
world leaders, bear witness to the concerted attempt to cease, or at least slow 
down, any movement toward mimetic violence.  These simple “scripts” are how 
the Torah directs its readers to gain control of a crisis; they help to reinstate order 
when the human inclination would be to regress into chaos. 	  
 
Positive Mimesis and Innermost Mediation 
 
 
Curtailing the destructive inertia of a mimetic crisis is helped, as demonstrated, 
by the prescriptions set forth in the books of Esther and Jonah.  These practical 
prescriptions seem simple, but were lacking from Girardian scholarship, with the 
one exception perhaps being the scholarship of Vern Redekop, whose work is 
focused on Giradian-inspired analysis of conflict and techniques for resolution.406  
Models for demonstrating positive mimesis or innermost mediation, separately, 
are also sorely lacking.  Positive mimesis, as distinct from the prescriptions 
above, are not quite a remedy to an existing crisis, but rather a creative and 
spontaneous act of goodness, love, and generosity, free from the constraints of 
the past or present circumstances or events.   
Girard’s most recent book, Battling to the End (2007/2010), might be 
considered the fullest exposition of his notion of “positive mimesis.”  Prior to 
Battling to the End, Girard admits that had been under the impression that the 
“universal knowledge of violence” alone would have been a sufficient contribution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 Vern Neufeld Redekop, A Hermeneutic of Deep-Rooted Conflict:  An Exploration of 
Rene Girard’s Theory of Mimetic Desire and Scapegoating and its Applicability to the 
Oka/Kanehsata:ke Crisis of 1990, dissertation submitted for a Doctor of Philosophy in Theology 
for the University of Ottawa (1998).  See also his book, From Violence to Blessing: How an 
Understanding of a Deep-rooted Conflict Can Open Paths of Reconciliation (Ottawa:  Novalis, 
2002). 
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to aid humanity in its progress; Girard had believed that the revelation of 
sacrificial violence would have been enough to inspire humankind’s 
transformation.407  But in Battling Girard admits the need for a new structure that 
is deliberately anti-sacrificial, and positively mimetic.408	   Thanks to the prodding 
of his interviewer, Benoit Chantre, Girard delves a bit deeper into what this 
remedy might look like.409   Based on Chantre’s idea, Girard agrees on the term 
“innermost mediation” to describe what he sees as a possible way out of 
sacrificial existence.  
Innermost mediation may be synonymous with what I and others have 
been calling “positive mimesis,” but innermost mediation is only paradoxically 
mimetic:  innermost mediation is only mimetic insofar as one imitates the 
intentional desire to not imitate or be imitated.  Innermost mediation seems to be 
the being one achieves when fully connected to the free, creative, unrestricted, 
authentic, and divine presence within, rather than gaining being through any kind 
of social mimicking.410  In order to really understand the complexity of innermost 
mediation, however, a brief summary of Girard’s thought leading up to this most 
recent idea will be helpful.  Let us then take a brief look at the evolution of 
Girard’s thought with regard to the notion of “positive mimesis” or innermost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 “This faith,” says Girard, “in the necessary reconciliation of men is what shocks me 
most today.”  Girard, Battling, 10. 
408 I must therefore disagree with Sandor Goodhart’s post-Battling warning, which reads: 
Kaptein asks the inevitable question: how do we go about finding a way out of 
this sacrificial crisis? This is an important move on Kaptein's part, and it 
highlights a very important feature of Girard's ideas, a feature often missed by a 
good many of the individuals who currently use Girard's ideas: namely, that there 
is no implied remedy. There is no ethical consequence to be gleaned from 
Girard's analysis, other than to end the violence, to refuser la violence.  
 
See Sandor Goodhart, “The Self and Other People,” in Journal of Philosophy:  A Cross-
Disciplinary Inquiry, Volume 7, Issue 16, Fall 2011, 14-25.  Thank you to Ann W. Astell for 
bringing this to my attention. 
409 A metaphorical prodding had been in place from the various authors and scholars who 
were looking for a remedy out of Girardian theory.  In Battling, it seems Girard may have been 
responding to many of his followers’ critiques.  See, for example, Rebecca Adams, “Loving 
Mimesis and Girard’s ‘Scapegoat of the Text’: A Creative Reassessment of Mimetic Desire,” in 
Violence Renounced:  René Girard, Biblical Studies and Peacemaking, ed. Willard M. Swartley 
(Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000). 
410 Girard uses a number of terms to describe the concept of innermost mediation 
including reverse mimetism, positive imitation, positive reciprocity, love, intelligent imitation, 
positive undifferentiation, identification, charity, empathy, and the imitation of Christ. 
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mediation (which, to be clear, I treat as synonymous terms.)  Then we will come 
back around to describe innermost mediation in more detail, and how the “peace 
vaccines” of the Birkhat ha-Banim and the Ninevites’ repentance may correlate. 
 Mimetic desire, to review our initial definition from chapter one, describes 
how humans acquire being, and more specifically their very desire(s), from other 
human beings.  No human being, in this paradigm, can desire anything 
autonomously; humans learn what to desire through imitation of others.  On the 
surface, mimetic desire may look like a competition for objects—take, for 
example, the scenario of two children fighting over a toy; it may seem the 
children are in competition for the toy, but before the first child picks up the toy, 
the second child notably has no interest in it.  It is only in imitation of the first child 
that the second child acquires his/her desire for the toy.  This scenario, then, 
illustrates that the competition is not really for the object, but for the being the 
child possesses through having it.  The second child therefore learns to desire 
the toy in imitation because they think this will lead to a fulfilling result.   
For Girard, the above scenario illustrates how our lives mimetically take 
shape, and quite unconsciously so.  Humans are run by imitative desire, which 
precludes any possibility that humans are in any way independent or 
autonomous.  Mimetic theory “tends to relativize the very possibility of 
introspection:  going into oneself always means finding the other, the mediator, 
the person who orients my desires without my being aware of it.”411  For Girard, 
human beings are deeply and unconsciously dependent upon one another; all of 
how we are is learned through mediating others (“models”) with whom we enter 
into relationship.  Girard uses the term “interdividual” to describe how who we are 
is that we are mediated through others.  So it is not that we simply imbibe the 
messages and values of our culture-at-large; the more powerful determining 
forces come from our one-on-one relationships with those we choose as 
“models” whom he alternatively calls “mediators” (as, sensibly, they function to 
mediate our desires). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Girard, Battling, 10. 
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Girard in fact begins the development of his theory of mimesis in Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel.  In Deceit, he uses the term “mediation,” (the term mimesis 
does not come into play in Girard’s work until later), and he describes a few 
different ways that mediation occurs.  Girard first describes what he calls “internal 
mediation,” which leads to the most intense rivalry.  Internal mediation denotes 
desire mediated by models that are more or less similar to oneself—models that 
are of approximately, for example, the same age or ability—models with whom 
one readily identifies.  Typical to internal mediation is also the subject’s 
perception of the model as possessing a kind of grandeur—a power; the model 
has a type of being that the subject wishes to have.  This grandeur tends to 
initially get projected onto an object that the model possesses, hearkening back 
to the example of the two children fighting over the same toy.  The competition 
over possession of the object creates a rivalry that intensifies the closer the 
subject comes to acquiring it.  The model, now defending his possession, clings 
more fiercely to the object, reminding the subject of their inferiority, which makes 
the subject fixate even more intensely on the conquest.  Through this process of 
intensification, the object is eventually forgotten and emptied of its meaning, and 
the rivalry between “mimetic doubles” is played out for the sake of the rivalry 
itself.  According to Girard, internal mediation is inherently violent due to the 
intense rivalry it generates; it may culminate in a compelling metaphysical desire 
where the subject seeks to replace, and even literally become the other (i.e., the 
model.)  These intense rivalries come from internal mediation precisely because 
the subject and the model are so similar; they embody the devolution into 
mimetic “twins,” creating a mimetic crisis that will be marked by violence.  The 
metaphysical proximity of the subject and the model (in which there is no strict 
boundary separating them) is thus quite dangerous.   
“External mediation” does not breed the same intensity of rivalry as 
internal mediation.  Unlike internal mediation, external mediation may, in fact, be 
a successful kind of mimesis.  This kind of mediation is when one’s desire is 
mediated through a remote, even transcendent figure; the mediator must be 
someone who is at a distance great enough removed from the subject that rivalry 
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is not sufficiently awakened.  According to Girard, there must be an extant 
metaphysical distance; there must be a strict boundary between subject and 
object that retains their differentiation to ward off competition, as for example 
between a teacher and a student or a parent and child.  (While a student may 
wish to become a teacher, it is something that will come well into the future, 
affirming a boundary of time.  Graduate students with their teachers, however, 
are different and must be categorized as “internal” due to proximity.)  In external 
mediation, the desires of the subject are still mediated through the external 
model, but their distance from each other is great enough to keep this 
relationship more or less safe from violence.  On the down side, even if humans 
have powerful, good, and well-chosen external mediators, keeping rivalry mostly 
at bay, Girard seems to maintain that other proximal desires will inevitably creep 
in and create competition.   
Girard’s notion of mediation in Deceit presents human beings, in general, 
as fundamentally interdividual.  In this paradigm, human beings acquire all of 
their desires through mediation.  Human beings can thus have no real inner 
fulfillment because their very being is only acquired from without; this keeps them 
in a vicious cycle of constantly seeking to fill their void through mediating models.  
Perhaps the greatest disintegration of the human being, discussed by Girard, is 
portrayed in Dostoevsky’s “Underground Man.”  Caught in the web of multiple 
obsessive relationships, underground man’s “self” is fragmented beyond any 
recognition.  He is aware of the mimetic web in which he is caught, too, but 
seems unable to break free.   
While Dostoevsky’s underground man is tormented due to his utterly 
fragmented self, however, Girard presents Notes from the Underground as a 
literary masterpiece that contains transcendent knowledge of the human 
condition.  The ability to create a novelistic masterpiece does not require a 
complete transformation; but it does require a depth of awareness of one’s own 
mediated condition.  Girard states:  “The victory over a self-centeredness which 
is other-centered, this renunciation of fascination and hatred, is the crowning 
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moment of novelistic creation.”412  This self-awareness is what Girard calls 
“creative renunciation.”413  In creative renunciation, the novelists come to their 
own transformation through “denouncing their deceptive divinity of pride.”414  
Giving up the creation of false “gods” whether through aggrandizement of self or 
the model is what begins the novelist’s transformation.  
Girard does elaborate on this idea in Deceit as well, distinguishing this 
state of awareness as being profoundly able to draw metaphysical boundaries.  
When one is able, for example, to maintain the integrity of the self, one can then 
appropriately acknowledge and identify with the Other.  This boundary creates a 
healthy relatedness in place of human-to-human mediation, which collapses self 
and other, providing only distorted knowledge of both.  This is, in fact, a very 
early version of Girard’s much later notion of innermost mediation, as we will see.  
But in Deceit, the way to engage in the process of innermost mediation is absent.  
In the novels he analyzes, Girard declares there to be: 
 
 
a call for symbols of vertical transcendency whether the author is 
Christian or not.  All the great novelists respond to this fundamental 
appeal but sometimes they manage to hide themselves from the 
meaning of their response.415 
 
 
The novels on which Girard writes are certainly adequate in revealing the 
mediating mechanism, and the problems of human desire and imitation.  But 
while aspiring to an even higher revelation about the human condition, it seems 
this was the farthest the novelists could go. 
These ideas of internal and external mediation are the foundation for what 
Girard later, in V&S and after, calls mimetic desire, as it is explicated above.  
Importantly, mimetic desire is now discussed in the context of religion, though, 
and not works of at least so-called secular literature.  Within this context, Girard 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 299. 
413 Ibid., 307.   
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid., 312. 
	   242	  
is able to relate mimetic desire to the foundation of religion; he is also able to 
articulate its antidote, which is very generally described as “positive mimesis,” the 
“imitation of Christ,” or more specifically the imitation of Jesus’ desire.  But he 
does not elaborate on what this kind of alternative mimesis really entails in his 
works before Battling.416 
It is the time to come back, then, to how Girard does elaborate on what he 
means by the idea of the imitation of Christ in Battling to the End, and in his 
doing so, he is forced to negotiate how human mediation and mimetic desire 
works in more detail.417  In Battling, Girard does, to be clear, adhere to his basic 
premise that humanity is headed toward an escalation to the extremes, or 
apocalyptic battle.  Girard states:   
 
We have to think of reconciliation not as a consequence but as the 
reverse of the escalation to the extremes.  It is a real possibility, but 
no one wants to see it.  The Kingdom is already here, but human 
violence will increasingly mask it.  This is the paradox of our 
world.418 
 
 
Girard also asserts, “Christ will have tried to bring humanity into adulthood, but 
humanity will have refused.  I am using the future perfect on purpose because 
there is a deep failure in all of this.”419  In the context of Girard’s presumed failure 
of humankind, however, he states that some rare humans, (those he calls heroes 
and geniuses), have been able to accomplish a kind of “internal criticism of 
reciprocity,” even an “internal mutation” of mimetics.420  Girard states these 
tantalizing ideas at the beginning of his book, and Chantre has to tease the 
details out through the process of the book-long interview.  As the book 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 It is my impression as well that Girard becomes more skeptical about the ability of 
humanity once mediation becomes mimesis in the context of religion.  The sacrificial structure 
seems to have a hold on humanity, for Girard, which will end in an all out battle. 
417 Chantre does a good job drawing out Girard’s thoughts on this topic, which I think 
otherwise Girard would have been happy to continue avoiding. 
418 Girard, Battling, 46. 
419 Ibid., 118. 
420 Ibid., 10.  Ann W. Astell has offered the idea that this kind of internal mutation or 
internal criticism may, in fact, relate to the idea of conscience.  Ann W. Astell, dissertation notes 
to author, (Indiana:  Notre Dame University, December 20, 2013). 
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progresses, the topic is brought back into the fore on several occasions during 
which Girard uses a wide variety of different terms to describe what seems, for 
him, to be a reversal of the escalation to the extremes.421  The overarching term 
that Chantre and Girard come up with together to describe the process, however, 
is, as mentioned, innermost mediation.422  Girard does not present his idea of 
innermost mediation very systematically, but I will attempt here to draw the 
various pieces of his picture together. 
First, positive mimesis involves identification over imitation.  As discussed 
above, imitation is the creation of one’s being through taking on the desires of 
one’s model(s), which creates a sameness (i.e., negative undifferentiation) 
between the subject and model leading most often to escalating rivalry and 
violence.423  Identification, on the other hand, means the practice of empathy – 
the ability to stand in another’s shoes, which due to its very nature necessitates 
that the empathetic person is not that same person as the one with whom they 
are empathizing.424  According to Ann W. Astell, a prolific writer and scholar on 
Girard who has written on this notion of empathy in particular, notes that empathy 
preserves a sense of “subjective distance.”425  Victoria Gaile Laidler, who writes 
in response to Astell, further describes empathy as that “sophisticated process 
discerns sameness and differentness, dances subject and object.  Neither 
appropriating the other nor abdicating the self, empathy is imaginative 
companionship.”426  Empathy preserves boundaries between self and other, 
while transversing those same boundaries.  Imitation, contrarily, breeds 
sameness and not differentiation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 The semantic field Girard creates through the book around what he calls variously 
positive mimesis, positive undifferentiation, charity, relationship, Christian love, imitation of Christ, 
identification, et.al., is in itself interesting and details the various aspects of how Girard seems to 
understand how this process will take place.   
422 Ibid., 133. 
423 Even a transcendent “external” mediator can be engaged in rivalry, such as in the 
biblical narratives of Eden and the Tower of Babel. 
424 An in-depth analysis of Girard and the idea of empathy as an antidote to sacrificial 
violence can be found in Ann W. Astell, “Saintly Mimesis, Contagion, and Empathy in the Thought 
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Girard elaborates on the notion of identification as a kind of boundary-
preservation.  It is only when one’s own boundary is intact that charity, (another 
synonym of Girard’s for positive mimesis), becomes a possibility.  Girard thus 
emphasizes the need to maintain the proper distance from the other.  In Battling, 
Girard brings in a metaphor from Pascal to help explain the leap from “the order 
of bodies to that of charity.”427  According to Girard, Pascal spoke of the distance 
one needs to be from a painting to see it properly; Pascal called this “the exact 
point which is the true place.”428  It is from this true place, this appropriate 
distance, that one must practice empathetic identification (or charity.)  Girard 
states that excessive empathy is mimetic, (presumably because one would be 
taking on the being of the model and thereby collapsing difference.)  But 
excessive indifference is just as mimetic (excessive distance can create a 
repulsing reciprocity as well.)  Girard asserts that identification with the other has 
to be envisaged as a means of correcting our mimetic tendencies.  “Mimetism 
brings me too close or too far from the other.  Identification makes it possible to 
see the other from the right distance.”429  Girard recalls Hölderlin as an exemplar 
of identification, who greeted guests with a ceremoniousness that supported 
sustaining this positive boundary, keeping his guests at the proper distance, yet 
presumably sharing an intimate closeness.430  
Ultimately, however, humans are still inherently mimetic creatures and, left 
to their own regressive mimetic tendencies, will be unable to follow these rules 
for relationship.  For Girard, therefore, the only way for humans to access these 
proper relationships is through imitating Christ.  “Only Christ makes it possible for 
humans to be at the right distance.”431  Because mimetic humans need a model, 
Girard emphasizes the need for to discern the right model:  Christ alone “enables 
us to escape from human imitation.”432  Therefore, it seems that “positive 
mimesis” for Girard is precisely the imitation of Christ, which enables human-to-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Girard, Battling, 134. 
428 Ibid. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
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human relationships of identification instead of imitation; the imitation of Christ 
brings a wholeness to the human being that is self-sustaining, precluding the 
need to seek fulfillment through imitation placed elsewhere, (elsewhere meaning 
in a mimetic and sacrificial world.) 
This same imitation of Christ is also called innermost mediation.  Mimesis 
with Christ, therefore, is finding our desires mediated through that which lay deep 
within us—the innermost divine, if you will.  With this idea of innermost mediation, 
Girard declares he is following Augustine’s lead in Confessions, when Augustine 
declares God is “more inward to me than my most inward part” or perhaps “more 
intimate to me than I am to myself” (Latin, Deos interior intimo meo).433  God here 
is described as the most inner recesses of the self; the pure being that lies 
beneath the sacrificial structure that has shaped human consciousness and 
activity.  This innermost self, for Augustine, is indeed that which makes human 
experience possible in the first place, and accessing this innermost self is like a 
conversion experience; it wipes away the sickness of sin (i.e. the sickness of the 
violent experiences that have shaped humanity) in which one has previously 
been trapped.434  Thus, for Girard, I would assert that the various terms positive 
mimesis, imitation of Christ, and innermost mediation, all refer to the mediation of 
human desire through the example of the divine recesses of the self – the 
authentic self-- that which is spontaneous and free of the bondage of the 
sacrificial structure.  In this sense, innermost mediation, or positive mimesis, will 
have nothing to do with “religion”; it has everything to do, however, with the living 
God. 
There is a paradox in positive mimesis, however, that defies the very 
notion of imitation.  Girard asserts that to imitate Christ is to no longer imitate and 
“to do everything to avoid being imitated.”435  Mediating through the innermost 
divine truly means free and creative response to the experience of life.  Under 
the auspices of positive mimesis, religious behavior will not conform to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 Saint Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. E. B. Pusey (Amazon 
Digital Services, Inc.), 20.  
434 Thank you to Ann W. Astell who suggested the idea of conversion to describe this 
process.  Astell, author’s dissertation defense, 2013. 
435 Girard, Battling, 122. 
	   246	  
sacrificial institution as it has been known to humankind; and even “secular” 
behavior will go against the grain as human structures and systems have been 
set up as equally sacrificial.  The imitation of Christ is rather imitating a freedom; 
and freedom by its very nature cannot be imitated.  The wholeness of the self, 
and the boundary of the individual, will therefore be fully intact and in positive 
undifferentiation with all others who likewise mediate through the innermost self.  
In this way, Girard views humans as brothers “in” Christ—that is, each person 
united in their spontaneous freedom—a freedom that cannot be imitated, and 
thus neither will it impose itself as a model.  Positive mimesis is almost an anti-
structure structure; it is non-routinize-able; it is, perhaps, love.  And for Girard, 
while this kind of being is unable to be imitated, it at the same time generates 
positive contagion due to its manifest self-expression and authenticity.436  
The fact that Girard includes this exposition of innermost mediation in his 
final book is heartening. It ultimately allows for the redemption of the human race, 
and avoids the scapegoating of human nature itself as the irredeemable cause of 
mimetic violence.  But no one said escaping negative mimesis was going to be 
easy.  Adapting to a mode of innermost mediation, as Girard has affirmed, seems 
a rare event.  Part of the difficulty is in its defiance of a definition or a set 
actionable routine.  As with “religion” in general, which has been distorted and 
reified over time, Girard’s notion of innermost mediation seems to have already 
incited some misinterpretation.  One example of misinterpretation is in Wolfgang 
Palaver’s recent book Rene Girard and Mimetic Theory.437  Certainly Palaver is a 
seasoned “Girardian” and astute scholar, and his book is a well-received addition 
to the Girardian collection.  I must, however, bring Palaver’s analysis to bear 
here.  And his analysis, admittedly, is based on words written by Girard himself, 
who may not always have been so consistent in his efforts to explain positive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 This is where I may disagree with Astell on her view of innermost mediation as a 
possible denotation of conscience.  Whether conscience, as a concept, is an a priori connection 
to a moral code, or whether it is constructed in experience is not something that can be dealt with 
in this work.  But Astell’s idea is worth considering and pursuing further given that there must be 
something that interjects consciously and intelligently in this kind of mimesis. 
437 Wolfgang Palaver, Rene Girard and Mimetic Theory (Michigan State Press, 2013). 
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mimesis.  I would like to demonstrate, then, how easy it is to regress into a reified 
and not-so-positive mimesis. 
 Palaver brings in ideas about positive mimesis from both Deceit and 
Girard’s later writings.  He is adept in his initial definitions and descriptions, 
discussing the aforementioned notions of “creative renunciation” as well as the 
imitation of Christ.  Palaver states that the key to overcoming mimetic rivalry is to 
“walk as Christ walked,” which is a form of “non-violent imitation”; Jesus is the 
only example Girard finds of one who does not enter into conflict either with the 
one he imitates or those who imitate him.438  Palaver rightly explains breaking the 
cycle of mimetic rivalry as a radical departure away from, essentially, suicide by 
our need for self-aggrandizement.  Renouncing this is to enter into life—a God-
centered life—and this is the ultimate aim of human desire.  But Palaver’s use of 
the term non-violence may be problematic, and will serve to severely limit what 
positive mimesis may really look like on a practical level. 
For example, Palaver, following Girard, seems to have a romanticized 
view of Jesus’ “non-violence.”  Palaver draws on the example Girard uses of 
“turning the other cheek” from Matthew’s gospel to illustrate one way to imitate 
Jesus and to overcome destructive mimetic rivalry.  Palaver quotes Girard:   
 
 
If you want to put an end to mimetic rivalry, you must surrender 
everything to your rival.  (Italics in the original) This will suffocate 
rivalry at its core.  This is not a matter of political strategy; it is much 
easier and more fundamental.  If the other places outrageous 
demands on you—because he is already under the spell of mimetic 
rivalry—he expects that you play along and attempt to out do him.  
The only way to take the wind out of his sails is to do the exact 
opposite:  Instead of outbidding him, yield to him doubly as 
much…If he strikes you on the left cheek, turn to him your right 
cheek. ”439 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Girard, Things Hidden, 230. 
439 René Girard, Quand ces choses commenceront…Entretiens avec Michel Treguer. 
(Paris: Arléa, 1994) quoted in Palaver, 228. 
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“Turning the other cheek” may indeed look like this.  I will always remember a 
workplace story told to me by a friend who had a colleague “steal” a meeting with 
a prestigious company that he had set up.  Instead of getting angry, my friend put 
together all of the pertinent research and analytical models he had built about the 
said company, and gave them to his colleague.  Instead of trying to get revenge, 
my friend gave his colleague more of his hard work.  This effectively mitigated 
any ongoing conflict that might have arisen.  “Turning the other cheek” can, in 
some cases, look like generosity.   
Walter Wink in The Powers That Be,440 however, points to the danger of 
misinterpreting the notion of turning the other cheek in its usual fashion, and as 
Girard and Palaver interpret it above—an interpretation that can make one, under 
certain conditions, into a shamed doormat.  Understanding the context in which 
Jesus spoke this injunction to turn the other cheek is key to understanding how 
one might develop a notion of positive mimesis.  Wink distinguishes, first, the 
biblical reader’s assumption that the blow to the “right cheek” is a blow with the 
right fist.  But a blow to the cheek would actually need to be done with the left fist.  
This is problematic as the left hand could only be used in ancient Israel for 
unclean tasks (a task performed with the left hand would require ritual ablution 
for ten days—no small matter.)  Thus, the only feasible blow Jesus can be talking 
about is a backhand.   
As Wink continues, backhand blows were blows to humiliate and degrade. 
Romans, for example, backhanded Jews, and Masters slaves.  As one in Jesus’ 
audience, it is likely that one was used to being degraded.  The injunction here, 
though, is not that the degraded give twice as much and then open up to receive 
another blow (as Girard’s interpretation would have it).  Rather, the injunction is 
to turn the other cheek so that a right backhanded blow would be impossible.  
“By turning the cheek, the ‘inferior’ is saying:  “I’m a human being, just like you.  I 
refuse to be humiliated any longer.”441 
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Jesus’ injunction to turn the other cheek is therefore Rosa Park’s refusal to 
give up her seat on the bus.  It is very different from if Parks had just given up her 
seat and walked home.  Any other action would have likely achieved relatively 
little for black civil rights; and the kind of action that was needed reflected the 
inequalities of the parties involved in the exchange.  This stands well against not 
just the quote by Girard above, but by Girard’s basic premise reiterated by James 
G. Williams in Girardians:  The Colloquium on Violence and Religion, 1990-2010:  
“The true opposition between what is Christian and what is archaic religiosity 
must be defined as an opposition between the sacrifice of oneself and the 
sacrifice of the other.”442  “Turning the other cheek” in the case of Jesus and 
Parks, however, is not an act of sacrificing oneself; it is a bold assertion of one’s 
fundamental right to being.443  In many situations such as those in which 
systemic oppression is occurring, what positive mimesis may indeed look like is 
active resistance to degradation—degradation, which is denial and rejection of 
one’s equal human (and divine) essence.  In the examples of Jesus and Parks, a 
new possibility was opened up for the lives and the essential right to be for 
sinners and African-Americans respectfully.  Non-violence need not mean 
passivity or self-sacrifice; dare I offer that it need not mean anything sacrificial; it 
is rather a “noncooperation with everything humiliating.”444  It may even mean 
action born of authentic self-expression and inner freedom.  Even if the 
circumstances are restrictive, a powerful expression of being is brought forth. 
 The question of what innermost mediation and the imitation of Christ looks 
like, therefore, would seem to depend very intensely on context.  Reducing the 
notion of innermost mediation or positive mimesis to the concept of self-
sacrificing non-violence, as Palaver (and Girard—at least in some writings) has 
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done, seems more an attempt to simply reverse the trend of violence than to 
actually inquire deeply into what a lasting alternative would look like.  If there is 
going to be a peaceful and non-violent human existence, this will need to spring 
from the deep well of humanity’s authentic self.  And the free self-expression 
which positive mimesis requires cannot be contained within Palaver’s 
interpretation. 
We must turn now back to positive mimesis and the problem of 
prescription.  Perhaps the best one can say about positive mimesis is, again, that 
it is spontaneous and free, and it is not ego-driven—it will not come from the 
space of a fragmented self in search of wholeness.  Fragmentation only leads to 
rivalry and the parasitic latching onto “models” to fill one’s own emptiness.  
Positive mimesis, on the other hand, can only come from a space of wholeness 
and presence of being, which almost transcends the possibilities of mimesis 
altogether, and even our known humanity (for if one is truly free, one would no 
longer be interdividual).  Ritualizing positive mimesis therefore seems an 
oxymoron; if positive mimesis is characterized as creative propriety and freedom, 
it cannot by definition be organized.  But in working with the conditions of the 
world as they seem to be, and assuming that mediation is unavoidable, it seems 
best, at least, to find rituals and formulas that align with this kind of positive will, 
in the hope of achieving more skill through the forms.  And yet there is still an 
issue: if positive mimesis varies by context, and can be defined only in the 
abstract, there is no formula at our disposal to latch onto.  This can be frightening 
as it puts the responsibility for cultivating skill squarely on each and every 
individual person’s lap. 
More models are necessary, then, to teach what this kind of freedom and 
spontaneity looks like, and how one might reorient one’s perspective.  These 
models can come from the wide range of figures in human history, and Girard 
does admit that a few rare individuals have accessed it; it would serve well to 
bring these models into a future Girardian study.  Here and now, however, it is at 
least possible to offer some Hebrew examples of positive mimesis to supplement 
Girard’s example of Jesus.   
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First, I bring forth Jacob and the Birkhat ha-Banim as a model for positive 
mimesis.  It was not in the purview of this dissertation to discuss the comedic 
aspects of our texts (all three of which contain strong elements of irony and 
comedy), but it is important to remark here how Jacob performs the blessing of 
his grandchildren in a comical, free and playful manner.  If we recall, Joseph tried 
to line his children up to receive the “right” blessings.  Jacob, nonetheless, 
humorously (as least for the reader if not for Joseph) reversed his arms and 
blessed Ephraim and Manasseh just as he wanted.  Jacob knew exactly what he 
was doing and as such provided us with a groundbreaking new perspective:  
blessings are merely a distraction from the deeper need for affirmation.  All 
children are entitled to acknowledgement of purpose, protection and a future.  
Jacob’s blessing was a spontaneous gesture of abundance and love.  That there 
was no conflict has been discussed in detailed fashion in terms of Ephraim and 
Manasseh’s response to their “unequal” blessings; but that there was no conflict 
also says a lot about how Jacob blessed.  Jacob’s blessing was the impromptu 
generation of positive mimesis.   
The second example of positive mimesis brought forth from this study is 
the immediate, anti-sacrificial, even anti-ritual, and also comical contagion of the 
Ninevites.  In this second comical episode, (in which even the animals are 
dressed for mourning), we again detect the kind of spontaneity and freedom we 
saw in Jacob.  The Ninevites do not strategize for forgiveness; they do not 
negotiate their fate.  They do not look for substitutes to take the blame.  They just 
surrender.  It seems so simple.  The extreme demonstration of their surrender, 
however, is blatantly anti-sacrificial and it may also look absurd.  They are 
atypical in their response, just as Jacob’s crossing his arms is free of Joseph’s 
limited perspective.   
These two examples, in their expressions of freedom, community, 
spontaneity, affirmation, and even silliness, illustrate that perhaps the search for 
positive mimesis has the potential to be disassociated from the very dramatic 
intensity often linked to salvation.  There is no sacrifice in the Birkhat ha-Banim.  
There is no sacrifice in Nineveh.  I offer that these rituals might even call into 
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question Girard’s foundational idea that religion is grounded in violence.  Despite 
the history of sibling conflict that comes previous to the narrative of the Birkhat 
ha-Banim, or the sinful past of Nineveh, I find no violence in these examples.  Of 
course we may encounter the problem of reification of our examples of positive 
mimesis into ritual form, rendering the creative energy of the initial events void.  
But I offer that, in Judaism, the emphasis must stay off of the ritual itself, and stay 
instead on the living act of reading the Torah.  If Girard’s positive mimesis stems 
from brothers “in” Christ, the Jewish version is of a community “through” Torah.  
Torah, as I hope I have shown, provides traditional vaccines to immunize against 
violence; it includes practical prescriptions to help alleviate mimetic crises; and it 
moreover mediates the reader’s desire to align with the freedom and mystery of 
the divine. 
With this in mind, I propose that the new nation of Israel that emerges in 
the book of Exodus is founded not upon the blood, but upon the peace of 
Ephraim and Manasseh—a peace that is generated from the freedom and 
creativity of Jacob, who inspires a new way to authentically, and generously, 
bless.   Perhaps can find hope in what Girard has called innermost mediation, 
and the human possibility of creating a peaceful and positive mimetic contagion.  
Given the humor of our examples, it is even possible that the way of positive 
mimesis might be fun.	  	   	  
	   253	  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion:   
Vaccinations from the Torah:  Building Immunity to Habitual 
Violence and Founding a New Order of Peace 
 
We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them. 
--Albert Einstein 
 
We have an atonement equivalent to it, and that is acts of loving-kindness. 
--R. Yohanan ben Zakkai 
 
Julian Assange, the infamous founder of WikiLeaks, once said, “You have to start 
with the truth. The truth is the only way that we can get anywhere. Because any 
decision-making that is based upon lies or ignorance can't lead to a good 
conclusion.”  This statement has many levels of relevance for the current project.  
On one level, it must be admitted that it is true the sacrificial has an uncanny 
draw for humanity.  Humanity lives under a veil of ignorance, pulled as if by 
gravity to the violent mechanisms of blame, mimetic rivalry and scapegoating, 
with barely a hint of awareness (if any) of one’s participation in perpetuating the 
cycle.  Humanity lives under an umbrella of delusion and wonders why the world 
is just so.  In addition, it seems from our examples that even if one sees through 
the veil, backsliding into violence is almost inevitable.  We have seen this 
regression into the romantic lie continuously:  the Tanakh itself provides 
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characters that illustrate this habitual relapse; many of our rabbinic 
commentators, revelation at their fingertips, have failed to break free; and some 
of our modern scholars have also demonstrated their sacrificial hermeneutics.445  
The sacrificial may oddly feel comforting for its familiarity; it may even occur that 
“good” violence is easier, quicker and preferable to the alternative.  But as our 
sailors of Jonah illustrate:  the satanic cycle of sacrifice is paved with good 
intentions.  Violence breeds more violence, and giving in to the cycle casts out 
the divine.  The truth here is that we are truly suckers for the sacrificial.  While we 
have received both Judaic and Christian revelations of its operations (and the 
revelations of other religions and sources of wisdom), our structures of thought 
have been deeply enculturated in blame. 
 On another level, the truth is that humanity has been given antidotes to 
sacrificial violence.  While the Christian revelation has been lauded as the 
clearest of these revelations, I hope I have demonstrated in this dissertation that 
the revelations of the Tanakh are equally lucid, efficacious and moreover 
practical.  The Tanakh has spoken from the voice of the victim; it has also 
provided a witness to how persecution operates, specific directives for what can 
be done about it (sometimes one must take one’s enemy seriously),446 and a 
frank message about the responsibility each person will have to bear for 
transformation.  Another truth is:  we will not be able to get to a good conclusion 
or happy ending unless we hear the texts and alter how we think and behave.  
How we hear the texts is decisive, and we must remain aware of the contexts we 
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bring to them.  Hearing the text entails distinguishing when the text itself reverts 
into the sacrificial, and noticing that we have likely done the same.447 
 The three vaccines examined in this dissertation are therefore crucial to 
waking up out of the satanic romance (at least for Jews, but many of the 
prescriptions, e.g. fasting, communal effort, are widely applicable.)  Humanity will 
need to garner the confidence to hear the truth of violence and do the hard work 
entailed to pull out of the vicious cycle.   
That humanity is absolutely capable of pulling out of this vicious cycle on 
its own seems clear from the Tanakh.  There are a plethora of examples for 
reconciliation moving from gradual transformation (e.g. Jonah; also Jacob and 
Esau) to instant transformation (e.g. the Ninevites) to already transformed (e.g. 
Ephraim and Manasseh.)   Jewish boys are vaccinated weekly as Ephraim and 
Manasseh to experience the wholeness and presence of truly being blessed in 
peace and dignity.  At the same time, the one enacting the blessing is called, 
according to our interpretation, to embody the creativity and freedom of Jacob.  
One has a heightened connection to the divine on the Sabbath; the Sabbath 
shekinah is humanity’s access to being in the image of God.  The commandment 
to follow the Sabbath is also a deterrent for negative mimesis:  it is a commanded 
rest from the creative work of the yetzer ha-ra.  The Sabbath is a day of peace. 
But the “peace vaccine” of the Birkhat ha-Banim is not an instant cure, and 
humanity must still figure out how to embody all that Jacob and the sibling pair 
represent during the rest of the week.  Rabbinic and other commentators, 
regressing into the sacrificial, ascribe a necessary death to effectuate humanity’s 
transformation through the figure of Ephraim, the Messiah ben Joseph, whose 
death is the vanquishing of the yetzer ha-ra.  Rather than scapegoating this part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 It is my view that both the Tanakh and the New Testament provide examples for this 
kind of regression.  We have provided in this dissertation some examples of the Tanakh 
reversion, particularly in the sailors of Jonah, as well as in Jonah himself.  Regarding the New 
Testament, Jesus’ words from the cross (originally from Psalm 22.1), “My God, my God, why hast 
thou forsaken me?” seems a parallel to Jonah’s words from the whale that blame God for that 
which only Jonah was responsible.  There are many possible explanation of this, but the point 
seems worthy of consideration. 
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of the self, however, the Tanakh seems clear in its more subtle, simple, and 
affirming Sabbath prescription.  In Jacob’s imitation of divine freedom and 
creativity, all siblings become the blessed.  Jacob’s positive mimesis is 
contagious; each child he blesses is then able to be whole, free, and full of 
unique purpose.  Every week children are affirmed in this way on the Sabbath, 
even if the world at large remains enmeshed in rivalry. 
The truth of the Book of Esther shocks the reader into this realization 
about the immutable violence of the world.  The Book of Esther reveals in not so 
subtle fashion that the mechanism requiring “good” violence is continually 
operative despite the redemption of the victim; and the primary ritual of Purim to 
hear the reading of the Megillah is the command to hear our utter entrapment.  
Purim commands that we emerge out of the mimetic crisis, too, but through 
reading, not bloodshed.  As with the Birkhat ha-Banim, a history of interpretation 
of Purim has caused exegesis and rituals to arise that have misinterpreted the 
text inside sacrificial hermeneutics.  But the book is a mirror for sudden 
awakening; its violence and unsavoriness is a shock tactic to wake us up.  The 
Purim vaccine is a yearly mega-dose of violence.  As we listen we are assaulted 
with its violence.  And while Jews celebrate their escape from imminent death, 
the means by which this escape is accomplished may rightly make one ill.  The 
stark reality of the immutable Persian law is the spiritual hopeful’s exile in a 
violent world.  And so we come back to this truth:  violence is real and rampant, 
and may indeed come after us.  Whether one is a victim or a persecutor, one is 
trapped in its hold.  As long as binary, sacrificial thinking gives humanity its 
blueprint for being and acting in the world, persecutors and victims will always 
arise.  In addition, when the operating power is itself sacrificial, one may have to 
use the force of violence against itself and alter its course, just to stay alive.  
Purim, if we do not see its revelatory aspect, is merely a celebration of sacrificial 
religion, and not a celebration of God. 
The Book of Jonah and the holy day of Yom Kippur is the flipside of 
Esther, and is a stark and direct challenge to enter face-to-face with one’s own 
	   257	  
conditioning, attachment to, and complacency in habitual violence.  The book 
says humans are capable of transforming on a dime, but also explores the reality 
of humanity’s stubborn resistance and regression that sustains our “comfortable” 
status quo.   One reads the book of Jonah when hungry from fasting, the 
question arising:  will one return to one’s old way of being, slaves to our base 
desires?  Or will one return to an existence that is inclusive, generous, merciful, 
and in deep communication and reciprocity with the other?  The book is the 
shofar’s wake-up call; life or death is for our choosing.  This third vaccine against 
mimetic desire injects the Jew on Yom Kippur with the physical and spiritual 
discomfort of Jonah’s sacrificial imprisonment, and it offers the possibility of 
release.  
While the behavior of Jonah may vaccinate the reader against mimetic 
tendencies, the Ninevites’ repentance presents a second peace vaccine.  Like 
Jacob, the Ninevites’ response to Jonah’s prophecy contains no resistance; it is a 
free outpouring of surrender, an embracing of life, and an absolute renunciation 
of violence.  Dressing their animals in sackcloth is the Ninevites’ declaration of 
their anti-sacrificial stand.  They are the model presented to the Jewish 
community in the midst of crisis, in the hope that this same life-giving freedom 
might be emulated. 
Some of our vaccines, then, contain a little bit of the poison in them—this 
is how they build up our immunity.  Certainly being exposed to Jonah’s sacrificial 
mentality, and the ritualized scapegoating of Esther, may deter the readers of 
these texts from their violence.  Sometimes people get sick after a vaccine, 
though, because even a tiny dose of the virus is powerful.  In this vein, the 
vaccine of Jonah has also been interpreted through sacrificial hermeneutics that 
justify Jonah’s inclination for self-preservation (and the preservation of Israel), 
even if it must be done through retributive or scapegoating violence.  As I will 
discuss in more detail below (in the Afterword), these types of exegeses are 
interpretive techniques to make suffering in history meaningful for Jews, and to 
find ways to ensure survival.  The importance of hearing the voice of those who 
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have been persecuted due to scapegoating violence is integral to humanity’s 
healing.  These particularist trends in exegesis have also been used to illustrate 
the unique self-perceived status of certain Jewish groups in history (e.g. the 
Qumran community, or sometimes Jews in general under the designation 
“chosen.”)  Jewish groups have often fallen into a hermeneutic focused on their 
existence as an intentional community of a new order—a community of holiness-- 
that may not need to be infinitely “of the world”, even if it is still lived “in the 
world.”  Scapegoating the world, however, is still under the influence of the 
sacrificial disease and denies one’s interdependence with the whole of creation.  
All the world’s children are already blessed—all of them.  As James G. Williams 
brilliantly notes, Jacob returns his blessing to Esau at their reunion in Genesis 33 
because he realizes he no longer needs it.  He has become whole in wrestling 
with God.  The blessing was merely an object of distraction from the real problem 
of Jacob’s perceived insufficiency. 
One cannot sacrifice even the yetzer ha-ra, then, as it is what 
fundamentally makes us human (as Girard also declares of mimetic desire).  
Martha Reineke, drawing on Rebecca Adams’ work, has noted the inherent 
problematic in Girard’s theory which leaves many of his followers desperately 
craving a “Girardian” solution to violent mimesis: 
 
As Adams perspicaciously notes in her essay on loving mimesis 
(2000), Girard’s mimetic framework seems split between an 
anthropology that documents “bad desire” in humans and a 
theology that establishes “good desire” in God.  However, Girard’s 
bifurcation of the processes of mimetic desire into two distinct 
arenas—human life and God’s life—risks scapegoating everything 
human:  one imitates Christ and shares in nonviolent love only by 
(still quoting Adams) “renouncing or expelling a fundamentally 
violent human nature/culture.”448 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Martha Reineke, “Toward a Creative and Loving Mimesis:  Insights in Winnicott for 
Girard,” Contagion:  Journal of Violence, Mimesis and Culture, Issue 14, 2007, 79-95, accessed 
July 27, 2013, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ctn/summary/v014/14.1reineke.html. 
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I aver, agreeing with Reineke (and Adams), that Girard, on one hand, leads us to 
believe that there is no way out of our mimetic violence short of the death of this 
troublesome part of human nature.  Girard consistently states that humankind, 
though in possession of the knowledge of mimesis and scapegoating, will resist 
transforming itself—even questioning whether humanity has the ability to 
transform itself.  But Girard has also acknowledged that there is the possibility of 
transformation through what he has called variously creative renunciation, 
positive mimesis, innermost mimesis, et. al.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, there is thus a way out of the sacrificial cycle in Girard’s work itself, and 
the possibility exists in human nature itself.  At worst, a part of human nature may 
need to be sacrificed, that is, the yetzer ha-ra.  But as the Jew is shielded from 
the workings of the yetzer ha-ra on the Sabbath, and is given something of a 
divine “boost”, Girard also acknowledges, it seems, that there is something 
accessible within human nature that can transform mimesis into a positive.   
As a less dramatic alternative to scapegoating human nature, then, and as 
I have outlined in the previous chapter, one can learn to exert control over the 
yetzer ha-ra in the world through the prescriptions and vaccines that have been 
given, while also redesigning oneself according to the examples of anti-sacrificial 
structures for thinking and being.  The journey out of violence will involve the 
whole human—how one thinks, how one acts, and who one is.  The ritual 
complements to our texts reinforce the intended transformation into our new 
existence, and the emphasis on reading, studying and hearing Torah cannot be 
overemphasized in this effort.  As Walter Breuggemann writes, “I shall insist, as 
consistently as I can, that the God of Old Testament theology as such lives in, 
with, and under the rhetorical enterprise of this text, and nowhere else in any 
other way.”449  The rabbinic injunction to “Get thee to the schoolhouse!” is thus a 
Jewish mantra.  The Jew sees the face of God inscribed in the words of Torah—
the text itself is the encounter.  The text is thus both a reading of us, and a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament:  Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy 
(Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 1997), 66. 
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reading of the divine; access to sacred liminality is in engagement (and 
sometimes wrestling) with the text.   
How one reads and hears the text therefore determines one’s openness to 
God and one’s relationship to the divine.  In this light, one can certainly read the 
Tanakh as a sacrificial text.  This has been humankind’s prevalent and automatic 
way of reading.  But what I hope I have shown in this dissertation is that it is 
possible to have a “Girardian Judaism” – an approach to the texts and liturgy of 
Judaism that fully and effectively reveals the habitual mechanisms of violence 
that stand in the way of humanity’s transformation, and that distort humanity’s 
understanding of the sacred.  I hope I have also shown that a Girardian Judaism 
distinguishes a real and practical “medical” regime for controlling violence and 
aggressive tendencies.  Third, I hope to have accomplished that a Girardian 
Jewish reading distinguishes the Jewish community as one living “in” Torah; the 
Torah commands Jews to strive and to live in the divine image of freedom, 
creativity, abundance, generosity and holiness.  And Jews are to make this 
holiness contagious. 
Perhaps only one question remains:  if Girard has been shown to be a 
valuable lens for interpreting the Hebrew texts and ritual practices, how might 
Judaism add value to Girard?  There are indeed some lingering areas of 
incongruity of the Hebrew revelation with Girard that should now be addressed.  
In moving toward the creation of a sincere “Hebraicized” version of Girard—i.e., a 
“Jewish Girardianism” as opposed to a “Girardian Judaism”—I will take a moment 
in the following chapter to present these lingering obstacles as food for further 
research and thought. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
Towards a Hebraicizing of Girard’s Theory 
 
We cannot despair of humanity, since we ourselves are human beings. 
       --Albert Einstein 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation on the primary works of Rene Girard, one 
deficiency of Girard’s work and correlative secondary sources was brought forth 
as an area that needed to be addressed.  This primary deficiency could be 
articulated as follows:  though Girard gives fair acknowledgement to the Hebrew 
scriptures, the final interpretive theology he endorses is a Christian one that sees 
the Hebrew revelation as fundamentally incomplete.  While Girard’s alignment of 
mimetic theory and scapegoating with his religious belief is helpful in its strength 
of position, this choice necessarily brackets out possibilities for his mimetic 
theory that do not align with his Christian point of view.  Further, in Girard’s 
providing the blessing to only one sibling, we have seen the disaster that results.  
Judaism and Christianity are as Ephraim and Manasseh, and both of them are 
whole and complete in their own way.  But can Girard’s theory be extracted from 
his Christian ideology?  If so, what might a Jewish theology, or even 
anthropology, do with Girard’s thought?    
This dissertation was first and foremost, then, an effort to determine if Girard’s 
notions of mimetic desire and scapegoating were ideas that Hebrew scriptures 
and ritual could be said to “reveal” and address.  In order to achieve this, Hebrew 
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sacred texts and their rituals, supplemented by rabbinic interpretations of those 
texts and rituals, were brought into conversation with Girard’s theories, to see 
what kind of compatibility, or perhaps incongruity, would result.  In this process, I 
used Girard as my hermeneutic, assuming a basic soundness of his theory.  I 
placed the lens of Girard’s ideas over the Hebrew texts being examined.  The 
more I researched, wrote, and discussed this project, however, the more the 
Hebrew texts and liturgy seemed to scream these Girardian ideas aloud all on 
their own.  There was, indeed, a profound resonance, and I hope I have shown 
that these resonances are beyond denial.  In the end, three Jewish texts and 
rituals were determined to be “vaccines” for mimetic desire, opening up a 
pathway to view the Hebrew text as a full exposition of Girard’s theory, in 
contrast to Girard’s claim of its incompletion.  A type of “Girardian Judaism” has 
been accomplished. 
 Now the task is to address how Judaism can express itself through Girard.  
What would a “Jewish Girardianism” look like?  What obstacles and challenges 
emerge that would prevent Girard from being compatible with Judaism?  What 
would prevent Jews from adopting Girard’s theory?  I may admit here that the 
major content of this dissertation was constructed to show how the Hebrew 
Scriptures revealed the human phenomenon of mimetic desire and 
scapegoating, and to show the usefulness of the Hebrew Scriptures for Girardian 
studies and vice versa; thus, little was presented to the contrary.  I will move on 
now to elaborate on some of the deeper points of dispute in bringing Girard and 
Judaism together, and how they may be resolved.  The usefulness of Girard and 
Judaism for each other is noteworthy, thus these deeper crash points are 
necessary to acknowledge if we are to ascend above any mimetic competition for 
truth. 
The issues at stake in bringing Girard and Judaism together and creating 
what I call a “Hebraicizing” of Girard’s theory are as follows.  The first issue 
addresses the Girardian assertion of the absolute certainty of who the victim is, 
and that they are innocent.  The second issue pertains to the gap Girard presents 
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between violent humanity and a completely non-violent God. (That is, how do we 
get “there” from “here”?  And how can we be certain of God’s nature?)  The third 
issue is whether one can reconcile particularistic interpretations of the Hebrew 
Scriptures with the universal revelation of mimetic rivalry without diminishing the 
importance of the Jewish emphasis on experience, identity and history.  I will 
address these issues one by one.  In the end, I believe both the Jewish and the 
Girardian perspectives will be enriched for being put in dialogue with each other.   
 
Issue #1:  The Ambiguity of the Victim and Jewish Openings for 
Transformation 
 
With great caution I include this question about the innocence of victims in the 
scapegoating process, and whether the innocence of the victim is absolutely 
necessary for the disclosure of mimetic violence.  This question gets to the heart 
of a deep tension between Judaism and Christianity, which has influence upon 
how Jewish readers will hear Girard’s ideas. 
The New Testament, of course, has a very strong claim regarding the 
innocence of Jesus—a claim that is central dogma for the Christian faith.  This 
claim of innocence, in the context of the history of the church, is traditionally 
necessary for Christ to operate theologically for the expiation of the sins of 
humanity.  For Girard, Christ’s innocence is not related to a need to expiate guilt, 
nor for propitiatory purposes, but to portray with absolute certainty that the 
scapegoating performed was, indeed, the murder of an innocent being and, 
moreover, of God Himself.  Girard asserts:  “A non-violent deity can only signal 
his existence to mankind by having himself driven out by violence—by 
demonstrating that he is not able to establish himself in the Kingdom of 
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Violence.”450  Girard is quite clear in confessing his Christian position, and in 
affirming the revelation of a non-violent and sinless God through Jesus. 
In line with this theological position of the uniqueness of Jesus, Girard is 
able to support his open preference for the New Testament revelation.  Jesus’ 
innocence is declared in the New Testament narratives, and this innocence 
supports Girard’s assertion that the New Testament is the superlative revelation 
of the scapegoat mechanism.  Girard states: 
 
Something happens that begins in the Old Testament. There are 
many stories that reverse this scapegoat process. In the story of 
Cain and Abel, the story of Joseph, the book of Job, and many of 
the psalms, the persecuting community is pictured as guilty and the 
victim is innocent. But Christ, the son of God, is the ultimate 
“scapegoat”—precisely because he is the son of God, and since he 
is innocent, he exposes all the myths of scapegoating and shows 
that the victims were innocent and the communities guilty.451 
 
 
Following Christ’s unique innocence, Girard notes the existential guilt of 
humankind:  “If Christ alone is innocent, then Adam is not the only one to be 
guilty.  All men share in this archetypal state of blame, but only to the extent that 
the chance of becoming free has been offered to them and they have let it slip 
away.”452  Girard’s anthropology is undeniable in its assertion of a tainted human 
nature—humankind is guilty of original sin as an existential state.  This original 
sin, for Girard, becomes actual “when knowledge about violence is placed at 
humanity’s disposition.”453  In other words, it seems one’s sin is original in the 
sense of potential; and once one has received the revelation of Christ, one’s sin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Girard, Things Hidden, 219. 
451 Rene Girard, interview by Brian McDonald, Touchstone: A Journal of Mere 
Christianity, 2013, http://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=16-10-040-
i#ixzz2dYzy9Z5L. 
452 Girard, Things Hidden, 223. 
453 Ibid. 
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becomes materialized if one does not ingest the revelation and follow the correct 
path. 
There are several issues with Girard’s professions for the Hebraicizing of 
his theory, which is admittedly articulated from the position of a faith other than 
Judaism.  Girard, as a Christian, is advocating Jesus’ innocence as an existential 
condition, which is of course appropriate within his belief system (and indeed 
necessary.)  Layers of Catholic dogma were generated in order to ensure that 
Jesus’ condition as sinless could not be put into doubt.  Girard expands on this 
dogma with his own interest: 
 
Saying that Christ is God, born of God, and saying that he has 
been conceived without sin is stating over and again that he is 
completely alien to the world of violence within which humankind 
has been imprisoned every since the foundation of the world:  that 
is to say, ever since Adam.454 
 
This faith position is clear and informs Girard’s evaluation of texts; his faith in an 
utterly non-violent God impels Girard to discredit texts that seem to impute any 
degree of violence to the deity.  As Christ was also man, there is the additional 
challenge to Judaism to meet Christianity with a similarly “innocent” victim.  
Judaism’s anthropology does not allow for this, though,455 and while Girard does 
acknowledge the reversal of the scapegoat mechanism in the Hebrew texts, the 
inability of the Hebrew Bible characters to be “innocent” in the same existential 
fashion as Jesus, is purported by Girard to diminish the Hebrew narrative’s 
revelatory effectiveness. 
 The innocence of the victim in the way that the Christian understands 
Jesus’ innocence will always be an obstacle for Judaism.  This is not necessarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Ibid. 
455 There are many different positions regarding the human condition in Judaism, but 
generally there is agreement that humans are prone to sin.  Try as they might, humans are prone 
to “miss the mark.” 
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an obstacle for “Girardianism,” though, as the absolute innocence of the victim is 
not after all required to reveal the structure of violence.  Girard himself asserts:  
“It matters little, in effect, who the victim is, provided that there is one.”456  
Therefore the Hebrew Bible narratives, for Girard, do sustain their worth as 
revelations for the victimage mechanism.  But the Hebraic revelation is different 
in its anthropological ambiguity.  This has a bearing on how Girard’s theory 
needs to be nuanced if it is to be applicable to Judaism without prejudice. 
What would be helpful to make Girard applicable (and palatable) within 
Jewish thought is to recognize the phenomenon of scapegoating in a solely 
structural light-- a light that is distinct from Girard’s own professions of faith.  
Scapegoating must not be understood through the idea of Jesus as free of sin, 
but structurally-- as placing undue blame upon a victim that is in complete 
disproportion to what, in the end, the victim may or may not have done.  This can 
be corroborated in Girard’s own words:  
 
The biblical and Christian power of understanding phenomena of 
victimization comes to light in the modern meaning of certain 
expressions such as "scapegoat."  A "scapegoat" is initially the 
victim in the Israelite ritual that was celebrated during a great 
ceremony of atonement (Lev. 16.21)…The ritual consisted of 
driving into the wilderness a goat on which all the sins of Israel had 
been laid.  The high priest placed his hands on the head of the 
goat, and this act was supposed to transfer onto the animal 
everything likely to poison relations between members of the 
community.  The effectiveness of the ritual was the idea that the 
sins were expelled with the goat and then the community was rid of 
them...This ritual of expulsion is similar to that of the pharmakos in 
Greece, but it is much less sinister because the victim is never a 
human being.  When an animal is chosen, the injustice seems less, 
or even nonexistent.  This is no doubt why the scapegoat ritual 
doesn't move us to the same repugnance as the "miraculous" 
stoning instigated by Apollonius of Tyana.  But the principle of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Ibid., 142.  And I would like to state the nuance here added by Ann W. Astell:  “But the 
victim is always relatively innocent for Girard, in the sense that s/he is singled out to bear the 
responsibility for the community’s division.”  Astell, author’s dissertation defense (December 20, 
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transference is no less exactly the same.  In a distant period when 
the ritual was effective as ritual, the transfer of the community's 
transgressions onto the goat must have been facilitated by the bad 
reputation of this animal, by its nauseating odor and its aggressive 
sexual drive.457 
 
Scapegoating, even for Girard, does not therefore require the innocence of the 
victim as a condition, but reveals a mechanism of unjustified blame (i.e., the 
animal was not “guilty”) as a way to mitigate violence.  This structure is also an 
aetiology for the origin and continuation of mitigating violence.  Certainly the 
history of the Jewish people as well as the Hebrew Scriptures can fit readily into 
this framework, and early sacrificial practices were even based on it.458   
When viewed in this light, the power of the mechanism as revealed in the 
Tanakh is enabled full expression and full revelatory power.  This expression 
enables the Book of Esther, as we have discussed, to list a series of persecution 
texts, and a series of victims and persecutors.  It allows expulsions and murders 
in Genesis to be viewed through this idea of victimage.  It allows other texts, too, 
in particular the Exodus from Egypt, to elucidate how (and even why (i.e., they 
were too fertile, mirroring the “aggressive sexual drive” of the goat)) Jews were 
entrenched in a mimetic conflict and ultimately expelled.  Further, as Girard 
asserts, these texts speak from the perspective of the victim.  Whether the 
victims were “innocent” or not, they were human, and they were unjustly accused 
and violated.459 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 Girard, I See Satan, 155. 
458 In the Temple periods of Judaism, religious ritual made explicit notes about the 
innocence of the sacrificial victim, e.g. they must be “without blemish,” referring to animal 
substitutions to atone for human sin.  After the destruction of the Second Temple, these sacrifices 
were no longer practiced, though even before the destruction there was a movement towards the 
spiritualization of sacrifice—substituting the reading of the Torah for the sacrificial rituals.  See 
Fisbane, “Aspects of the Transformation of Sacrifice in Judaism.” 
459 From the perspective of a Jew, Jesus would have been of the same disposition and 
living within the same human condition as the scapegoats, Jewish or otherwise, just described.  
Any Jew who subscribes to the basic Jewish belief system, would not hold that Jesus was 
existentially any different.  Without the theological underpinning of Jesus as the Son of God, and 
Jesus’ existential (even pre-existential) innocence, the scapegoating of Jesus would have no 
more or less merit as a revelation than the scapegoating incidents of the Hebrew Bible.  Richard 
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This structural definition would, in addition, lend the Jewish community an 
appropriate lens through which to examine the atrocities of history.  Scholar 
David Biale has written a wonderful work in this vein named Blood and Belief, 
which addresses how Jews were, (in my words), ritually prepared for their 
scapegoating throughout different eras in history.460  Biale brings to light the 
ironic conception that the Jews, as a minority and underrepresented group in 
almost every country in the world, get endowed with an inexplicable and intense 
kind of power.  This power was seen in many cases as an almost vampiric 
aggression.  Like the goat with the aggressive sexual drive or nasty odor, the 
Jews are, in this way, set up to receive blame and its ensuing violence.  This 
creation of the Jews as a potent and threatening “Other” is what creates the Jews 
over and over as a scapegoated community—setting them up for undue blame to 
be cast. 
 In this light, scapegoating has nothing to do with communal or individual 
innocence.461  If Girard’s theory is to be palatable to Jews and with the Hebrew 
Scriptures, it ultimately must stick to a theology-free structure.  In terms of Jewish 
anthropology, ambiguities abound:  Jonah the prophet is obstinate; Mordecai is 
defiant; Esther is (perhaps) manipulative.  The character of Job is one of the few 
in the Tanakh who is described as tamim -- giving the sense of being whole, 
perfect or complete -- perhaps implying one free of sin.  Even in Job, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Landes of Boston University, for example, “takes issue with Girard‘s claim that Jesus was 
innocent. He writes that Girard uses the term Christ–not Jesus –and is working with the myth of 
the Christ rather than the real person of Jesus, who was not innocent at all in the eyes of those in 
power at the time.”  Landes continues that “the Romans viewed him as a dangerous division 
maker, a disturber of the pax romana, whose peace the Romans nailed down, literally, with 
crucifixion.”  Quoted in Teresa Ann Pitts, “Politics as Violence: A Girardian Analysis of Pre-
Genocide Rwandan Politics,” Master’s thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University (Blacksburg, VA: 2011), accessed September 6, 2013, 
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05102011153938/unrestricted/ 
PITTS_TA_T_2011.pdf.   
460 David Biale,  Blood and Belief: The Circulation of a Symbol between Jews and 
Christians (Berkeley: University of California, 2007). 
461 While James G. Williams provides an excellent analysis of the narratives of the 
Tanakh, he, like Girard and many other Girardians, ultimately advocates for the superiority of 
Jesus as the innocent victim.  See Williams, The Bible, Violence, and the Sacred.  Also, 
Raymund Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats?  Violence and Redemption in the Bible (NY:  
The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000); and Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled:  Humanity at the 
Crossroads (NY:  The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997).
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the reader finds that there was something more he needed to learn by the end of 
the book-- for he repents in dust and ashes.  
Judaism presents an anthropology in which humankind, as divine creation, 
is indeed “good.”  Yet there is the yetzer ha-ra implanted in humans that makes 
them prone to sin.  As individuals and as a community, therefore, a victim need 
not be (and cannot be) divinized to demonstrate an unjust act of violence.  The 
victims are not innocent inasmuch as they are human.  The scapegoats rather 
than being divinized to create a false “pagan” sacred, are instead humanized.  
Thus, for Jews, the revelation of the mechanism is only clear when the violence 
that has been committed comes face-to-face with the flesh and blood humans 
who have been the recipients of that violence.  Emanuel Levinas would indicate 
that it is a genuine face-to-face encounter alone that can elicit an ethic of 
responsibility for the other, and a cessation of violence.  Thus when Abel’s blood 
cries out from the land, it no longer matters what Abel might have done to 
instigate his brother.  We then come face-to-face with Mordecai and all of his 
people who were to be exterminated.  Who would in this context ask if Mordecai 
acted with disrespect?  Nineveh, finally, is saved out of mercy, and not because 
its people were innocent.  The highest holy day of Yom Kippur expects one, 
therefore, to come before God having reconciled with their fellow humans, and 
with one self, first.  One stands before the Ark on this day in synagogue, face-to-
face with God’s word in the Torah that speaks about the phenomenon of 
violence, as well as mercy and loving-kindness.  The Torah, for Jews, is the face 
of the God who cares for all who have been vulnerable in their humanity; 
vulnerability and striving in all covenants is sought, not necessarily innocence.  
And atonement is available and immediate.  Human foibles and sufferings are 
granted forgiveness. 
Sandor Goodhart has pointed out that using Girard as a structure for 
interpretation does not mean one needs to come from a standpoint of a particular 
belief system. 
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Part of the limitation of our own customary perspective on these 
matters may be our thinking that traditional scriptural texts are only 
(or even primarily) scripts for religious practice. It may be that in 
order to understand a thinker like Rene Girard we need to expand 
our conception of both "the religious" and of "religious scripture," 
and recognize the extent to which scriptural writing, like the writing 
we have identified for the past two hundred years in European 
culture as the "literary," participates in the deepest and most 
thorough-going questioning available to us.  Does that mean that in 
order to participate in a Girardian perspective one needs of 
necessity at least to share his reverence for Jewish and Christian 
interpretative readings? Again, not necessarily. Girard has asserted 
that his reading is a “scientific hypothesis.”462 
 
A “scientific hypothesis” means that Girard’s theory, according to Goodhart, may 
definitionaly be a tentative explanation of an observation that can be applied and 
tested.  If Girard’s scapegoating mechanism can be managed within this type of 
discussion, it will go very far within the Jewish community.   
 
Issue #2:  The Ambiguity of the Sacred  
 
One finds in Girard a second obstacle to Hebraicizing his theory, and this is with 
regard to Girard’s conception of the divine.  Girard’s position on Jesus as the Son 
of God provides a view of Girard’s understanding of the divine nature in general, 
which is one of non-violence and love.  Girardian scholar Per Bjornar Grande, for 
example, remarks that, “The Kingdom of God meant a replacement of sacrifice 
and prohibitions by love.”463  And more elaborately, author James Warren, in his 
book Apocalypse or Compassion? explains: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 Sandor Goodhart, "The Self and Other People:  Reading Conflict Resolution and 
Reconciliation with Rene Girard and Emmanuel Levinas," in Journal of Philosophy:  A Cross-
Disciplinary Inquiry, Vol. 7, Issue 16 (Fall 2001), 14-25, Philosophy Documentation Center, 
accessed July 6, 2013, http://www.pdcnet.org. 
463 Per Bjornar Grande, “Girard’s Christology,” accessed September 3, 2013, 
http://www.preachingpeace.org/ documents/Girard_Christology.pdf. 
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But we must bear in mind that while Jesus effected a reconciliation 
of humanity to God, God had no need to be reconciled to us.  The 
rivalry had been all on one side; from God’s side there had always 
been unconditional love.  Jesus’ death and resurrection has given 
us access to that love, as a result of the opening of our hearts in 
response to his infinite forgiveness.  In the place where our envy 
and anger should have been met with reciprocal violence, it 
encountered instead an absolutely unlimited font of compassionate 
forgiveness.464 
 
As expressed in Girard and through the works of those like Grande and Warren 
who write in support of his theory, Jesus was certainly in the world, but not “of the 
world.”  Language here is tricky for, though Jesus was human, he could not, for 
Girard or his followers be “of” the world of violence.  As the divine incarnate, 
Jesus is the bearer and conveyor of deep love toward humanity with no violence 
in him.  The divine Father, for Girard, is also, naturally, this.   
As a result of this theological position, the texts of the Tanakh that convey 
a “mixed message” (if you will) about what “love” might look like are considered 
at best incomplete revelations.  Girard calls these ambiguous Hebrew texts 
‘mixed texts’ or ‘texts in travail.’  For Girard, these terms mean that these texts 
are uncertain about the nonviolent nature of the deity, and they often ascribe 
violence to the divine.  For Girard, any text that connects violence with the 
sacred, or expresses ambivalence about oppressive victimage, is considered 
ambiguous, and therefore an incomplete revelation.465  Quite understandably, 
Girard hesitates to give credence to implications of a “violent” sacred, and he is 
unsatisfied with any ambiguity along these lines.  Even a remotely violent sacred 
would raise an issue for his theory, and also likely to his faith. 
I bring to bear Walter Brueggemann’s hermeneutic for textual exegesis 
here as an analogue, whose resonance with Girard has already been noted by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 James Warren, Compassion or Apocalypse?: A Comprehensible Guide to the 
Thought of Rene Girard (PA:  Christian Alternative Books, 2013). 
465 Michael Kirwan, Girard and Theology (New York, NY: T&T Clark, 2009), 92.  On this 
topic of the ambiguity of the sacred, Kirwan discusses the resonance between Girard and 
Brueggemann, which I will pick up on below. 
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Michael Kirwan in his book Girard and Theology.  Brueggemann’s formula of 
biblical exegesis makes note of two different locations for the sacred:  “in the 
fray” and “above the fray.”  The sacred in the fray is the sacred that is entangled 
in history; this sacred is revealed in the details of the texts, locating revelation 
within the parameters of space and time, using history as its vehicle.  The sacred 
above the fray is less common in the biblical scriptures, but presents a more 
remote impersonal force in operation—the mover behind what is seen, if you 
will—and that which is more a universal principle.  Brueggemann locates the 
highest source of revelation not in the fray or above it, but rather in the tension 
between the two.  One might say Brueggemann locates revelation in the space in 
between “here” and “there.”  He locates revelation in the relationship between the 
nitty-gritty of human life, and the ideal of peace, the Messianic Era, Gan Eden, 
the Kingdom of God, Heaven, and the like.  Therefore, the sacred presence is 
here and now, but also striving.   
Often accused of advocating an “ambiguous” sacred, Brueggemann 
seems to me to exegete in the Jewish spirit that makes integrating Judaism with 
Girard problematic.  Unlike Brueggemann who is able to find the source of 
revelation in the ambiguity, Girard believes this ambiguity to be merely a step in 
the evolutionary process toward the more poignant and certain revelation of the 
New Testament.  In other words, Girard views the sacred as well ‘above the fray’, 
‘other-worldly’, and with ‘no violence in him.’  The desire that Jesus expresses for 
God and only God, and the being he presents to the world as such, is what 
humans, too, are to manifest mimetically.  As I understand it in this paradigm, 
humans are never to become God, though they are to be like God in imitation of 
Jesus’ God-centered desire. 
And yet, the many faces of the Hebrew sacred in the Tanakh may make 
this aspiration tricky.  The Hebrew sacred is partly in complete alignment with 
Girard’s divine-- God is love, forgiveness, mercy, and compassion.  Hesed, or 
loving-kindness is a divine virtue that to be emulated.  But the Hebrew sacred 
expresses hesed in unexpected ways.  This is the sacred that wrestles Jacob, 
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who tempts Job, and who brings Abraham to his emotional limit.  The Hebrew 
God brings one into deep confrontation with one’s self, one’s identity, and one’s 
limited understanding.  This kind of ruthless compassion may indeed be called 
“love” when in the abstract, but on the human court it may not look entirely “non-
violent.”  Perhaps, the Hebrew God may in fact be likened to the person of Jesus.  
The historical person of Jesus was entangled “in the fray” of conflicting 
viewpoints and politics—and various communities vying for power.  In this 
context, the historical Jesus comforted the weak and challenged the strong; 
Jesus’ message was not passive or docile.  And not all would agree that Jesus 
was completely non-violent.  But all the while, these challenges come out of a 
being that was clearly full of caring, love and compassion. 
The Hebrew sacred, then, is an unchanging being yet with the ability to 
redefine itself through the movement of history (compare it, if you will, to 
Troeltsch’s understanding of Christianity, or to the notion of recursion in 
computer science.)  Girard’s focus, contrarily, seems somewhat limited and one-
dimensional in comparison.  It is an alluring perspective to be sure—we all want 
God to be an unchanging ideal of pure love and peace-- but Girard’s view seems 
to deny the many faces of love, and the faces that may reveal themselves inside 
the mess and tensions that life sometimes is.  For Girard, of course, the “mess” 
of this world—and even the purported “order” of this world—are of Satan.  This 
Girardian position thus necessitates a divine that is external and ‘other-worldly’ 
casting out the Hebrew encounter with the divine in history.  But the ability to 
encounter the sacred in history and in the midst of messy relationships and 
searches for identity is essential for harmonizing Girard with Judaism. 
A Hebraicized Girardianism, therefore, must acknowledge the ambiguities 
inherent both in the Hebrew victim and in the sacred.  The Hebrew text presents 
the struggles of humanity learning how to be in relationship with both each other 
and with God.  This is no small task, and may endure for all of human history, 
and I maintain that Girard’s theories are important for humanity (whether we can 
escape the cycle or not) to move forward with greater self-awareness.  Girard’s 
	   274	  
theories of mimesis and the scapegoat mechanism are essential revelations 
through which to understand Hebrew Scriptures, ritual, history, and ourselves.  
But inside of Girard’s structures, there must be some room to wrestle with the 
divine.  Perhaps desire for God is most obvious, in fact, in one’s willingness to 
wrestle with him, challenge him, or even, as Job, demand a response. 
 
Issue #3:  The Challenge of Particularism and the Reality of Anti-Semitism 
 
The third primary challenge to our effort to make Girard functional for the Hebraic 
spirit and belief system is in the tension between particularistic and universalistic 
interpretations of the scriptures.  This has been a point of tension inside of 
Jewish communities themselves.  As Yosef Green states: 
 
Throughout the millennia of its history, Judaism kept in focus its 
particularistic origin and function as well as its universal vision and thrust. 
No interpretation of Judaism that possesses any degree of authenticity 
can fail to recognize and share this recognition and appreciation of a Jew's 
specific group loyalty linked to an attachment to universal values. This 
balance, which is at the very core of Judaism, has nevertheless appeared 
as a stumbling block, if not an outright scandal, to some and a 
contradiction to others. The ineluctable fact is, however, that both 
elements in this balance have survived in Jewish consciousness and 
thought for millennia.466 
 
What is at stake when this issue is cast in the light of Girardian studies is the 
Girardian tendency toward diminution (if not complete disregard) of the specific 
history of the Jewish people in favor of the mechanism Girard distinguishes in 
general.  On the one hand, Girard’s theories are emphatically supportive of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Yosef Green, “Universalism and/or Particularism,” Jewish Bible Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 
1 (2002), accessed September 13, 2013, 
http://jbq.jewishbible.org/assets/Uploads/301/301_green30.pdf.   
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historical and chronic oppression of the Jews (as well as any victimized group) in 
his distinguishing the Hebrew Bible as the first scripture that hears the voice of 
the victim.  But criticisms from the Jewish community as well as others who 
speak from a post-colonial perspective are perturbed by Girard’s absolutism. 
 In I See Satan, Girard calls up the Gospel of John—the oft-accused “anti-
Semitic” gospel-- to elucidate how he views the mechanism to be the crux of the 
gospel writer’s words, and not any kind of anti-Jewish sentiment.  I quote Girard’s 
entire passage: 
 
Our righteous indignation against John’s Gospel has no basis.  
Jesus speaks the truth to his questioners:  they have chosen 
rivalistic desire, and the long-term consequences will be disastrous.  
The fact that these people are Jews is much less important than 
those exegetes who are a little too eager to convict the Gospels of 
anti-Semitism. 
After its mimetic definition of desire, the Gospel of John makes the 
consequence of this desire explicit—satanic murder.  The 
impression that Christian animosity toward the Jews produced this 
text is due to our misunderstandings of its content, so we imagine a 
series of gratuitous insults.  This effect of our ignorance is often 
compounded by a preconceived hostility toward the gospel 
message.  We project our own resentment upon Christianity.467 
 
Girard here is trying to convey the universal, humanistic message of the Gospels 
in his assertion that Jesus, in them, is speaking to all people.  All people have to 
choose whether they will be a “child of God”, meaning one who renounces 
mimetic rivalry and violence, or a “child of the devil,” meaning one who casts out 
violence by violence (Satan with Satan).  In a footnote to this section, Girard also 
indicates:  “This distinction has nothing to do with Christians vs. Jews.”468  
 On one hand, Girard’s interpretation is liberating in its release of the 
Gospels (and, in turn, much of Christianity) from anti-Semitism.  If New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Girard, I See Satan, 42. 
468 Ibid., footnote 3. 
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Testament scriptures have been used to fuel hatred of the Jews, Girard clearly 
indicates “we have already chosen the devil and his mimetic violence.”469  I would 
agree with Girard in asserting that “the devil” has indeed been chosen throughout 
history.  It is possible to agree with Girard and say the onus for this, however, is 
not on the sacred texts, but on human misinterpretation of them.  This would be a 
very refreshing “revelation.” 
 On the other hand, there is a real historical context in which these 
scriptures were written, not to mention real historical situations in which the anti-
Semitism fueled by misunderstanding has manifested itself in human atrocities.  
The crying voice of the victim in the Hebrew Scriptures, for example, is a Jewish 
voice—at least in most cases--that has experienced severe triumphs and trials—
trials that have lasted well beyond the era of the bible.  Girard’s claim against the 
anti-Semitism of John (especially when the revelation of the Tanakh is declared 
as incomplete) is minimizing the particular circumstances of violence done unto 
these people, and the deep emotional anguish of their experience.  The universal 
choice given by Jesus, as Girard understands it, is an important intellectual 
approach to understanding the problem of this violence.  Hearing the voice of 
actual victims, (including those of Jesus and his followers that have been 
persecuted through history), however, provides emotional understanding, which 
is perhaps where real transformation in consciousness can occur.  Girard himself 
declares this to be the decisive difference between the “pagan” sacred and the 
biblical witness:  hearing the voice of the victim.   
In addition to Girard’s transportation of his theories into the framework of 
Christianity (as discussed above), then, I propose that historical oversight is a 
large reason behind why the “Jewish” contribution has been wanting in the 
Girardian circles.  Girard’s emphasis on structure, a kind of “dogma” if you will, 
over history, is in itself (if I could generalize) a seemingly more Christian 
approach to meaning and revelation, and this has enabled a full blossoming of 
elaborations and responses to Girard by faithful Christians.  There is a natural 	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structural resonance between Girard and Christianity.  A paper delivered at this 
year’s Colloquium on Violence and Religion (the academic organization devoted 
to Girard’s thought), however, highlights the importance of particularism, history 
and identity for the Jewish people, over and above anything that might resemble 
a belief system, opening up whether we can find similar Girardian resonance with 
Judaism. 
Newcomer to the organization, for example, is Rabbi Dr. Barbara Thiede 
from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.   Attending this year’s 
colloquium (2013), she voices her own criticisms of Girard’s work in light of her 
scholarly focus on Judaism and the history of anti-Semitism.  In her paper  
"Girardian Scapegoats Twice Over? Nineteenth and Twentieth Century German 
Scholars Lynch the Jews (Again) in Pseudo-Academic Discourse on the First 
Century Alexandrian Pogrom," Dr. Thiede reflected a basic agreement with 
Girard’s elucidation of the scapegoating dynamic within societies, but criticized 
the implication of Girard that scripture was written with the purpose of revealing 
this structure.  Rather, Dr. Thiede contends that the scriptures (in her talk 
specifying the New Testament writings) were written out of a context of mimetic 
rivalry and scapegoating (i.e. between the early Christians and the Jews) rather 
than from an enlightened “revelatory” point of view.  From Thiede’s perspective, 
recognizing the rivalry with and scapegoating of Jews that is happening in and 
underneath the New Testament paints the picture of an oppressive thought 
regime that has been in place for centuries.  For her, the real historic 
phenomenon of the hatred of the Jews – coming face-to-face with this historical 
reality of anti-Semitism—is an essential access point to coming to terms with 
violence.  Taking the scriptures as a universal revelation of mimetic theory and 
scapegoating does have the capacity to undermine real, tragically violent, 
historical phenomena.  The consequence of such a denial is scapegoating those 
already lynched.470 
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John Darr of Boston College, while he believes Girard’s theory a major 
contribution across disciplines, makes a similar criticism of Girard’s analysis of 
the New Testament more generally.  In his article “Mimetic Desire, The Gospels, 
and Early Christianity,” Darr observes that Girard, in his analysis of the Gospels,  
 
fails to place these idiosyncratic documents in their appropriate 
cultural contexts in the late first century….The mimetic rivalry is not 
between the groups and persons in the passion story, but rather 
between rival Jewish sects that survived the catastrophe of the fall 
of Jerusalem and scrambled to re-establish themselves in the wake 
of it.  Christianity—the Christianity that produced the Gospels—was 
one of those Jewish groups; the other was pre-rabbinic Judaism, 
the heirs of the Pharisees.  The object of the mimetic rivalry 
between them was the sacred tradition.  Who is heir to the 
promises?  To whom does the history of revelation, of salvation, 
belong?  Who are now the elect of God?471 
 
Darr continues that the Gospels are “not pristine;” they are “former weapons in 
the struggle for cultural and religious heritage and identity.”472  Indeed, this time 
period is the fertile ground out of which both rabbinic Judaism and Christianity 
sprung; and scholars have made excellent demonstrations of how these two 
religions formed themselves side-by-side in parallel, as opposed to other thought 
models which would have Judaism the “father” of Christianity.  Even within 
Judaism itself, therefore, one can glean from the religious literature of the 
Second Temple period how mimetic rivalry, even internal scapegoating was at 
play.473   
Both Thiede and Darr’s criticisms are noteworthy in this respect and read 
the scriptures through a politically sensitive lens.  The importance of history, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Century Alexandrian Pogrom," (presentation, Colloquium on Violence and Religion, University of 
Northern Iowa, July 11-14, 2013). 
471 John A. Darr, “Mimetic Desire, the Gospels, and Early Christianity: A Response to 
René Girard”, Biblical Interpretation 1, no. 3 (1993), 363. 
472 Ibid., 364. 
473 The Qumran scrolls, for example, make very clear the rivalry between the Essenes 
and both the Sadducees and the Pharisees.  Second Temple Judaism was a period rife with both 
internal and external mimetic conflicts. 
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the significance of real people, Jews or Christians, who have been stereotyped 
and persecuted unjustly are meaningful events.  Who these people are matters.  
And for what reasons they were persecuted, for example, for their religion or 
ethnicity, matters.  In the same vein, Girard has been duly criticized for ignoring 
women’s voices in his analyses.  Cheryl Kirk-Duggan, for example, criticizes 
Girard’s theory for failing to provide an “adequate critique of women as 
protagonists and victims.”474  Kirk-Duggan follows in line with Thiede and Darr: 
she sustains some praise for Girard’s theory, but also asserts its reductionist and 
limited perspective.   
The specific history and struggle for the rights and liberties of any 
oppressed group can easily be undermined by a generic structuralist focus.  For 
example, one could acknowledge one’s own violence and participation in 
systemic oppression, but then what does one or even the world do with this 
revelation?  On one hand, awareness of one’s own participation in violence in 
and of itself is an enormous leap forward.  On the other hand, the imbalance 
created by the violence of our hands has left an enormous emotional scar on 
various groups of people, which also needs to be addressed.  Receiving the 
revelation of the mechanism is one thing; hearing the voice of its victims is 
another.  Can Girard therefore really find a home within the tradition of Jewish 
interpretation that finds solace and identity in a unique history, and a meaningful 
history? 
Fortunately, the Hebrew tendency toward ambiguity and dialectic is helpful 
here.  I refer back to Rabbi Yosef Green who articulates the mainstream Jewish 
position between these nodes as follows: 
 
If Jews believe that the Jewish people play a critical role in human 
history – namely, ushering in the messianic era – then remaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Cheryl A. Kirk-Duggan, “Gender, Violence, and Transformation in The Color Purple”, 
in Curing Violence, eds. Mark Wallace and Theophus H. Smith (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 
1994), 266-86.  
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faithfully Jewish and doing one's best to transmit the Jewish 
heritage to future generations becomes a critical Jewish 
responsibility of cosmic dimensions. Once we accept this premise, 
then Jewish particularity mandates our universal concerns whereby 
we can be identified with all mankind.475  
 
Jews’ self-concern, therefore, is understood to be paradoxically for the sake of 
humankind, which is where Judaism straddles the particularist/universalist fence.  
And both sides of this fence are utterly important for the maintenance and repair 
of human relations. 
 The particularist viewpoint, by necessity, keeps one inside of a binary 
thought pattern, distinguishing an “us” and “them.”  This construction of “us” 
creates boundaries of special love –family or communal structures that are 
intentional, and that provide the most basic avenue for passing on affection, 
sustenance, nurturing and love.  These boundaries are ones that provide safety 
and security as well, and we need these boundaries, too, as Girard would admit, 
to maintain differentiation and order in society.  These aspects of particularism, 
one might say, are at heart of a well-functioning society.476  A family or 
community’s own sense of beloved-ness also gives impetus to care for the 
outsider; it allows for boundaries to be negotiated properly, which might just help 
in the avoidance of violence across borders, so to speak.  Internal harmony is a 
key for producing external, social and relational harmony.  A focus on “us” and a 
healthy sense of identity may naturally open in hospitality to the “other.”  In 
certain cases, the particularist narrative is a way to separate from the “other”, 
especially when there are hostile relations.  Again, particularism enables a sense 
of safety, security, family, and “home.”  It is a platform from which one’s voice 
can be presented to the world, if the world wants to hear.477 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 Green, no page number indicated. 
476 This is an idea brought forth by Marc Gopin in his study of biblical remythicizing in 
Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
477 I note here too, the necessity of healthy boundaries and wholeness for the practice of 
positive mimesis as discussed in chapter 5. 
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The universalistic interpretation, on the other hand, affirms that this 
particularist voice is relevant for all people.  The universalistic interpretation takes 
into account that there is an interdependence of all people, and that violence to 
anyone in the human family is violence done also to us.  The universalistic voice 
not only affirms that security in one’s own identity leads to interdividual or inter-
communal harmony, but even further to the idea that, in the end, “they” are “us.”  
Nineveh was Israel before the covenant with Yahweh.  The child sees in its 
parent’s eyes what it is to become, and the parent sees who they were.  Nineveh 
and Israel, parent and child--- each will have its own narrative, but the universal 
interpretation helps to bridge our socially-constructed alienation, and even, 
maybe, our outright conflict.  The universal therefore emerges out of the 
particular in our ability to hear each other’s particular voices.  The voice of 
Judaism is, indeed one particular voice.  So also is the call of Christianity.  One 
cannot lose the differences between these two histories, traditions, and related 
persons and divinity, when absorbing them into one overarching structure.  I 
maintain that it is out of the encounter between the national or communal and the 
universal—in this liminal state where the “I” realizes the “All”-- that the sacred is 
also revealed. 
Following Victor Turner and others in his vein, I assert that the way of the 
world forces one out of this liminal space – this universal mindset.  Though it is in 
this liminality where one may truly encounter the sacred, liminality can 
unfortunately make negotiating everyday life quite challenging.  Similarly, 
understanding the universal schema of mimesis and scapegoating is essential to 
recognize, but this awareness perhaps does little to help one practically negotiate 
boundaries.  Locating the sacred revelation as absolute, and pinning God down 
with certainty, (even if this God is the one of non-violence and love we truly 
desire), pushes aside a lot of the complexities one finds in the world, and thus 
fails to help us respond to them.  This is why Girard has so much difficulty finding 
the solution to our entrapment in the world in the world.  Girard’s trajectory for the 
world, as he makes clear in Battling to the End, is a linear movement that will 
entail the breakdown of the violent cycle in which we currently exist, and a period 
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of chaos during which we have no structure to replace it.  This, for Girard, will be 
the apocalypse and the beginning of a completely new existence.  Though a full 
exploration of innermost mediation as a solution was explored in chapter five, 
apocalypse is clearly Girard’s projected future for humanity. 
We have seen in this dissertation a certain affinity with this Girardian 
notion of apocalypse, as the apocalyptic is also one trajectory within Judaic 
thought.  Esther cannot escape the cycle of violence, the sailors of Jonah fail in 
the end, and certainly Jonah struggles with any movement toward non-violence.  
Even Ephraim becomes tainted with an overlay of violence to avert the crisis of 
the yetzer ha-ra.  Girard declares in the first sentence of his Foreword to Gil 
Bailie’s Violence Unveiled that we are in a spiritual crisis today (a sentiment he 
expresses in numerous works).478  But are we really spiritually any worse off than 
in the past?  Are we really in a crisis?  It seems Girard is looking to create a crisis 
because of his desire for a change.  But perhaps such drama is not necessary to 
move forward.  Today’s drama would be just one more crisis in a series of crises 
just like the ones we have encountered throughout the Hebrew Bible in this 
dissertation.  Perhaps it is just a perceived crisis, and the remedy is actually in 
our power.  The remedy must be more practical, though, and must integrate our 
small nationalisms into the larger structure that Girard brings to light. 
If one manages to keep Girard’s structure in mind (i.e. the universal 
structure common to all humanity), one can come back into the world of 
particulars, to learn how to negotiate boundaries and reconcile the “us” and the 
“them” differently.  This job is messy.  But certain successes have been 
attained.479  If scapegoating violence is indeed in our awareness, (as Girard 
maintains) and made forbidden, we are in essence forced to reckon with the 
notion of mimesis, and where it is that we, as a person or a nation, lacks being.  
Being may be equated, and often is, with symbols of land, food, identity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled:  Humanity at the Crossroads (NY:  The Crossroad  
Publishing Company, 1995), xi. 
479 One of the most poignant examples is the accomplishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. 
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resources, and other goods.  It may even be equated with a deity.  But these are 
only the objects that deceive us and trap us in mimetic rivalry.  Our own 
particularisms and individual stories must be juxtaposed with others in order to 
find those common expressions and places where we are deficient.  This must 
be a joint effort. 
In the end, I aver that it may not be our own violence that we are most 
afraid of confronting, as Girard asserts.  Perhaps it is our own lack of being of 
which we are most afraid.  Each individual, in the end, may have to reckon with 
this notion; and each nation collectively as well.  The push for individual and 
communal identity is the access point to peeling off the layers of this onion, and 
our Hebrew Scriptures have revealed this process through Jonah’s resistance to 
Nineveh, and Haman and Mordecai’s resistance to each other.  The projected 
future, therefore, may not be a Girardian apocalypse of unleashed violence.  It 
may be each person’s and each nation’s stark confrontation with their own 
emptiness.  Violence is really nothing more than camouflage for this deep fear of 
emptiness.  And no amount of scapegoats will be able to fill this void.  If 
innermost mediation or positive mimesis is ever going to take hold, it is precisely 
this emptiness that we will need to reckon with, too.  Humanity must learn to 
access the deep well of being that is our inheritance.  And what may then happen 
is perhaps nothing more than a humble approach to communicating across 
personal and national boundaries out of the knowledge that we are all in the 
same.  The sacred, according to the Hebrew mind, is within this kind of dialogue. 
Hebrew particularism must be considered, in the end, as of essential 
importance.  It is in the personal, particularistic stories that one begins to learn 
that these stories are all interconnected.  Only by sharing these stories across 
borders might it be realized that the “us” narratives intensely affect the “them” 
narratives, and may even be stories of striking similarity.  But each particularist 
story must be heard and acknowledged; each victim’s narrative needs to be 
played out in order to deal with revelation on an emotional and not just 
intellectual level.  A Hebraicized Girardianism, therefore, must not overlook the 
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victim (and further scapegoat the scapegoated), for the sake of the mechanism.  
It must integrate each voice in reconciliation.  This push for a remedy has been 
put on Girard many times over the past 30 years (by this author here, too), and I 
believe this comes from the need to negotiate and include the voices of those 
who have been the subjects of persecution.  We cannot just acknowledge, for the 
Hebraic spirit and others, that scapegoating is a violent mechanism in which we 
are trapped.  The violent mechanism has caused a lot of pain in the world.  Like 
Dante’s entertaining Inferno, violence just distracts us like a soap opera from a 
very deep yearning to be and be heard.  May we each find and speak our 
authentic voice, and begin to truly listen to each other and heal. 
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